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Executive Summary
The arid lands of the Truckee-Carson basins are in transition: urbanization
is increasing and the agricultural base is declining. Significant amounts of
water are being allocated to the preservation of Indian cultures, endangered
fish and wetlands. The 1990 Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights
Settlement Act (P.L. 101-618), a negotiated settlement confirmed by
Congress, suggests that water use conflicts can be resolved through a
combination of litigation, legislation, voluntary transfers, and consensusbuilding processes. Regulatory property rights were initially asserted to
produce a reallocation foreclosed by the law of prior appropriation but, within
the shadow of litigation, physical solutions and the operation of the market
are producing a new reallocation. However, important parties have not yet
fully bought into this settlement, including irrigated agriculture and the rural
communities of the Truckee-Carson basins.
The Truckee-Carson transition is characterized by creative use of water
transfers, primarily from agriculture, to solve the intense water allocation
conflicts that have arisen between traditional and nontraditional users. A
heretofore relatively powerless minority, an Indian tribe, was able to
influence the water allocation process through assertion of federal
environmental laws and tribal trust responsibilities. Litigation was
successfully pursued by the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe (Tribe) to change the
balance of power among major water users in the basin and to reallocate
water in favor of protecting Pyramid Lake and its endangered fish (cui-ui and
Lahontan cutthroat trout). The Tribe also asserted a fiduciary duty on the
part of the United States to preserve water for Pyramid Lake by preventing
improper and wasteful use of Truckee River water diverted to the Newlands
Project.
Despite the existence of a favorable water rights adjudication, the Newlands
Irrigation Project and the local irrigation economy created in the first half of
this century are being compelled to adjust to a fundamental shift in water
resource values that has occurred in the past two decades. Restoration—
including protection of historic ecological diversity and Indian cultural
values—is forcefully replacing the past emphasis on consumptive water uses.
The new balance of power forged by tribal litigation provided an incentive for
some of the major water users in the basins to devise solutions that worked
for their collective interests, but balance the water books with a combination
of water transfer purchases and forced efficiency improvements from
irrigated agriculture. The resulting reduction in irrigation diversions and
irrigated lands are expected to impact local, agriculturally-based rural
communities as well.

Truckee-Carson River Basin Study

For tribal, environmental, and municipal interests, however, efforts to
address basin wide problems comprehensively and to devise creative
solutions that promote both efficiency and equity have produced an
acceptable compromise. These players have moved to trade firm rights for a
risk-based physical solution that provides an adequate margin of safety in
water-short years.
Through the Settlement Act, Congress played a critical role in the long trek
from conflict to consensus. The resulting legislation (the Truckee-CarsonPyramid Lake Water Settlement Act, Title II of P.L. 101-618) may prove to be
a model for other western basin settlement acts. However, the TruckeeCarson basin has several distinctive features that suggest caution in
applying the negotiated settlement to other basins:
•

It is a relatively small, self-contained geographic area.

•

The competing interests are discrete, entrenched and relatively well
organized.

•

Few examples of Congressional settlements exist.

•

The consensus achieved to date does not yet include a positive settlement
with the irrigators.

•

The Newlands Project is not typical of federal water projects in the West.
It contracts for operation and maintenance, not water, while the water
rights are held by individuals.

•

The Truckee River itself is not a federal water project, but rather the
United States is bound by a federal court order, along with other parties.
Therefore, the role of the federal Water Master, who is a court appointee
to administer the terms of the federal court decree is important to
understand as an authority separate and apart from the United States.

One commentator to the draft report felt that the degree of contention and
litigation with regard to the Newlands Project has led to a unique history
that may have limited applicability in other river basins. However, a history
of contention and litigation is characteristic of a number of western river
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basins; each of which is unique in its own way, but all of which share
elements in common among the stresses they face and the contention this
engenders.
In the past decade, tribal people have been able to gain unprecedented power
in the Truckee-Carson to influence the water allocation process through
federal environmental and tribal laws, a power denied them in earlier
adjudications. Ironically, the Indians' success, along with the ongoing effects
of a prolonged drought and of substantial urban and agricultural diversions
of water, has contributed to the reduction of a formerly thriving wildlife
habitat—the Stillwater Marsh and surrounding Lahontan Valley wetlands.
Wetlands in the Lahontan Valley have been variously affected by the advent
of irrigated agriculture: first, by diversion of the historic Carson River flow,
then by diversion of the Truckee River flow, and more recently, by efforts to
improve the efficiency of the Newlands Irrigation Project. These remnant
wetlands were able to coexist precariously with an upstream irrigation
district but not with the additional goal of restoring the native fishery. To
the extent that inflows to Pyramid Lake required to meet Endangered
Species Act requirements are met, there is a reduction in the amount of
water available to the irrigation project and the wetlands. A water rights
acquisition program implemented to transfer water from irrigation to
wetlands maintenance holds promise for stabilizing the wetland area.

Lessons Learned and the Federal Agenda for the Next 20 years
Drawing upon interviews with federal, state, and local officials, both in the
Truckee-Carson basins and at their headquarters offices, together with the
other major players in the process, we have developed the following list of
important lessons learned and suggestions as to what the federal
government should be doing to address critical water problems in the next
20 years.
Level the Playing Field
Finding
The Federal government has enormous resources and when these are
committed to a particular side in a water conflict, it can be very difficult and
prohibitively expensive for the affected parties to cope. For decades, the
weight of the government was on the side of reclamation values. Today, it
has swung to favor tribal trust and endangered species issues.
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Recommendations
•

Where the federal government provides legal and technical assistance, it
should work to equalize the balance among legitimate interests and
assure that the negotiating playing field is level. Pursuing such a goal
need not, as some commentators on the draft report would have it, entail
“funding non-Indian groups to undermine [federal] tribal trust
responsibilities”—or any other federal responsibility. It would entail
giving fair and balanced support to all federal responsibilities.

•

Protection of established water rights and protection of tribal trust or
environmental values need to be balanced. Neither should be made
secondary to one another.
Direct Negotiations Among Stakeholders

Finding
The Preliminary Settlement Agreement negotiated directly between the
Tribe and Sierra Pacific is a model of stakeholders taking the initiative to
solve water issues directly among themselves, and provided the
breakthrough on which the Settlement Agreement could be founded.
On the other end of the spectrum, it has been said more than once that the
issues remaining in the basins will not be resolved until the tribe and
irrigators sit down together and work them out directly. The Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe feel that the most basic issue concerns filling Lahontan
Reservoir. The irrigators believe that they are entitled to an absolute right
to divert all the Truckee River water it takes to fill Lahontan Reservoir each
year. The Tribe believes that the right to divert should consider how much of
that supplemental water is beneficially used or how much is wasted due to
conveyance losses, evaporation or spills. The Tribe’s attorney considers this
the fundamental impasse issue affecting the basin.

Recommendation
•

These two counterpoints in the success of direct negotiation and the need
for direct problem-solving between key water-users in the basins
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suggests that the federal government should explore opportunities for
direct negotiations in western water policy and, where appropriate and
potentially productive, encourage the parties representing differing
interests to negotiate directly with one another. This should be subject to
federal approval where federal funds or facilities are involved.
Risk-Sharing Formulas
Finding
Stakeholders in the Truckee-Carson are recognizing that the purpose of a
negotiation is not to simply shore up property entitlements, but to find risksharing formulas. However, efforts to accommodate some stakeholders in
the basin have been hampered by their failure to recognize that the
conceptual foundation of resource conflict negotiations are changing. At
base, property rights reflect different risk-sharing arrangements and
progress among conflicting stakeholders can only be made if each recognizes
that they can each live with the alternatives proposed. Such a negotiation
succeeds when it can articulate the necessary conditions (e.g., flow regime)
that will allow essential activities to be carried out. The objective then
becomes to find physical solutions and adaptive management strategies that
provide high—but not absolute—assurances that these conditions will be
met, or provide adequate contingency plans.
Recommendation
•

Consider risk-based physical solutions, trading firm rights for an
adequate margin of safety in water-short years. The federal government
can empower such approaches by supporting a mix of water exchanges
and flexible use of storage and water rights, maximizing use of available
facilities.
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Creativity, Flexibility, and the Market
Finding
Creativity in using storage exchanges was key to creating the flexibility
needed to unlock the system and meet diverse goals while satisfying rights
(at least, for most players). Another key was in rescheduling the
consumptive use portion of Nevada water which allowed purchase of
agricultural rights to increase summer reservoir storage. Integrating
operations and other watershed or river management agreements, such as
was done with TROA and the Water Quality Agreement, had tremendous
synergy in benefitting fish and other basin resources. In the TruckeeCarson, the addition of the PSA worked to benefit municipal water during
drought as well.
Revising Floriston rate requirements to allow water to be retained in storage
for the benefit of the Pyramid Lake fishery to the extent the water that
would have been released would have been diverted solely for the generation
of hydroelectric power and would have flowed to Pyramid Lake is a good
example of the kind of creative solution that provided a breakthrough in
Truckee River management.
Recommendation
•

The Truckee-Carson illustrates the power of creative and flexible
solutions to unlock long-standing conflicts. The federal government
should empower and encourage such initiatives, staying within water
law, protecting basic rights, and meeting federal trust responsibilities.
There is no model or formula for successful settlement; each settlement
needs flexibility to be successful. Where creativity and flexibility are
encouraged, such latitude should be afforded to all players.

Operating Criteria and Procedures (OCAP)
Finding
An innovation in the Truckee-Carson has been the federal development and
imposition of “Operating Criteria and Procedures” designed to minimize the
loss of water to irrigation inefficiencies and place the farmers of the
Newlands Project on a strict water budget. The objective is to conserve as
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much Truckee River water as possible from diversion, allowing it to serve
endangered fish and tribal trust responsibilities in the watershed of origin.
The OCAPs approach is open to significant question as a viable strategy. It
is not clear to what extent OCAPs themselves have reduced diversions (as
opposed to other driving factors). Even though water may have been
conserved, the cost in good will has been very large. Both the reported
tendency for unproductive accounting disputes to overtake larger objectives
(on the part of both the irrigators and the Tribe) and the tendency to foster
an unproductive focus on the issue of rights raise questions as to whether
other conservation strategies can both save water and serve a more positive,
inclusive solution.
Recommendation
•

We strongly recommend against pursuing an OCAP approach in other
Western river basins. The federal government should promote solutions
that depend on market incentives and enlightened self-interest over
those that depend on the use of a large stick. Third-party micromanagement of reclamation projects (not only through OCAP, but also
such things as water-transfer and water-rights litigation) is clearly
deeply resented and leads to entrenchment rather than cooperation.

Negotiating Framework
Finding
Keeping an ongoing discussion among so many diverse parties for so long has
been a major achievement in the Truckee-Carson negotiations. However
positive the negotiated settlement may have been for most major players in
the basin, there remain key players who have not yet fully bought into this
settlement, including irrigated agriculture and the rural communities of the
Truckee-Carson basins. On the one hand, the negotiations have served to
alienate these players. On the other hand, parties have to want to settle, and
the players who have come to consensus are frustrated that the irriga-tors
and rural communities have not been willing to buy into solutions despite
long, sincere and numerous efforts to seek consensus. Western water policy
occurs in a fishbowl, and the Truckee-Carson is a prime example of how
perceptions can be as damaging to solutions as an actual injustice would be.
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Some of those interviewed stated that TROA meetings were much too big.
Some said there were 100 people around a table. Small sessions are seen as
more productive. The Interior lead official responds that the largest sessions
had about 60 people in attendance. These were “plenary” session intended to
update a wide audience on the status of negotiations and new information.
Negotiating sessions were said to be smaller, but making them smaller than
they are is difficult because of the number of interests involved that need to
be represented.
Recommendations
•

Define a water baseline using good science, policy and the law. Use the
baseline to clearly bound the process by identifying when federal
responsibilities, such as endangered species protection or tribal trust
responsibility will have been met.

•

Maintain an appearance of fairness as the highest priority. Consistent
with established rights and needs, no bias should shown in favor of or
against any party with respect to opportunities to participate in such
water management practices as water transfers, storage, and exchange.

•

Vigilantly protect the appearance of objectivity on the part of the federal
government. In the Truckee-Carson, contractual relationships with
environmental parties were interpreted by the irrigators as presenting
conflicts of interest to the role and confidences with which the irrigators
had entrusted them.

•

Work toward solutions, not victory. Resolve to bring peace among the
parties as a priority. Develop behaviors that would further that goal.

•

Consider all proposals on their merits, not based on who might be
offering them.

•

Avoid continual change in policy.

•

Carefully manage the role of the Department of Justice to protect the
legitimate policy-setting and technical assessment roles that properly
belong to other agencies.
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•

A durable settlement requires a good faith effort by all participants. An
unwillingness to seek solutions by any party, or attempts to scapegoat or
exclude an uncooperative party will weaken and perhaps jeopardize the
entire process.

•

Do not underestimate the ability of groups that may be marginalized to
object to a process that does not appear to hear or include their interests.

•

Participant stability and consistency is important. These build trust as a
basis on which agreements can be concluded.

•

The challenge with large meetings for such multiparty, multi-stakeholder
negotiations as TROA is to keep them to a size where they can be
productive.

•

Parties such as tribes and irrigators may need extra time to work through
grassroots decisionmaking processes. These needs should be respected.

Negotiation Strategy
Finding
It is important to note that Sierra paid a price in the form of water, a waiver
of hydroelectric rights and expensive conservation measures for the use of
space in federal reservoirs. TCID had and continues to control equally
valuable asset. But while both Sierra and TCID had valuable assets, Sierra
brought theirs to the table, bargained them and negotiated for their
interests, but TCID did not. The irrigators believe their assets were taken
from them; others hold that their lose of bargaining position is their own
fault. This was a strategic coup for Sierra and has been an ongoing strategic
failure for the Newlands irrigators. Some feel that the focus on being treated
unfairly has kept the irrigators from engaging in the kind of give-and-take
necessary to get some return on their assets. These parties feel that the
irrigators did not assess their assets well; they were not really detached
enough from their emotional involvement in them.
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Recommendations
•

Seek to shift focus from rights to interests. Acknowledge rights and move
to take advantage of mutual self-interest as a negotiation driver.

•

Advantage should not be taken of a lack of success in negotiating
effectively on the part of any key player; instead, assistance should be
lent to help improve and mature the quality of negotiations on all sides.

•

The irrigators are criticized for “saying no to everything.” Other parties
feel that this put irrigators in position of going down with the ship. Hard
choices may be needed between achieving consensus or meeting pressing
goals for redressing past wrongs and present environmental degradation.
Both tribes and irrigators feel that consensus for its own sake is not
always more important than basic core values that cannot be “traded off.”
This is a recipe for ongoing stalemate.

•

Strong central leadership may break stalemate; when such leadership is
lacking, the situation may tend to revert to stalemate.

Local Governance and Local Coordination
Finding
Perhaps because so much of Nevada is under federal management, marked
sensitivity was shown to the issue of local governance. The establishment of
the local Truckee-Carson Coordination Office and the long-term local ties of
federal officials in several agencies have been served to address such
concerns in very positive ways. The conflict between federal and state
interpretations of water law requirements is a potential flashpoint.
Recommendations
•

Move to empower the local level, including local federal officials, with
decisionmaking authority.

•

Providing federal coordination among the various agencies involved, as
has been accomplished with the Truckee-Carson Coordination Office, is a
model to be considered for other river basins. However, the effort to
speak with one voice should not stifle the needed articulation of
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sometimes competing interests which the federal agencies represent, nor
should it be allowed to lead the federal to government to favor one set of
interests over other, equally legitimate ones. A local coordination office
should be paired with a Washington D.C. official not beholden to any of
the bureaus or Assistant Secretaries.
•

Some felt a loss of authority on the Truckee River on the part of the
Secretary of Interior was due to the focus placed by the Truckee River
Agreement on the federal Watermaster. In that context, federal
regulation came as an imposition. A continuing strong presence would
have made things smoother. Others felt that making the Watermaster
responsible for day-to-day operations, as TROA does, is as it should be.

•

Work to improve the federal-state relationship on water law. The federal
side must recognize and comply with state law, and the state must
recognize and support the duties and responsibilities of federal agencies
charged with land management, tribal trust and fish and wildlife.

•

Congressional allocations are not necessarily superior to interstate
compact as a means of interstate water allocation. In either case, care
must be taken not to neglect the interests of legitimate parties,
notwithstanding current and shifting social values. Federal leadship is
critical, whatever the vehicle, but the imposition of federal will must
always be handled with kid gloves.

•

Joint leadership, collaboratively involving federal, state, local, tribal,
environmental, and major private economic interests holds the greatest
promise for success.
Resource Carrying Capacity

Findings
Although western water issues are driving by classical carrying capacity
issues, long-term questions of planning for growth and accommodating the
carrying capacity of the resource are frequently not directly addressed.
Recommendations
•

It would be well for future generations and the long-term economic and
environmental health of the Truckee-Carson basins that such long-term
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questions be more explicitly addressed, both here and throughout
western water policy.
Maintaining Rural Agricultural Communities
Findings
The reduction in irrigation diversions and irrigated lands will bring impacts
to the local, agriculturally-based rural communities. The marginal economic
value of crops grown with irrigation water in the area must be balanced
against the desire to avoid these impacts and preserve a way of life. To date,
the majority of irrigated lands going out of agriculture as part of water rights
acquisition programs have been from urban development rather than
wetlands water right transfers. The lands being fallowed are the less
productive lands and there remains a strong potential to maintain a viable
agricultural core in Churchill County.
Recommendations
•

Answers to the following key questions are needed are west-wide:
(1) What is a viable ag community?
(2) Can agriculture bring itself to move off a “rights focus” and engage in
risk-sharing give-and-take?
(3) Can a partnership approach to solutions be fostered?

•

The Land Evaluation and Site Assessment (LESA) method might be used
in conjunction with water rights acquisition programs to focus irrigation
on the most efficient canals, best soils, and most productive farmers. Such
an approach has been advocated as a basis to shrink irrigation projects to
a tight core, using land swaps to trade outliers back into the center. The
Natural Resource Conservation Service might provide leadership in such
an approach, as it is a trusted agency experienced in the land evaluation
process. The cost of this endeavor could be funded through a water
transfer fee at the time of water right acquisition as well as real estate
transfer tax.
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Surface-Groundwater Relationships and Water Quality
Findings
Surface and groundwater conditions have equilibrated to changes brought
about by human use and changes in that use drives a reequilibration.
Irrigation efficiency improvements and changes in irrigation patterns
(e.g., due to water rights acquisition), may or may not have detrimental
effects. This is not clear either with regard to water quality or quantity.
Contemporary urbanization effects may have greater effects on the shallow
water aquifer than the effects of irrigation over the past century. The
Truckee-Carson basins are exceptionally sensitive to change.
Land use changes are more significant in terms of water quality in basins
where surface-groundwater continuity is strong than in western basins
where groundwater is confined and hydrologic conductivity is low.
Water quality may be more limiting and may have more significant long-term
impacts on the ability of the water resource to sustain use in these situations
than water quantity, although the latter has received far more attention in
the Truckee-Carson basins.
Decision Science
Findings
TROA leaders point out the critical need for good and flexible modeling in
these kinds of programs. However, the development and documentation of
the Negotiation Model has been subject to significant question by expert
reviewers hired by the federal government itself.
It is not possible to measure the original surface and groundwater conditions
or the effects of original changes on those conditions. The possibility exists
that the uncertainty involved in those events may be larger than the changes
that have occurred since. Effects to wetlands and other water-related
phenomena due to the changes such as irrigation may not be capable of being
definitively differentiated from the potential effects due to climatic change in
this century.
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Recommendation
•

Model development and documentation is critical. These should occur in
an open, public forum. For systems as complex as most high-controversy
Western water basins, model development, documentation and
maintenance it is probably important that the federal government take
this role. Access to use the model to test questions and develop scenarios
should be provided all major players.
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1. Existing Setting
This section describes the setting of the Truckee-Carson River basins and the
history of water-related development and problems which have characterized
the past 100 years in the basins. Figure 1-1 presents an overview of project
watersheds, features, major land use designations and water facilities.

1.1 Climate and Hydrology
Climate
Nevada is the driest state in the nation, with an average annual precipitation
of approximately 9 inches (230 mm) per year. Fallon, in the lower Truckee
basin, averages 4.9 inches of precipitation per year, and Reno, higher
upstream, averages 7.5 inches. Of Nevada’s average annual precipitation,
90% is lost to evaporation and transpiration. Droughts are commonplace;
indeed, every six out of ten years, the major rivers in the state experience
below-average mean flows. This regularly places increased pressure on
water supplies in the state. The most recent severe drought lasted for eight
years (1987-1994).
Elevations in the watersheds range from 9,000 to over 10,000 feet in the
Sierras, on their western edges, to less than 4,000 to 5,000 feet in the valleys
of the basin and range terrain to the east. In the Carson watershed,
elevations drop to just under 4,000 feet.
The high elevations in the Sierras are the coldest and wettest part of the
region; the lower areas to the east lie in the rain shadow of the Sierras and
are much more arid. The difference in precipitation are demonstrated by the
change in vegetation, from coniferous forests in the Sierras to sagebrush,
rabbit brush and alkali grasses in the desert areas (TRA:29, CRA:37).
The basin’s climate is characterized by long, very cold winters, particularly in
the Sierras, and by short moderate to warm summers. Precipitation follows a
seasonal pattern, primarily occurring from late October through early May.
Summer thunderstorms are common in the region, but seldom produce
significant amounts of precipitation over a wide area. Winter precipitation
above the 5,000 foot elevation usually takes the form of snow. The spring
runoff season lasts longer than is normal for watershed of lower elevation,
extending into early July, because the snowpack at the highest elevations
melts late in the season (TRA:33, CRA:37).
Temperatures can vary widely with location in the region. In the coldest
areas, around Truckee and Lake Tahoe, extreme lows can reach from –15º to
–30 ºF, with maximums in the 90º to 100 ºF range. The eastern portion of the
region is warmer; temperature extremes in the Reno/Sparks area range from
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–10 º to about 110 ºF (TRA:33, CRA:37). The Truckee and Carson River
Atlases provide detailed tables of temperature extremes and frost-free days
at key locations.
Figures 1-2 and 1-3 are isohyetal (precipitation) maps for the Truckee and
Carson watersheds. In the Truckee River watershed, annual precipitation is
below 10 inches per year below Washoe Lake and Farad. In the Carson
River watershed, the 8-inch per year isohyete crosses the watershed well
upstream of Lahontan Reservoir.
Surface Hydrology and Water Development
Water users depend primarily on two rivers, the Carson and the Truckee,
which drain from the eastern slope of the Sierra Nevada into two closed
Great Basin systems, Pyramid Lake and the Lahontan Valley marshes,
including the Stillwater National Wildlife Refuge and the Carson Sink.
Carryover storage and transbasin diversions both play a large role in meeting
existing water needs, but water diversions play the most significant role in
the Truckee-Carson basins. The Carson River has been dammed only at the
lower end to supply the Newlands Project; above Lahontan Reservoir its
flows have great seasonal variability. To guarantee firm yield to the
Newlands Project, part of the annual flow of the Truckee River is diverted to
the Carson through the Truckee Canal, which runs from Derby Dam to
Lahontan Reservoir. Several upstream reservoirs have been constructed on
the Truckee, but there is insufficient carryover storage to provide normal
flows during a two- or three-year drought cycle.
These features of the Truckee-Carson water delivery system are described
further below and in more detail in the new Truckee River Operating Agreement and in the Truckee River Atlas (TRA) and Carson River Atlas (CRA)
published by the California Department of Water Resources. Figures 1-2
through 1-16 are taken from these sources. Far more detailed hydrologies
are contained in the Truckee River Chronology (TRC) and Carson River
Chronology (CRC) published by the Nevada Division of Water Planning (and
available on the NDWP home page).
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Truckee River and Lake Tahoe.—Flowing 114 miles from Lake Tahoe to
Marble Bluff Dam, above Pyramid Lake, the Truckee River drains a
watershed of 3,120 square miles (including the Tahoe subbasin), about 75%
of which lies in Nevada and the remainder in California. Figures 1-4 through
1-6 show watershed detail and elevations. The river has its headwaters in
California’s Sierra Nevada mountains, from which it flows into Lake Tahoe.
This segment resembles a typical alpine stream, relatively unaffected by
human activities (TRA:5). Its chief characteristic is its steep gradient (Figure
1-7).
Lake Tahoe is the first point at which the river’s flow can be controlled.
Tahoe covers 192 square miles with an average depth of 990 feet, the tenth
deepest in the world. The lake drains an area of 506 square miles and
occupies an unusually large proportion of its drainage area.
Lake Tahoe is both a natural lake of great beauty and a storage reservoir for
the Truckee. It has received designation from the Environmental Protection
Agency as an Outstanding Natural Resource Water, protecting water quality
in the lake from degradation. The lake could provide all the carryover
storage that the area would need for the long term, but most of the water has
been dedicated to in-place, non-consumptive use. This is not to imply that
water rights established such purpose have been issued, but the early
Truckee Basin history is one of conflict not over Pyramid Lake, but rather
Lake Tahoe pumping. The State of California, Lake Tahoe residents and
environmental interests have strongly defended the lake against such
demands, and proposals that would affect the lake beyond the existing
arrangements (see discussion immediately below) would likely be politically
very difficult if not impossible.
Although Tahoe is a natural lake, it is controlled by a small dam constructed
400 feet downstream of the natural outlet rim at the northwestern edge of
the lake, which lies at an elevation of 6223 feet. Tahoe has a total capacity of
about 122,160,000 acre-feet, but the dam, constructed In 1913 by the Truckee
River General Electric Company, regulates lake level to fluctuate a maximum
of 6.1 feet, yielding a usable storage capacity of 744,600 acre-feet.
Six other small storage reservoirs constructed on the upper Truckee and its
tributaries have a total capacity of 324,400 acre-feet (see Chapter 2 below).
From Tahoe City, the Truckee River flows northward through a small canyon
toward the town of Truckee. The only tributaries of any size in this canyon
reach are Bear Creek and Squaw Creek. The next significant tributary is
Donner Creek, just upstream of Truckee. Flow in Donner Creek is controlled
3
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by a small dam on Donner Lake, another natural lake whose storage capacity
has been enlarged by damming. Rights to the usable capacity of this lake are
held jointly by Sierra Pacific Power Company (Sierra Pacific) and TruckeeCarson Irrigation District (TCID), and the water is used for municipal supply
in Reno and irrigation on the Newlands Project.
Downstream of Truckee, several major tributaries join the river. All of these
are controlled by federal reservoirs, reflecting the fact that most of the
significant water supply development has been in California, where
topography and annual precipitation are more favorable for reservoir
construction (TRA:6). Both Prosser Creek and Martis Creek join the Truckee
River near Martis Valley; each is controlled by a reservoir named after the
creek. Further downstream the Little Truckee River joins from the north.
The Little Truckee itself has one significant tributary, Independence Creek,
which is controlled by a privately owned dam at Independence Lake. In
addition to the very small privately owned Webber Lake at the extreme
northwestern edge of the watershed, the larger federal Stampede and Boca
reservoirs control flow on the Little Truckee. All of this development and
these tributaries are entirely contained within California.
Stampede is noteworthy as the second-largest of the Truckee River watershed reservoirs at 226,500 acre-feet and has been the object of contention as
to its primary purpose. It was originally constructed to serve multiple
purposes, including to supplement Reno’s water supply. However, after
listing of threatened and endangered fish in Pyramid Lake (see below), the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in 1982 that reservoir storage had to be
managed to maintain fish flows rather than for municipal and industrial
uses.
Shortly below the Little Truckee River confluence, the river enters a deep
canyon, turns north and passes the town of Floriston, significant for lending
its name to agreed flows maintained on the river by release from Lake Tahoe
(as well as Prosser and Boca, see discussion below; these flows are actually
measured at a gage near Farad). The river enters Nevada at Farad, where
the first of four small turn-of-the-century hydroelectric plants can be seen
(there were once five, but one no longer operates).
Bending east at the border, the Truckee River flows through the Truckee
Meadows, a bowl-shaped valley and alluvial fan bounded by mountain ranges
and hills. At one time, Truckee Meadows was a wet meadow area largely
developed for agriculture; today it is occupied by the rapidly growing cities of
Reno and Sparks. The Truckee River flows through downtown Reno andthen
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is joined by its only significant Nevada tributary, Steamboat Creek which
flows north from Washoe Lake.
Leaving Truckee Meadows, the river flows through an arid basin and range
terrain. At Derby Dam, a small diversion dam, the Truckee Canal carries
water from the river southeast into the watershed of the Carson River. The
32.5 mile canal has a capacity of about 900 cfs. It was constructed by the
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) as part of the Newlands Project,
the Nation’s first project under the Reclamation Act of 1902. The canal
transports Truckee River water to Lahontan Reservoir near Fallon, to
supplement Carson River water in irrigating Project lands. Truckee River
water is also used for irrigation within its own watershed, in the Truckee
Division of the Newlands Project, near Fernley (TRA:10).
Beyond Derby Dam, the river turns north and enters the Pyramid Lake
Indian Reservation, home of the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians. This
lower segment of the river cuts deeply into alluvial valley soils, and
alternating channel erosion and sedimentation are evident. As the river
enters Pyramid Lake, about fifty miles northeast of Lake Tahoe, sediment
deposition—in combination with reduced river flows and a consequent drop
in Pyramid Lake—has created a delta that can impede upstream passage of
migratory fish.
Pyramid Lake is a remnant of ancient Lake Lahontan, which once inundated
the arid valleys of western Nevada (including the Lahontan Valley, an
important feature of the Carson system, discussed below). Created by giant
glaciers, ancient Lake Lahontan reached its last high water mark (4380 feet
elevation) around 13,000 years ago. It began to alternately recede and
advance as the climate became more arid, finally leaving many smaller lakes
at the ends of the remaining river systems. The deepest basin in the region
remained as a lake, which we know today as Pyramid Lake.
Pyramid is a terminal lake or “sink”, meaning it occupies a topographic
depression, and water leaves it only by evaporation. The lake evaporates
approximately four feet per year, or roughly 440,000 acreFigures 1-4 through 1-7 color figures (NOT AVAILABLE)
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feet. With the advent of the Newlands Project, a steep decline in the level of
Pyramid Lake began around 1910, as shown in Figure 1-8 (this corresponds
with a loss of about 20,000 acres in lake surface area). It stands today (as of
March 1997) at about 3808 feet in elevation, roughly fifty feet below its level
at the time it was discovered in 1844 by John C. Fremont and Kit Carson
(TRA:22-24). The effects of this decline on native fish and Native Americans
are discussed below.
Because the Truckee River has no outlet from Pyramid Lake, in wetter years
prior to diversion its excess water would overflow into a trough to the east,
creating another large lake, Winnemucca. At its highest historical level,
Winnemucca Lake was once about 85 feet deep, and about 25 miles long and
3.5 miles wide. Its greatest volume was about 3.6 million acre-feet of water,
as compared to Pyramid Lake’s 26 million acre-feet. As the flow of the
Truckee diminished following completion of the Newlands Project, the
overflow to Winnemucca was eliminated. The lake became permanently dry
by 1939 and is today a dry alkali lake.
The Bureau of Reclamation comments “Diversions from the Truckee River
are not totally responsible for Winnemucca Lake becoming a dry lake. A
1987 thesis by Wendy Milne from the Colorado School of Mines (A
Comparison of Reconstructed lake Level Records Since the Mid-1800's of Some
Great Basin Lakes) shows that Winnemucca Lake would have desiccated in
1949-52, 1961-67, and 1979-82 under pristine conditions; i.e., even if the
Newlands Project had never diverted water out of the Truckee River. . .it
should also be mentioned that Winnemucca Lake had dried up several times
before the Newlands Project began diverting water out of the Truckee River.”
Figure 1-9 shows average annual streamflow at selected locations. Most of
the runoff in the watershed is generated in the upper elevations in California, where precipitation is greatest. On average, the potential Pyramid
Lake inflow for 1910-1966 was 508,500 acre-feet. Annual diversions from
the Truckee River to the Newlands Project for that period averaged 230,000
acre-feet, approximately 45% of the Truckee River flow. For the 1967-1995
period, when various OCAP imposed diversion limitations, the potential
Pyramid Lake inflow was 602,900 acre-feet and average annual diversions to
the Newlands Project averaged 181,800 acre-feet, about 30 percent of the
Truckee River flow. Under the 1988 OCAP now in place, annual diversions
from the Truckee River are calculated to average 109,100 acre-feet, less than
20% of the Truckee River flow.
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The Truckee River’s greatest historical annual flow at stateline (Farad gage)
was 1,769,000 acre-feet in 1983; the lowest was 133,200 acre-feet in 1931.
The greatest flood of record at Reno was in December 1955, when peak flow
reached 20,800 cfs. Flood damage occurs when flows in the Truckee
Meadows area exceed about 6,000 cfs (TRA:34).
Carson River.—The Carson River also originates in the Sierra Nevada in
California and flows eastward to drain into the marshes of the Stillwater
National Wildlife Refuge and eventually into the Carson Sink, where any
remaining surface water evaporates. Figures 1-10 through 1-12 show
watershed detail and elevations. The 184-mile long Carson River drains an
area comparable to the Truckee, about 3,966 square miles, of which 85% lies
in Nevada, the remainder in California. Although it is a relatively small
river, it is an important water source in arid western Nevada (CRA:1).
In the upper watershed, the Carson River is divided into two parts—the East
and West forks—both of which arise in the Sierras. A characteristic shared
by both forks at their higher elevations is their steep gradients, as shown in
Figure 1-13. Another shared characteristic is the number of small lakes at
the higher elevations (Figure 1-14; see Carson River Atlas for a detailed
discussion). Some are small natural lakes which have been converted to
reservoirs by construction of small dams at their outlets. Some are reservoirs
that were originally constructed to serve water for agricultural purposes such
as raising alfalfa and irrigating pasture for livestock, a use which they still
serve with few exceptions. There are no large reservoirs in the upper
watershed (CRA:5, 17).
Construction of most of the high alpine reservoirs began around the turn of
the century. Many of the reservoir sites were acquired and developed under
the auspices of the Alpine Company (later known as the Alpine Land and
Reservoir Company), formed by a group of farmers in the Carson Valley who
sought to conserve spring runoff for summer irrigation
The West Fork, the smaller of the two, flows northeast from Markleeville
into Diamond Valley just before stateline. Diamond Valley is the only
agricultural area of any size in the upper watershed. The East Fork
originates further south, near Sonora Pass and flows through the CarsonIceberg Wilderness. The highest elevations of the East Fork contain several
small alpine lakes used for storage. Important tributaries include Silver
King, Silver, and Wolf creeks. It crosses into Nevada just above its
confluence with Bryant Creek, which drains the Leviathan Mine area
Figures 1-8 through 1-9 color figures (NOT AVAILABLE)
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bringing water quality concerns. Several small tributaries of the East Fork
in this vicinity are fed by hot springs (CRA:7).
The East and West forks leave the mountainous terrain of the Sierras as
they join downstream of stateline, near Genoa, about in the middle of the
broad Carson Valley. Though largely agricultural, suburban development is
increasing in the Minden/Gardnerville area. The river skirts Eagle Valley,
where Carson City is located, and turns east to traverse a narrow canyon and
issue into a small valley by Dayton. In this vicinity, drainage from the
Comstock silver mine brings additional water quality problems (mercury
contamination), and the river in this reach is a Superfund site (CRA:9)
The Carson River then empties into Lahontan Reservoir (average inflow into
the Reservoir from the Carson is 261,350 acre-feet/year). The Lahontan
Reservoir is the principle Carson River storage feature of the Newlands
Project (Lake Tahoe, in the Truckee River watershed, actually has the larger
storage capacity for Newlands Project use). Completed by the Bureau of
Reclamation in 1915, the facility has a capacity of 295,500 acre-feet
(316,900 acre-feet with flashboards installed) and impounds the entire flow
of the Carson River plus water diverted from the Truckee via the Truckee
Canal. A 1.92 MW hydropower plant is located immediately downstream
(CRA:11).
The Carson Division of the Newlands Project is larger than the Truckee
Division, and irrigates lands in the Lahontan Valley. Water released from
the Lahontan Dam travels about five miles down the old river channel before
reaching Carson Diversion Dam, a 23-foot concrete dam that diverts water
into the two main canals. The “T Canal” and “V Canal” carry the water into
an extensive network of canals and laterals. Once in the distribution system,
the water can be regulated at several other small facilities including Coleman
and Sagouspe diversion dams and Sheckler, S-Line and Harmon reservoirs.
The system is operated by TCID, which has an operation and maintenance
contract Reclamation for the Newlands Project. TCID has constructed a
small hydropower plant 12, 28)on the V Canal (CRA:12,28).
The facilities also include a deep agricultural drainage system, constructed to
combat the twin problems of saline and/or alkaline soils and a locally high
ground water table (CRA:29). Groundwater levels rose to near the ground
surface in parts of the project area after construction, due to applied
irrigation water and canal seepage,
Figures 1-10 through 1-14 color figures (NOT AVAILABLE)
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eventually creating perched water tables in some locations. Much of the
Project’s drain water has supplied the downstream Stillwater marshes,
creating water quality concerns on the one hand and a potential conflict with
mandated efficiency improvements on the other (both discussed further
below).
Construction of the irrigation works in the Fallon area has led to agricultural
and municipal development over much of the former desert land. Although it
is generally said that the river terminates in the “Carson Sink”, there are
today several individual sinks within the larger closed drainage basin (Figure
1-15). One channel of the river turns northward near Fallon, leading to the
playa lake called “Carson Sink” by many. Water now reaches this extreme
northeastern portion of the basin only in the wettest years. Another channel
turns south toward another important sink known as “Carson Lake and
Pasture” (CRA:12-13). There are several other lakes or collections of ponds
in the basin, including Indian Lakes, the lakes in the Stillwater area, and
Soda Lakes. These are described in more detail in the Carson River Atlas
(1991, Chapter 2).
Following convention established in the Carson River Atlas, the term “Carson
Sink” is used in this report in its broadest possible sense to refer to the closed
drainage basin below Lahontan Reservoir, which contains a number of
individual sinks. The alkali flats in the extreme northeastern portion of the
basin are designated “Carson Playa”, and include the area called “Big Water.”
Historically, waters of the Carson River spread out over a broad region to the
east of the present-day Fallon, creating a series of lakes and marsh areas,
some ephemeral and some permanent. The Lahontan Valley wetlands
formed in these sinks created high-value waterfowl and shorebird habitat.
The Stillwater area, discussed below, is a remnant of these wetlands.
Settlement and agriculture have altered the flow patterns and volume of
water reaching the remaining wetlands in the sink. In wet years when
floodwaters exceed the needs of agricultural users, excess flows primarily
have reached Carson Lake and Pasture and the Stillwater; floodwaters
seldom reach the alkali flats of Carson Playa. Proposals to purchase and
transfer water rights to the wetlands are a major feature of the negotiated
settlement in the Truckee-Carson basins, and are discussed in detail below.
A detailed hydrology of Stillwater itself has not been undertaken. There are
23 wetland management units (ponds and small lakes) in the present
Stillwater National Wildlife Refuge. While each of these is more or less self9
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contained, they are connected by a variety of dikes, canals and headgates for
water management. As water is added to the system, new units are opened
and, if needed, water conveyance facilities are created to get water where it is
wanted. The efficiency of these conveyance facilities is not much of an
issue—water is moving from wetland to wetland. “Big Water” at the
downstream end of the Stillwater is used as a “sump”—water reaching the
far end of the system at Big Water quickly evaporates, dries, and the salts
blow away.1
The size of the main feed canals limits the amount of water that can be
brought into the refuge at any one time. It is estimated that it would cost
$3 million to enlarge the canals; this may be needed if the water rights
purchase program succeeds (or if the refuge is to take spill water now going
to Carson Sink).2
Figure 1-16 shows average annual streamflow at selected locations. Most of
the runoff in the watershed is generated in the upper elevations in
California, where precipitation is greatest. The Carson River’s greatest
historical annual flow at the confluence of the East and West Forks was
796,000 acre-feet in 1967; the lowest was 42,320 acre-feet in 1977. During
the historic 1928-34 drought, Lahontan Reservoir operated at a very low
capacity and was essentially dry during 4 of the 7 years. The Carson River
near Fort Churchill has gone dry on a number of occasions because upstream
diversions take all of the river’s flow during dry years (CRA:42).
At the opposite extreme, the greatest floods are estimated at about 30,000 cfs
(at Carson City) during 1955. Since the upper watershed is not regulated to
provide flood control, large peak flows occur downstream. The developed
areas along the Sierra front, particularly the suburban areas around Minden
and Gardnerville are particularly at risk.

Groundwater Hydrology and Use
Geohydrology.—Groundwater resources occur throughout the Truckee and
Carson River basins. Estimates of total groundwater recharge and discharge
are available for most of the individual valleys in these two river basins from
a series of reconnaissance studies performed in the
Figures 1-15 through 1-16 color figures (NOT AVAILABLE)
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1960s and 1970s by the U.S. Geological Survey in cooperation with the
Nevada Department of Conservation and Natural Resources. However,
detailed quantitative knowledge of the availability and quality of the
groundwater resources ranges from well documented in some of the valleys
where the groundwater is a significant source for irrigation and domestic
supplies to little known or uncertain in undeveloped valleys that have not
been studied other than to a reconnaissance level.
The principal source of groundwater recharge to the valleys of the two river
basins is from precipitation as rain and snow in the higher altitudes of the
bordering mountain ranges, principally in the headwaters valleys along the
east slope of the Sierra Nevada. Locally, infiltration of ephemeral stream
flows down alluvial fans, from both surface water and groundwater irrigation
and irrigation by treated sewage effluent on the valley floors, and recharge
from the rivers (from both by natural infiltration loses and induced by
pumping adjacent alluvial aquifers) may be important secondary sources of
groundwater recharge.
Groundwater is discharged from the valleys of the two river basins by
evapotranspiration of native phreatophytic plants and irrigated crops,
domestic and municipal pumpage, inflow into gaining reaches of some river
segments, and minor underflow to adjacent down-gradient valleys. The
principal production aquifers in the valleys are in thick permeable alluvial
deposits under valley floors. Where fractured or consisting of more
permeable volcanic rocks, bedrock aquifers in the mountains forming the
valley boundaries may be used locally for domestic, irrigation or small public
water system supplies. However, water yields from the localized bedrock
aquifers are usually much lower than from the alluvial deposits in the valley
fills.
The only significant development of groundwater from a consolidated bedrock
aquifer in the two river basins is from a very permeable basaltic stock in the
Carson Desert near Fallon at the terminus of the Carson River basin. The
volcanic aquifer at Fallon may be conceptualized as a mushroom-shaped
island intruded from an unknown depth upwards through the surrounding
alluvial deposits to outcrop at Rattlesnake Hill northwest of Fallon. The
basalt is composed of dense massive layers separated by very permeable
cinder zones which yield as much as 1,000 gallons per minute to wells. The
entire basalt stock is highly transmissive.
Generally the individual valleys of the two river basins act as closed systems
with respect to groundwater flow. Most groundwater discharge is internal
11
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within the valleys, or where the valleys are connected by the channels of the
two rivers, discharge to the river near the downstream end of the valley.
Small amounts of groundwater underflow may occur to down gradient
adjacent valleys. A general regional groundwater gradient exists in an
easterly direction that follows the river drainages from the headwaters in the
Sierra Nevada to the terminus of the Truckee River in Pyramid Lake Valley
and the Carson River in the sink of the Carson Desert. Minor subsurface
recharge to and discharge from adjacent valleys occurs along this regional
gradient.
The general hydrology of the aquifers of the Newlands Project is known and
has been summarized in two recent USGS reports (Seiler and Allander, 1993;
Maurer and others, 1994). The principal source of recharge to the shallow
alluvial aquifer is infiltration of irrigation on the Newlands Project west and
northwest of Fallon and to a lesser extent episodic flood flows in the lower
Carson River. West of Fallon, the intermediate aquifer is in turn recharged
by the shallow system. The basalt aquifer receives its recharge from
surrounding shallow and intermediate alluvial aquifers. The general
direction of groundwater flow is from recharge areas west and north of Fallon
east and northeast towards discharge areas is and near the Stillwater and
Fallon wildlife wetlands and the Carson Sink. In these discharge areas, the
intermediate and shallow aquifers discharge upward to the irrigation drains,
wetlands areas, and to evapotranspiration be native plants and farm crops
and evaporation from the desert soils. Deeper geothermal waters also
discharge upward through the intermediate and shallow aquifers in the
Stillwater area (Olmstead and others, 1984), adding to the loading of
evaporative salt residues to the surficial soils and drains.

Groundwater Development and Use.—The largest areas of groundwater use
in the Truckee River Basin are in the Truckee Meadows in Nevada. In the
California portion of the basin, the only potentially large groundwater
resource is in the alluvial deposits of Martis Valley near Truckee (TRA:34).
However, some communities in the Lake Tahoe Basin also pump ground
water from localized fractured bedrock and alluvial deposits.
In the Truckee Meadows, the valley containing the largest portion of the
Reno-Sparks urban area, municipal water purveyors operate high-capacity
production wells. Sierra Pacific Power Company, the largest water utility in
the valley, holds rights to about 48,000 acre-feet per year of ground water.
However, the Nevada State Engineer has restricted groundwater extractions
to about 15,000 acre-feet per year. Other valleys in the Truckee River
12
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system pumping groundwater for domestic and smaller municipal systems
include the so-called ‘north valleys’ (Lemmon, Cold Springs, Warm Springs,
Spanish Springs, and Sun valleys) north of the Truckee Meadows, the
Truckee Canyon and Dodge Flat areas of the lower Truckee River basin, and
the Fernley Area adjacent to the Truckee Canal that diverts water from the
Truckee to the Carson River’s Lahontan Reservoir.
Urban growth in the Reno-Sparks metropolitan and suburban areas has
strained the existing sources of both surface-water and groundwater
supplies.3 The Silver State Project, proposed in a report prepared for Washoe
County, would have constructed a pipeline as far north as the Oregon border
to import groundwater from valleys along the California-Nevada border into
the Reno-Sparks area for municipal supply. Since some of the target valleys
extended into California, the project received strong opposition from several
northeastern California counties. The California Department of Water
Resources assisted these counties in forming groundwater management
districts to provide a framework for possible regulation of withdrawals in the
California portions of these valleys.
Although the Silver State Project never materialized, one of the proposed
components, export of ground water from the Nevada Portion of Honey Lake
Valley, located along the state line about 50 miles northwest of Reno, was
pursued by Washoe County and a private concern (Western Water
Development Company, Inc.) through the Truckee Meadows Project. A large
ranch in the basin was purchased and water rights were secured with the
intent to import water from Honey Lake.4 The rights were found to be in the
public interest by the Nevada Supreme Court.5 The court relied primarily on
a finding by the Nevada State Engineer that there was no evidence that
pumping groundwater would result in an impairment of other water rights.
Work on this project was halted when the Environmental Impact Statement
on the pipeline from Honey Lake Valley was suspended in April, 1994, by the
Secretary of Interior pending resolution of three issues by Washoe County:
potential effect of the project on efforts by the Army to remediate
groundwater contamination at the Sierra Army Depot in Honey Lake Valley,
an Indian Trust issue related to potential capture of regional groundwater
underflow to the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation, and technical concerns
about groundwater modeling done for the draft EIS. The Nevada State
Engineer placed a moratorium on all appropriations and transfers on Nevada
lands in the basin pending the completion of studies on the basin's
characteristics and water reserves.6
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The largest groundwater resource in the Carson River Basin is comprised of
the valley-fill aquifers of Carson Valley in Nevada. Currently most pumpage
is for supplemental irrigation during periods of deficient river flow and for
municipal supplies in the Minden-Gardnerville area. Ground water is also
used as a source of domestic and municipal supply in Carson City (Eagle
Valley, Dayton (Dayton Valley), Silver Springs (Churchill Valley), and Fallon
(Carson Desert). An issue in the upper Carson River Basin (Carson, Eagle,
Dayton, Churchill Valleys) is whether or not provisions of the Alpine Ditch
Decree will allow transfer of ground-and surface-water irrigation rights to
storage in Lahontan Reservoir for use for maintenance of wetland wildlife
habitat by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service at the Stillwater refuge in the
Carson Desert. Resolution of this issue is compli-cated by both watermanagement requirements of the Alpine Decree and complex
groundwater/surface-water interactions in the irrigated areas of Carson
Valley. Although a steady-state mathematical model of the Carson Valley
groundwater reservoirs and their interaction with the Carson River is
available7 the spatial resolution and time steps of this model are currently
insufficient to assess all the potential legal and water-management issues
related to water-rights transfers from Carson Valley to Lahontan Reservoir.
In order to more quantitatively address the potential effects of changes in
land use and groundwater pumpage in Carson Valley on Carson River flows,
linkage of the existing groundwater model would need to be provided to a
river management/flow model under development by the USGS8 or a waterrights model under development by the Carson Water Subconservancy
District Regionally, in order to fully address such issues through the rapidly
developing Upper Carson River Basin, the existing groundwater model needs
to be combined with a model of the Eagle Valley aquifers9 and extended
regionally to include Dayton and Churchill Valleys.

Groundwater Recharge.—A major groundwater issue in the lower Carson
River Basin revolves around potential effects on groundwater recharge in the
Fallon area of the Carson Desert(also known as the Lahontan Valley) from
transfer of Newlands Project irrigation water rights(surface waters from the
Carson River and Truckee Canal Diversions from the Truckee River, both
stored in Lahontan Reservoir) to the Stillwater wetlands. This would be
achieved by a federal buyout of water rights and lands from willing sellers in
the Newlands Project. Currently, municipal water for the City of Fallon, the
Fallon Naval Air Station, and the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Indian Tribe is
pumped from a volcanic bedrock aquifer near Fallon. The source of water for
about 4,000 wells serving the farms and rapidly expanding suburban
population of Churchill County outside of the Fallon service area is
14
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groundwater from a very shallow (less than 50 feet) aquifer system, which is
recharged by infiltration of Newlands Project irritation water. Also present
in the area around Fallon is an intermediate depth alluvial aquifer that is
being increasingly tapped (currently about 1,000 wells) by new suburban
homes and businesses in Churchill County.

Groundwater Quality.—The quality of ground water in the three main
aquifers in the Fallon/Newlands area of Churchill County is highly variable.
The shallowest surficial aquifers contain generally potable water currently
recharged by the Newlands Project irrigation system of canals and ditches
from Lahontan Reservoir. However, this shallow ground water may locally
have levels of dissolved solids, arsenic, boron, and other salts derived from
the desert soils that exceed drinking water standards and criteria. The
deeper(50 to over 500 feet) intermediate aquifer also generally has potable
water but locally may be affected by hydrogen sulfide from organic matter
deposited during various stands of the Pleistocene Lake Lahontan that
covered much of northwestern Nevada about 10,000 years ago.
In groundwater discharge areas in north, east, and southeast of Fallon,
dissolved solids, arsenic and other salts may also be a problem in the
intermediate aquifers. Water levels in the volcanic aquifer at Fallon have
been declining in recent years because of increased pumpage. Concomitantly,
concentrations of chlorides and arsenic have been increasing. Although the
salinity of the water currently is well below drinking water standards, the
increasing trend is of concern as the exact cause—infiltration of poor quality
water from surrounding alluvium or induction of saline water present at
depth in the basalt—is not known. Arsenic levels in the basalt aquifer
already approach or exceed current drinking water standards, requiring some
blending with water from other sources to meet standards for public
consumption.
Groundwater quality in the shallow and intermediate aquifers in the current
recharge areas west and north of Fallon, although variable, is generally
acceptable for domestic and municipal uses. Water quality decreases as the
flow becomes upward through the desert soils and saline alluvial sediments
east of Fallon. The permeability of the alluvial aquifers also decreases along
the est to east flow lines, as the sediments grade from relatively coarse
deposits of old Carson River deltas and Lahontan shorelines to the finegrained lacustrine sediments deposited in Lake Lahontan beds east of
Fallon. For these reasons, is has been difficult to obtain significant
groundwater supplies of acceptable quality east of Fallon in the Stillwater
15
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area. For example, the Fallon Indian Reservation ended up piping water over
6 miles from a well in the basalt aquifer to the reservation in order to obtain
a reliable potable water supply.

1.2 Water Quality
In several areas, impaired water quality limits the beneficial uses of surface
or ground water. In the upper Carson basin, water quality constraints are
primarily associated with former mining areas, including the Leviathan Mine
and Monitor-Mogul mining district. There are also localized water quality
constraints caused by elevated mineral levels associated with thermal
waters. Mining impacts are again evident on the mainstem Carson River
near Dayton, where elevated mercury levels are residual from the Comstock
mines. Mercury from the Comstock is found in the remainder of the river
downstream, including sediments in Lahontan Reservoir and the Carson
Sink (CRA:46-47). Any activity which disturbs the sediments could
potentially release the trapped mercury and create toxic contamination.
The Carson Sink area has additional water quality constraints on both
surface and ground water. Surface water quality is affected by the
concentration of minerals by evaporation and by agricultural drain water.
Some of this drain water carries elevated levels of metals such as arsenic,
that may be associated with geothermal features (Stillwater lies on the edge
of a geothermal resource area). Surface water tends to become increasingly
saline as it flows through the sink, reducing its value for wildlife. Ultimately,
water too saline for use is disposed of in evaporation ponds (CRA:47).
Groundwater quality is a function of both the materials the water passes
through and the water’s residence time in those materials. Land uses in the
surface water drainage area contribute minerals and chemicals to the water
prior to seepage into the shallow aquifers. Metals associated with historic
mining practices are known to have accumulated in the drainages and to be
exhumed during floods. The desert nature of the lower areas of the drainages results in the potential to both mobilize salts by contact with imported
water as well as reprecipitate these salts by evaporation of those waters.
The development of “fronts” of high Total Dissolved Solid (TDS) groundwater
has been reported and may be impacting the shallow aquifer water quality as
well as river water where such water drains back to the rivers.
Groundwater in shallow alluvial aquifers in the Carson Sink exhibits
mineralization common to geothermal zones, making it not potable in most
16
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instances. Groundwater flowing into some of the agricultural drains may be
the source of some of the contaminants reaching Stillwater. Groundwater in
the deeper basalt aquifer in the valley does support municipal use in the
Fallon area, although special treatment is necessary to remove arsenic. This
aquifer contains elevated levels of naturally occurring arsenic, again associated with geothermal activity. Although a large volume of water is stored
in Lahontan Valley, much of it is too saline or alkaline for domestic use.
The interaction between groundwater and surface water is significant to both
quantity and quality in the middle and lower areas of the Truckee-Carson
River Basins. Substantial study and understanding of the physical characteristics of the shallow groundwater occurrence exists, but not for the deeper
aquifers. The changes in land use and distribution of surface water has
impacted both the storage and the quality of water in the shallow aquifer
unit. There is increasing well development of the aquifers in this area but
the impacts on quantity and quality of the groundwater is uncertain.
The TJ Drain typifies the water quality problem which the Lahontan Valley
wetlands have experienced with the coming of the Newlands Project.
Previously-clean water supplies in the remaining wetlands has been replaced
by agricultural runoff from irrigated acreage. Water from the TJ Drain flows
into both the SWMA and the SNWR. Between 1987-90, water from this
drain was found to contain some of the highest recorded concentrations of
trace elements in drainwater sampled in the Newlands Project, including
potentially toxic concentrations of trace elements, such as dissolved arsenic,
boron, lithium, molybdenum, and selenium.10
The TJ Drain is being closely monitored. Recent sampling of the agricultural
drain water that flows to the TJ Drain indicates that farm drainage is not
likely to be the problem. The TJ Drain water quality samples that should
such high dissolved solids concentrations were taken at the discharge end of
the canal. The problem is that the TJ Drain intercepts highly contaminated
groundwater. Over the past several years, there has not been an indication
of continued toxic flows into the wetlands. This could be due, in part, to the
long drought that occurred, or it could represent a more permanent change, if
the leaching process that occurs during first years new lands are brought into
production is nearing completion. To assure that the toxic drainage does not
recur, however, the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Fallon Tribes are
proceeding to close the drain, as called for in Section 106 of P.L. 101-618.
As the efficiency of the irrigation system in the area improves through
enforcement of OCAP, agricultural drainage will be reduced, with consequent
17
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reductions in return flows to the wetlands. This may increase concentrations
of trace elements and, potentially, toxics in the drain water. However, as
documented in the Lahontan Valley Wetlands Water Rights Acquisition EIS,
as direct service water from the project is acquired for the wetlands (see
below), the total water supply to the wetlands will greatly improve in quality.
Water quality issues add a further layer of complexity to regional water
management. Fisheries require adequate clean, cool water and are affected
by upstream urban and agricultural activities that influence water
temperature and quality. Local governments plan to dispose of a modest
amount of effluent through land application, but the majority of effluent will
continue to be discharged to the river in compliance with EPA discharge
standards under the Clean Water Act. There had been controversy over onetime plans for large-scale land application because treated effluent would no
longer be returned to the Truckee River, resulting in decreased river flows.
By the terms of the 1994 Unappropriated Water Agreement, the parties
agreed that whenever effluent is not returned to the river it must be
substituted with fresh water specifically to maintain downstream flows,
however when effluent is groundwater originated, it may be stored and used
for flow augmentation at a later time.
In 1996, the Department of Interior (Interior), the cities and Washoe County
concluded Water Quality Agreement to acquire additional water rights to
dilute their discharges of effluent into the Truckee River. The federal
government will assist in securing storage space for those rights.11 Benefits
are anticipated to include reduced nitrogen and phosphorus concentrations,
as river water rights stored under a new water reuse program will replace
the treated effluent that was previously discharged from the Truckee
Meadows Water Treatment Facility.

1.3 Natural Resources
Both the Truckee and the Carson rivers flow into the arid Great Basin to
form once vast marshes before disappearing into the region's granitic alluvial
sands. Within this relatively short and closed system, over thousands of
years, plant and animal species have evolved unique natural histories.
Desert ecosystems are often characterized by low species diversity and
specialized adaptations for survival in a highly variable environment.
Typically, fragile ecological relationships emerge whereby even subtle
changes to the system's most important physical element, the availability of
water, can have a dramatic effect on its biotic dependents.
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With the advent of the Newlands Project, the diversion of a large part of the
Truckee’s flow into the Carson and the diversion of the Carson below
Lahontan dam, the effects on both river’s ecosystems have been profound,
particularly in their terminal lakes or sinks. The development of the
Newlands project has also created a conflict between the two ecosystems
which continues to the present. In the Truckee basin, fish have been
endangered or gone extinct, waterbirds have been affected and one terminal
lake has dried up entirely (although it would have been dry in some years in
any case); in the Carson basin, wetland habitats and their dependent
waterbird populations have dramatically declined.

Carson River Ecosystem
As Ancient Lake Lahontan receded, a series of shallow lakes, marshes and
wet meadows formed in Lahontan Valley, a basin at the terminus of the
Carson River within Churchill County in west-central Nevada. During this
period, waterfowl, marsh birds, shorebirds, and other wetland-dependent
wildlife used the Lahontan Valley for migratory stopovers and as wintering,
foraging, and breeding grounds.
Lahontan Valley, a remnant of the ancient lake bed, is characterized by
sedimentary soils with old river channel and lake deposits, sand dunes,
wetlands and playas. The Stillwater Marsh, Carson Lake and Pasture, and
Carson Playa are large terminal wetlands created where the Carson
discharges in the valley. These terminal wetlands have supported a diversity
of wildlife for at least 4,000 years. They are representative of the Great
Basin wetlands ecosystem, where a continuous shrinking and swelling of
wetland areas occurs, both seasonally and over geologic time. The Lahontan
Valley wetlands are unique in that they are located in the second driest
inland desert in North America.12
Wetlands once covered vast areas of Lahontan Valley, but since the early
1900s, both the quality and quantity of wetland habitat in Lahontan Valley
has been reduced dramatically. Historically, the Carson River sustained an
average of about 150,000 wetland acres in the Carson Lake, Stillwater, and
Carson Playa marshes. But since the turn of the century, more than 82% of
the wetland habitat in western Nevada has been lost.13
Lahontan Valley wetlands functions and values (or at least the appearance of
them) are said to be quickly recovered when water is provided,14 leading to a
wide range of estimates in the overall reduction of Lahontan Valley wetlands
19
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acreage from historic conditions,15 depending on year-to-year variability in
water supply. Nevertheless, it is clear that what once was the dominant
landscape feature of the Lahontan Valley has been nearly eliminated. As
recently as 1992, the Lahontan Valley wetlands recorded a low of fewer than
2,000 acres of wetlands habitat.16
The Lahontan Valley lies on the eastern edge of the Pacific Flyway for
migrating birds. These migratory birds and their habitat are protected under
treaty between the United States and Canada.17 A vital stop-over for
migrant shorebirds, in 1988 it was designated as a Western Hemisphere
Shorebird Reserve—one of four such sites in the United States and 17 in the
entire hemisphere.
Once vast and productive, the wetlands of the Carson Sink were some of the
most productive wildlife habitat in North America: 30,000 feeding white
pelicans, 13,000 geese, 12,000 tundra swans, and an annual average of more
than 250,000 migrant ducks (particularly northern pintail, green-winged teal,
northern shoveler and up to 50% of the canvasbacks in the entire Pacific
Flyway) have been counted there. At times 90% of the snow geese in Nevada
were on these wetlands. In many years, up to 70% of the State’s migratory
waterfowl pass through and feed there. Waterbird such as black-necked
stilts and American avocets nest here; there are egrets and marsh birds,
including the world's largest colony of white-faced ibises. Bald eagles and
other raptors often congregate there during their winter migrations.
However, waterfowl use has declined by more than 40% between 1975 and
1989.18
Shallow waters and abundant food supplies are key elements that attract
these large numbers of waterfowl to Lahontan Valley wetlands. Most of the
waterfowl use occurs on Stillwater National Wildlife Refuge and Carson
Lake and Pasture, where more than 80% of the wetland habitat has been
less than 18 inches deep. Shallow waters provide quality feeding habitat.19
Lahontan Valley wetlands are not only important for migrating waterfowl,
they are one of the most important duck breeding grounds in Nevada. The
numerous small islands, combined with a good ratio of emergent vegetation
to open water, make many of the valley wetlands highly attractive to nesting
ducks. As with waterfowl use, nesting has also declined substantially over
the past 25 years.20
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In recognition of these values, a number of attempts have been made over
the years to formally recognize and preserve the lands which support these
productive systems. These include:
!
!
!
•
•

Carson Lake and Pasture
Fallon National Wildlife Refuge
Stillwater Wildlife Management Area
Stillwater National Wildlife Refuge
Winnemucca Lake National Wildlife Refuge

Of these, only two have a viable future (Carson Lake and Pasture and the
Stillwater National Wildlife Refuge). All are discussed in brief below.
The Bureau of Reclamation created the Carson Lake and Pasture in about
1919 to provide a community grazing area for livestock. Revenues from rents
were intended to help repay the Newlands Project costs. In 1928, TCID took
over operation of the pasture and entered into an agreement with Greenhead
Hunting Club to manage it for wetland development and migratory bird
hunting. In the late 1970s, TCID set aside the central portion of Carson
Lake as a wildlife area and dedicated more than 7,500 acres of the
22,220 acres for management of wildlife. The area not so dedicated is still
used by local ranchers for grazing. In the 1980 Fleischmann Agreement
between TCID and Nevada Department of Wildlife (NDOW), the two
agencies agreed to jointly manage the wetlands and to create a Carson Lake
Advisory Board with members representing the agencies, hunting club and
grazing permittees. Under Subsection 206(e) of P.L. 101-618, the Secretary
of Interior is authorized to convey Carson Lake and Pasture to the State of
Nevada for use as a wildlife refuge, to be managed by NDOW as a component
of the Western Hemisphere Shorebird Reserve Network.21 Like the SNWR,
Carson Lake and Pasture has been diked into individual management units.
In 1931, 18,000 acres were set aside as Fallon National Wildlife Refuge, the
first Fish & Wildlife Service refuge in the valley. Today, water remains only
in the wettest years and contains salts in concentrations well beyond the
tolerance of most species that used the area just a few decades before.
Four years later, in 1935, TCID approached the Bureau of Biological Survey
proposing to establish a wildlife management area encompassing the
Stillwater marsh areas and portions of the Carson desert. In 1948 TCID, the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the Nevada State Board of Fish and
Game Commissioners (now NDOW) agreed to manage some 163,000 acres of
public lands which had been withdrawn by Reclamation for the irrigation
21
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project. The area, known as the Stillwater Wildlife Management Area
(SWMA)22 is managed under a three-way, fifty-year plan that expires in
November 1998. The SWMA will cease to exist on that date.
Subsection 206(b) of Public Law 101-618 created the Stillwater National
Wildlife Refuge (SNWR) in 1991 as part of the overall negotiated settlement
in the Truckee-Carson basins (see discussion below). Approximately
77,250 acres of public land within the original SWMA were transferred from
Reclamation’s jurisdiction to FWS to create the refuge. Today, the SNWR
includes a variety of habitats, from freshwater sloughs and marshes to
brackish-water marshes and alkali flats.23 The refuge includes Lead Lake
and Stillwater Point Reservoir.
The difficulty with all but the most recent of the agreements that established
these management areas has been that the water rights necessary to sustain
them were not also provided. Following Newlands Project construction, the
water that reached valley wetlands consisted of excess irrigation water
delivered to but not utilized by crops, water that seeped out of irrigation
canals, and spills from Lahontan Reservoir. This “lost” water, referred to as
drain water or return flows, plus water released for winter hydropower
generation and spills, was collected by a system of drains that flowed to the
Stillwater Marsh and Carson Lake and Pasture wetlands. The FWS has
determined that this source offers inadequate inflow volume to meet longterm wetland objectives.24
Diversion flows from the Truckee have been diminished as a result of
lawsuits filed by the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe to protect threatened and
endangered fish in the lake (see below). In 1966, a federal court directed
Reclamation to develop more stringent criteria to improve the efficiency of
the Newlands Project with respect to diversions from the Truckee and
operations of the Project. Wetlands acreage began to diminish markedly in
the late 1960s, directly after TCID halted winter diversions solely for power
generation. In conjunction with the most severe and extended drought on
record and the growth of other upstream uses, these factors reduced the
primary wetlands to less than 6,000 acres by 1990, and as low as 845 acres in
1992.
Between 1988 and 1993, an annual average of only about 10,000 acres of
primary and secondary wetlands within Lahontan Valley were sustained.25
To relieve these stresses on both the Truckee and the Carson River ecosystems, wildlife interests are turning to the market to obtain rights denied by
early adjudications and subsequent reallocations. Section 206 of P.L. 10122
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618 authorizes and directs the Secretary of Interior, in conjunction with
actions by the State of Nevada, to acquire water and water rights to sustain,
on a long-term average, approximately 25,000 acres of primary wetland
habitat in four designated Lahontan Valley wetlands. To meet this objective,
the FWS has calculated that an annual average of five acre-feet of water is
needed per acre of primary wetland habitat, based on historical water operations data for Lahontan Valley, evaporation rates, and water requirements
for palustrine marsh habitat.26 Thus, a total of 125,000 acre-feet of water is
needed to meet the goal of sustaining 25,000 acres of wetland habitat. From
this, the FWS subtracts the amount of expected return flow from the irrigation project and the amount of projected usable spill water from Lahontan
Reservoir to determine to acquisition need. The selected option in the Record
of Decision specifies a goal of 75,000 acre-feet of project water to be acquired
from the Carson Division (of which about 20,000 acre-feet have been
acquired to date), with the remainder to come from the Carson River
upstream of Lahontan Reservoir, Carson Division leasing and groundwater
pumping.
Interior states that a part of this water will come from the Truckee River.
Presumably these will be in the form of purchased existing water rights, as
new diversions would be contrary to P.L. 101-618, federal trust responsibilities, the Endangered Species Act and common sense.
In September 1996 the FWS published a Final Environmental Impact
Statement (FEIS) for the Lahontan Valley wetlands water rights acquisition
program. The designated Lahontan Valley wetland areas identified in
P.L. 101-618 and evaluated in the FEIS, together with their respective
wetlands goals, are:
!
!
!

Stillwater NWR and SWMA, 14,000 acres
Carson Lake and Pasture, 10,200 acres
Tribal wetlands, 800 acres

The last of these, the tribal wetlands, are a by-product of irrigation of Indian
lands served by the Newlands Project under agreements with Interior. The
lands identified as tribal wetlands were, in the past, sporadically flooded with
drain water or irrigation water to facilitate grazing and waterfowl hunting.
Because the area had a high water table, irrigation saturated the soils,
creating wetland habitat. Bureau of Indian Affairs authorized the
construction of the TJ Drain in 1983 to drain the waterlogged fields.27
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Truckee River Ecosystem
The Truckee and Carson river ecosystems are interconnected in subtle ways
by the diversion of water from the one river to the other. Anaho Island,
surrounded by Pyramid Lake some sixty miles northwest of the Carson
marshes, is the nesting site of one of the nation’s largest breeding colony of
white pelicans. Double-breasted cormorants, California gulls and other birds
also nest on Anaho. This island, which covered 248 acres before the water
began to recede, has been a federal wildlife sanctuary since 1913. Because
Pyramid Lake presents few suitable foraging opportunities (according to Fish
and Wildlife Service comments received on the draft report, they do at times
feed on tui chub that spawn in Pyramid Lake as well as on cui-ui that
accumulate at the delta in their attempt to move up the Truckee River to
spawn), the nesting pelicans often forage elsewhere. In earlier times they
had a short flight to Winnemucca Lake; with that source dried up, they now
often fly 60 miles each way to the Stillwater refuge. With flights totaling
about 800 miles a week, food gathering costs the pelicans much more energy
than it did before. Concentrated toxics in agricultural drain water and the
diminished productivity of the Carson Sink marshes themselves add to the
strain.
The loss of Winnemucca Lake (described above) from the Truckee River
Basin parallels the Carson Basin’s loss of important wetland habitat. As
Truckee River flows to Pyramid Lake diminished and all flows into Winnemucca Lake were eliminated, an effort to rescue Winnemucca Lake and its
resources was undertaken by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In 1936,
Roosevelt issued an executive order creating a 61,500 acre Winnemucca Lake
National Wildlife Refuge. Nevertheless the lake became completely dry
within two years and was stripped of its refuge designation in 1962, becoming the first national wildlife refuge to be abandoned due to lack of water.
Among the resources lost in the drying up of Winnemucca Lake were a
unique population of giant cutthroat trout. These Lahontan trout were also
found in Pyramid Lake together with a large lake sucker called cui-ui.
Population declines in these two fish species provided the basis for the
Pyramid Lake Tribe, decades later, to challenge water allocations under the
Endangered Species Act and effect a reallocation of water among users in the
two basins.
One of three related fish species, the cui-ui (Chasmistes cujus) once occurred
(up to 5,000 years ago) in the many ancient lakes that covered much of
northwest and west-central Nevada. Cui-ui, listed since 1967 as an
24
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endangered species under the Endangered Species Act (and its predecessors),
remained in the deepest (Pyramid) of the many ancient lakes that dried up
due to long-term climatic changes. Over time, only fragmented lakes
remained and the species became isolated. Following the loss of the
Winnemucca Lake in the 1930s, cui-ui were eliminated from all former
habitat except Pyramid Lake.
Historically, huge numbers of cui-ui spawned in the lower Truckee River;
biologists have determined that their eggs cannot survive in the highly saline
water of Pyramid Lake. Sometimes reaching a length of two feet, the species
was traditionally exploited as an abundant seasonal food source by Native
Americans for hundreds of years. Today, Pyramid Lake is some 50 feet below
its level at the turn of the century and a delta has formed that can inhibit
spawning migrations.
Biologists determined that in the thirty years between 1950 and 1980, only in
1950 and 1969 were major year-classes of cui-ui produced. Only in these
exceedingly wet years did conditions permit a spawning run. Successful
spawning runs have occurred in eleven of the sixteen years since 1980,
however (1982-87 and 1993-97), a span that includes an eight-year drought
that was the most extended and severe on record. The 1997 cui-ui run is
underway at the time of this report and marks the fifth consecutive year with
a spawning run. It is no longer true that spawning runs can occur only in
exceedingly wet years, due to the availability of Stampede Reservoir water.
Fortunately for the cui-ui, their longevity (living 30+ years) and ability to
survive despite extended periods between spawning years, no doubt saved
the species from extinction. This same characteristic has provided a measure
of flexibility in negotiations among competing water interests in the basin;
for example, the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe recently negotiated an
agreement with Sierra Pacific Power Company allowing the water purveyor
to take water stored in Stampede Reservoir during certain dry years because
the species does not need to spawn in every year.28
In addition to the delta formed by the lowering of Pyramid Lake, Marble
Bluff and Numana dams present structural impediments to fish passage. In
need of protection to avoid extinction, cui-ui were reared by hatchery
operations at Pyramid Lake. Unfortunately, the fishway and fish facility at
Marble Bluff suffer from design imperfections and fewer than hoped cui-ui
pass through. Problems include providing sufficient attraction flows, fish
kills due to dissolved oxygen depletion, and a limited capacity to handle the
volumes of fish needed for recovery. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
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Truckee-Carson River Basin Study

(COE) is cooperating in designing a bypass meander channel; a short pilot
channel was tested in 1996 and demonstrated that the concept is feasible,
subject to a number of details that remain to be worked out. Reclamation is
beginning modification of the Marble Bluff fish facility (developed in
consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Cui-ui Recovery
Team, the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe and the COE), which is anticipated to
increase the fish passage ability by a factor of more than ten. The work is
scheduled to be completed before the 1998 spawning run begins. Overall,
hatchery efforts have proved successful as a remedial action to avoid
extinction, but the future of the cui-ui remains uncertain.
A Cui-ui Recovery Plan was approved in 1992 which outlines the steps
necessary for the species' recovery and long-term management. The core
management recommendations that will ensure recovery and delisting are
dependent upon securing water upstream from Pyramid Lake. The objective
of the Recovery Plan is to improve the status of cui-ui so that the species has
at least a 95 percent probability of persisting for 200 years—and may be
delisted by 2016 if all conservation measures are successfully implemented.
Part of this objective may be achieved by securing and maintaining additional
spawning and rearing habitat for cui-ui in the lower Truckee River and
Pyramid Lake. According to the recovery plan, sufficient habitat would be
provided if Truckee River inflow to Pyramid Lake was supplemented with up
to 110,000 acre-feet of water per year. Equivalent habitat benefits could be
generated by implementing a variety of other water management measures
and habitat improvement strategies:
!

Reducing Truckee River diversions to the Newlands Project by
implementing Reclamation’s revised bench and bottom land map,
modifying operational criteria and procedures (called OCAP, discussed
further below), improving structural and operational delivery facilities,
reducing annual carryover storage in project reservoirs, conserving
irrigation water on Fallon Naval Air Station, and reducing irrigation
demand in the upper portions of the Carson River;

!

Rehabilitating the lower Truckee River;

!

Improving fish passage over the Truckee River delta;

!

Implementing the Truckee River Operating Agreement;

!

Acquiring water rights; and/or
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!

Recouping excess water from the Newlands Project.

The FWS is at various stages in implementing the measures, and it is too
early to determine the exact amount of water or benefits to the species that
have been secured or achieved.
A similar scenario to that of the cui-ui surrounds the Lahontan cutthroat
trout (Oncorhnchus clarki henshawi), an inland subspecies of cutthroat
endemic to the Lahontan Basin of northern Nevada, eastern California, and
southern Oregon. This threatened species now occupies less than 1% of its
historical lake habitat and about 10% of its historical stream habitat. It was
federally listed as an endangered species in 1970 and reclassified as
threatened in 1975. The factors associated with the species’ demise are more
diverse than those of the cui-ui. Pollution, over-harvesting, grazing impacts
to riparian vegetation, and the introduction of non-native trout species have
contributed greatly to the species' decline, which has been widespread. In
the case of the Pyramid Lake strain, which was extinct by 1944, water
diversions from the Truckee River at Derby Dam for the Newlands Project
may have been the most significant factor. Stream flows were usually
inadequate for the trout to swim upstream to spawn; when flows were
adequate, the fish could not pass Derby Dam because it had no suitable fish
ladder. Hatchery stocking began in 1967 and effectively reestablished the
species in Pyramid Lake; a successful recreational fishery exists, and the
hatchery program is now integral to perpetuating the species throughout
much of its remaining suitable habitat. The original Pyramid Lake strain of
Lahontan cutthroat trout lived 10 years or longer and grew to 40 to 60
pounds; current hatchery stocks in the lake seldom grow over 15 pounds.
Like the cui-ui, the Lahontan cutthroat trout is an obligatory stream
spawner. Returning Lahontan cutthroat trout to the Truckee River and
other streams is a primary objective of the recovery effort, since viable selfsustaining populations can only occur in stream habitats. Unfortunately, for
natural spawning by cutthroat to be reestablished in the lower Truckee
River, flow conditions must greatly exceed those required by the cui-ui and
they need to occur throughout most of the year. Numerous biological
problems have surfaced as obstacles to the full recovery of Lahontan
cutthroat trout; not all are related simply to water availability. The decline
and fragmentation of the species began thousands of years ago as Lake
Lahontan began to dry up. Some genetic diversity has been permanently lost
and the recovery process will be a complex one.
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The Final Recovery Plan for Lahontan cutthroat trout was approved in early
1995 and provides for separate delisting of three population subgroups,
protection and management of all existing populations to prevent the species
from declining irreversibly, securing and maintaining habitat to sustain
viable populations, and reintroduction of the trout to some sites within its
historic range.
Recovery objectives are proposed to maintain and enhance 155 stream
populations and two self-perpetuating lake populations. Pyramid Lake is
identified as an area for population viability research and ecosystem
planning for recovery of lake-dwelling stocks. The FWS plans to complete
population modeling to determine whether sufficient numbers of viable
populations of the trout are being maintained.

1.4 Socioeconomic Setting
The Truckee-Carson River basins encompasses a diversified regional
economy ranging from highly developed urban areas, to sparsely populated
ranch lands and irrigated farms, to remote, unpopulated wetlands and
wildlife habitat. The urban areas are characterized by high population
growth, resulting in pressures to acquire more water for urban uses.
The basins contain adequate economic diversity so that transfers of water
from irrigation to urban growth, fisheries and wetlands need not negatively
impact the region’s overall economic vitality. Agriculture accounts for only a
small percentage of jobs and personal income, and transfers to new uses will
support thriving urban and recreation-based economic sectors creating jobs
in those areas. Limited water supplies have constrained economic
development in the Lake Tahoe area and eventually may limit urban growth
in the Reno-Sparks area. For the next several decades, however, areas
served by Sierra Pacific have adequate supplies for growth due to innovative
agreements concerning water storage and reservoir operations, continuing
water acquisitions, and urban conservation efforts.
In California, the Truckee watershed includes portions of Sierra, Nevada,
Placer and El Dorado counties; in Nevada, most of the watershed is in
Washoe County. The upper Truckee watershed does not have extensive
urban development; most is around Lake Tahoe, Truckee, or in several small
recreational communities. Tourism is key to the economy in the upper basin.
Most of the basins’ population is concentrated in the rapidly growing
metropolitan Truckee Meadows area (the cities of Reno and Sparks, Nevada).
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These urban demands dominate the upper Truckee River water use. By
1992, half of the original agricultural use in the Truckee Meadows had been
converted to municipal and industrial use. Remnant agricultural lands
include pasture and alfalfa. Communities outside Truckee Meadows and the
surrounding area include Fernley, the center of the Truckee Division of the
Newlands Project, and several small communities on the Pyramid Lake
Indian Reservation.
Reno/Sparks grew by 31-33 percent in the decade between 1980 and 1990
(CRA:50). Urban areas in the Carson watershed kept pace: the Carson City
grew 26% over the same period and Fallon grew by 51%. This rapid growth
has driven increased municipal demand stress on scarce water resources.
Over the past 10 years, the growth rate in the Reno-Sparks area has
ameliorated, averaging 2-3% per year.29
The upper Carson watershed, in Alpine County, California, is sparsely
populated. With a population of 1,113 in the 1990 census, Alpine is
California’s least-populated county. The lower watershed, in Nevada,
includes parts of Douglas, Carson City30, Lyon, Pershing, Storey, and
Churchill counties. Agriculture and logging, the historic land uses in the
upper Carson after the mining boom ceased, are practiced on a smaller scale
today. Most agricultural activities, primarily cattle grazing, occur on the only
large area of private land remaining in this part of Alpine County—Diamond
Valley, at the head of the larger Carson Valley.
Most rural communities in the region rely on a mix of economic activities to
support community economic vitality, with agriculture ranking third or fourth
in the list of economic sectors that provide jobs and income in Churchill and
Lyon Counties. Even so, buyouts of irrigated land will force businesses
linked to agriculture to downsize, or to adapt to serve the increasingly nonagricultural clientele moving into the Lahontan Valley. Outside of the RenoSparks urban area, the primary sources of employment are the services
sector (which includes gaming and tourism), government (particularly in
Carson City and Fallon), manufacturing, and retail trade. Although most
land ownership in the upper watershed of both basins is in federal forest
lands, logging has diminished from its historical role as a significant
component of the local economies of the upper watersheds. Mining is an
element in the economic climate of northern Nevada as a whole; the state is a
leader in gold mining (CRA:57) and there are several mines for commodities
used in the construction and manufacturing trades in the lower Carson basin
(CRA:50).
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Nevada has few major farming areas, due to the state’s arid nature. The
area served by the Newlands Project is one of the state’s most important
agricultural regions. However, despite this and despite the fact that
agriculture is a dominant land use in much of the lower Carson basin,
agriculture (including farming and agricultural service businesses) accounts
for a small portion of overall jobs and earnings in the basin (less than 4%),
but is important to some communities. In Churchill and Lyon Counties,
farming and agricultural services account for 10–12 percent of jobs and
personal income, with agriculture ranking below services, mining,
government, and wholesale and retail trade as a component of the counties’
economies31. Most acreage is devoted to alfalfa and irrigated pasture for
livestock production; grains and truck crops are produced in lesser amounts.
Land ownership in agriculture is typified by a mix of large and small farms,
some of which could be characterized as suburban ranchettes with little
commercial agricultural function. Figures supplied to Congress in
conjunction with 1994 hearings on P.L. 101-618 indicated that, in 1990, out of
a total of 3,130 farms in the Newlands Project, the number of farms of less
than 10 acres was 2,373 and those farms averaged 1.7 acres. However, they
totaled only about 5% of the total farm acreage on the project. (Since this
data was based on County parcel units without analysis of ownership, the
conclusions drawn from the data must be qualified.)
In contrast, there were 162 farms of 100 acres or larger. These averaged
305 acres and accounted for 65% of the acreage and, presumably, about that
percentage of water rights. There were 595 farms in the 10 to 100 acre range
with an average acreage of 38 acres, constituting 30% of the farm acreage.
While Churchill County’s irrigated agriculture is likely to be significantly
affected by water acquisitions for wetlands restoration, only about ten
percent of the irrigated acreage in Lyon County is located in areas relevant
for water acquisitions to restore wetlands. Consequently, Churchill County
has been the focus of concerns over economic effects of water acquisition
programs and is the geographic scope for the recently completed Final EIS for
such acquisitions.32
The Fallon Naval Air Station (Fallon NAS) accounts for 27 percent of jobs in
Churchill County; the NAS together with nature-based recreation and
farming have been the traditional mainstays of the Churchill County
economy. Given the rapid growth in the Reno-Sparks corridor, Churchill
County also is beginning to serve as a bedroom area for commuters into the
cities.33
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Land outside the urban areas, small rural communities and areas developed
for natural resources (such as agriculture, mining or logging) could be
characterized as high cold desert. Outdoor recreation associated with
wetlands such as hunting, fishing, hiking, and birdwatching) is another
important component of the economy of some communities in the basin and
can be expected to become more significant as wetland acreage improves in
quality and size.34

1.5 Public Lands and Public Trust Resources
Historically, it is often difficult to distinguish between public and private land
management. Public lands have been available for mining and timber
harvest. Ownership of these lands was less important than the right to use
the land for extractive purposes.35
In the middle of the nineteenth century the federal government seeking to fill
the territories of the new states fostered land settlement. Much of the
federal land was available for homesteading: federal programs required
certain land improvements within a given time frame in order to have the
land title transferred to a private party. Early settlers in the TruckeeCarson Water Basin region could not afford the cost of transportation and
water supply infrastructure. Thus, these large capital projects were
developed by governmental financing schemes including: 1) granting federal
lands for rail corridor development; and 2) the federal reclamation program
providing major public works projects to benefit local homesteaders at a
forgiving payback rate.
These actions influenced land management by regulating basin-wide water
resources so that farmers could grow irrigated crops in an otherwise
unfavorable climate. Rail access enabled the farmers to participate in
commerce in a much wider region.
The most important government policy shaping land management has been
that regarding water rights. Paradoxically, western land management is
wedded to water availability, yet water resource management has been
divorced from consideration of the effects of different kinds of land uses until
quite recently.
Common law provides for landowners adjacent to watercourses to have
reasonable rights to instream water, known as riparian rights. However,
early mining activities depended on appropriating water from natural
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channels to engineered conveyances for transfer of water some distance from
natural drainage to the mining site. These activities were codified as
appropriated water rights.
Past public land management has been for mineral extraction, timber
harvest, agricultural development, rail transportation (granting of federal
lands) and homesteading for settlement purposes. The following is a brief
and incomplete survey of the public lands within the Truckee-Carson River
Basin. Further investigation should be conducted for school lands and their
management, for specific Bureau of Land Management lands and their
opportunities and constraints for basin or watershed management.

Carson River Watershed
California.—More than 95 percent of the California watershed for Carson
River is owned by the federal government (CRA:49). The Toiyabe National
Forest includes portions of two wilderness areas—Mokelumne and Carson
Iceberg wilderness areas. Historic uses include mining, agriculture and
logging. Most agricultural activities, primarily cattle grazing, are generally
confined to private lands. The forest lands are used for a variety of
recreational activities including hiking, camping and skiing in addition to
logging.
Rafting is possible on the East Fork during the spring snowmelt period when
high flows are available in normal to wet years. A portion of the East Fork
from Markleeville downstream to stateline has been added to California’s
Wild and Scenic River System. Federal reservoirs and water facilities in the
watershed are described above. Several undeveloped hot springs are located
on public lands accessible to hikers or off-road vehicles.
Potential residential and recreational development on private agricultural
lands due to growth pressures from Lake Tahoe was a catalyst for groups
interested in preserving open space to take action. Mountain meadows
supporting low-value grazing have been targeted for land acquisition through
options or purchases to be transferred to the Forest Service.
Carson River supports a popular recreational trout fishery in the upper
watershed in California. Department of Fish and Game stock the East Fork
with hatchery trout; other segments are designated as wild trout waters from
which hatchery fish are prohibited and special fishing regulations apply.
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Heenan Lake, on Monitor Creek tributary to the East Fork is used by DFG
for raising Lahontan cutthroat trout to stock other Sierra locations.
Other public lands, such as the waterways of the rivers were historically
managed by water diversion to provide water for private land activities.

Nevada.—Similar to the California portion of Carson Watershed, land
ownership in Nevada's Carson Sink is dominated by federal land ownership.
Some of this ownership is characterized by a "checkerboard" pattern of
alternating private and federal sections. This pattern was created when the
federal government granted lands to railroad companies as incentive to build
the transcontinental rail. The Bureau of Land Management administers
most of the federal land in the Nevada portion of the Carson watershed; the
remainder are managed by the Bureau of Reclamation, Fish and Wildlife
Service and the military.
Reclamation has developed an interpretive area at Grimes Point, on the
sink's eastern edge, where extensive traces of prehistoric inhabitants have
been found. The Hidden Cave area is a cluster of caves used by early huntergatherers. Public land management of the Lahontan Valley wetlands is
described above.

Truckee River Watershed
California.—The watershed in California includes portions of Sierra,
Nevada, Placer, and El Dorado counties and a very slim portion of Alpine
County. The largest landowner is the federal government, managed by the
forest service for Tahoe or El Dorado National Forest. Only the fringe of land
around Lake Tahoe is in private ownership. According to the DWR Truckee
River Atlas, the federal government owns at least 50 percent of the
California portion of the watershed.
U.S. Forest Lands are managed largely for recreational uses including
campgrounds, portions of ski areas, and hiking trails. During the mining
years, the watershed forest was cut for wood to build flumes, mills and
habitable structures. The forest as represented by second growth trees and
logging is greatly diminished as witnessed by the closure of the last large
lumber mill in Truckee by the year 1991. The dominant uses today for
watershed lands in federal ownership are water-based recreation, and
appreciation of the scenic values.
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Lake Tahoe is a major recreation destination for boating, hiking, camping,
and fishing. The federal reservoirs provide facilities for various uses. The
Truckee River supports rafting on a short stretch below Lake Tahoe Dam
with certain flows.

Nevada.—Washoe County in Nevada is the most populous county in the
Truckee watershed. Other counties include portions of Storey, Pershing,
Lyon, Douglas, Churchill, and Carson City. At least half of the total land
area is owned by the federal government, particularly to the north and east
of the City of Reno and Sparks area. The U.S. Bureau of Land Management
manages most of the federal land not including the Indian reservation for dry
land grazing and mining uses. The U.S. Forest Service manages a small
portion of the Toiyabe National Forest which is within the Nevada portion of
the watershed.
Pyramid Lake is managed by the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, including a
Lahontan cutthroat fishery. The lake is the site of Anaho Island National
Wildlife Refuge (described above), home of the American white pelicans, and
the only National Wildlife Refuge in the Truckee Watershed. Federal water
facilities in the watershed are described above.

1.6 Institutional Setting
The Truckee-Carson River basin negotiations, settlement, and ongoing issues
involve a complex array of institutions, including diverse and layered
agencies of federal, state, and regional government, cities and counties,
nonprofit environmental organizations, and two Indian tribes. For example,
there are no fewer than eight agencies within the U.S. Department of
Interior involved. The following provides a reference resource, briefly
identifying each institution and its role (water purveyors are covered in
Chapter 2 below).

Federal Agencies
The federal government has been deeply involved in the development of
water in the Truckee-Carson River Basins from the beginning of the
Newlands Project (Bureau of Reclamation) and in the tribal issues (Bureau
of Indian Affairs) and fish and wildlife issues (U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service)
associated with water development. The diversity of voices and perspectives
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issuing from these branches of the federal government led the Office of the
Secretary of the Department of Interior to establish a Truckee-Carson
Coordination Office, to provide local coordination on the ground and help
these Interior agencies to speak with one voice. In addition, several agencies
of the departments of Agriculture, Army and Navy are involved. Following is
a list of some of the more prominent agencies:

Department of Interior.—
!
!
!
!
!
!

Truckee-Carson Coordination Office
Bureau of Reclamation
Fish & Wildlife Service
Bureau of Indian Affairs
Bureau of Land Management
Geological Survey

Department of Army.—
!

Army Corps of Engineers

Department of Navy.—
Fallon Naval Air Station.—The Fallon Naval Air Station (NAS), located
in the Carson River Basin near Fallon, in the Newlands Project area, is one
of the largest employers in Churchill County. The NAS became important to
the Settlement Agreement due to water rights it owns and uses to grow crops
adjacent to runways to control dust and foreign objects and suppress aircraftcaused brush and grass fires. Under the Settlement Agreement, the NAS
was required to prepare a modified land management plan and implement
water conservation measures. Paragraph 206(c)(3) of the Agreement states:
All water no longer used and water rights no longer exercised by the
Secretary of the Navy as a result of the implementation of the modified
land management plan or measures specified by this subsection shall
be managed by the Secretary for the benefit of fish and wildlife
resources referenced in sections 206 and 207 of this title.
These waters and water rights are to be managed primarily for the
conservation of Pyramid Lake resources, with some water rights to be used
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for the benefit of Lahontan Valley wetlands. The FWS and the Navy have
signed a Memorandum of Agreement that calls for the irrigation water saved
or conserved at the NAS in the future to be used for fish and wildlife,
primarily cui-ui, and secondarily wetlands protection. Based on the
provisions of the MOA, about 2,300 acre-feet per year could be available from
the Navy under this agreement.

Department of Agriculture.—
!
!

Forest Service
Natural Resources Conservation Service
State Agencies

Two states, Nevada and California, share an interest in the waters of the
Truckee-Carson River Basins. Their pursuit of an interstate compact to
allocate and regulate these waters is described in Chapter 3 below.
Following is a list of some of the key agencies involved in both states:
California.—
!
!
!
!

Department of Water Resources
State Water Resources Control Board
Department of Fish and Game
Interstate Compact Commission
Nevada.—

!
!
!
!
!
!
!

Department of Conservation and Natural Resources
Division of Environmental Protection
Division of Water Planning
State Engineer
Department of Wildlife
Interstate Compact Commission
Cooperative Extension Service

Regional Agencies
Several regional agencies also have roles in the watersheds or basins of the
Truckee-Carson, including the interstate Tahoe Regional Planning Agency
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(TRPA) which regulates development and coordinates planning on both the
California and Nevada sides of the Lake Tahoe watershed:
!

Regional Water Planning Commission of Reno-Sparks and Washoe
County

!

Regional Planning Governing Board (Reno, Sparks, Washoe County)

!

Tahoe Regional Planning Agency

Comments by the California Department of Water Resources drew attention
to TRPA as the type of innovative governance alternative that other river
basins can learn from. TRPA was created by interstate compact adopted by
the legislatures of each state and subsequently ratified by Congress. In
coordination with other state and local agencies in the basin, TRPA acts to
control growth and regulate land use planning and development. TRPA has
imposed stringent controls on basin development, with a key focus being
actions to preserve the pristine water quality which has made Lake Tahoe
special.

Cities and Counties
There are five California counties and seven Nevada counties within the
Truckee-Carson River basins, and about 15 cities and towns. Particularly
noteworthy are the cities of Reno and Sparks and Washoe County, Nevada,
for their growing municipal water demands; and Churchill County, Nevada,
together with the towns of Fallon and Fernley, which are rural agricultural
communities which have served as town centers for Newlands Project
irrigators for decades and which will bear the brunt of the impact with
changing water allocations.
The City of Fallon, in response to the draft report, provided the following
history and context: “The City of Fallon [was in incorporated in] 1908 and is
situated near the geographic center of the county. The City owns surface
water rights served by the Newlands Project. However, much more
importantly, the City has a municipal water system which supplies drinking
water to many thousands of Nevadans, and this system is affected by
Newlands Project water deliveries. The City’s municipal system is fully
permitted under Nevada law and its appropriated underground Nevada
water rights utilize the basalt aquifer, recharged at least in part by the
surface irrigation practices of owners of decreed water rights served by the
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Newlands Project. Protection of the quality and quantity of its residents’
drinking water supply is a paramount and nondiscretionary responsibility of
the City.” The City believes that its interests and “the drinking water upon
which its residents rely for health and safety are jeopardized by the current
implementation of the mandates set in motion by P.L. 101-618.”

Native American Tribes
Native Americans seek water rights to preserve their cultural heritage and
to sustain themselves economically. Native Americans have had unique
water rights since 1908 but the rights were difficult to exercise and did not
always recognize tribal needs. The original purpose of granting Indian Tribes
water rights was to transform nomadic tribes to pastoral peoples. Many
Native Americans consider this purpose incomplete at best and seek water
for traditional uses as well as for irrigation and M&I uses. In the past
decade, tribes and other Native American groups have been able to gain
unprecedented power to reallocate water process through federal
environmental and tribal laws.

Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe.—The Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation,
ancestral home of the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, was established in 1859
and occupies 640,815 acres surrounding Pyramid Lake. As described above,
the lake provides critical habitat for the cui-ui, an endangered fish, and
Lahontan cutthroat trout, a threatened fish. Both this unique high desert
lake and the fish are of special cultural significance to the Tribe. The Tribe
derives most of its livelihood from the Lahontan cutthroat trout fishery by
selling use permits for fishing, boating and camping. Many families residing
on the Reservation are employed by the fisheries, with the balance employed
in tribal administration, private enterprise, cattle operations, and offReservation employment in nearby Reno. The Tribe has a total membership
of about 2,400 people, of which about 1,500 reside on the Reservation.
Water is a major component of the Tribe’s identity and way of life, which
integrates the people, the lake, and the fish. From the Tribe’s perspective,
these three are inseparable; one does not exist without the other. Thus, the
Tribe and its way of life were deeply affected by the Newlands Project
diversions, together with the federal decision, in negotiating water rights on
the Tribe’s behalf in the first half of this century, that it was the purpose of
the Tribe to be farmers.
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The Pyramid Lake Tribe has long claimed additional flows to improve the
quality, quantity and timing of flows into Pyramid Lake. Under the Winters
Doctrine, the tribe is entitled to sufficient water to serve all the purposes for
which the reservation was established. However, under the Orr Ditch
decree, although it received water for irrigation with the first priority, the
tribe received no water for maintenance of the lake for traditional
subsistence fishing and spiritual culture. There is no provision for purposes
other than irrigation; neither Pyramid Lake nor the fishery were recognized
purposes. The Orr Ditch Decree (described elsewhere), awarded water rights
for the irrigation of approximately 5,800 acres on the Pyramid Lake
Reservation with a 1859 priority date (the year in which the reservation was
created).
The Tribe felt its way of life imperiled after the Truckee Canal diverted about
one-half of the flow of the Truckee River to the Carson basin, causing the
lake level to drop precipitously. After a long period of protest with the
Bureau of Indian Affairs, the tribe turned to litigation to restore the Truckee
flows. In the 1960s the tribe began to challenge the Orr Ditch decree.
Although the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the finality of the
decree, the tribe's objections have rendered the Newlands Project's rights
more uncertain in the past two decades.
The tribe pursued three strategies: (1) modify the operation of the Newlands
Project, (2) reopen the Orr Ditch decree, and (3) use the Endangered Species
Act to control unallocated blocks of water. The first and third strategies were
successful. The Newlands Project controls the major available pool of water
open to reallocation. In a major decision, a federal district court held in 1973
that the tribe was owed a trust duty and ordered Interior to modify the
operation of the Newlands Project.36
Interior was directed to supply the Newlands Project with sufficient water to
serve water rights, but not more than was necessary to serve those rights.
The reasoning behind this was that the United States must meet its trust
obligation to the Tribe by letting all water not needed to fully meet Newlands
water rights flow to the reservation and Pyramid Lake. Interior states that
“in so holding, the court required a standard for federal actions affecting
trust responsibilities that has been consistently upheld by the courts: the
trust responsibility must be met unless overridden by specific federal law,
contract, rights, etc. Beyond that, responsibilities and opportunities can be
balanced. The court further mandated implementation of a specific OCAP
[see discussion below] and the same legal requirement drives the OCAP.”

39

Truckee-Carson River Basin Study

In response to this decision, Interior has issued progressively more stringent
sets of Operating Criteria and Procedures (OCAP) for the Newlands Project,
which is described further below. The tribe tried to reopen the Orr Ditch
decree on the grounds that Interior's representation of both the tribe and the
Newlands Project landowners in the adjudication constituted a conflict of
interest. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Orr Ditch Decree was settled
law. The tribe then sued on grounds that it had not been adequately
represented and settled out of court.37
Despite its setbacks, the tribe has been able to assert its traditional water
uses to achieve results through the Endangered Species Act. After the cui-ui
was listed as endangered and the Lahontan cutthroat as threatened, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Stampede Reservoir, built in the
1960s to supplement Reno's water supply, had to be managed to maintain
the fish species instead of for municipal and industrial uses. This decision
has given the Pyramid Lake Tribe great leverage with upstream users, to
complement the leverage that the earlier decision gave it with the Newlands
Project. The Truckee and Carson river users were forced to negotiate a
legislative settlement. Under the Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water
Rights Settlement Act (P.L. 101-618) and the Preliminary Settlement
Agreement with Sierra Pacific, the Pyramid Lake Tribe has sought to protect
its gains while supporting a workable compromise with other river users.

Fallon Paiute Shoshone Tribe.—Most of the attention has been focused on
the Pyramid Lake Tribe, but another small band seeks more traditional
Winter rights. The Fallon Indian Reservation on the eastern edge of the
Newlands Projects has been characterized as the "forgotten tribe" in this
mix.38 In 1890, under the provisions of the General Allotment Act of 1887,
fifty 160-acre allotments of land were awarded to the tribe, followed by an
additional allotment of 146 160-acre parcels of land in 1894, for a total of
more than 31,000 acres. Most of this acreage was initially located in what
later became the Newlands Project Area.
Following the authorization and implementation of the Newlands Act of
1902, the national government entered into contracts with the tribe, whereby
186 individual tribe members gave up their 160-acre tracts of land (for the
Newlands Project) in exchange for 10-acre allotments with fully-irrigable
water rights attached thereto, to be served by the Newlands Project. Thus
30,000 acres were carved out of the Indians' reservation to make way for the
Newlands Project. In exchange, these tribal members received 4,640 acres
with water rights attached, to be given to the tribes in perpetuity at no cost.
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Additional acreage was later added to the reservation, bringing the total
amount of acreage up to 5,400, again with attached water rights. However in
1978, by passing Public Law 95-337, Congress recognized the failure of the
government to meet its contractual responsibilities to the Indians. It also
recognized tribal growth, and therefore increased the size of their reservation
by 2,700 acres. The mandate of the 1978 Act, however, also was not carried
out.39
In 1990, the tribe achieved partial satisfaction on its claim for breach of trust
under the Settlement Act which created a fund from which monies may be
used to purchase up to 8,453 acre-feet per year and for improvement of the
existing irrigation system. Total tribal water use is limited to 10,568 acrefeet per year.

Washoe Tribe.—This tribe occupies lands in the upper Carson River basin.
Environmental Community
Environmental interests were first organized in about 1988 into the
Lahontan Wetlands Coalition (which included the Environmental Defense
Fund [EDF], Nevada Waterfowl Association, and about 20 other members
concerned with the environmental issues of the Truckee-Carson River
basins.
In 1989, The Nature and Conservancy (TNC) joined EDF in a joint venture to
represent environmental issues. The joint venture was particularly active
after the 1990 Settlement Act, and hired Dr. Graham Chisholm in 1992 to
coordinate their activities. TNC became a key player in assisting FWS
acquire water rights for the Lahontan wetlands, consistent with its role
elsewhere.
TNC and EDF later joined the Wetlands Coalition to form a “Conservation
Caucus” representing environmental interests at the second generation
negotiations in 1994-95.

Lahontan Valley Environmental Alliance
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Fallon and Fernley residents formed the Lahontan Valley Environmental
Alliance (LVEA) in October 1993. The LVEA represented an inter-local
agreement between the City of Fallon, Town of Fernley, Churchill County,
Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, Lahontan Conservation District, and the
Stillwater Conservation District. LVEA represented a more community-wide
effort to negotiate a settlement to outstanding water issues and to maintain
a viable agricultural industry in the region.40
Newlands Water Protective Association
The non-profit Newlands Water Protective Association (NWPA) was formed
to protect the rights of Newlands water rights owners in Lyon and Churchill
counties. According to comments submitted on the draft Truckee-Carson
Basin Study, the NWPA was organized in response to the Tribe’s decision to
file about 2,200 petitions in Federal District Court against certain Newlands
Project water rights and has participated in several of the negotiations
involving Newlands water since then.

Truckee-Carson Leasing Authority
The Truckee-Carson Leasing Authority (TCLA) became incorporated in
Nevada in 1993 as a non-profit organization. TCLA's organizers created the
agency to encourage TCID farmers to lease their water rather than sell it, as
a means to satisfy upstream urban demands, wetland and wildlife needs, and
other uses while retaining ownership of the right. It was feared that if water
right holders in the Newlands Project sold their water rights outright, it
would soon become too expensive and inefficient to operate the project's
extensive irrigation system for those who wished to remain in agriculture.
Under TCLA's organizational plan, members were to pay a $125 membership
fee and then give ten percent of any profits derived from leasing to TCLA for
operating costs. After an investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice,
TCLA agreed that no more than 25 percent of the water-righted acreage in
the Newlands Project would be involved at any one time in leasing.41
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2. Water Use and Rights
This section presents a summary of water use and rights in the TruckeeCarson river basins, including a survey of the major uses and users; the
agreements, decrees and doctrines governing use of the rivers; the water
purveyors and water operations; and the regional water transfer market.
The major features of the water storage and delivery system were reviewed
in Chapter 1 in conjunction with the discussion of basin hydrologies.

2.1 Water Use
Although most water development has occurred in California, almost all of
the water is used downstream, in arid western Nevada. Most available
surface water supplies are appropriated by adjudications begun in the
reclamation era. There are substantial reallocation pressures as urban areas
grow, irrigated agriculture continues to decline, and environmental values
become recognized. Municipal and industrial uses, irrigated agriculture
(including both Indian and non-Indian irrigators), aboriginal Indian fisheries,
wetland maintenance, and migratory waterfowl compete for some 750,000
acre-feet per year of decreed rights. The major water-using competitors
include
!
!
!
!
!

Truckee meadows urban area
Newlands Project irrigated agriculture
Pyramid Lake endangered fish
Lahontan Valley wetlands
Upper Carson River farms and urban areas
Municipal Use

Litigation enabled the Pyramid Lake Tribe to influence water use throughout
the Truckee-Carson system. This created substantial problems for water
suppliers and developers in the Truckee meadows area; they had neither
secure access to federal reservoirs nor clear access to alternative supplies.
Interstate ground water use remains uncertain. To accommodate the
continued rapid growth in the Reno-Sparks areas, water suppliers and
developers have had to acquire existing irrigation rights. Most of the existing
water rights have now been acquired by the water supply division of Sierra
Pacific. The third party effects of these reallocations on downstream users
who may be entitled to return flows are considered by Sierra Pacific to be
potentially beneficial, in that net flows to downstream users have increased
as the Truckee Meadows has urbanized (comments received on draft report).
Municipal water use in the California portion of the basin located
downstream of Lake Tahoe is 5,000–6,000 acre-feet per year, supplied almost
entirely by groundwater. Under the interstate allocation provisions of
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PL 101-618 to be implemented by TROA, use by the developed areas in
California and Nevada that surround Lake Tahoe would be capped at
34,000 acre-feet from the lake, streams, springs, and groundwater. Strict
growth control measures around Lake Tahoe are based on a water
availability of 34,000 acre-feet—an amount negotiated as a part of the
1990 water settlement TRA:75–76). In the early 1990s, Truckee River
municipal diversions below stateline ranged from about 49,000 to
63,000 acre-feet per year (TRA:77)
Nevada is not only the driest state in the nation, it has the fastest growth
rate in the nation as well. Washoe County, which includes Reno and Sparks
(regional centers for commerce and tourism), has a metropolitan area
population of about 300,000 and an average growth rate during the 1980s of
2–4 percent.42 The vast majority of urban residents and industry receive gas,
water, and electrical service from the Sierra Pacific Power Company (Sierra
Pacific), a privately owned utility. Most of the municipal demand in the
region occurs near the cities of Reno and Sparks, where Sierra Pacific served
about 63,000 acre-feet per year to its retail customers in 1994 (TRA:77).43
Sierra Pacific projects that the population it serves (which is about seventyfour percent of the total Washoe County population) will grow to about
300,000 by the year 2015. Per capita use has ranged from 333 gallons per
day in 1985 to a low of 249 gallons per day in 1993, during a severe drought
with water use restrictions imposed. In 1994, per capita use had risen to
268 gallons per day. The utility expects a total water demand of about
70,000 acre-feet per year in the year 2015, incorporating its metering
program and other conservation measures along with population growth.
The utility expects to have adequate firm water supplies to serve its
projected demands well beyond the year 2015 due to successful acquisition of
additional surface water and groundwater to serve new development, and to
a multi-party agreement which gives the utility firmer dry year supplies. In
1994, Sierra Pacific negotiated a 25 year agreement with other basin
interests to augment its supplies through leasing additional reservoir
storage, through refining reservoir management to better accommodate both
endangered fishery needs and urban demands, and through implementing
additional municipal conservation programs.44 The agreement reiterates the
utility’s obligation to implement its metering program (described below) and
obligates it to expend a specific amount of money each year on public water
conservation education programs, leak detection and repair, distribution of
water saving devices, and monitoring of outdoor watering in its service
area.45
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Residential water use in the Reno-Sparks area is largely unmetered,
although meters are being installed gradually to under agreements made
with Sierra Pacific. The Nevada state legislature reversed its historic no
water metering stance with new legislation in 1989. Per capita use generally
has been high compared to other western cities, over 300 gallons per day,
with notable decreases during drought years when residents altered their
water use habits. Most residential water users pay a flat rate for water
service. Residential use, which accounts for about 60% of urban area use, is
split evenly between indoor and outdoor uses.46
Sierra Pacific is implementing conservation measures, including a plan for
financing and installing water meters and an inverted block rate water
structure. With funds collected from developers seeking water service, the
utility has begun a meter installation program. The program’s goal is
installation of 44,000 meters over the next decade. Two thousand meters
had been installed by mid-1996. Households must volunteer to switch from a
flat water bill of $43/month for a typical household to metered water rates
which will result in lower monthly water bills. The metered water rates are
based on a two-tiered increasing block structure, with the lowest price block
set at 6,000 gallons per month (gpm) for a single family residence to
accommodate typical indoor residential use. Once 90% of customers that
formerly paid flat water rates are metered, then metered water rates become
mandatory. New residential and commercial customers have been required
to be metered since mid-1988. In addition to metering, the utility has
implemented limits on outdoor watering, leak detection and repair, public
education, and other conservation measures.47 In 1996, the Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe formally agreed that the actions taken by Sierra Pacific have
satisfied the conditions laid out in the Settlement Act.48
Water used by Reno historically has been returned to the stream as treated
effluent. The problem is that these discharges have been in violation of the
Clean Water Act, and Reno and Sparks are seriously considering land
disposal as a treatment alternative. The new Water Quality Agreement
(discussed elsewhere in this report) is intended to provide clean flows, allow
land application of treated effluent, and avoid concerns about reduced return
flows. All western states have struggled with how to allocate the
entitlements to treated sewage, and this represents an innovative solution.
The Washoe County Public Works Department provides some water service
to outlying communities in the Reno-Sparks area. Nonagricultural water
users located outside of the service area of water purveyors generally have to
rely on local groundwater supplies to meet their water demands.
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Groundwater basins in northwestern Nevada are closed to additional
appropriation, so new groundwater users generally need to acquire water
rights from existing users.
Sierra Pacific, the cities, and Washoe County typify growing areas of the
West in their search for water supplies that will support new residents in the
style to which immigrating urban dwellers are accustomed. Lawns,
fountains, pools, and verdant landscaping belie the desert surroundings and
attract newcomers. In addition to pursuing water for new growth, water
providers also urgently seek supplies that are reliable during the droughts to
which the region is susceptible.
Agricultural Use
By far the largest agricultural water use in the Truckee-Carson River basins
occurs in the Newlands Project. According to the Newlands Project Efficiency
Study, the Newlands Project has over 73,700 acres of water-righted lands,
although historically a maximum of about 65,000 acres have been irrigated.
There are two divisions to the Newlands Project, the Truckee Division and
the Carson Division. The Carson Division is the larger of the two. Quoting
from the 1994 Efficiency Study:
Truckee Division lands comprise about 5,900 water-righted acres, eight
percent of project lands; approximately 4,300 acres are under
cultivation and are supplied with water directly from the 31.2 milelong Truckee Canal. Beginning in 1905, water was diverted from the
Truckee River at Derby Dam for agricultural use. Most of the division
lands are located near the town of Fernley in the Truckee River
watershed. All but 7.5 acres of Truckee Division lands are currently
classified as bench lands, entitled to 4.5 acre-feet/acre of water
annually. If Reclamation’s proposed bench/bottom criteria are
approved, bottom lands will increase to 228.1 acres.
Carson Division lands are in the Carson River watershed near the
town of Fallon. The Division consists of about 67,820 acres, of which
about 52,900 acres are currently irrigated, which comprise the bulk of
the project lands and are supplied with water by releases from
Lahontan Reservoir and a small amount from the Rock Dam Ditch.
Since the flow of the Carson River alone was not sufficient to irrigate
the entire acreage estimated to be arable, the Truckee Canal was
designed to divert a substantial amount of Truckee River water south
to augment the Carson’s flow at Lahontan Dam. Over 75% of Carson
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Division lands are classified as bottom lands, entitled to 3.5 acrefeet/acre annually; the remainder are mostly bench lands, with a small
amount of pasture lands which have a maximum entitlement of 1.5
acre-feet per acre.
Over the past 20 years, in an average water year, TCID diverted
172,380 acre-feet of water from the Truckee River to the Truckee Canal, as
measured at Wadsworth gage. Of this amount, 23,000 acre-feet is used in
the Truckee Division of the Newlands Project (which includes Fernley, Hazen
and Swingle Bench) and about 20,000 acre-feet is Truckee Canal loss. The
remaining 129,000 acre-feet flowed into Lahontan Reservoir, for use in the
Carson Division of the Newlands Project. According to the Efficiency Study,
USGS water gage records over a 26 year period (1967-1993) show that about
62% of the 375,100 acre-feet diverted annually to the Carson Division was
supplied by the Carson River, with the remainder diverted from the Truckee
River. According to the Draft EA for the proposed Adjusted OCAP (see
discussion below), more recent modeling results now indicate that the Carson
River supplies an average of more than 80% of inflow to Lahontan Reservoir.
Under the 1988 OCAP, the Project is entitled to divert from the Truckee
River to serve water right entitlements in the Truckee Division and to meet
Lahontan Reservoir storage targets (e.g., 215,000 acre-feet at the end of
June). The Final OCAP EIS projected that Newlands diversions from the
Truckee River would average 121,400 acre-feet per year assuming that
diversions from the Truckee Canal to the Truckee Division and releases from
Lahontan Reservoir to the Carson Division would total 320,000 acre-feet per
year. It also projected an average Truckee Canal inflow to Lahontan
Reservoir of about 80,000 acre-feet per year.
Over the years, various crops have been grown, including the famous Heart
of Gold Fallon cantaloupe, but the most successful money-making crop in the
Project remains the production of alfalfa and alfalfa pellets for California’s
growing domestic horse population. The irrigated agriculture of the Project
represented about 10% of the Fallon economy, or $50 million in gross income,
in 1992.49
A total of 232,000 acres were originally proposed to be irrigated; the amount
actually irrigated varies from year to year (as quoted above, the 1994 Efficiency Study estimated total irrigation at about 57,100 acres. Interior
estimated in 1985 that 63,100 acres were irrigated and that of these only
57,518 acres held project water rights.50

47

Truckee-Carson River Basin Study

Unlike most irrigation projects, Newlands’ irrigators do not buy water; each
acre of water-righted land is entitled to a court-decreed amount of water per
acre annually, depending on the classification of the land, measured at the
farm headgate. The Alpine Decree granted property owners in the Newlands
Project the right of ownership of their water rights (". . .Each such landowner
is the owner of an appurtenant water right for the patented land. . .") as
opposed to ownership by the federal government (Reclamation).51 This action
has important implications with respect to the federal government's ability to
cancel, restrict, or re-acquire these water rights from individual owners.
Thus, water rights on the Newlands Project are associated with specific
parcels of land.
Irrigation water use is now governed by the Operating Criteria and
Procedures (OCAP) for the Newlands Project, and the 1944 Orr Ditch Decree
and 1980 Alpine Decree, all of which are described in more detail below. The
two decrees specify the water duty assigned to those lands designated as
“bench and bottom” lands. With respect to waters diverted from the Truckee
River and applied to lands within the Newlands Irrigation Project, the Orr
Ditch Decree established a maximum irrigation water duty of 4.5 acre-feet
per acre per year for water-righted bench land and 3.5 acre-feet per acre per
year for bottom lands. While the Alpine Decree established water duties for
bench and bottom lands, it made no identification of those lands.52 The water
duties would apply to all irrigated lands within the Newlands Project and
therefore affect allowable diversions from the Truckee River as well. Both
decrees declare that the water is appurtenant to the land once it is put to
beneficial use under state water law.
Irrigators in the Truckee Meadows also hold individual decrees for water in
the Truckee River which is distributed to them by private ditch companies. A
number of ditch companies once provided Truckee River water to irrigators in
the Truckee Meadows. Many of these companies are now inactive because
the lands within their service areas have been developed and their water
rights transferred to Sierra Pacific.
Agricultural water use in the Truckee Meadows area has declined steadily as
irrigated lands have been urbanized. In the early 1990s, about 10,000 acres
remained as irrigated agriculture (TRA:72). Limited irrigation occurs in the
Sierra Valley of California, where Little Truckee River water is diverted for
irrigating high mountain pasture and alfalfa (TRA:74). Higher up in the
Carson Basin, about 47,000 acres are irrigated in one of the oldest farming
areas in Nevada (CRA:88–91).
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The Carson Valley in the upper Carson River Basin has about 47,000 irrigated acres (CRA:91). This valley is one of Nevada’s oldest agricultural areas
and has some very early water rights priorities. Agricultural water supply in
the valley comes from a combination of direct diversion of surface water from
an extensive system of privately owned ditches and from stored water in the
upper alpine reservoirs. Some ground water extraction occurs.
California’s Diamond Valley, adjoining the upper end of Carson Valley, also
has a concentration of irrigated acreage. About 24,000 acre-feet per year of
decreed irrigation rights were held in 1991 (CRA:93). A few scattered areas
in the upper Carson River watershed receive a small irrigation supply from
the export of Lake Tahoe basin waste water, described elsewhere in this
report. Decreed irrigation rights in the upper watershed are gradually being
converted to municipal use.
A small amount of irrigated acreage (about 1000 acres irrigated of a total
right of about 6,545 acres) exists on the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe
Reservation, and about 2,900 of 5,440 acres of irrigation right are irrigated
on the Fallon Paiute Shoshone Reservation.

Hydroelectric Use
The Truckee River General Electric Company (predecessor of the present-day
Sierra Pacific Power Company of Reno, Nevada) obtained title to the Lake
Tahoe Dam at Tahoe City and surrounding land for the price of $40,000.
This acquisition allowed the power company to effectively control the flow of
the Truckee River. In the early 1900s, four industrial users of water power
built plants on the river: (1) Floriston Pulp and Paper Company; (2) Truckee
River General Electric Company; (3) Washoe Power and Development
Company; and (4) Reno Power, Light and Water Company. All these water
users held superior rights (prior appropriations) to the river which had to be
satisfied before the Reclamation could begin to store irrigation water in Lake
Tahoe for the Newlands Project.
Limited hydroelectric use on the river remains today, the legacy of these
early plants. They include the Farad (1901, 2.6 MW), Washoe (1904,
2.5 MW), Fleish (1905, 2.5 MW), and Verdi (1911, 2.5 MW) plants. In
addition, Reclamation completed construction of a hydropower facility of
3.65 MW at Stampede Reservoir in 1988.
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Truckee River water diverted out of the watershed is also used for power
generation. Pacific Gas and Electric Company claims pre-1914 rights to
water diverted from Echo Lake in the Tahoe basin, into South Fork American
River. This diversion, initiated in 1876, amounts to up to 2,000 acre-feet per
year.
Water diverted to the Newlands Project via the Truckee Canal also can be
used for hydropower generation incidental to operation of the Project. The
power plant is located immediately below the dam. The first hydro plant
adjacent to Lahontan Dam, installed in 1915, had a capacity of 1.92 MW.
TCID later constructed another small plant on one of the Project’s canals and
a new power plant in 1989 with Synergics next to the old plant.
Environmental Use
Environmental water uses are described in detail in Chapter 1 above. The
major upstream storage reservoirs in the Truckee River Basin are operated
to provide specified minimum instream releases for fish. Some reservoirs,
such as Prosser Creek and Stampede are operated in substantial part to
provide fish flows. Most attention has focused on the listed fish species
(cui-ui and Lahontan cutthroat trout), described above. Pyramid Lake levels
were closely watched to protect nesting white pelicans on Anaho Island
during the period when Pyramid Lake reached its historic low (1967). Today,
the elevation level of the lake is high enough to avoid concern regarding the
potential to form a land bridge and is project to rise with the current OCAP
to still higher levels. In the Carson Basin, environmental water use focuses
on the Lahontan wetlands, again described above.
Use of environmental amenities for recreation purposes is centered on Lake
Tahoe. About 1,000 acre-feet per year is used in the California part of the
Truckee Basin for snow-making at ski resorts.

2.2 Water Purveyors
Sierra Pacific Power Company/WestPac Utilities
Sierra Pacific Power Company (Sierra Pacific) is both a water retailer and a
water wholesaler—it supplies water directly to most users but also
wholesales water to several of the small purveyors. Sierra Pacific meets
most of its needs from surface water—direct diversion of unstored water
from the Truckee River and its tributaries (e.g., Hunter Creek in Nevada)
and use of stored water from Donner and Independence lakes (and, under
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certain conditions, from Stampede Reservoir). Sierra Pacific also owns a
minor amount of storage capacity in Boca Reservoir (TRA:77).
Sierra Pacific holds direct diversion rights on the river, a right to divert 40 cfs
throughout the year, subject only to the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe’s rights
for its reservation. The seniority of this right was negotiated between the
parties to the 1935 Truckee River Agreement and is a subject of the TROA
negotiations. The relative seniority of this direct diversion right means that
water is physically available for diversion in all but the driest years (TRA:77).
Over time, Sierra Pacific has also acquired former Truckee Meadows irrigation water rights; in 1991 these were reported to have a face value of about
35,000 acre-feet (TRA:77). The actual dry period yield of these rights is much
less, however, since their priorities are generally more junior, even though
they are generally the most senior in the Truckee Meadows. In a drought
year, the natural flow of the Truckee River near Farad can drop to as little as
about 50 cfs, so the supply to virtually all irrigation rights can be shot off
shortly after storage water to maintain Floriston rates is depleted.
After the loss of Stampede Reservoir storage priority to fish flows, Sierra
focused on securing drought supplies to avoid a moratorium on new hookups. Agreements negotiated with the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe and
through the Truckee-Carson settlement process will provide backup for the
continued conversion of Truckee Meadows agricultural water rights to
municipal use for about 60 years of growth at 2.5% per year, assuming the
TROA is consummated in its present form.
Truckee-Carson Irrigation District
In 1918, the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District (TCID) was organized by a
group of Newlands irrigators, with the initial purpose of solving the area’s
irrigation drainage problems. Between 1921-28, drains were constructed to
lower the water table in the valley. Since 1926, TCID has operated the
Newlands Project for the Bureau of Reclamation under both long-term and
temporary (interim) contracts.
The Newlands Project is so named after pioneer reclamation advocate
Senator Francis G. Newlands, who is credited with drafting the Reclamation
Act of 1902. The Newlands Project was one of the first authorized after
passage of the Act. Water rights for lands irrigated by the Newlands Projects
are held by the landowners, not TCID. TCID is responsible for delivering the
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appropriate water duty to each farmer, as defined under the Orr Ditch and
Alpine decrees.
Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy District
This is a Nevada agency that was created to contract with the Bureau of
Reclamation for the water from Stampede Reservoir, at the time it was to
serve primarily municipal and industrial use.
Washoe County Water Conservancy District
This conservancy district represents irrigators in the Truckee Meadows area.
It includes ditch companies and private individuals. WCWCD operates Boca
Reservoir.
Carson Water Subconservancy District
This subconservancy district represents the various water users with rights
to reservoir storage in the many small high alpine lakes and reservoirs in the
upper Carson River watershed. It was originally formed as the Nevada
water district that would contract with Reclamation for the construction of
Watasheamu Dam and Reservoir and other planned Washoe Project facilities
on the upper Carson River in Douglas County. This reservoir was deauthorized by PL 101-618. The 1989 Nevada legislature expanded the district
to include Carson City and the portion of Lyon County in the Carson River
basin, and created a funding mechanism for local and regional water projects.
Small Purveyors
On the California side of the Lake Tahoe Basin much of the water service is
provided by three public utility districts—North Tahoe PUD, South Tahoe
PUD, and Tahoe City PUD—that have, over time, assumed operation of some
of the small systems. Other small purveyors include the Sierra Valley Water
Company and Donner Lake Company.
As described elsewhere, the PUDs also handle sewage treatment and
transfer of effluent out of the Lake Tahoe Basin. These entities service the
sewage collection needs of the west side of Lake Tahoe north to the
California-Nevada state line at Crystal Bay, Nevada. Sewage is transported
to the Tahoe-Truckee Sewage Treatment Plant at Truckee, California where
it receives advanced tertiary treatment and then is infiltrated into the
ground.
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2.3

Water Operations in the Truckee-Carson Basin

The following summary draws extensively upon the Nevada Division of
Water Planning Truckee River Chronology (November 1996 update) and
Carson River Chronology, (October 1996 update), both prepared by Gary
Horton. Figures 2-1 through 2-3 are flow schematics for the upper and lower
Truckee River and the Carson River, taken from the chronologies (originally
from USGS annual water data reports).
Principal Storage Facilities of the Truckee River Basin
Major storage facilities of the Truckee River Basin (excluding the basin's
terminus, Pyramid Lake), along with their characteristics, capacities, and
operating requirements, are detailed below. Table 2-1 provides statistics for
the major reservoirs in the watershed.53 River flows and water releases from
these lakes and reservoirs are controlled by the Federal Water Master in
Reno, Nevada, in accordance with specific operating criteria, specifically, the
1944 Orr Ditch Decree and its incorporated 1935 Truckee River Agreement
and the Floriston Rates (see discussion below).
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Figure 2-1.—Lake Tahoe and Upper Truckee River Flow Schematic
Lake Tahoe and Truckee River Basins Listing of USGS Gaging Stations.
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Figure 2-2.—Lower Truckee River Flow Schematic
Truckee River Basin Listing of USGS Gaging Stations.
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Figure 2-3.—Carson River Flow Schematic
Carson River Basin Listing of USGS Gaging Stations. 00
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Table 2-1.—Statistics for major reservoirs in Truckee River Watershed

Reservoir name

Dam owner

Dam
operator

Lake Tahoe

Sierra Pacific Power
Company1

Truckee-Carson
Irrigation
District

Donner Lake

Sierra Pacific Power
Company/TruckeeCarson Irrigation
District

Sierra Pacific
Power
Company

Martis Creek

U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers

U.S. Army
Corps of
Engineers

Prosser Creek

U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation

Independence
Lake

Usable
storage
(acre-feet)

Construc- Dam
tion
height
date
(feet)

Drainage
area
(square
miles)

744,600

1913

18

506

9,500

1930s

14

14

20,400

1971

113

40

U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation

29,800

1962

163

50

Sierra Pacific Power
Company

Sierra Pacific
Power
Company

17,500

1939

31

8

Stampede
Reservoir

U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation

U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation

226,500

1970

239

136

Boca
Reservoir

U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation

Washoe
County Water
Conservation
District

41,100

1937

116

172

1
2

2

U.S. Bureau of Reclamation controls the dam under easement from Sierra Pacific Power Company.
Flood control storage only.

Lake Tahoe.—Storage capacity is used to supplement Floriston Rates in
conjunction with natural runoff of other tributaries and Boca Dam releases.
An easement to Lake Tahoe Dam is owned by Reclamation and operated
under agreement by the TCID for the Newlands Project in Churchill County,
Nevada. Lake Tahoe's storage capacity is not considered part of the
COE flood control system. Lake Tahoe waters may be "exchanged" for water
from Prosser Creek Reservoir (the Tahoe-Prosser Exchange Agreement) in
order to maintain a live stream below the Lake Tahoe Dam without
adversely affecting Nevada water users' storage. Whenever possible, Lake
Tahoe releases must be sufficient to maintain a minimum instream flow of
50-70 cubic feet per second (cfs) downstream from the dam (varies with
season).
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Donner Lake.—The first dam on Donner Lake was built in 1877, while the
current dam was constructed in the 1930s, and provides for 9,500 acre-feet of
storage capacity. Donner Lake drains an area of only approximately
14 square miles. Water in Donner Lake is privately owned by Sierra Pacific
and TCID, and is not required to be used to meet Floriston Rates. The dam is
jointly owned and operated by Sierra Pacific and TCID. The Sierra Pacific
portion of the stored water is used to supplement Reno-Sparks municipal and
industrial water use in the Truckee Meadows; the TCID portion is used to
supplement Newlands Project irrigation water requirements. After Donner
Lake fills, lake inflows are passed through to supplement Floriston Rates.
Lake storage is not part of COE flood control system. California requires a
minimum flow of 2-3 cfs downstream from the dam for maintaining fish
habitat.
Martis Creek Reservoir.—The Martis Creek Dam was constructed by the
COE in 1971 and was intended to store waters from a 40 square mile
drainage area to include not only Martis Creek, but the East, West, and
Central Martis Creeks as well. In accordance with COE requirements, this
reservoir, with a total storage capacity of 20,400 acre-feet, serves only flood
control purposes. While legislation allows for other uses, only temporary
storage is currently permitted due to an unsafe, leaking dam. Except during
flood storage, reservoir outflows are set to equal inflows.
Prosser Creek Reservoir.—The Prosser Creek Reservoir was constructed by
Reclamation in 1962 to store waters from a 50 square mile drainage area
beginning 11 miles to the west at Warren Lake. The reservoir, with a total
capacity of 29,800 acre-feet, is owned and operated by Reclamation for three
purposes: (a) as part of the COE Truckee River flood control program; (b) the
storage of water under the terms of the Tahoe-Prosser Exchange Agreement
(which provides that a portion of this water, when available, may be used to
meet Floriston Rates in lieu of making such releases from Lake Tahoe); and
(c) to meet the spawning flow needs of Pyramid Lake's endangered cui-ui fish
species and its threatened Lahontan cutthroat trout, or for other federal
purposes. California generally requires a minimum of natural flow or 5 cfs,
whichever is less, downstream from the dam for maintaining fish habitat.
Independence Lake.—The original Independence Lake Dam was
constructed in 1879 and created a storage capacity of 3,000 acre-feet. After
Sierra Pacific acquired ownership of the lake and dam in 1937, the dam was
enlarged in 1939 to its present size with a total storage capacity of
17,500 acre-feet. Independence Lake drains an area of only eight square
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miles. Like Donner Lake water, the waters of Independence Lake are
privately owned and are not required to be used to meet Floriston Rates; the
stored waters are owned by Sierra Pacific and supplement the company’s
water supply for the Reno-Sparks municipal and industrial water use during
droughts. The lake's first storage priority is for 3,000 acre-feet of (original)
storage; an additional 14,500 acre-feet of storage is permitted after Boca
Reservoir is full and the Floriston Rates and Truckee River diversion rights
(Orr Ditch Decree rights) are satisfied. California requires a minimum flow
of 2 cfs downstream from the dam for maintaining fish habitat.
Stampede Reservoir.—Stampede Dam and Reservoir, constructed by
Reclamation in 1970, drains an area of some 136 square miles and has a total
capacity of 226,000 acre-feet. Water must be used primarily for spawning
flows for the endangered cui-ui fish species and the threatened Lahontan
cutthroat trout of Pyramid Lake. Storage space is also part of COE flood
control plan. Water may be stored in Stampede Reservoir only after: (1)
Floriston Rates and Truckee River diversion rights have been satisfied; (2)
Boca Reservoir (below Stampede Reservoir) is full; and (3) Independence
Lake (above Stampede Reservoir) is full. Due to its relatively junior water
rights, this reservoir fills only about 25% of the time in the spring and has
been targeted as a prime storage location for Reno-Sparks municipal water
as part of the negotiated settlement (Public Law 101-618) and the
implementation of a new Truckee River Operating Agreement (TROA).
California requires a minimum flow of 30 cfs downstream from the dam for
maintaining fish habitat (although this agreement has expired, the rates of
flow have been maintained).
Boca Reservoir.—The original Boca dam was built around 1868 for ice
harvesting. The present, much larger dam, was constructed just upstream in
1937 and created a reservoir with a total capacity of 41,100 acre-feet and a
drainage area, including the entire Little Truckee River Basin (including both
Independence Lake and Stampede Reservoir) of some 172 square miles. Title
to stored water is held by Reclamation and the dam is operated by the
Washoe County Water Conservation District (WCWCD). The reservoir's
water is used in conjunction with Lake Tahoe water to maintain Floriston
Rates and to provide part of the required COE flood control capacity. Up to
25,000 acre-feet of water may be stored in Boca Reservoir only after
Floriston Rates are satisfied and Independence Lake's first storage priority
of 3,000 acre-feet has been satisfied. The balance may not be filled unless
the Newlands Project diversion right at Derby Dam (on the lower Truckee
River) has been satisfied. Sierra Pacific stores a small portion (800 acre-feet)
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of its privately owned stored water rights here. There are no minimum
downstream flow requirement associated with Boca Reservoir.
Derby Dam/Truckee Canal.—Derby Dam, which is located approximately 11
miles upstream from Wadsworth, Nevada, is the regulating device by which
Truckee River waters are diverted into the Truckee Canal for use within the
Truckee Division of the Newlands Project and for storage in Lahontan
Reservoir in the Carson River Basin for use within the Carson Division of the
Newlands Project. The dam, originally named the Truckee River Diversion
Dam, was completed by the U.S. Reclamation Service in June 1905, whereas
the Truckee Canal was not completed through to the Carson River until
August 1906.
Diversions and releases are conducted in accordance with the Truckee River
Agreement, the Orr Ditch Decree, and Newlands Project Operating Criteria
and Procedures (OCAP), which allow for a maximum diversion of up to
1,500 cfs (Orr Ditch Decree right, although current canal nominal capacity is
only 900 cfs) from: (a) remainder of Floriston Rates and return flows from
upstream diversions; (b) right to Truckee River tributary water; and © any
water bypassed or released to obtain space to store flood waters in reservoirs
if water right holder did not identify a use for the release. Under the more
recent project OCAP determination method implemented in 1988, the
quantity of water which may be diverted from the Truckee River at Derby
Dam varies with the irrigation entitlement each year (water-righted acreage
actually to be irrigated and the appropriate water duty for bench and bottom
lands) and the predicted runoff from the Carson River and water in storage
in Lahontan Reservoir.
The Washoe Project.—Prosser and Stampede are facilities of the Washoe
Project, operated by Reclamation. Authorization of the Washoe Project
provided a forum for a series of water negotiations in the late 1940s and
1950s that ultimately helped bring Nevada and California together to discuss
other interstate water issues. The most recent facilities of the project include
Marble Bluff Dam and the Pyramid Lake fishway, completed in 1975.
Principal Storage Facilities of the Carson River Basin
Upper Basin Lakes and Reservoirs.—The storage facilities of the upper
Carson River Basin, stretching from the Carson Valley to the headwaters of
the East and West forks, , including their capacity, priority dates and water
sources, are detailed in the Carson River Atlas. These 19 small reservoirs in
Alpine and Douglas counties run as small as 31 acre-feet in capacity, but
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most are in the 100-500 acre-foot range. Mud Lake (2,383 acre-feet) and
Heenan Lake (2,948 acre-feet) are the only larger ones. River flows and
water releases from these lakes and reservoirs are controlled by the federal
Water Master in Reno, Nevada (through a deputy Water Master in Carson
City), in accordance with specific operating criteria contained in the
1980 Alpine Decree.54
Lahontan Reservoir.—Lahontan Reservoir stores Carson River water for
use in the Carson Division of the Newlands Projects, which is supplemented
by Truckee River waters diverted at Derby Dam on the lower Truckee River
and conveyed through the Truckee Canal to Lahontan Reservoir. The
reservoir was not completed until 1915, at which time the Truckee Canal's
outlet was re-routed slightly upstream so as to enter Lahontan Reservoir
instead of flowing directly into the Carson River.
Diversions at Derby Dam on the lower Truckee River, which flow into
Lahontan Reservoir via the Truckee Canal, are also controlled by the federal
Water Master in accordance with the 1944 Orr Ditch Decree and its
incorporated 1935 Truckee River Agreement and 1915 Floriston Rates.55 In
the lower Carson River Basin, releases of stored Carson River and Truckee
River waters from Lahontan Reservoir and their diversion at the Carson
Diversion Dam are controlled by TCID in accordance with the current OCAP.
Current Diversions from the Truckee River and Lake Tahoe Basins
There currently exist seven (7) recognized water diversions from the Truckee
River Basin and/or the Lake Tahoe Basin (as part of the Truckee River
Basin) as listed below:
Lake Tahoe Basin.—The are a number of diversions of Lake Tahoe's waters
out of the Lake Tahoe Basin for domestic uses, including by Sierra Pacific,
TCID and the Donner Lake Company; however, only three result in waters
actually leaving the Truckee River Basin entirely. First, Harvey Place
Reservoir, located in Alpine County, California, in the Carson River Basin,
receives advanced secondary treated effluent from the South Tahoe Public
Utility District (STPUD) in the Lake Tahoe Basin (Truckee River Basin).
Effluent exports, amounting to approximately 5,000 acre-feet per year
(4.5 million gallons per day),56 are routed from the southern end of Lake
Tahoe through a pipeline, generally following the route of the Upper Truckee
River, over Luther Pass from El Dorado County, California, into Alpine
County, California, and the Carson River Basin. These effluent exports
began in 1968 when Indian Creek Reservoir was constructed by the South
Tahoe Public Utility District. Beginning in 1989, exports were re-routed to
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Harvey Place Reservoir and Indian Creek Reservoir was turned into a
freshwater recreational area managed by the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM).
The other two diversions are to Carson Valley, located in the Carson River
Basin in Douglas County, Nevada, which receives the treated effluent from
the Incline Village (Nevada) General Improvement District (IVGID) and the
Douglas County Sewer Improvement District (DCSID). Together these
utilities cover the wastewater treatment of the Nevada portion of the Lake
Tahoe Basin (Truckee River Basin), located in Washoe County, Carson City,
and Douglas County. The IVGID pumps approximately 1,700 acre-feet per
year (1.5 million gallons per day) of treated waste water from its Incline
Village treatment plant, along the east side of the lake to Spooner Summit,
then down Clear Creek Valley to wetlands located in the northeastern
portion of the Carson Valley. The DCSID handles sewage collection and
treatment on the Nevada side of Lake Tahoe from Glenbrook to the NevadaCalifornia state line at South Lake Tahoe. It pumps approximately
2,600 acre-feet per year (2.3 million gallons per day) of treated effluent over
the Kingsbury Grade (Haines Canyon) and then to a storage reservoir on the
east side of the Carson Valley in the Pine Nut Range, where it receives
winter storage. During the irrigation season, these stored waters are then
pumped back across the Carson Valley and used for supplemental irrigation
purposes. According to the California-Nevada Interstate Compact as ratified
in the Settlement Act, Nevada's gross diversions of the waters of Lake Tahoe
are set at a maximum of 11,000 acre-feet per year, while California's
diversions of Lake Tahoe's waters cannot exceed 23,000 acre-feet per year.
Echo Lake.—Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) diverts waters
from the Lake Tahoe Basin at Echo Lake to the upper South Fork of the
American River. This diversion out of the Lake Tahoe Basin totals
approximately 1,500 acre-feet per year and is used for hydroelectric power
generation at their El Dorado Power Plant.
Third Creek.—Water diversions from Third Creek constitute an intrabasin
diversion from a tributary of Lake Tahoe into Washoe Valley of 5.5 cubic feet
per second. The Third Creek diversion actually takes water from the Lake
Tahoe Basin only, as the water remains within the Truckee River Basin.
Third Creek is located on the west (Lake Tahoe) side of the Mount Rose
highway summit. A portion of its waters are diverted down the east side of
the Carson Range by means of Ophir Creek and then into Washoe Lake, then
to Steamboat Creek and eventually to the Truckee River below Reno near
the Truckee Meadows Water Reclamation Facility.
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Marlette Lake.—Water in this lake, which is owned by the State of Nevada,
is diverted from the Lake Tahoe Basin, pumped over the Carson Range to
Hobart Creek Reservoir, enters Franktown Creek below the reservoir, and is
sometimes sold for delivery to the Hobart Storage System for use by Virginia
City (after being piped across Washoe Valley to Five-Mile Reservoir) and
Carson City, both of which lie within the Carson River Basin. These water
users have generally replaced such demands from other sources within the
Carson River Basin. Diversions total approximately 3,000 acre-feet per year.
Franktown Creek/Hobart Creek Reservoir.—A tributary of Washoe Lake,
which eventually flows into the Truckee River through Steamboat Creek,
Franktown Creek is the outlet stream for Hobart Creek Reservoir which is
fed from Hobart Creek. [Hobart Creek Reservoir waters are also
supplemented by Marlette Lake water. See Marlette Lake diversions,
above.] Waters from Franktown Creek are piped into the Hobart Storage
System for use by Virginia City (Five-Mile Reservoir) and Carson City, both
of which are in the Carson River Basin.
Sierra Valley.—Water is diverted by canal from the Little Truckee River, a
primary tributary of the Truckee River, into Webber Creek for the Sierra
Valley Water Company for supplemental irrigation use in the Sierra Valley.
These waters eventually flow into the Feather River Basin in California. The
maximum diversion rate is 60 cubic feet per second during the growing
season (March 15th through September 30th) with a priority date of 1870.
As a supplemental supply of irrigation water, these interbasin water
diversions vary from 1,500 acre-feet per year to 10,000 acre-feet per year and
have typically averaged approximately 5,700 acre-feet per year.
Lower Truckee River Diversion (Derby Dam).—Waters are taken out of the
lower Truckee River at Derby Dam and transported to the Newlands Project
Truckee Division and to Lahontan Reservoir in the Carson River Basin via
the Truckee Canal.
TCID, representing the Newlands Project farmers, originally contracted with
the Reclamation in 1926 for a firm supply, when available, of 406,000 acrefeet per year to be delivered to the Lahontan Reservoir outlet works and to
canal headings using waters from both the Carson and Truckee rivers.
Diversions at Derby Dam on the lower Truckee River have averaged
approximately 183,160 acre-feet per year over the 1967-1994 period of record
and 172,380 acre-feet per year over the more recent 1973-1994 period of
record.57 Diversion records show that over the period of 1910-1966, when
Truckee River waters were also used for power generation at Lahontan Dam
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and on the "V" canal below the Carson Diversion Dam, these diversions
averaged a considerably greater 240,000 acre-feet per year.58
Historical diversions from the Truckee River to the Newlands Project are not
representative of current conditions however, because the do not show the
effect of the Operating Criteria and Procedures. In addition, the period 1988
through 1994 is not representative of current conditions, since this period
comprised the most severe drought in this century. OCAP call for the
maximum use of Carson River waters whenever possible. Because of the
limited number of years with the current OCAP in place, the current
diversion level from the Truckee River should be estimated with the use of a
model. Based on 1901-1980 hydrology, according to comments received from
Reclamation and the OCAP Final EIS, Newlands Project diversions from the
Truckee River are projected to average 121,400 acre-feet per year. (This
assumes that diversions from the Truckee Canal to the Truckee Division and
releases from Lahontan Reservoir to the Carson Division would total
320,000 acre-feet per year. The annual diversions to the Truckee and Carson
divisions have been less than 320,000 acre-feet since 1992.)
These projected diversions represent about 22 percent of the average annual
flow of 548,200 acre-feet (1973-1994 period of record) of Truckee River water
crossing the California-Nevada border and recorded at the Farad gaging
station.
Current Diversions into the Carson River Basin
Currently there are no diversions of water outside of the Carson River Basin.
In fact, Article VII of the California-Nevada Interstate Compact specifically
prohibits waters of the Carson River from being used in areas outside the
Carson River Basin.59 While this compact has never been ratified by
Congress, its provisions have been accepted through a "gentleman's
agreement" and individual state legislation.60
While no waters are diverted out of the Carson River Basin, this basin
receives waters diverted from the Truckee River Basin.61 The basin is also
the recipient of natural, high-water year inflows from the Humboldt River
Basin via the Humboldt Sink and Humboldt Slough, and infrequent flows
from the Walker River Basin via Adrian Valley. The following is a list of the
known current diversions into the Carson River Basin. All these diversions
have as their source either the Lake Tahoe Basin or, ultimately, the Truckee
River Basin.
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Marlette Lake, Franktown Creek, and Hobart Creek Reservoir.—The Marlette
Lake water system, originally constructed in 1873, was intended to meet the
growing needs of Virginia City during the Comstock era. This water system,
which at one time consisted of flumes, a tunnel, and over 21 miles of an
inverted suction pipeline, first ran from just below Hobart Creek Reservoir
(which is fed by Hobart Creek) on Franktown Creek, which drains into
Washoe Valley and Washoe Lake, then across Washoe Valley to Five-Mile
Reservoir in the Virginia City range on the east side of Washoe Valley. A
second pipeline from Franktown Creek was completed in 1875. A third
pipeline (originally consisting of a flume and tunnel system), this time
tapping the waters of Marlette Lake, which drains directly into Lake Tahoe,
was completed in 1887. The current system pumps water directly from
Marlette Lake to Hobart Creek Reservoir. Total diversion from this source is
approximately 3,000 acre-feet per year.
Harvey Place Reservoir.—Located in Alpine County, California, this
reservoir receives advanced secondary treated effluent from the South Tahoe
Public Utility District (STPUD) in the Lake Tahoe Basin (Truckee River
Basin). Effluent exports, amounting to approximately 5,000 acre-feet per
year (4.5 million gallons per day),62 are routed from the southern end of Lake
Tahoe through a pipeline running generally along the course of the Upper
Truckee River and over Luther Pass from El Dorado County, California, into
Alpine County and the Carson River Basin. These effluent exports began in
1968 when Indian Creek Reservoir was constructed by STPUD. Beginning in
1989, exports were re-routed to Harvey Place Reservoir and Indian Creek
Reservoir was turned into a freshwater recreational area managed by the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM).

Carson Valley.—Located in Douglas County, Nevada, Carson Valley
receives the treated effluent from the Incline Village (Nevada) General
Improvement District (IVGID) and the Douglas County Sewer Improvement
District (DCSID), which together cover the municipal water uses of the
Nevada portion of the Lake Tahoe Basin (as part of the Truckee River
Basin). The IVGID pumps approximately 1,700 acre-feet per year
(1.5 million gallons per day) of treated waste water from its Incline Village
treatment plant, along the east side of the lake to Spooner Summit, then
down Clear Creek Valley to wetlands located in the northeastern portion of
Carson Valley. The DCSID handles sewage collection and treatment on the
Nevada side of Lake Tahoe from Glenbrook to the Nevada-California state
line at South Lake Tahoe. It pumps approximately 2,600 acre-feet
(2.3 million gallons per day) of treated effluent over the Kingsbury Grade
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(Haines Canyon) and then to the east side of Carson Valley in the Pine Nut
Range where it receives winter storage. During the irrigation season, these
stored waters are then pumped back across Carson Valley and used for
supplemental irrigation.
Derby Dam and the Truckee Canal.—These facilities, the first components
constructed under the Truckee-Carson Irrigation Project in 1905-1906 (later
renamed the Newlands Project), constitute the most significant means of
diversion and conveyance of water from the lower Truckee River to the lower
Carson River. For the water years 1967-1995, on the average, approximately
181,720 acre-feet of water flowed each year into the Truckee Canal at Derby
Dam on the lower Truckee River. Truckee River waters flow through the
32.5-mile long Truckee Canal, first paralleling the river, then running along
the western side of Lahontan Valley and into Lahontan Reservoir on the
lower Carson River just above the project farmlands. Of this annual average
181,720 acre-feet of water diverted at Derby Dam, about 135,380 acre-feet
per year, or nearly 75 percent of the total diverted amount, has actually
flowed into Lahontan Reservoir.63
Agreements, Decrees and Doctrines Governing the Allocation of Water in the
Truckee-Carson River Basins
The Truckee-Carson basins are regulated by a number of agreements,
decrees, and river operating requirements extending as far back as the turn
of the century. These are monitored and enforced by a Federal Water
Master, first appointed in 1926 as a result of the original Orr Ditch lawsuit
filed by Reclamation to adjudicate waters in the two basins. The most critical
to present-day river operations include:
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

The 1908 Floriston Rates (Truckee River);
The 1915 Truckee River General Electric Decree;
The 1935 Truckee River Agreement;
The 1944 Orr Ditch Decree (Truckee River);
The OCAP, first instituted in 1967;
The 1980 Alpine Decree (Carson River); and
The 1996 Water Quality Agreement.

Over time, each subsequent agreement or operating criteria has incorporated
those established river operating requirements in effect before it. Specifically, the Floriston Rates were incorporated into the Truckee River General
Electric Decree, which was subsequently incorporated into the Truckee River
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Agreement which, in turn, became the river operating component of the Orr
Ditch Decree.
The waters of the Truckee and Carson rivers were appropriated in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and this allocation remained
relatively constant until the Pyramid Lake Tribe was able to challenge it in
the 1970s. Initially, the allocation of the Truckee was determined by a series
of agreements going back to 1903 that fixed the flow rates in the Truckee to
maximize the beneficial use of the river for hydroelectric power generation.
Subsequently, the available supply of the Truckee River was adjudicated, as
was the Carson River. The first dam at the mouth of the Truckee at Lake
Tahoe was built in 1870; Truckee River flows, referred to as the Floriston
Rates, were first established in 1908. In 1915 the Bureau of Reclamation
acquired the Lake Tahoe Dam in a consent decree that settled a condemnation suit. This decree gave the United States the right to raise the level of
Lake Tahoe and obligated it to maintain the Floriston Rates.
Adjudication of the Truckee began in 1913, shortly after the California
Conservation Commission recommended that the state seek an equitable
apportionment of the Truckee and Lake Tahoe. Truckee River water use is
controlled by the Orr Ditch decree (United States of America v. Orr Water
Ditch Company, 1944), the establishment of minimum levels for Lake Tahoe,
and the Truckee River Agreement of 1935. The decree was not made final
until 1944 and was not protected against collateral attack by the Pyramid
Lake Tribe until 1983. This decree is administered by a federal water
master; his basic task is to maintain a minimum flow at the CaliforniaNevada state line relative to the level of Lake Tahoe.
The Carson River use is allocated by the Alpine decree (United States v.
Alpine Land and Reservoir Co.,1980). It defines the water rights differently
from the Orr Ditch Decree. The Orr Ditch decree defines rights as claimed
appropriations, whereas the Alpine decree defines the rights in terms of
maximum consumptive use. The Alpine Decree provides that Project water
would be distributed pursuant to Nevada State water law.
Lake Tahoe storage is limited to 744,000 acre-feet and withdrawals from the
storage pool are controlled by the Truckee River Agreement, in which
Interior modified the original Floriston Rates to allow additional flood
storage. Minimum flows of 400 cfs are required during the winter months
and 500 cfs during the summer months. Lower winter flows are allowed
when the level of the lake is between 6,226.0 and 6,225.25 feet.
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In addition several new agreements have been recently negotiated or are in
the final stages of negotiation. When and if implemented, these will
profoundly affect river basin operations. These include:
!

The Preliminary Settlement Agreement between the Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe and Sierra Pacific Power Company (to be incorporated in
TROA) and the Settlement Agreement embodied in Public Law 101-618

!

The new Truckee River Operating Agreement (TROA)

!

The Water Quality Agreement between several parties (also incorporated
in TROA)

Details of these and other rate agreements, decrees, and operating criteria
are presented below, or in the following chapter.

The Public Trust Doctrine.—A common law little used until the middle of
the twentieth century, the "Public Trust Doctrine” is important in governing
water use in California. There is some dispute about the historical origin of
the public trust doctrine.64 Popular convention believes the public trust
doctrine derived from roman Justinian times and was brought to England
during the Roman occupation. It became established as English common law
that certain resources were available in common to all humankind; among
those common resources were "the air, running water, the sea and consequently the shores of the sea." Navigable waterways were declared to be
"common highways, forever free". This English common law came to North
America with the English settlers and was modified to include non-tidal
waters.
The public trust doctrine is applied in this country through both federal and
state law. It is common to all states which enter the union. The "equal
footing doctrine" accords equivalent status to all states in the Union. The
federal government holds the beds of navigable rivers in territories in trust
for future states which upon statehood are transferred in title to the state.
The doctrine "illustrates a fascinating and significant intersection of property
rights and constitutional concepts. It provides a dramatic example of how
common heritage natural resources, given constitutional protection, can
inspire a unique property rights regime" 65The breadth of the state's
authority to regulate public trust lands is directly related to the public
interests which the doctrine is intended to protect.66
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In California, the doctrine applies to lands underlying tidelands, bays and
estuaries, swamp and overflow lands, navigable rivers and lakes. Public
trust lands are determined by the last natural channel at the time of entry
into the Union. Last natural channel can be determined based on historical
records, maps and surveys up to the time the last natural channel was
altered, such as in dam construction or channelization.
These lands underlying waterways are characterized as sovereign lands or
lands with fee interest held by the people and managed in trust for the
people by the state. Some public trust lands were sold. Case law holds those
lands must be managed in a manner not inconsistent with the public trust. It
is important to understand the "bundle of sticks" of fee interest or property
ownership does not extinguish public trust characteristic of the land. In
other words, if the lands are sold or granted, such granting is for most of the
interest in the land, but not for the public trust. Those formerly sovereign
lands held by a private party are still impressed with the public trust
although in every other respect the lands are owned in fee.
In Nevada, at the time of statehood, the state asserted its ownership to bed
and banks of navigable rivers and lakes to hold in Trust for the people.
Unlike California, the doctrine is not in the Nevada constitution and has
never been the subject of court cases67.
California has well established public trust law, indeed recently settled in the
Audubon case regarding Mono Lake. Other cases laid the foundation for the
Court's holding that public trust doctrine is ". . .an affirmation of the duty of
the state to protect the people's common heritage of streams, lakes,
marshlands and tidelands, surrendering the right of protection only in rare
cases when the abandonment of that right is consistent with the purposes of
the trust." Audubon also stated the principle that the state has "an
affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the planning and
allocation of water resources, and to protect public trust uses whenever
feasible.”
The vigor of the California Public Trust Doctrine is matched by the absence
of this common law in Nevada water resource management. Nevada's "public
interest" policy could be compared to the public interest standard in a water
right proceeding in Idaho and other California cases. The public trust and
public interest serve to help resolve conflicts between the public, which
believes that it has a right to have waters left in place for navigation, fishery,
environmental quality and other public uses, and appropriators who believe
that they have a right to extract these same waters for irrigation, municipal
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and industrial purposes. The principle of public trust or interest focus
resource management from local needs to basin wide issues.
Few places in Nevada show the need for water resource management more
than the Truckee-Carson basins. Legendary legal disputes, discussed
elsewhere in this report, chronicle the quarrels about whose water it is and
how should it be used. Extensive impacts to natural resources, described
above, illustrate how, without a common law to guide resource management,
public trust values can be severely affected. The importance of maintaining
irreplaceable public trust resources was eloquently expressed by the Oregon
Court of Appeals:
The severe restriction upon the power of the state as trustee to
modify water resources is predicated not only upon the importance
of the public use of such waters and lands, but upon the exhaustible
and irreplaceable nature of the resources and its fundamental
importance to our society and to our environmental. These
resources, after all, can only be spent once. Therefore, the law has
historically and consistently recognized that rivers and estuaries
once destroyed or diminished may never be restored to the public
and, accordingly, has required the highest degree of protection from
the public trustee.68
The Public Trust Doctrine protects the rights of the public to use water
courses for commerce, navigation, fisheries, recreation, open space,
preservation of ecological units in their natural state, and similar uses for
which those lands are uniquely suited. There is debate about conflicting
uses. One school of thought holds that the basic resource of waterways is the
corpus of the trust and cannot be fouled or spent to bankruptcy. The other
school of thought is that the public trust resources must be balanced with
public trust uses even if such uses adversely affect the public trust resource.
As Professor Sax noted in 1970, "[o]f all the concepts known to American law,
only the public trust doctrine seems to have the breadth and substantive
content which might make it useful as a tool of general application for
citizens seeking to develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource
management problems".
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Truckee River General Electric Decree and Floriston Rates.—Floriston Rates
currently represent the primary operational criteria of the Truckee River
between its source (Lake Tahoe) and its terminus (Pyramid Lake). These
river flow rates date back to a 1908 agreement among the Truckee River
General Electric Company (predecessor to Sierra Pacific), the Floriston Land
and Power Company, and the Floriston Pulp and Paper Company. This
agreement required that ". . .there shall be maintained a flow of water in the
said Truckee River at Floriston [California] of not less than 500 cubic feet per
second from the First day of March to the 30th day of September inclusive, in
each year, and of not less than 400 cubic feet per second from the 1st day of
October to the last day of February, inclusive, in each year." The Floriston
Rates were subsequently incorporated into the 1915 Truckee River General
Electric Decree.
The Truckee River General Electric Decree represented the resolution,
through a 1915 federal court consent decree, of a lengthy series of conflicts,
litigation, and negotiations between the U.S. Reclamation Service (USRS)
and the Truckee River General Electric Company. In 1902, the Truckee
River General Electric Company, through a complicated series of real estate
transactions, had obtained title to the Lake Tahoe Dam, surrounding lands,
and the hydropower plants on the Truckee River. The USRS was in
desperate need of Lake Tahoe water for the Newlands Project, then nearing
completion near Fallon in Churchill County, Nevada. This decree granted
the USRS an easement, for a purchase price of $139,500, to the Lake Tahoe
Dam and surrounding property owned by the power company. On its part,
the USRS was required to provide certain year-round flow rates (the
1908 Floriston Rates), measured at a stream gage near the state line, to
support hydropower generation. While the Truckee River General Electric
Decree dictated how the Lake Tahoe Dam would be operated, it did little to
solve the concerns of residents of the lake and lessen California's concerns
over the apportionment of Lake Tahoe's waters.

Truckee River Agreement.—The Truckee River Agreement, finalized in
1935, represents the current basis for the operation of the Truckee River,
including its tributaries and diversions, between its source (Lake Tahoe) and
its terminus (Pyramid Lake). Parties to this agreement included the Bureau
of Reclamation; TCID, serving the irrigation rights of agricultural water
users of the Newlands Project in Churchill County, Nevada; Sierra Pacific
Power Company, serving primarily the municipal and industrial water needs
of the cities of Reno and Sparks, Nevada; and the Washoe County Water
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Conservation District, serving the agricultural water users in the Truckee
Meadows.
Article XI of the Truckee River Agreement provided the basis of the Pyramid
Lake Paiute Tribe’s irrigation rights under the Orr Ditch Decree. One of the
purposes of the agreement was to “raise and stabilize the mean elevation of
the water surface of [Lake Tahoe], in order that [the parties] and the owners
of lands bordering on or in the vicinity of [the lake].” The construction of Boca
Reservoir and the implementation of reduced Floriston rates, together with
the establishment of a maximum lake level at elevation 6229.1 feet resulted
in a higher and more stable lake level, benefitting water users in Nevada and
property owners at Lake Tahoe.
Under the Agreement, operation of upstream reservoirs is under the supervision of a Federal Water Master in Reno, who administers court-imposed
requirements under the 1944 Orr Ditch Decree to supply water to achieve
Floriston Rates (mandated river flow rates) at the California-Nevada border
(currently measured at the Farad gaging station). The Truckee River
Agreement provides for the operation of storage facilities, especially Lake
Tahoe, to satisfy these rights and required the building of Boca Dam and
Reservoir. The Floriston Rates essentially constitute a minimum instream
flow in the river, as long as water is physically available in Lake Tahoe and
Boca Reservoir to support the rates. Water may be stored in Lake Tahoe and
Boca Reservoir only when rates are met. The precise definition for the
Floriston Rates contained in the Truckee River Agreement is as follows:
! Floriston Rates means the rate of flow in the Truckee River at the head
of the diversion penstock at Floriston, California, measured at the
Iceland gage [currently the Farad gage] consisting of an average flow of
500 cubic feet of water per second each day during the period commencing
March 1 and ending September 30 of any year, and an average flow of
400 cubic feet per second each day during the period commencing October
1 and ending the last day of the next following February of any year.
!

Reduced Floriston Rates reduce the Truckee River's minimum
allowable rate of flow at the Farad gaging station from 350 cfs (Orr Ditch
Decree rights) to 300 cfs during the period commencing November 1 and
ending the next following March 31 of each year, determined as follows:
(a) 350 cubic feet per second whenever the elevation of the water surface
of Lake Tahoe is below 6,226.0 feet above sea level and not below
6,225.25 feet above sea level; and
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(b) 300 cubic feet per second whenever the water surface elevation of
Lake Tahoe is below 6,225.25 feet above sea level.
In addition to crucial operating criteria for Truckee River operations, the
1935 Truckee River Agreement further contained language intended to settle
the long-standing disputes over pumping Lake Tahoe when if fell below its
natural rim of 6,223.0 feet by:
!

Establishing the natural conditions in the bed and banks of Lake Tahoe
and of the Truckee River near Tahoe City, Placer County, California, and
prohibiting any alteration of such natural conditions without the
approval of the Attorney General of the State of California, and, in fact,
allowing parties to the agreement the right to restore these areas to their
natural condition, as necessary;

!

Prohibiting the creation of any other outlet of Lake Tahoe in addition to
the present and natural outlet at the head of the Truckee River;

!

Prohibiting the removal of water from Lake Tahoe for irrigation or power
uses by any means other than gravity except upon the declaration of the
U.S. Secretary of the Interior; and

!

Prohibiting the removal of water from Lake Tahoe for sanitary or
domestic uses by any means other than gravity, except upon the condition
that the Departments of Health of the States of Nevada and California,
or other officers exercising similar authority, shall first have made and
filed with the Attorney General of the State of Nevada and the Attorney
General of the State of California certificates showing that a necessity for
such pumping of Lake Tahoe exists (TRA:54).

Orr Ditch Decree (Truckee River).—The 1944 Orr Ditch Decree, which
incorporates the Truckee River Agreement, affirmed numerous individual
water rights (both municipal and industrial and agricultural), including
Truckee River diversion rights earlier than 1939. This decree represented a
tabulation or adjudication of water rights for the Truckee River within
Nevada and its tributaries regulated through a series of reservoirs and
irrigation canals, administered by the U.S. District Court Federal Water
Master in Reno, Nevada. The Orr Ditch Decree represented the culmination
of a "friendly suit" (U.S. v. Orr Ditch Water Company, et al.) filed in 1913 by
the USRS to quantify water rights on the Truckee River in Nevada in order
to secure Truckee River water rights for its Truckee-Carson (Newlands)
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Irrigation Project. In combination with the Truckee River Agreement and the
Floriston Rates, the Orr Ditch Decree currently represents the basis for
operation of the Truckee River between its source (Lake Tahoe) and its
terminus (Pyramid Lake). The Orr Ditch Decree incorporates the provisions
of the Truckee River Agreement, which provides for operation of storage
facilities, especially Lake Tahoe, to satisfy Truckee River water rights. The
Floriston Rates constitute the chief operational objective on the Truckee
River today and originated as a turn-of-the-century flow requirement for
original run-of-the-river users--hydropower and a pulp and paper mill. While
the Orr Ditch Decree establishes water rights for entities within Nevada
using the Truckee River's waters, the Truckee River Agreement, as part of
that Decree, determines the operational mechanisms to satisfy those rights.

Sierra Valley Decree (Little Truckee River) .—The 1958 Sierra Valley Decree
(precipitated from U.S. v. Sierra Valley Water Company, et al.) allows the
Sierra Valley Water Company to divert a portion of the Little Truckee River
in California into the Feather River Basin for use as supplemental irrigation
in the Sierra Valley (TRA:60). The maximum allowable diversion is 60 cubic
feet per second between March 15th and September 30th of each year. The
amount varies with the flow of Bonta Creek, averaging approximately
5,700 acre-feet per year (although as a supplemental water source, diversions
typically vary between 1,500 acre-feet to 10,000 acre-feet). The priority date
of this water right was set at 1870.(161)
Tahoe-Prosser Exchange Agreement.—The Tahoe-Prosser Exchange
Agreement ("Agreement for Water Exchange Operations of Lake Tahoe and
Prosser Creek Reservoir") was finalized in June 1959 and designated certain
waters in Prosser Reservoir as "Tahoe Exchange Water." By this agreement,
when waters are to be released from Lake Tahoe for a minimum instream
flow (50 cfs winter; 70 cfs summer) and when such releases from Lake Tahoe
are not necessary for Floriston Rates due to normal flows elsewhere in the
river, then an equal amount of water (exchange water) may be stored in
Prosser Reservoir and used for releases at other times.69 The agreement
provides for release of water from Prosser Creek Reservoir for the purpose of
maintaining Floriston Rates in exchange for prior releases from Lake Tahoe
needed to sustain the Truckee River fishery immediately below the lake for
longer periods.
Alpine Decree (Carson River).—The Alpine Decree is the Federal Court
adjudication of the relative water rights on the Carson River which is the
primary regulatory control of Carson River operations today. The decree is
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administered in the field by a Water Master appointed by the federal district
court. The decree, finally issued on October 28, 1980 after initial litigation
was begun in 1935, established the respective water rights (to surface water
only) of the parties to the original lawsuit, both in California and Nevada, to
Carson River water. The decree did not make an interstate allocation of the
Carson River between California and Nevada; it only quantified individual
water rights. Neither state was a party to the decree.
In addition to Carson River surface water rights, the Alpine Decree also
established the rights to reservoir storage in the many small high alpine
lakes and reservoirs in the upper Carson River watershed. The decree
confirmed the historical practice of operating the river on rotation, so that
irrigators with more junior priorities could be served as long as possible.
These upper alpine reservoirs were permitted to fill out of priority order, in
accordance with historical practice, because snow melt at this high elevation
comes late enough into the summer that flows are already beginning to
diminish in the valley below. The decree also allows the historical practice of
refilling reservoirs more than once during the runoff season.
The decree also specifically recognized riparian water rights in California (as
distinguished from the quantified appropriative water rights used in
Nevada). For purposes of water distribution, the Carson River and its east
and west forks, were divided into eight segments and when the river went
into regulation (i.e., there was not enough water in the Upper Carson River
to serve the most junior priority) each segment of the river was to be
administered autonomously.
Duties of water were set forth for various locations according to bench land
and bottom land designations. For lands in the Newlands Irrigation Project
(i.e., below Lahontan Dam) in Churchill County near Fallon, the Alpine
Decree provided for an annual net consumptive use values for water that can
be transferred when there is a change in use from irrigation to any other
purpose. A total of 2.99 acre-feet per acre can be transferred and a maximum water duty of 4.5 acre-feet per acre for water-righted bench lands and
3.5 acre-feet per acre for water-righted bottom lands delivered to the land.
For lands above the Newlands Project (i.e., above Lahontan Reservoir), the
net consumptive water use that can be transferred was set at 2.5 acre-feet
per acre with water duties of 4.5 acre-feet per acre diverted to the canal for
bottom lands, 6.0 acre-feet per acre diverted to the canal for the alluvial fan
lands and 9.0 acre-feet per acre diverted to the canal for the bench lands.
This annual net consumptive use, or crop water requirement, was based on
the water duty of alfalfa, as it is a dominant and the highest water-using crop
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grown in Nevada. While the Alpine Decree established water duties for
bench and bottom lands throughout the Carson River Basin, it made no
identification of those lands. The decree also granted landowners on the
Newlands Project an appurtenant water right for the patented lands,
effectively transferring water rights to these land holders individually.

Preliminary Settlement Agreement70.—In May 1989 a Preliminary
Settlement Agreement (PSA) was negotiated between the Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe of Indians and Sierra Pacific. The PSA was later incorporated
into Public Law 101-618 by reference and was mandated to be incorporated
in the new Truckee River Operating Agreement mandated under the
Settlement Act.
In this agreement, Sierra Pacific agreed to waive the hydroelectric water
rights that it had been granted in the Truckee River General Electric Decree
and the Orr Ditch Decree. Sierra Pacific also waived its claim to unappropriated water in favor of the Tribe. Another requirement of the PSA, was
that the Reno-Sparks metropolitan area would be required to implement
conservation measures reducing water use by about ten percent.71 In
exchange, Sierra Pacific was permitted to utilize unused storage capacity in
Truckee River Reservoirs, where it will store water from its Donner and
Independence Lakes reservoirs and from its agricultural rights. The PSA
provides Sierra Pacific the ability to store up to 39,500 acre-feet of water
covered by a portion of its water rights at times when it was not needed for
municipal and industrial water supply in the Reno-Sparks metropolitan area.
This water is to be used to meet M&I needs during drought years. On April 1
of non-drought years, a portion of Sierra Pacific’s previously stored water is
given to the fish.
The PSA exchange allows the water that would normally have been used to
maintain Floriston Rates for hydroelectric power generation by Sierra Pacific
enabling better timing of flows to benefit spawning for the fishery at Pyramid
Lake. This is water that would have eventually gone into Pyramid Lake
anyway. Under the PSA, however, instead of releasing that water yearround to maintain Floriston Rates for Sierra Pacific, it is stored as "Fish
Credit Water" and released as needed for spawning. Since the Stampede
Reservoir, where much of the new storage capacity for Sierra Pacific was to
be located, was exclusively managed to benefit the Pyramid Lake fishery, the
Pyramid Lake Tribe needed to agree to this provision.

76

Water Use and Rights

In comments to the draft report, the Tribe submitted the following background
on the PSA:
Since the turn of the century, the federal reservoirs on the Truckee
River have been operated to meet specific rates of flow measured at the
state line (Floriston Rates) primarily to generate hydroelectric power in
the upper portion of the basin and to serve agricultural uses in the
Truckee Meadows (around Reno and Sparks) and the Newlands
Project. By 1990, the significance of the hydroelectric power produced
by the four small run-of-the-river plants had declined to the point
where they produced less than 0.5% of the power supplied by Sierra
Pacific Power Company (Sierra). The amount of irrigated land in the
Truckee Meadows had been reduced by more than 50% and Truckee
River diversions to the Newlands Project had been cut by more than
60%. During this period, the population of the Reno-Sparks
metropolitan area grew substantially and the Truckee River/ Pyramid
Lake ecosystem deteriorated, jeopardizing Pyramid Lake’s protected
species and their critical habitat.
Notwithstanding all of these major changes and developments, the
operation of the Truckee River system appeared to be frozen in time.
Water required to meet the Floriston Rates had to be released by virtue
of court decrees even if the water was not needed at the time and even if
its retention and subsequent release would have improved the health
and well-being of Pyramid Lake’s protected fish. There was no incentive for urban conservation because, regardless of the M&I demand, the
same amount of water would be released from the reservoirs and flow
past Reno and Sparks. New reservoirs were added to the system, Boca
in the 1940s, Prosser Creek in 1959 and Stampede in 1970, but all of
the reservoirs were operated in a piecemeal, uncoordinated and
inefficient manner. Maintenance of instream flows and reservoir
recreation levels were ignored as were the frequent violations of the
Truckee River’s water quality standards. In short, the situation clearly
cried out for a major overhaul but the inflexible system in place seemed
embedded in concrete and resistant to change.
This was the backdrop to the negotiations which commenced in earnest
in 1988 between the Tribe and Sierra under the auspices and guidance
of Nevada Senator Harry Reid.72 Sierra needed a secure drought water
supply for its M&I customers. It had long planned on utilizing
Stampede Reservoir for that purpose but the courts had ruled that the
first priority of the water stored in Stampede was for spawning flows
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for Pyramid Lake’s protected species. Sierra brought several valuable
assets to the table, most notably ownership and control of a significant
portion of the water released to satisfy the Floriston Rates (which was
used solely to generate hydroelectric power and then returned to the
River), Truckee River water rights (many of which were formerly used
for agricultural purposes) substantially in excess of the quantity
necessary to meet the needs of its customers in most years and privately
owned and stored water (POSW) in Donner and Independence lakes.
The POSW was burdened with several constraints which severely
limited its value to Sierra. The Tribe’s major negotiating leverage was
Stampede Reservoir.
This mixture gave birth to the breakthrough PSA. The Tribe agreed
that Sierra could use the excess space in Stampede Reservoir to store
and carry over the consumptive use portion of its excess water rights
and its POSW for a M&I drought water supply. Sierra agreed: (i) to
turn over to the Pyramid Lake fishery in non-drought years its drought
water in excess of specified amounts; (ii) to allow Floriston Rate water
to be retained in storage for the benefit of the Pyramid Lake fishery to
the extent the water that would have been released would have been
diverted solely for the generation of hydroelectric power and would
have flowed to Pyramid Lake; and (iii) to undertake significant water
conservation measures including a program estimated to cost
approximately $25 million to install water meters on all residences
within its service area.73
The PSA benefitted Sierra by significantly enhancing its drought water
supply. The major advantage to the Tribe was the modification of the
Floriston rate regime to augment substantially the spawning flows in
the lower Truckee River during the spring and summer months. The
PSA was not intended to increase the total volume of inflow to
Pyramid Lake. OCAP and the Water Quality Agreement achieve that
goal.
It is very important to note that Sierra paid a price in the form of
water, a waiver of hydroelectric rights and expensive conservation
measures for the use of space in federal reservoirs. The reservoirs were
used, in effect, as leverage to redress the historic imbalance in the
allocation and management of Truckee River water resources. Space in
the federal reservoirs was made available to Sierra in return for
measures that would benefit the Pyramid Lake fishery. This policy
fulfilled both endangered species and Indian trust obligations. This
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critically important precedent, that the benefit of additional storage in
federal reservoirs would be provided in return for measures that would
contribute to the recovery of Pyramid Lake’s protected species, was
subsequently carried over to other parties in the TROA.
The PSA also demonstrated to the Reno/Sparks community and to
other interested parties that mutually acceptable and beneficial
solutions could be found for the area’s water problems. Prior to the
PSA, there was a general feeling that Indian rights and endangered
species obligations were inherently and inevitably at odds with all
other water related interests in the Truckee and Carson basins except
perhaps for environmental interests. The new attitude engendered by
the PSA led to the Tribe being asked in 1994 to appoint a tribal
representative to sit as a voting member of a regional water planning
commission formed by Reno, Sparks and Washoe County [the Water
Planning Commission of Washoe County]. The local community
decided on its own that it was better to work with the Tribe from the
outset and to try to find ways of addressing water issues that would
benefit the system as a whole, or failing that, at least would not harm
the downstream interests of the Tribe, than to proceed on its own and
risk more adversarial encounters.74 [We are] not aware of any similar
arrangement between local governmental entities and an Indian tribe.
There is one other aspect of the PSA that deserves mention. . .
Section 28 was included in the PSA to insure that all holders of water
rights under the Truckee River (Orr Ditch) decree, including those on
the Newlands Reclamation Project, would continue to receive the
amount of water to which they are entitled and that they would not be
injured by the Floriston Rate modifications authorized in the PSA.
This provision in the first step of the settlement process clearly shows
that the Tribe, Sierra and the federal government (which later ratified
the PSA) had no intention of interfering with the rights of Newlands
Project irrigators.

Interim Storage Contract.—In November 1995, by means of an interim
agreement between Sierra Pacific and the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, the
federal Water Master dropped the Truckee River's minimum allowable rate
of flow at the Farad gaging station from 350 cfs (Orr Ditch Decree rights) to
300 cfs. The difference in flow will allow an estimated twenty to thirty
thousand acre-feet to be stored in Stampede Reservoir and used during the
next spring's spawning run for Pyramid Lake's endangered cui-ui sucker
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fish.75 Sierra is required under the terms of the Interim Storage Contract to
waive its single-purpose hydroelectric right for 15 years in exchange (among
other things) for the ability to store water in federal reservoirs until TROA is
effective. Sierra Pacific’s maximum amounts of “base storage” will only be
reached at the full implementation of the negotiated settlement, about
50 years in the future.
Water Quality Agreement.—[Note: the following discussion is extracted
from comments to the draft report submitted by the Tribe.] In the 1980s,
water quality lawsuits were filed by Reno and Sparks against the Tribe and
by the Tribe against Reno, Sparks, the Federal Environmental Protection
Administration (EPA) and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection.
The lawsuits involved the validity of an EPA grant for the expansion of the
Reno/Sparks Sewage Treatment Plant. EPA had issued the grant even
though the Fish and Wildlife Service had concluded in its biological opinion
issued under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act that the grant would
jeopardize the continued existence of Pyramid Lake’s protected species.
The Settlement Act (section 210(a)(1)) requires as a condition of the
effectiveness of several of its major provisions that five listed lawsuits be
dismissed with prejudice or otherwise finally resolved. The water quality
lawsuits were not included on that list because at that time the parties did
not know of any mutually acceptable negotiated solution. They wanted to
proceed to resolve the issues they were confident could be settled and not
risk losing everything because of being unable to find a solution to the water
quality lawsuits.
The 1996 water quality settlement grew out of the 1994-95 facilitated,
“second generation” negotiations. During these negotiations, Reno, Sparks,
Washoe County, the Tribe and the federal government reached an agreement
in principle under which the water quality lawsuits would be dismissed. The
federal government and the Truckee Meadows interests would each
contribute $12 million, for a total of $24 million, toward the purchase of
water rights to be used to improve water quality in the Truckee River, from
the California/Nevada state line to Pyramid Lake, and in Pyramid Lake. A
significant portion of the acquired water rights would be stored upstream in
federal reservoirs under the provisions of TROA and would be released
primarily during low flow periods in the summer months to improve water
quality conditions. The water rights to be acquired with the $24 million
would be used solely for instream flows; they could not be diverted for
M&I use or for any other purpose.
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The Water Quality Settlement Agreement embodies these principles. Among
other things, it includes a provision stating that no water rights from the
Carson Division of the Newlands Project would be acquired pursuant to the
Water Quality Agreement. It is anticipated that water rights from the
Truckee Division along the Truckee Canal will be acquired under that
agreement.
The augmentation of Truckee River instream flows primarily during low flow
periods in the summer months was deemed to be the best, most practical and
most cost effective way of improving water quality conditions in the Truckee
River by experts from the Tribe, the State of Nevada, the Truckee Meadows
urban interests, EPA, the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Bureau of Indian
Affairs. Those increased flows also will improve the riparian habitat along
the River which will eventually further improve water quality by increasing
the shade canopy and thereby reducing water temperatures. At the same
time, the increased flows into Pyramid Lake will raise its level, improve its
water quality and increase recruitment of fish to the lake by facilitating the
passage of larger numbers of cui-ui and Lahontan cutthroat trout spawners
through the delta at the mouth of the Truckee River.
The Water Quality Agreement provides substantial benefits to the Truckee
Meadows urban interests in addition to the settlement of the lawsuits. The
Truckee River flows through the heart of downtown Reno. A healthy and
vibrant river corridor helps attract visitors which are vital to the local
tourist/gaming based economy. Reno is now planning a major redevelopment
effort along the river featuring cafés, bars, restaurants and shops. The river
also is important to the residents of Reno and Sparks. The community’s
dependence on the river was heightened during the recent severe drought in
the late 1980s and early 1990s when the river frequently dried up during the
summer months and wildlife dependent on the river suffered severely.
The Water Quality Agreement also contributes significantly to
environmental values further upstream in California. The water quality
water released from upstream reservoirs during low flow periods will help
meet the minimum and preferred flows in the upstream portion of the river
and its tributaries. The additional water held in storage will improve
recreation levels.
In short, the Water Quality Agreement benefits everyone on the Truckee
River from Lake Tahoe to Pyramid Lake. It will contribute substantially to
meeting the water quality standards of the Clean Water Act and inflow
stream requirements in California, Nevada and the Pyramid Lake Indian
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Reservations. It will also go a long way toward implementing the objectives
of the cui-ui recovery plan. There will be a further reduction in irrigated
agriculture, but that would likely happen in any event and the owners of the
acquired water rights will receive fair compensation, i.e., their rights will not
be “taken” through regulation.
The parties to the Water Quality Agreement recognize that the interests of
the Town of Fernley are affected by the proposed purchases of water rights
from the Truckee Division of the Newlands Project and that it is desirable to
reach an accommodation with Fernley. Fernley is located in close proximity
to the Town of Wadsworth which is within the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation. Wadsworth and Fernley share some of the same resources, problems,
interests and concerns. Hopefully, an agreement with the Town of Fernley
will be the next step in the process of changing the operation, management
and distribution of the waters of the Truckee River to meet the needs of the
21st century and beyond.
Truckee River Operating Agreement.—Under the provisions of P.L. 101-618,
the Secretary of Interior was ordered to negotiate an operating agreement
with the State of Nevada and the State of California, for the operation of the
Truckee River and the Newlands Project (the Truckee River Operating
Agreement, or TROA). Under the terms of this law, the TROA must:
!

Provide for the operation of the Truckee River reservoirs to satisfy dam
safety and flood requirements;

!

Provide for the enhancement of spawning flows available in the Lower
Truckee River for the Pyramid Lake fishery (in order to meet the
requirements of the Endangered Species Act);

!

Carry out the terms of the Preliminary Settlement Agreement; and

!

Ensure that water is stored and released from Truckee River reservoirs
to satisfy the exercise of water rights in conformance with the Orr Ditch
and Truckee River General Electric Decree, except where those rights
have been modified by the Preliminary Settlement Agreement—or which
are transferred pursuant to State law (Sec. 205(a).

The TROA must also minimize the costs associated with the operation and
maintenance of Stampede Reservoir. In order for the TROA to enter into
effect, it must be signed by the States of Nevada and California, the
Secretary of Interior, Sierra Pacific Power Company, and the Pyramid Lake
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Paiute Tribe (the latter two signatories are required as a function of the
Preliminary Settlement Agreement). The TROA also has to be approved by
both the Orr Ditch and Truckee River General Agreement (TRGA) courts.
Other affected parties will be provided the opportunity to sign the agreement, although this is not mandated by P.L. 101-618. Nine additional
signatures are sought, in an attempt to go before the Orr Ditch and
TRGA courts for approval with no protest. These nine include the TruckeeCarson Irrigation District; Washoe and Churchill counties; the cities of
Sparks, Reno and Fernley; and Washoe County Water Conservation District,
among others.
Under TROA, reservoir operations and stream flows in the Truckee River
basin would be managed by a combination of new operating procedures, an
allocation of Lake Tahoe water and Truckee River water between the States
of Nevada and California, and many elements of existing court decrees,
agreements and regulations. The TROA provides a water management tool
for making effective and more efficient use of existing federal and nonfederal reservoirs, and for improving the timing and magnitude of river flows.
It would contain procedures intended to achieve the following primary
benefits:
!

Increasing the municipal and industrial (M&I) drought water supply for
the Truckee Meadows area;

!

Enhancing spawning flows for Pyramid Lake fish;

!

Enhancing instream flows and water quality;

!

Sustaining reservoir storage to serve recreational uses

These benefits would be realized by modifying several of the present water
storage and release practices. TROA would not alter or conflict with
presently exercised water rights or interfere with flood control and dam
safety criteria. There are two key elements of TROA:
!

Retain in storage, under new water categories, pooled water that would
have been released and/or runoff water that would have been passed
through federal reservoirs to achieve Floriston Rates, if not needed to
immediately satisfy the exercise of Orr Ditch Decree affirmed water
rights.
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!

Exchange stored water among Truckee River reservoirs. TROA will
facilitate and encourage coordination of scheduled releases and
exchanges of water among reservoirs. This will allow a scheduled release
from one reservoir to be substituted for a release from another, with
water accounts in the two reservoirs credited or debited. Water would
not necessarily need to be physically moved between reservoirs under
this arrangement and releases of stored water for a single purpose could
be coordinated to derive multiple benefits. Thus, existing water and
storage rights will be served while enhancing instream flows and
recreation pools and possibly retaining water that would otherwise spill
in storage elsewhere.

These river reoperation provisions coordinate empty space in five federal
reservoirs (Tahoe, Prosser Creek, Martis Creek, Stampede, and Boca) for use
as if it were a new reservoir. Water is moved around within the system via
exchanges and credits, to place water for a particular use in the location
where it best serves the need. In addition, California would be allocated
space for M&I supply and allowed to temporarily use designated waters for
enhancing instream flows and recreational pools.
Credit Water is a new category of stored water that would be created by
TROA. Storage of M&I or fish credit water would be accomplished by
retaining in Truckee River Reservoirs certain stored or runoff water that
would otherwise have been released to achieve Floriston Rates and by
exchanging or restoring certain privately owned water. Among the categories
of storage and credit water would be:
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!

Pooled Water
M&I Credit Water
Fish Water and Fish Credit Water
Tahoe-Prosser Exchange Water
Water Quality Water (under the Water Quality Agreement)
Sierra Pacific privately owned water
California M&I Storage
Joint Program Fish Credit Water (for use in California)
Other Stored Water

Exchanges would be the main procedure for moving (physically or administratively) water categories among the reservoirs to conserve storage,
enhance instream flows, and maintain reservoir recreational pools.
Exchanges could be made between any water categories. Exchange
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procedures would vary with reservoir, water category, and hydrologic
conditions. Exchanges could be made by:
!
!
!

Trading (administratively) water in one reservoir for that in another;
Releasing water from one reservoir in lieu of another; or
Moving water from an upstream water to a downstream reservoir.
In comments to the draft report, the Tribe submitted the following
additional background on TROA:
TROA is still a work in progress. It implements and builds on the
foundation provided by the PSA. Among other things, in its current
form it provides for further modifications in Floriston Rates and
additional credit storage to improve instream flows in the Truckee
River and its tributaries in California, enhance recreation levels in the
federal and non-federal reservoirs in California, enhance instream
flows and improve water quality in the Truckee River in Nevada,
particularly in the lower river below Derby Dam, and provide storage
for additional water rights acquired by the Tribe and/or the federal
government for fish purposes and for an M&I water supply for use in
California. TROA also eventually may include storage for an M&I
water supply for the Town of Fernley.
There is much to be said and written about the TROA negotiation and
implementation process. . .. All of the major interested parties, from the
top of the Truckee River watershed in California to its terminus on the
Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation, with the sole exception of the
Lahontan Valley irrigation and M&I interests, have achieved an
unprecedented degree of cooperation. The federal government has
participated in a responsive and constructive manner, frequently
advancing creative proposals to resolve differences or to satisfy the
needs of one party without harming the interests of any other party.
All of the participants are now viewing the issues and the alternatives
not just from the standpoints of their own interests, but from the
broader perspective of the watershed as a whole.76 [The Tribe is] not
aware of any other place in the West where integration, consultation,
and coordination to this extent has occurred within an entire
watershed. This state of affairs is all the more remarkable because in
the mid- 1980s there was probably more conflict and litigation on the
Truckee River than any other stream in the West. This striking change
for the better deserves more than just passing mention. . ..
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Army Corps Flood Control Criteria.—The COE flood control criteria govern
operation of the federal reservoirs, except Lake Tahoe, for flood control
during winter months. Lake Tahoe is monitored and, if factors such as
snowpack water content and precipitation suggest that lake levels would rise
above the maximum permitted storage elevation, water is released from the
lake so as not to exceed an elevation of 6,229.1 feet. Flood releases are
monitored as well to ensure that damages downstream are minimized.
COE flood control procedures govern the combined operation of Martis
Creek, Stampede, Boca and Prosser Creek reservoirs for downstream flood
protection in the winter. Up to 65,000 acre-feet of capacity in the four
reservoirs combined is held in reserve to accommodate potential flood flows
(see the Truckee River Atlas, Chapter 7 for further details). All of Martis’s
capacity is available for this use; the remaining space is allocated among the
other reservoir and inflows that encroach into the flood control reservation
must be released.
During a flood, releases are made to limit (to the extent possible) flows in the
Reno area to the channel capacity of 14,000 cfs. When possible, flows are
limited to 6,000 cfs, which is the nominal channel capacity in the Truckee
Meadows below Reno (TRA:92). Flood protection improvements in this area
are planned to increase channel capacity to 14,000 cfs throughout Truckee
Meadows.
Lake Tahoe Wastewater Agreements.—Disposal of treated wastewater is
banned within the Lake Tahoe basin to help protect the lake’s famous clarity.
Local agencies responsible for treatment are required to export wastewater
from the basin. Wastewater is exported either to the Truckee River
watershed downstream, or to the Carson watershed. The largest export to
the Carson comes from South Tahoe PUD over Luther Pass into Alpine
County. This export began in the 1960s and was delivered to Indian Creek
Reservoir, constructed especially for that purpose. Today, effluent exports
amounting to 4,000 to 5,000 acre-feet per year are sent to Harvey Place
Reservoir; Indian Creek is used for freshwater recreation. The wastewater is
delivered from the reservoir to selected agricultural users for irrigation in
specified areas.
Operating Criteria and Procedures
Background.—In 1964, the Secretary of Interior formed a task force to
study and report on Newlands Project operations and management and to
resolve conflicts among various users regarding the right-of-use of available
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water. Subsequently, a task force was established to formulate Operating
Criteria and Procedures (OCAP) for the project.
OCAP were first instituted by the Secretary on October 1, 1967, to provide
for coordinated operation of the Truckee and Carson Rivers while making
diversions for irrigation use. These OCAP were reinstituted annually
through 1972 and specified that maximum use would be made of Carson
River water, while diversions from the Truckee River would minimized, “to
make as much water available to Pyramid Lake as possible.” An OCAP with
an annual diversion limit from both rivers of 378,000 acre-feet was approved
by the Secretary of Interior in 1972 but subsequently rejected and a court
order was issued directing the Secretary to revise the OCAP to, among other
things, “give proper weight to the maximum farm headgate entitlements of
both the Orr Ditch and Alpine decrees.” The Secretary submitted an OCAP
with a diversion limit of 358,000 acre-feet, together with a lengthy
explanation of why this diversion limit was based solely on the Orr Ditch
decree bottom and benchland water duties (3.5 and 4.5 acre-feet per acre,
respectively) and did not use the duty of 2.92 acre-feet per acre specified in
1949 and 1950 temporary restraining orders in the Alpine case. The
diversion limit of 358,000 acre-feet was based on 60,500 acres in irrigation,
an average water duty of 3.473 acre-feet per acre, and a conveyance efficiency
of 58.7%. The court found that the Secretary’s amended OCAP did not
conform to his order and ordered the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe to submit an
OCAP that would comply. The Tribe submitted an OCAP with a diversion
limit of 288,129 acre-feet, based on 55,210 acres, an average water duty of
3.200 acre-feet per acre, and a conveyance efficiency of 61.3%. The Tribe’s
calculation assumed the Alpine water duty was applicable to three-fourths of
the Carson Division, and the Orr Ditch bottom land duty was applicable to
the remainder of the division. On February 20, 1973, the Federal District
Court found that Newlands Project water diverted for use by TCID was
inefficiently used. (The Project uses flood irrigation and its pre-OCAP
delivery systems were highly inefficient by current standards. Approximately
40% of the water did not reach the crops it was diverted to irrigate.) The
court ordered the implementation of an OCAP which limited the combined
annual project diversion from the Carson and Truckee Rivers to 350,000 acre
feet in 1973 and 288,129 acre-feet in 1974. The use of water for singlepurpose power generation was no longer allowed, and diversion criteria were
implemented to limit storage in Lahontan Reservoir and thereby reduce
reservoir spills and evaporation.
In a second important case,77 the Secretary of the Interior was required to
deliver all water to Pyramid Lake not otherwise obligated by court decrees or
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contracts. The court further ordered the Secretary to enforce the
1973 OCAP; if the provisions of the OCAP were violated further, the court
asserted, the 1926 Newlands contract with TCID was to be terminated. The
Secretary terminated the contract, as directed,78 and TCID brought suit. The
central issue in the litigation was whether or not the Secretary’s compliance
with the court order on OCAP was legal. Interior put TCID on notice that
any water diverted in excess of the court-ordered OCAP would be recouped.
TCID continued diverting above the amount to which it was entitled under
OCAP, an action that neither Reclamation nor the federal Water Master
prevented. From 1973, Reclamation issued an interim OCAP each year,
pending the outcome of the case. The case concluded in 1985 with the courts
upholding the United States. Interim OCAP with approved modifications
continued to be issued through 1987, when the 1988 OCAP were adopted.

1988 OCAP.—In April 1988, the Federal District Court in Reno, Nevada
preliminarily approved a new OCAP until objections could be ruled upon, and
the Secretary of the Interior adopted the OCAP for the Newlands Project
with respect to allowable water diversions.
The OCAP expressly state that they are designed to achieve compliance with
the Truckee (Orr Ditch) and Carson (Alpine) decrees. It is the federal
government’s position that they provide for and are predicated on the
delivery of the legal entitlements to the farm headgates for all irrigated
water-righted land within the Project. The irrigators, as discussed below,
believe that they constitute a “taking” of property rights.
The 1988 OCAP stated nine guiding principles, as follows:
!

Provide water deliveries sufficient to meet the water right entitlements of
project water users;

!

Meet the requirements of the Endangered Species Act as they specifically
relate to the Truckee River/Pyramid Lake cui-ui

!

Fulfill federal trust responsibilities to the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Indian
Tribe;

!

Fulfill federal trust responsibilities to the Pyramid Lake Paiute Indian
Tribe;
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!

Conserve wetland and wildlife values in both the Truckee and Carson
River basins;

!

Give cognizance to the State laws affecting water rights and water uses;

!

Provide for stable economies and improve quality of life in the region to
the extent it is influenced by Interior-managed resources and facilities;

!

Allow local control and initiative to the maximum extent possible; and

!

Provide stability and predictability through straightforward operation
based on actual versus forecast conditions.

The preamble to the 1988 OCAP states that it “relies on both rules and
incentives.” Procedures are included to monitor water use and Project
operations and to enforce the OCAP. The introduction states that Interior
believes the OCAP efficiency targets are reasonable because they are
“achievable,” “without significant capital expenditures”, and “are within the
range of efficiencies achieved in comparable systems.” The OCAP are
designed “to produce a long term average effect, recognizing that each year
will necessarily be different.”
There are three basic elements, according to the 1988 OCAP introduction:
(1) monitoring headgate deliveries against the acreage eligible to receive
Project water multiplied by court-decreed water duty; (2) efficiency targets
coupled with incentives for more efficient operation and disincentives (water
debits) for less efficient operations; and (3) a maximum allowable diversion
(MAD) limit for irrigation and a maximum efficiency deficit (MED). The
latter limits are set with the intent of providing a cushion for TCID operations, but “neither limit is expected to ever be encountered in actual
operation.”
Under the 1988 OCAP, in any given year, the Project's maximum water
allotment determined by the MAD is based on actual project water-righted
and irrigated acreage, bench and bottom lands designations, and the water
duties specified under the Orr Ditch and Alpine decrees. The MAD may vary
from year to year and is comprised of the sum of maximum headgate
entitlements plus distribution and operation losses. The 1988 OCAP states
that, potentially, 73,000 acres of Project land could be irrigated and included
in the MAD. However, the maximum acreage has never been irrigated. The
acreage projected to be irrigated in 1988 through 1992, as shown in the 1988
OCAP, ranges from 61,630 acres (1988) to 64,850 acres (1992). The MAD in
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1996 was based on 59,689.44 acres, of which about 4,000 acres are located in
the Truckee Division, fed directly from the Truckee Canal (Truckee River
waters only), and the remainder in the Carson Division, fed from Lahontan
Reservoir (Carson and Truckee River waters).79
The MED “is a fixed number set equal to the operating cushion” and represents “the limit on how much accumulated storage can be borrowed from the
future to satisfy a less efficient operation.” The OCAP state that, if the MED
is exceeded and an acceptable plan to reduce the MED is not furnished by
TCID, allocations will be reduced by the amount in excess of the MED plus
one-half of the MED (13,000 acre-feet). The OCAP state “Nominally this will
mean a forced reduction of approximately 5% of entitlements. . .. Liabilities
arising from shortages occasioned by operation of this provision shall be the
responsibility of the District or individual water users.”
The 1988 OCAP uses diversion criteria to limit diversions from the Truckee
River to Lahontan Reservoir. It is based on models projecting average
annual diversions to TCID from the combined Carson-Truckee system of
about 320,000 acre-feet/year. The 320,000 acre-foot limit does not appear
directly in the OCAP itself (except in an example table showing the MAD at
various percent entitlement delivered), however the OCAP has the effect of
reducing annual diversions from all sources to satisfy Project irrigation rights
from 370,000 to 320,000 acre-feet (at the corresponding entitlement delivery
level).
The 1988 OCAP also suggests possible conservation measures to improve
project efficiency, and provides for incentives and penalties to encourage the
Project operator to achieve efficiency improvements. Efficiency levels were
phased in over a five-year period and beginning in 1992, the maximum
required Project efficiency was set at 68.4% if all eligible Project lands
received their maximum headgate entitlements. Efficiency is defined as
maximum headgate entitlement divided by the MAD; in practice, it is
measured as the quantity of water delivered at the farm headgates divided
by the total diversions to the Project. The 1988 OCAP sets a range of
efficiency targets depending on the percent of maximum headgate
entitlements used by the irrigators as a whole. In 1992 and beyond (the end
of the phase-in period), these range from 64% (at 75% of entitlements) to
68.4% (at 100%). The irrigators typically use 90% to 95% of their
entitlements; if so, their efficiency target would range between 65.5% and
67.5%. If the target is not reached, a water penalty is imposed the next year;
if exceeded, a water credit is given in the following year. The conservation
criteria apply only to the irrigation system efficiency in delivery canals and
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laterals; they do not apply to Lahontan Reservoir and the Truckee Canal, nor
do they apply on the farms.
Functionally, the OCAP works as follows: Truckee River diversions to the
Carson Division are governed by end-of-month storage target levels in
Lahontan Reservoir. When Truckee River water is available at Derby Dam
(i.e., when not required to meet more senior water rights), water is diverted
from the Truckee River through the Truckee Canal to Lahontan Reservoir
each month. Truckee River diversions to the Carson Division are limited to
supplementing Carson River flows to the extent that such flows are
insufficient to meet at Lahontan Reservoir end-of-month storage targets.
The storage target for June, for instance, is 215,000 acre-feet. If Carson
River flows and previous diversions from the Truckee River are insufficient
to reach that target and water is available in the Truckee River (beyond that
required to meet more senior water rights), then water is diverted from the
Truckee to Lahontan Reservoir. The monthly targets are intended to be
adequate to serve all Carson Division water rights in full water years and
many drought years at 100% of demand, given operation of the project at
target efficiency. Monthly storage objectives are based on NRCS forecasts; a
formula for calculating the monthly storage objective is defined in the OCAP.
If the reservoir is above the target levels, water may not be diverted. If the
project exceeds its target efficiency level based on the amount of water rights
served, it gets a water credit; if it is below the efficiency level it gets a debit.
If the following year is a water-short year (i.e., a drought), the debit is
written off to the extent it is offset by drought shortage, however an
additional shortage over and above that caused by drought may be required if
the drought shortage is less than the debit shortage. For example, if a debit
of 20,000 acre-feet exists and drought causes a shortage of 15,000 acre-feet,
the 15,000 acre-feet of drought shortage is written off the debit, but 5,000
acre-feet of debit remain. TCID is able to employ any method it chooses to
achieve the efficiency targets and was given five years to achieve them (from
the 1988 OCAP).
Notwithstanding the OCAP’s stated protection of water rights, certain
restrictions on Truckee River diversions are incorporated to protect the
river’s vulnerable resources. These include a prohibition on canal diversions
which would reduce river flows below Derby Dam by more than 20% in a
24-hour period when the Truckee River flow (measured at the gage below
Derby Dam) is less than 100 cfs, and a requirement to coordinate with
releases from Stampede Reservoir to minimize fluctuations in the Truckee
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River below Derby Dam to meet annual flow regimes established by FWS for
listed species in the lower Truckee River.
In comments received on draft report, the Tribe cites the following
OCAP measures as key to conserving water for Pyramid Lake:
!

Halting the practice of diverting and releasing water solely for the
generation of hydroelectric power at and below Lahontan Dam during the
non-irrigation season;

!

Maximizing the use of Carson River water in the Carson Division of the
Newlands Project and minimizing the diversion of Truckee River water
and reducing spills, evaporation and conveyance losses by establishing
monthly target storage levels for Lahontan Reservoir which constrain the
amount and alter the timing of the Truckee River diversions;

!

Requiring the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District (TCID) to keep track of
the amount of actually irrigated land with water rights;

!

Enforcing the maximum farm headgate delivery limitations of the
Truckee (Orr Ditch) and Carson (Alpine) River decrees;

!

Prohibiting the irrigation of non-water righted land; and

!

Requiring TCID to minimize operational losses through enforcement of
specified distribution system efficiencies for the Truckee and Carson
Divisions.

Allowable diversions to the Truckee Canal can be stored in Stampede
Reservoir and released to TCID as part of the reservoir credit allowed under
the 1988 OCAP. TCID is entitled to a storage credit to the extent that the
storage credit and actual Lahontan storage does not exceed the Lahontan
target storage. Further litigation has established that Interior need not
carry over the credit from year to year.80
Newlands Project Efficiency Study.—Reclamation completed a Newlands
Project Efficiency Study in January 1994 to fulfill requirements of
P.L. 101-618 (Section 209(c)), which state the Secretary shall study the
feasibility of improving the conveyance efficiency of Newlands Project
facilities, as defined under applicable OCAP, to an average level of 75% or
greater by November 16, 2002. The Secretary is also directed to consider the
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impacts of the measures needed to attain this efficiency level on groundwater
resources and wetlands in the Project area.
The Efficiency Study notes that “the Act does not require the Project to be
operated at a 75% efficiency level but is meant to furnish a comprehensive
plan to maximize the efficiency of the Newlands Project so that additional
water is available to meet the increased demand for project water for other
purposes [such as assisting with the recovery of the endangered cui-ui and
the threatened Lahontan cutthroat trout], while protecting the viability of
the Project.” (Again, “Project efficiency” in this context is actually the
Newlands conveyance system efficiency and does not include on-farm
efficiency.)
Two alternatives were developed and discussed in the Efficiency Study:
!

The Least Cost Alternative relies on acquisition of water rights from
targeted areas, transferring them to the wetlands, installing measuring
devices at 49% of the turnouts, and lining the first 5.9 miles of the V-line
Canal with concrete.

!

The Structural Improvement Alternative relies on acquisition of water
rights from targeted areas, installing measuring devices at 50% of the
turnouts and lining 44.9 miles of major canals with concrete.

The Efficiency Study notes that “by setting efficiency targets, the OCAP
sought to eliminate any wasteful operations and make any water savings
available for competing uses particularly as they relate to Endangered
Species Act requirements,” however neither the OCAP nor the Efficiency
Study define “waste.” The OCAP does state that the key to the target
efficiencies “is the application of ‘reasonable’,” and states that “reasonable”
was defined in terms of current operating experience, the experience of other
irrigation systems, economics, and environmental impacts, but provides no
documentation as to how these things established the range considered
“reasonable.”
Approximately 40% of the water that is diverted to service irrigated agriculture in the Newlands Project area does not make it to the fields. Part of
this loss is due to seepage and evaporation (the diversionary ditches and
canals are currently both unlined and uncovered) and some is due to
operational spills. The Project has about 326 miles of canals running through
uncompacted earth; only 7% of these are lined. The water balance reported
in the Newlands Project Efficiency Study shows operational losses of 8,100
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acre-feet and canal seepage (distribution system) losses of 81,300 acre-feet,
in addition to 6,000 acre-feet of evaporation losses and 13,370 acre-feet of
regulating reservoir seepage and evaporation losses. Seepage and
evaporation are by far the major components of Newlands Project losses.
The Efficiency Study concludes that “a 75% efficiency level can be achieved
on the Newlands Project through some combination of structural improvements and operational changes. Increasing the efficiency is likely to have
significant impacts on both area groundwater and wetlands. Improved
efficiency will lessen the volume of flow through the Project and consequently
decrease recharge of the area aquifers which supply local municipal and well
water. Agricultural return flows, which have been the major source of water
for area wetlands in the past, are likely to decrease substantially as
efficiency increases.” The economic feasibility of achieving such an efficiency
level remains open to question, however. At issue is what measures are
“reasonable” for the irrigators to undertake to achieve higher efficiencies.
According to testimony at the 1994 hearing on P.L. 101-618, activities to
improve efficiency might include a combination of improved measurement of
irrigation deliveries, lining of some canals, and targeting acquisition of blocks
of Project land. In addition, testimony stated that FWS/Nevada acquisitions
of Project water rights to transfer to wetlands, if well-targeted, could
increase Project efficiency as well. The Efficiency Study notes, however, that
the conservation estimates associated with measures listed in the 1988
OCAP were overstated and that some of the measures would not produce
savings. It also notes that its findings must be tempered by the fact that
data gathering occurred at the close of the most severe drought experienced
in most of Nevada.
Proposed Adjusted OCAP.—Public Law 101-618 (Section 209(j)), enacted on
November 16, 1990, requires that the current (1988) OCAP remain in effect
at least through December 31, 1997, unless the Secretary decides, in his sole
discretion, that changes are needed to comply with his obligations, including
those under the Endangered Species Act, as amended. In December 1990,
the District Court remanded the OCAP case to the Secretary for
reconsideration because of the possible effect of recent Ninth Circuit Court
opinions and Public Law 101-618 on the OCAP.
The summary to the proposed rule states that “adjustments are proposed to
the Project efficiency requirements, maximum allowable diversion
calculations, and Lahontan Reservoir storage targets in the 1988 OCAP to
reflect current irrigated acreage and court decrees which have lowered the
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water duty applicable to certain Project lands. To better manage diversions
from the Truckee River to the Project, additional proposed adjustments to
the 1988 OCAP provide flexibility in using snowpack and runoff forecasts
and extending the time frame for storing water in Truckee River reservoirs in
lieu of diversions to the Project from the Truckee River.” The background
statement further elaborates “The Department is proposing at this time to
make a number of revisions to the 1988 OCAP to adjust for changes in use of
water rights, to increase flexibility, and to clarify and fine-tune the language
of the OCAP based on experience gained in administering the 1988 OCAP
through eight irrigation seasons.”
The proposed rule notes the following general differences between the 1992
projections of the 1988 OCAP, and the 1995 experience which are the stated
basis for the proposed adjustments:
!

Acreage: the anticipated increase in irrigated acreage has not
materialized. It was projected to reach 64,850 acres in 1992, but actual
irrigation in 1995 was 59,023 acres. (No mention is made of waterrighted acreage idled through the transfer litigation.)

!

Average water duty: as a result of the so-called “bench/bottom litigation”,
some Project lands have been reclassified, resulting in a reduced demand
of about 5,000 acre-feet of water (assuming certain levels of use of
entitlements).

!

Average use of entitlement: the proposed rule increases the estimated
percent use of entitlement and notes several factors affecting use of
entitlements (the percent use will be determined based on actual
experience and used in calculating the expected irrigation diversion for
each irrigation season).

!

Efficiency: within the same size project, more irrigated acreage results in
greater efficiency; with less irrigated acreage lower efficiencies are
expected. For that reason, efficiency targets are reduced slightly. (The
rule cites the ongoing water acquisition program and states “efficiencies
should improve stemming from the concentration of deliveries through
the system” but does not explain why acquisitions might not leave a
more scattered pattern of irrigators, possibly decreasing efficiencies.)
Adjustments do not take into consideration the fact, as reported in the
Efficiency Study, that the measures identified in the 1988 OCAP as
possible means to achieve the targeted efficiencies and that have been
implemented by TCID have not yielded the anticipated savings. The
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reduced efficiencies in the Adjusted OCAP are based solely on the
reduced acreage.
In response to less acreage and varying water demand, Interior proposes to
calculate the annual Project water budget for each irrigation season in
accordance with the Newlands Project Water Budget table of the Adjusted
OCAP. The intent is clearly to allow the Project water budget to
accommodate anticipated changes in Project characteristics. This would
appear to benefit irrigators by not subjecting them to an inflexible rule
regardless of actual conditions, but it raises the potential for an annual
debate on assumptions and projections, possibly increasing the irrigators’
feeling of being micro-managed.
As noted above, Truckee River diversions to the Carson Division are
governed by end-of-month storage targets at Lahontan Reservoir, and the
formula calculating the allowable diversion relies in part on the runoff
forecast for the Carson River. The imprecision inherent in such forecasting
can lead to more Truckee River water being diverted than is needed to serve
the Project and, on occasion, to spills or precautionary drawdowns at
Lahontan Reservoir. Spilled water that cannot be transported to waterrighted lands or Lahontan Valley wetlands flows into the Carson Sink, failing
to serve any of the priority uses in the lower Carson Basin. The rule
concludes that the current storage targets permit unnecessary diversions
from the Truckee River and proposes Adjusted OCAP storage targets based
on lower Carson Division demand and reducing water loss to seepage and
evaporation. The critical end-of-June storage target is reduced from
215,000 acre-feet to 174,000 acre-feet.
The proposed Adjusted OCAP further proposes to fine-tune the Truckee
River system by allowing retention of Truckee River water in upstream
storage earlier in the year, so that the degree to which Carson River runoff
will fill Lahontan Reservoir can be better ascertained before diverting
Truckee River water. It notes that the limited window allowed for storage
retention contributed to an unnecessary diversion of 70,000 acre-feet of
water to Lahontan Reservoir before March 31 in 1995, which later had to be
spilled. The rule proposes allowing credit storage as early as January, but
not carrying over such storage credit from year to year.
Proposed Revised OCAP.—In addition to pursuing the proposed Adjusted
OCAP, Interior has issued a Notice of Intent (NOI) to do an EIS to evaluate,
among other things, options to substantially revise OCAP. The proposed
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Adjusted OCAP are considered an interim measure until Interior is able to
conduct an in-depth evaluation of OCAP.

Unappropriated Water
In 1930, TCID filed an application for 100,000 acre-feet per year of additional
(unappropriated) Truckee River water (Application 9330).81 At issue in
TCID's 1930 filing are the Truckee River's excess (unallocated, i.e., flood)
flows (averaging nearly 400 TAF/yr). In a wet water year, unappropriated
flows can amount to as much as 1,890,000 acre-feet of water. The Pyramid
Tribe has filed a claim for this water and Sierra Pacific has opted to support
that claim, subject to TROA entering into effect.
Hearings before the Nevada State Engineer on the TCID request were not
held until May 1994, at which time Interior categorically stated their
objection to TCID's request. The Assistant Secretary of Water and Science of
Interior, wrote a letter to the Nevada State Engineer, R. Michael Turnipseed,
stating that even if TCID's request was approved, Interior would not allow
federal facilities to be used for the conveyance, storage, or delivery of Truckee
River water appropriated pursuant to that application. Ms. Rieke stated that
such approval was contrary to section 210(a)(2)(B) of the
Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act (Public
Law 101-618).
Based on this "threshold issue" alone, on May 31, 1994, the State Engineer
denied TCID's application without ruling on whether there exists
unappropriated water, whether this application would interfere with existing
rights, or whether the application would threaten to prove detrimental to the
public interest.82
Subsequently, a Newlands irrigator motioned to intervene and the court
remanded the case back to the State Engineer for a re-hearing so additional
evidence and testimony could be presented. The court determined that the
real party in interest under Application 9330 for unappropriated water was
not the TCID but the individuals who hold water rights within the Newlands
Project, and that the TCID was an agent through contract with the United
States. The City of Fallon, Churchill County and the Town of Fernley have
all intervened and been granted interested party status. Hearings were held
in early 1996 and the State Engineer has yet to issue a ruling on the matter.
These are waters which the Pyramid Lake Paiute Indian Tribe would prefer
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to see flow into Pyramid Lake. All other parties have agreed not to object to
the tribe being granted unappropriated waters.
According to comments received from the tribe’s attorney, “the Tribe expects
to obtain all of the unappropriated water allocated to Nevada by virtue of
section 210(a)(2)(B) of the Settlement Act, the Tribe’s 1993 Memorandum of
Understanding with the State of Nevada and the Tribe’s agreement with the
Sierra Pacific Power Company, Reno, Sparks and Washoe County under
which those entities agreed to relinquish their claims to the unappropriated
water and withdraw their protests of the Tribe’s applications. The Tribe has
made clear that there will not be a settlement if it does not obtain all of
Nevada’s unappropriated water.”
Churchill County officials has also filed a request with the Reclamation for
supplemental Truckee River water rights under the Orr Ditch Decree
(Claim No. 3),83 and the TCID 1930 request for unappropriated (flood) flows
of the Truckee River.84

2.4

Water Transfer Markets

In the Reno-Sparks area, new water demands for urban growth and Truckee
River/Pyramid Lake fisheries have been accommodated through a longstanding program of water rights acquisition and through innovative multiparty agreements regarding river operations. The newly-recognized demand
for water to support Lahontan Valley wetlands has not yet been satisfied and
it may take another decade before the success of the voluntary transfer
program can be evaluated.
Historical Development of the Regional Water Market
Historically, transfers of water in the Truckee River Basin were confined
mainly to the Truckee Meadows, with a small number of groundwater
transfers occurring in some nearby valleys. Much of the market activity in
this study area has involved Sierra Pacific, which began purchasing irrigation
rights to supplement its original Truckee River appropriations in the mid1940s.85 Figure 2-4 summarizes water rights prices in this region over the
period 1960 to 1990. All transactions reported prior to 1980 were Sierra
Pacific acquisitions. Other buyers did not enter the market until the 1980s.
The water market began to change during the late 1970s when Interior
decided not to provide water and storage rights in Stampede Reservoir for
municipal and industrial purposes. Sierra Pacific had been counting on
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receiving additional water rights and regulatory storage space in the
reservoir for a low cost of about $17 per acre-foot per year. The utility’s rate
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Figure 2-4.—Market Prices for Water Rights Truckee Basin, Nevada.
Source: Saliba and Bush, 1987; Colby unpublished data, 1988-90.
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of acquiring additional irrigation water rights from irrigators had been
declining and unprecedented rates of urban growth threatened to outpace
Sierra Pacific’s capacity to serve additional water. In 1978, Sierra Pacific
commissioned an independent study of its water resources and projected
demands. The report concluded that the current rates of growth in water use
in Sierra Pacific’s service area would exceed the firm yield of the company’s
existing water rights inventory and would be insufficient to meet demand
within two or three years.86
A water crisis hit the Truckee Meadows seemingly overnight. Holders of
water rights on the Truckee River recognized that they possessed a scarce
and valuable commodity. Landowners, who had until then subdivided their
holdings with the water rights appurtenant, began to sever the water rights
from the land to sell them separately. Sierra Pacific was reluctant to pay the
increased costs for water rights. In 1980, the utility raised its offer price for
water right from $75 to a range of $95 to $135 per acre-foot, based on relative
water rights priority dates. Later it raised its offer price to $140 per acre-foot
and eventually to $250. The increase, however, was not enough to attract
sufficient numbers of sellers, who found many other buyers willing to pay
over $1,500 per acre-foot. Water rights acquisitions by Sierra Pacific slowed
to a trickle as potential sellers held out for higher prices.
Faced with an impending water shortage, Sierra Pacific was forced to slow its
provision of new water service. New water users were put on a lengthy
waiting list pending the acquisition of sufficient water rights. The creation of
the waiting list touched off a political battle between government and
industry and between pro-growth and no-growth advocates. In response to
this crisis, Sierra Pacific, the Nevada Public Service Commission, and the
state, county, and local governments created a new legal and administrative
process to provide water for growth. Under a ruling of the Public Service
Commission, Sierra Pacific was required to provide water service to approved
new developments within 60 days87 but this rule became obsolete as the
water rights market became better established. Water rights are provided to
Sierra Pacific by Washoe County on a 99-year lease88 and by Reno and
Sparks under a Treatment and Distribution Agreement.
Local governments acquire the water rights they lease to Sierra Pacific from
developers who must dedicate sufficient water rights to the local government
jurisdiction as a condition for project approval. The developers acquire the
rights themselves or from Sierra Pacific.
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In accepting water rights in exchange for water service, Sierra Pacific
established the following guidelines. The water rights are required to
produce a firm yield (initially defined as 58 percent of the long-term average
yield, but with implementation of the Preliminary Settlement Agreement,
now set at 90 percent) of water sufficient to meet the estimated water
demand for the proposed development.
In 1985, Reno, Sparks, Washoe County, and Sierra Pacific agreed to offer
landowners $422 per acre-foot for their water rights under a coordinated
local government acquisition program. The price was based on market values
for water rights, less the transactions costs of acquiring and transferring the
water. When the rights are applied towards a new development, Sierra
Pacific passes its costs of acquiring the water right, plus the expenses
incurred in doing the title work on the transfer, on to the new water users.89
During its first year, this program of acquiring water rights met with only
limited success. Sparks had purchased about 50 acre-feet of rights, and Reno
about 325 acre-feet. There were two reasons for potential sellers’ general
lack of response to the program. First, many holders of water rights resisted
selling their rights in the belief that prices would soon rise significantly in
the future. Second, several private water brokers operating in the Truckee
Meadows were outbidding the cities. Typically, the price offered by the
brokers to the sellers ranged between $600 and $800 per acre-foot, far
exceeding the local governments’ offer price. Private brokers were able to
consolidate small rights into larger packages of water rights which they then
sold to developers for $2,000 per acre-foot.90
Since the mid-1980s, Washoe County has been acquiring private water
companies providing groundwater in rural areas. The acquisitions began
because of concerns regarding the poor condition of many of the companies
and potential health problems posed by their deteriorating facilities. As a
condition for taking over the companies, the county generally has required
the owners sell all assets and rights of way necessary to provide water
service to existing customers, including water rights, for an amount not to
exceed the cost of the initial investment.91
Surface water rights in the Truckee Basin are highly valued, although prices
vary. Large, consolidated blocks of surface water rights appurtenant to lands
outside the existing service area of Sierra Pacific sell for higher prices.
Somewhat lower prices are observed for small rights appurtenant to
urbanized lands within the Reno-Sparks metropolitan area which are already
served water by Sierra Pacific. An independent water rights appraisal
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conducted in 1984 listed 52 water rights transactions occurring between 1982
and 1984, with (nominal) prices ranging from $875 to $2,016 per acre-foot.92
According to comments on the draft report submitted by Sierra Pacific, recent
prices for Truckee River water rights located in Truckee Meadows have risen
to $2500 to $3000 per acre-foot. Larger lots of water rights tend to bring
higher unit prices than do smaller lots because of the high transaction costs
associated with water rights transfers in the Truckee Meadows. Lengthy
and sometimes expensive title searches are often necessary to prove
ownership of water rights before they can be transferred. According to Sierra
Pacific, the total cost for the title search, the payment of filing fees, and other
costs for transferring a water right can be $1,000 per transaction or more.93
Interior comments note a small market for water rights in the Truckee
Division of the Newlands Project. The major direction of transfers is from
agriculture to municipal use. The Town of Fernley has already acquired over
3,000 acre-feet of water rights in association with development projects in
much the same manner as is done in Reno. It is expected that a substantial
portion of the water rights in the Truckee Division will be purchased by
Reno, Sparks, Washoe County and Interior (on a willing seller basis) in
implementing the Truckee River Water Quality Agreement.
Groundwater rights in northwestern Nevada have sold for substantial sums
of money. Prices have risen to unusually high levels in some isolated
groundwater basins where development pressures are strong. In the late
1980s, for example, groundwater rights in the Spanish Springs and Lemmon
Valley areas outside of Reno and Sparks sold for prices ranging between
$4,000 and $18,000 per acre-foot.94
Sierra Pacific and others have actively explored importing groundwater from
other basins, as described above. For such locations as the Honey Lake
Basin, the high costs and political controversies associated with inter-basin
transfers have made such transfers less promising than local options for
improving urban water supplies. To date, no water has become available to
augment urban water supplies from the Honey Lake Basin or from other
distant groundwater basins that Sierra Pacific was considering for interbasin
water transfers.

Present-Day Water Transfers Market
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As in many of the arid western states, water policy in the Truckee-Carson
Basin now emphasizes transfers of water from one use to another. Initial
activity centered on transfers from agriculture to serve growing cities. More
recently, transfers have been initiated to enhance fisheries and wildlife and
to resolve conflicts over the appropriate allocation of water between
environmental, agricultural, and municipal uses. The impetus for a
voluntary market approach to resolving conflicts over water allocation was
enhanced by the 1990 water settlement, which specifically authorized market
acquisitions of water to satisfy environmental needs.
Since the 1990 Settlement Act, several different types of voluntary water
transfers have occurred to accommodate urban and environmental needs for
water. First, Sierra Pacific continues to acquire water rights to support
growth in the Reno-Sparks area. The rights are transferred to developers at
a price that covers Sierra Pacific’s acquisition and administrative costs, and
the developers in turn dedicate the rights to the appropriate local
government. This process has resulted in a regular transfer of water for
urban growth during the 1990s. Such transfers are likely to accelerate under
the 1996 multi-party agreement to acquire water to maintain water quality
in Pyramid Lake. Carson City, on a smaller scale, also has acquired water
from irrigators. In 1991 and 1992, it completed several transfers of Carson
River water rights to serve its growing population and reduce its reliance on
local groundwater. Acquisition of water for urban growth appears to be
effectively accomplished through voluntary transfers in the Truckee-Carson
Basin.
Water transfers out of agriculture to protect the Stillwater National Wildlife
Refuge began to occur in the late 1980s primarily through purchases from
willing sellers. Through a series of local, state, federal, and actions,
significant amounts of water have been transferred to support the refuge.
Regional public interest groups, sportsmen's groups, the Nevada Legislature,
and Congress have worked cooperatively to provide water rights acquisition
funds in order to supplement flows into the refuge:95
!
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Congress allocated $2.7 million to the Fish and Wildlife Service in the
late 1980s to acquire parcels of irrigation rights for transfer to wetlands
preservation.96
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!

The Nevada Legislature made up to $9 million available in 1989 through
separate funds earmarked to settle water rights disputes in the Truckee
basin and bond money allocated for parks and natural resource
protection.97

!

Another state bill, enacted during the 1989 session, clarified the
definition of beneficial use to include “the watering of wildlife and the
establishment and maintenance of wetlands, fisheries and other wildlife
habitats,” legitimizing water rights acquisitions to protect wetlands
areas.98

!

In 1990, through voter ballot, Nevada passed legislation to issue bonds
for parks and wildlife habitat, including $8 million for acquisition of
water for the Lahontan Valley Wetlands.99

!

In 1991, new state legislation authorized the Nevada State Engineer to
enter into interstate agreements over management of shared
groundwater basins.100

!

In 1995, Nevada passed Senate Bill 03 which authorizes directors of
irrigation districts to allow transfer of storage water to land outside of
TCID, if the potential impacts of the transfer on district members’ water
costs and district delivery efficiencies are considered, and if the public
interest is considered.101

These legislative actions demonstrate commitment by the state to resolve
water conflicts in the Truckee-Carson Basin.
Locally, the Nevada Waterfowl Association, the Lahontan Valley Wetlands
Coalition, and the Nature Conservancy have spearheaded efforts to raise
funds, purchase irrigation rights, and transfer them to wetlands purposes.
The 1990 negotiated settlement authorized federal purchase of water rights
from willing sellers, including targeted purchases in areas deemed to be most
beneficial for wetland restoration. TCID endorsed proposals allowing
farmers to transfer voluntarily water rights previously associated with
marginal farmland for wetlands protection.102
The Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe typically objected to transfers of Truckee
River water that is diverted for use in the Carson basin because they want to
protect flows vital to Pyramid Lake. After extensive negotiations among area
interests in 1990, the State Engineer allowed water rights to be transferred
to the Stillwater National Wildlife Management Area, ensuring that the
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transfer did not impair water availability for Pyramid Lake through strictly
limiting the quantity transferred to the amount that formerly had been used
in farming. TCID withdrew its objections to the transfer after the parties
agreed that the federal government (which holds water rights for the federal
wildlife area) would pay the operation and maintenance assessments for the
water transferred from the district. Resolution of early proposed transfers
set an important precedent for future transfers of water from irrigation to
fish, wildlife, and recreation.
As described above, the FWS and NDOW developed and implemented an
active water rights acquisition program in the early 1990s. The water rights
are being used to improve and expand wetlands in the Lahontan Valley. The
guiding policy objective for the program is to restore and maintain
25,000 acres of primary wetland habitat. Roughly 122,000 acre-feet of water
rights may need to be acquired to accomplish this objective. Water rights are
acquired from willing sellers in voluntary transactions, which can include
acquisition of land along with water rights. In addition, some water for
wetland restoration may be acquired through leases, through acquisition of
water rights held by the Fallon Naval Air Station, through exchanges of land
and/or water, and by accepting donations of water and money to support
wetland restoration.103
The acquisition program initiated prior to the 1990 water settlement through
various congressional actions is nearly complete, with about 20,000 acre-feet
acquired as of mid-1996 by FWS and NDOW. Prices paid per acre-feet of
water transferable to the wetlands ranged from $435–$812.104 Water rights
acquisitions have been on hold, pending the completion of an EIS on the
program. The Final EIS was released in September, 1996 and a Record of
Decision supporting the acquisition program was issued on November 4.
Churchill County and the City of Fallon have filed litigation regarding their
concern with further acquisitions. The District Court ruled in favor of FWS
and the case is on appeal. The required 45-day notice for the next phase of
acquisitions has been sent and the agencies are preparing for the next phase
of acquisitions.105
In August 1995, Churchill County filed a formal request with Reclamation in
Carson City to receive approximately 20,000 acre-feet of Truckee River water
for supplemental municipal and industrial use to be delivered through the
Truckee Canal and the existing distribution network in Churchill County,
Nevada. The water would come from Claim 3 of the Orr Ditch Decree which
allows up to 1,500 cfs (nominal capacity of the Truckee Canal is only 900 cfs)
of water to be diverted at Derby Dam on the lower Truckee River.106 Since
106

Water Use and Rights

Truckee River diversions began at Derby Dam in 1906 for Newlands Project
farmlands, this represented the first formal request for an additional
interbasin transfer of Truckee River water for a purpose (municipal and
industrial) other than agriculture. This has heightened concerns that water
rights purchases on lands irrigated by the project could dramatically affect
the reliability of future water supplies (CRA:95-96). However, Interior’s
trust responsibilities to the Pyramid Lake Tribe and under the Endangered
Species Act raise a substantial bar against new Truckee River diversions.
Churchill County could follow the example of Fernley, Reno, Sparks, Washoe
County and others upstream on the Carson, and purchase irrigation water
rights for use in a domestic water system, or require develops to purchase
such rights and deed them over to serve new developments.
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3. History and Implementation
of the Settlement Act
At the end of 1990, Congress passed the Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake
Water Rights Settlement Act (Public Law 101-618). This Act attempted to
resolve decades of disputes between the states of California and Nevada over
the allocation and use of the Truckee and Carson River basins they share.
This Act also settled several conflicts between competing users in the state of
Nevada, and put into place a framework for identifying—and
resolving—those conflicts that were not settled by the provisions of this Act.
During the ensuing six years, efforts have been made to implement the
provisions of P.L. 101-618. This Chapter provides an historical background
to the negotiations that resulted in P.L. 101-618 and those that followed in
the atmosphere created by P.L. 101-618; describe the provisions contained in
this law; and document those elements of P.L. 101-618 that have been
carried out to date.

3.1 Early Conflicts
The history of conflict over water resources within and between the states of
Nevada and California is long and complicated. For over a century, different
water interests within each state have tried, unsuccessfully, to reconcile their
conflicting water demands. Lake Tahoe lies in the Sierra Nevada, straddling
the California-Nevada border; two-thirds of the lake lies in California, while
the remainder is located in Nevada. The shared Truckee and Carson river
systems are described above (Chapter 1). Given these physical
circumstances, it is no surprise that competition emerged between the two
states.
The long history of conflict in the Truckee-Carson basins began in the 1860's
when Alexis Von Schmidt created the first major controversy over Lake
Tahoe when he formed a water company to supply water to San Francisco via
an aqueduct. This plan drew heavy opposition from Nevada, which feared
loss of Truckee River waters and other water rights entanglements led to the
project’s abandonment in the early 1900's. The dam constructed by
Von Schmidt and surrounding property eventually came into the hands of the
Bureau of Reclamation and Truckee River General Electric Company. The
ensuing conflict among the power company, federal government, and
lakeshore property owners marked the beginning of the modern era of
controversy about uses of the Truckee River. The controversy focused on
water rights and the special complications that occur on interstate rivers.
The authorization and construction of the Newlands Project in Northern
Nevada in 1905 did little to solve the water problems of competing users in
the area. Indeed, it exacerbated them by bringing into existence additional
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players and competing uses for the area's scarce water supplies.107 The
Newlands Project was the first major reclamation project undertaken by the
Reclamation Service (later the Bureau of Reclamation) under the authority of
the Reclamation Act of 1902. It was designed to irrigate the lands around
Fallon, Nevada. The Newlands Act made reclamation of arid regions through
irrigation a national responsibility. It also set the pace and direction of
future reclamation activity in the West.108
Upon completion of the Project, additional controversies surfaced
immediately, both among competing users within the state of Nevada, and
between Nevada and California. During the early years, the allocation and
use of water supplies were dictated primarily by local interests: Tahoe
property owners, power company officials, representatives of various
irrigation districts, and individual farmers. Steps were eventually
undertaken by the two states, however, to more formally conclude the
disputes. And as the tendency to use litigation as a means to allocate water
rights increased, state and federal courts became involved. As a
consequence, a number of agreements, decrees and doctrines resulted,
governing allocation and use of the waters of Lake Tahoe and the Truckee
and Carson River systems.109
In 1908, the Truckee River General Electric Company entered into an
agreement with the Floriston Pulp and Paper Company (both of whom
utilized Truckee River waters in their operations) to establish Floriston
Rates on the Truckee River. These rates require that water be released from
Lake Tahoe (if possible) when natural flows in the river drop below a certain
point. The agreement was made to assure adequate flows for the generation
of electricity by the electric company, which then owned the dam at the outlet
of Lake Tahoe.
Without clear control of the dam at Lake Tahoe, the reliability of the
Bureau’s Newlands Project water supply was questionable. The Truckee
River General Electric Decree issued in federal court in 1915 partially
resolved issues between the agency and the electric company by granting
Reclamation an easement to operate the dam and use surrounding lands.
When the Reclamation Service obtained possession of Lake Tahoe dam from
the electric company in 1915, the revised consent decree required the
government to adhere to the Floriston Rates.110
Lakeshore property owners continued in conflict with irrigators over the lake
level, especially during the record drought of 1928-1934. Some of the more
colorful examples include a threat by Truckee Meadow farmers to dynamite
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the rim of the lake after it dropped below its natural rim in 1924, and a
steam shovel dispatched by Nevada interests with a Reno police force guard
to dig a diversion trench to the rim in 1930. A local sheriff’s posse sought to
stop the digging and an injunction was ultimately obtained against TCID to
halt the digging. Crop damage suits were threatened against lakeshore
owners and pumping was sometimes allowed under this coercion.
Negotiations continued intermittently over many years, but were hampered
by uncertainties regarding Truckee River water rights, including
complications due to the two states’ different water doctrines. These
negotiations finally issued in the Truckee River Agreement of 1935, which
remains the basis for river operation. The Agreement also played an
important role in the 1944 Orr Ditch Decree, which adjudicated water rights
among the Pyramid Lake Tribe, Sierra Pacific Power Company, TCID,
Washoe County Water District, Newlands Project irrigators, and individual
water rights holders.
On the Carson River, the first disputes over water arose from milling
activities associated with the Comstock mines. The extremely rapid
expansion of the mines in the early 1860s led to a correspondingly intense
period of mill construction. It was estimated that the area had more than
70 mills by the end of 1861 (CRA:61). Typically each mill would construct a
timber diversion dam to direct water to its flume. Some generated electric
power as well. Scant summer flows, however, combined with upstream
irrigation diversions forced mill to shut down and twenty years of litigation
between mill owners and agricultural water users followed. Called the
“Union Mill cases,” these led to federal court recognition of the priority of
riparian rights, while the Nevada State Supreme Court repudiated the
doctrine of riparian rights in an 1885 decision, holding that the state’s water
rights should be based on the doctrine of prior appropriation, because it
better suited the region’s arid conditions. The mills themselves did not
survive the collapse of the Comstock boom and most were gone shortly after
the turn of the century.
Later clashes in the Carson watershed involved upper river users and
Newlands Project users on the lower river. The Anderson-Bassman Decree,
issued in 1905, addressed the West Fork Carson River in both California and
Nevada, primarily Diamond Valley and upper watershed valleys in California
and Carson Valley in Nevada. The decree did not specify the amounts of
water that could be diverted, but established the acreage that could be
irrigated pursuant to these rights, established a rotation of the river between
California and Nevada users, and made special recognition of riparian rights.
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Subsequently, the Price Decree in 1921 adjudicated California water rights in
the upper basin.
In 1925, the federal government initiated litigation in the Carson River
Basin, complementary to that it had initiated in 1913 on the Truckee River,
to establish Newlands Project water rights. This long-running battle did not
issue in an adjudication on the Carson River until the 1980 Alpine Decree
(defined above and further discussed in the subsequent sections).

3.2 History of Settlement Act of 1990
Water rights disputes over the Truckee River and Lake Tahoe dating to
before the turn of the century, led to a 1912 recommendation by the
California Conservation Commission that California petition the
U.S. Supreme Court for an allocation of the water between the two states
(TRA:1). Twenty years later, responding to pressures caused by the severe
drought then in progress (1929-35), the governors of California and Nevada
established the California-Nevada Interstate Water Conference Committee
in 1931, and assigned it the task of reaching an agreement governing the
allocation and use of Truckee River waters. The final result of their efforts
were incorporated into the Truckee River Agreement, signed in 1935. This
agreement, negotiated among the major water rights holders themselves,
specified operating criteria for the Truckee River, established maximum
storage levels for Lake Tahoe, and laid the groundwork for the construction
of Boca Reservoir to create additional storage on the Truckee System. It
included the Floriston Rates requirement, which could be met by releases
from Lake Tahoe or Boca Reservoir, once the latter was completed.111
In 1913, the United States government had initiated a suit to establish firm
water rights for both the Newlands Project and for irrigation on the Pyramid
Lake Reservation (United States v. Orr Water Ditch Company). Although the
trial took place between 1919 and 1921, the final decree was not issued until
1944. The Orr Ditch Decree, as it later became known, gave legal sanction to
the major elements of the Truckee River Agreement, including the section
dealing with Floriston Rates. It also awarded the national government water
rights for the irrigation of approximately 5,800 acres on the Pyramid Lake
Reservation. These rights were awarded a 1859 priority date (the year in
which the reservation was created). The national government made no effort
to obtain water rights on behalf of the Pyramid Lake Tribe for purposes other
than irrigation. Efforts by the Tribe to reopen adjudication and challenge
this on the basis of reserved rights were rejected by the courts, a result which
has led the irrigation community to hold that subsequent decisions in favor of
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tribal trust and endangered species responsibilities are fundamentally in
error.
This specific focus and commitment became important during later efforts to
negotiate an interstate compact between the States of Nevada and
California. For the Newlands Project, the United States received a
1902 priority right to divert Truckee waters at Derby Dam at the rate of
1,500 cubic ft. per second. The water was to be used for the irrigation of
232,800 project acres; for storage at Lahontan Reservoir; and/or for the
generation of power and other municipal and domestic purposes.112
During the 1930s and 1940s, reclamation projects in the West were pursued
as part of Roosevelt's public works program to take the United States out of
the Great Depression. During the 1950s, reclamation became part of the
"pork" of pork-barrel politics.113 Nevada received her share; consequently,
additional storage capacity now serves the system. None of these actions
resulted in long-term, comprehensive solutions to broader interstate water
problems--which were becoming more numerous and complicated as the
years went by.
Competition for East slope waters intensified after World War II. Lake
Tahoe grew into a major gaming and recreational area. The Reno-Sparks
Metropolitan area evolved into a bustling commercial and recreation center.
Competition for water among the ranching and farming interests on both
sides of the border continued. All of these changes resulted in increased
demands on the system—and contributed to a growing awareness of the need
for the two states to reach a comprehensive agreement regarding the
allocation of their shared water resources. The political leadership in both
states advocated the development of plans to allocate the water in the
Walker River, and the preparation of contingencies for drought years.
California politicians wanted assurance that some of the flows of all three
rivers would be available to support future state growth. Nevada's leaders
were fearful that California would one day lay claim to the waters that,
although originating in California, flowed naturally into Nevada. Both sides
realized that an interstate water compact was the only way to get a
comprehensive water agreement through Congress.114
Against this backdrop, the two states decided in 1955 to use the authority of
the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution to negotiate an interstate
compact, which would allocate once and for all the waters which they held in
common. On August 4, 1955, President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed
Congressional legislation authorizing representatives of the two states to
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begin negotiations. The ensuing process was a lengthy one, requiring the
appointment of compact commissions in each state, with a federal representative to safeguard federal interests and to chair a joint commission; ratification by the respective state legislatures in identical form; signatures of the
two governors; ratification by the U.S. Congress; and the signature of the
President of the United States.115
After 14 intense years of negotiation, an agreement was finally reached:
90% of the disputed waters were allocated to Nevada and supplies reserved
for growth in the Lake Tahoe-Truckee area of California. In 1968, the
compact was submitted to the respective state legislatures for ratification.
Much to the surprise of the participants, it took yet another two years and
many concessions to complete the process of state approval.116 California
ratified the compact in 1970; Nevada followed in 1971. Approval by the
United States Congress, however, was not forthcoming. The states operated
voluntarily according to the terms of the compact from that time until the
larger Settlement Act supervened. Numerous efforts were made to persuade
Congress to give its stamp of approval. Indeed, between 1972 and 1979,
Nevada and California Congressional delegations offered six different bills
seeking ratification; none even received a hearing. One last major effort to
have the compact ratified was made by U.S. Senator Paul Laxalt in 1985;
although his proposal did receive a hearing, at least, no other actions were
taken.117
The failure of various parties to obtain ratification of the compact for more
than 15 years was due, in large part, to the fact that the versions of the
compact submitted to Congress emphasized the protection of the water rights
of the vested interests involved in negotiating it, to the exclusion of other
interests involved, especially those of the Pyramid Lake Tribe. Neither the
possible inclusion of water to maintain Pyramid Lake nor the recognition of
nonestablished or unclaimed water rights by the Pyramid Lake Paiutes
under the Winters Doctrine of 1908 was seriously considered by the compact
commission.118 The commission recognized only those waters allocated by the
Orr Ditch Decree of 1944, which limited tribal water rights to agricul-tural
use. Under the Winters Doctrine of 1908, however, and subsequent case law,
the tribe is entitled to enough water to serve all the purposes for which a
reservation of land was made; additionally, those reserved water rights are
entitled to the priority date on which the reservation was created (in this
case, 1859).
The state’s view, as given in comments on the draft report offered by the
California Department of Water Resources (DWR), is that the federal
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government had been asked to participate in the negotiations, declined to be
substantively involved, and then opposed the solution that the states worked
out. DWR states that California and Nevada have long enjoyed a cooperative
working relationship on Truckee-Carson interstate issues. For example, for
years both states voluntarily limited the issuance of new water rights in the
Tahoe Basin so that the allocations contained in the proposed interstate
compact would not be encroached. Over the many years when the states
sought federal ratification of the compact, DWR felt that “it was usually a
case of the states agreeing with one another and disagreeing with the federal
government. The states were frustrated over the unwillingness of one part of
the federal government to formally participate in compact negotiations, while
at the same time another part of the federal government was actively
involved in building reservoirs in the basin.”
As described above, the various water diversion and storage components of
the Newlands Project have been associated with a series of adverse impacts
to the resources of Pyramid Lake. Lake levels dropped, exposing sandbars at
the mouth of the Truckee; fewer and fewer fish were able to spawn. With its
last spawning run in 1938, the original strain of Lahontan cutthroat trout in
Pyramid Lake became extinct by 1940. A closely related strain of Lahontan
cutthroat trout was subsequently introduced to the lake, and it has been
declared "threatened" while the cui-ui, found only in Pyramid Lake, have
been listed as "endangered." Both are thus entitled to protection under the
provisions of the Endangered Species Act of 1967. Indeed, negative
environmental impacts to Pyramid Lake from the Newlands Project has
triggered lengthy and intense litigation by both the Pyramid Lake Paiute
Tribe and the U.S. government against the Newlands Project's operators,
Truckee-Carson Irrigation District (TCID), as well as virtually every other
user of Truckee River water in both Nevada and California.119 The Tribe had
been winning these cases—and was becoming increasingly successful in its
efforts to increase flows into Pyramid Lake.120
For example, in the early 1970s, the Secretary of the Interior, responding to
the provisions of the Endangered Species Act, decided to use the waters
stored in Stampede Reservoir exclusively for the benefit of the Pyramid Lake
fisheries.121 That decision was challenged unsuccessfully by the CarsonTruckee Water Conservancy District and Sierra Pacific Power Company.
And in 1973, in response to a suit brought by TCID asserting that the
amount of water allocated to it was insufficient, the court found instead that
Newlands Project water diverted for use by TCID was inefficiently used
(approximately 40% of the diversions did not reach the crops they were
diverted to irrigate). Subsequently, a federal court-ordered administrative
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process, known as "Operating Criteria and Procedures" (OCAP, discussed
above), in combination with several court cases, have served to significantly
reduce Newlands Project diversions from the Truckee,122 in order to provide
as much water as possible to Pyramid Lake.
In a second important case,123 the Secretary of the Interior was required to
deliver all water to Pyramid Lake not otherwise obligated by court decrees or
contracts. The court further ordered the Secretary to enforce the original
1973 OCAP, which reduce TCID's combined Carson and Truckee River
diversions to a maximum of 288,000 acre/feet annually; if the provisions of
the OCAP were violated further, the court asserted, the 1926 Newlands
contract with TCID was to be terminated. The Secretary terminated the
contract, as directed,124 and TCID brought suit. From 1973, the Bureau of
Reclamation issued an interim OCAP each year, pending the outcome of the
case which concluded in 1985 (the courts upheld the United States). The
central issue in the litigation was whether or not the Secretary’s compliance
with the court order on OCAP was legal. Interior put TCID on notice that
any water diverted in excess of the court-ordered OCAP would be recouped.
TCID continued to divert, and neither the Bureau of Reclamation nor the
federal Water Master prevented TCID from diverting water above the
amount to which it was entitled under OCAP. The Bureau then issued the
1988 OCAP, based on projected diversions averaging 320,000 acre-feet. The
1988 OCAP is mandated to remain in place through 1997 under P.L. 101-618,
however P.L. 101-618 reserved to the Secretary of Interior the right to modify
the 1988 OCAP prior to 1998, if deemed necessary to meet his legal
obligations.
A new contract between the Bureau and TCID signed in 1996, covers the
appointment and function of a District water conservation coordinator; the
implementation of water conservation education projects for Project water
users; the water measurement and accounting system to be used by the
District and a water measurement component; the Operation and
Maintenance charging structures to be used by the District to obtain
sufficient Operation and Maintenance revenues from Project users while
encouraging water conservation; and a prioritization of activities to be
performed under the Plan, an estimate of their costs, and a schedule for
implementing each activity. Thus, the new contract will emphasize
conservation issues, which Reclamation estimates will increase costs to
farmers by 10 to 20 percent over the next five years. TCID has agreed to set
aside certain miscellaneous revenues they receive from the U.S., or 10% of
their water service payments, whichever is greater, for water conservation
measures including improved water measurement.
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In 1988, the Bureau proposed an OCAP based on models projecting average
annual diversions to TCID from the Carson-Truckee system of
320,000 acre-feet/year. This proposal was challenged on a number of fronts.
The Tribe has also been pursuing restitution from TCID and Newlands
Project irrigators for past diversions from the Truckee which are claimed to
have violated the OCAP. Such disputed diversions may be in excess of
one million acre-feet.125
Failure to achieve ratification of the interstate compact after the 1970s can
be attributed to other factors as well. One of these is the environment. The
federal government felt, for example, that the terms of the proposed compact
would conflict with their efforts to secure water to repair the environmental
damage caused by the Newlands Project, not only within Pyramid Lake but
elsewhere in the Carson-Truckee system.126 Consequently, under pressure
from various environmental groups, one set of environmental problems
targeted in the 1990 legislation involved the Lahontan Valley wetlands in
general, and the Stillwater area near Fallon in particular (impacts to these
systems are described in Chapter 1).
The third set of water problems facing the federal government in Northern
Nevada concerned the status of the Fallon Paiute Shoshone Indian Tribe (see
discussion in Chapter 1, above). Promised irrigation water in return for
surrendering most of its lands when the Newlands Project was formed, the
Fallon's saw the on-reservation irrigation works go uncompleted for decades.
By the late 1980s, the federal government found itself the target of pressure
to make restitution to the Indian tribes involved in these disputes, as well as
to the environmental interests that had been harmed by previous policy. It
was under these conditions that the final effort to negotiate an interstate
compact between the States of Nevada and California occurred.

3.3 The Settlement Act Negotiations
Harry Reid was elected to represent Nevada in the U.S. Senate in 1986, and
assumed office in 1987. His predecessor, Senator Laxalt, had failed to obtain
ratification in the Senate of his version of an interstate compact during his
last year in office, largely due to the fact that it did not adequately address
federal obligations resulting from treaties and other agreements.
Immediately after assuming office, Reid announced his intention to
successfully resolve the myriad issues relating to a long-term solution to
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northern Nevada's water problems. He chose to utilize negotiation as the
means to this achievement, as promoted by the Reagan administration.
Toward the end of 1987, Senator Reid and his staff began to develop a
comprehensive understanding of the various parties and issues involved in
Nevada water politics. That process took nearly six months. At that time,
Reid brought the major Nevada players together for the first rounds of
negotiations: Sierra Pacific Power Company (interested in the capacity to
store additional water supplies to provide both drought protection and
support future growth); the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe (interested in
economic development, compensation, and the enhancement and
preservation of Pyramid Lake and its fisheries); the state of Nevada
(interested in seeing to it that northern Nevada's rights to water were
protected from encroachment by California); and the Truckee-Carson
Irrigation District (interested in continuing to utilize Newlands Project water
supplies for irrigated agriculture).
Although other parties would certainly be affected by the outcome, Reid felt
strongly that the scope of the conflict resolution process should not be
enlarged until the need arose. The Fallon Paiute Shoshone Tribe's legal
position was so strong that, combined with the commitment of the federal
government to see to it that their situation was remedied, Reid felt it was not
necessary to bring them into early negotiations. The remedy that would be
forthcoming had already been agreed upon (a settlement fund of
$43 million)—and is reflected in the 1990 legislation.127 The environmental
groups advocating protection of the wetlands, most notably the Lahontan
Valley Wetlands Coalition, would be brought in later in the process, after
some of the more conflictual elements of the agreement were worked out.
According to some observers, TCID took an adamant position at the outset.
By June of 1988, it withdrew from the process.128 An attorney representing
the opposing interests of the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe offered the opinion
that TCID felt it had little or no incentive to participate; he believed that
TCID felt that it would stand a better chance in the courts. Frank Dimick,
Western Relations Liaison for the Bureau of Reclamation, mirrored this
sentiment: "TCID felt there was nothing to bargain for. There are different
perceptions to what happened that day when they walked out. They
voluntarily left, but they felt there was nothing to negotiate so they were
squeezed out. Why negotiate for less water? No one left them anything to
bargain with—no chips on the table."129
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One observer130 noted the difference in atmosphere at these negotiations,
compared to previous attempts. In the earlier cases, there seemed to have
emerged an "us" against "them" attitude, which pitted the non-Indian
interests against Indian claims, and served to push the Indian interests into
the background. Such an attitude was not apparent during the
1988 negotiations. In fact, the parties—with the exception of TCID—seemed
willing to bargain rather than pursue additional years of court battles.131
After TCID's departure, the other players remained and managed to reach
agreement on the major issues involved, one issue at a time.132
An important building block for the initial negotiations was the Pyramid
Lake Tribe and Sierra Pacific Power Company preliminary agreement to seek
an adjustment of the Floriston Rates. This “Preliminary Settlement
Agreement” (see discussion in Chapter 2) allowed water from Stampede to be
released in the springtime during the spawning of the cui-ui fish, while
allowing Sierra Pacific Power Company storage in Stampede under certain
conditions.133
Reid gradually expanded the negotiations in the summer of 1988 to include
the State of California, the Stillwater National Wildlife Refuge, the Fallon
Naval Air Station, the Fallon Paiute Shoshone Tribe, the cities of Reno and
Sparks, as well as the U.S. Department of Interior bureaus of Reclamation
and Indian Affairs. The two Interior bureaus needed to sign onto an
agreement before Congressional ratification would be likely. As more and
more progress was made, very large sessions, which included all interested
parties, were held. Two groups which became involved at this point in the
process were the Lahontan Valley Wetlands Coalition and the Coalition for a
Negotiated Settlement. These sessions provided participants the opportunity
to report what had been accomplished to date and to obtain input.
Throughout this process, the parties came to realize that unless the legal and
political problems facing the federal government regarding the Indian tribes
and the environment were adequately addressed in the settlement,
ratification by Congress would not be forthcoming.134 As noted, neglect of
these interests was the major impediment to consideration of the 1985
Laxalt proposal.
An agreement was reached in a remarkably short amount of time (less than
two years). The Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Agreement was signed and a
draft of its component parts was submitted to Congress on August 4, 1989;
the Act was signed into law by President Bush on November 16, 1990.
Implementation of its provisions is discussed below.
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3.4 Washington, D.C.: The Bigger Picture
The negotiated water settlement that was reached in Northern Nevada was
hailed as an outstanding feat by many, especially given the number and
scope of the conflicts that arose at the state level. The bill had to be ratified
by Congress, however, to become law. And Washington politics proved to be
an even more complex negotiation process than that which took place in
Nevada, with many Congressmen, Senators, committees, agencies and the
President needing to sign off on the bill to make it law.
To a distant observer who may have read the Reno papers, the process
appeared basic. The water policy bill was introduced by Senator Harry Reid
and initially died in a package of other water bills in the Senate Water and
Power Subcommittee.135 The bill was later revived and attached as a "rider"
to S. 3084, the Fallon Paiute Shoshone Tribal Settlement Act. This Act was
passed in the Senate during the last days of the 101st Session of Congress.
Subsequently, it was passed by the House of Representatives and was signed
into law by President Bush.
Prior to that, however, the proposal had a number of other hurdles to jump.
A closer look at the process which culminated in Public Law 101-618
demonstrates that several Washington politicians significantly influenced
the outcome. These actors, pursuing seemingly unrelated political agendas of
their own, had the power to kill the bill outright if those agendas were
thwarted.
Several members of Congress wanted to use the legislation to take a broader
policy stance in a related issue area. For example, Senator Bill Bradley, as
Chair of the Senate Water and Power Subcommittee which exercised
jurisdiction over the bill, questioned the rationality of continued support of
Western irrigated agricultural projects, especially in the face of increased
competition from more "beneficial" uses (environmental, Native American,
industrial, municipal).136 Several Eastern legislators made known their
distaste for Western water practices. They noted that farmers in Maine were
going bankrupt without federal water subsidies, while Western farmers,
living in the desert, are flourishing because of them.137
The message emanating from Bradley and other influential D.C. politicians
was straightforward. Irrigated agriculture in the West should no longer be
subsidized; rather, western water should be subject to the same market
mechanisms as other commodities.138 From their point of view, the economics
of irrigated agriculture have never been even marginal; the major reason for
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developing reclamation projects involved the need to encourage Westward
development.
Currently, for example, western farmers in general are getting 80% of the
benefits of federally subsidized irrigation projects, while footing only 20% of
the bill.139 Comments received from Reclamation in response to the draft
report, however, assert that Newlands farmers are not heavily subsidized. In
an average water year, the Newlands Project consumes more than 4.5 times
as much water as Sierra Pacific's entire water service area. Water
consumers in the Reno/Sparks area pay roughly 80 times as much for their
water as do agricultural consumers in the Newlands Project. (To some
observers, these facts might suggest that farmers are benefitting at the
expense of others. However, as pointed out in comments received on the
draft report, if the Newlands ceased taking any water from the Truckee
River, there would not be any more water available for the Reno/Sparks area,
nor would there be any decrease in the price they would pay. Nearly half the
water rights used by the Newlands Project are held by 3% of the large
farmers.) The Newlands Project losses amount to about twice as much water
as the Sierra Pacific service area uses. And, finally, 82% of the water is used
to support less than 1% of the economy, while 18% of the water use supports
95% of the economy.140
A typical consumer of water for agriculture in the Newlands Project area
pays an average of $5.86 per acre/foot of water, while the average consumer
for municipal/residential purposes in Reno and Sparks pays $450.00.141
Urbanization and the drought have only intensified the concern and demand
for water, not only in Nevada but elsewhere in the West.142 (Beginning in
1987, Nevada suffered from extreme drought conditions for seven years.)
The concerns expressed by various D.C. politicians regarding the inefficiency
of Western water projects were not the only ones to surface as the bill wound
its way through the Congressional system. Significant elements of the
Washington bureaucracy also became involved, most of them located in the
Department of Interior. Indeed, cooperation from the Department of Interior
was critical for passage of the bill. Cooperation within the Department was
difficult to obtain, however.
The Department of Interior has competing (and sometimes conflicting)
interests, with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Bureau of Reclamation, the
Division of Water and Science, the Bureau of Land Management, and the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (among others) all under the same roof. When
three assistant interior secretaries testified before Bradley's Water and
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Power Subcommittee in February of 1990 on this and other pending water
settlement legislation, the subcommittee expressed displeasure with the lack
of knowledge and unwillingness to cooperate among them.143 Interior then
proceeded to iron out and evaluate the department's position, resulting in a
unified position. Members of this committee helped draft the amendment
language that eventually was signed into law—language that moves away
from traditional conceptions of reclamation policy in the United States.144
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Senate Select
Committee on Indian Affairs also tried to influence a major component of the
settlement. The amount of money to be allocated to the Pyramid Lake Tribe
was the key issue here.145 Although the OMB insisted that the amount of
money targeted for the Tribe ($65 million) was much too high, the Select
Committee thought the offer was fair, and the Tribe itself was in agreement.
Senator Reid was worried that Bush would refuse to accept this section of
the bill if OMB dug in its heels. Reid decided to go with the Committee's
recommendation anyway. President Bush apparently agreed. In the closing
hours of the 101st Congress, Reid successfully lobbied committee chairmen in
the House to let the bill go to the floor on a voice-vote.
Pivotal to the process was the united front presented by the Nevada
delegation. Senators Bryan and Reid and House members Vucanovich and
Bilbray all favored the amended legislation.146
Another crucial aspect of the bill's success was the united front in supporting
its passage by the local parties involved in the initial negotiations. Those
parties with veto power—the States of Nevada and California, the Federal
government, Pyramid Lake Tribe, and Sierra Pacific—supported the
measure.147 TCID, which left the table early on and chose to take its own
opposing stance on the measure, did not have the influence to stop the
process.
Between the time the bill was submitted and signed into law (nearly a year),
several significant amendments had been made to it. The amendments were
significant because they were apparently specifically designed to restrict
TCID's ability to litigate, and thereby stall implementation of the settlement.
The amendments also mandated recoupment of illegally-diverted Project
waters, giving the Secretary of the Interior leverage to force TCID to improve
its irrigation systems. Both these amendment were added to Reid's original
proposal by the Committee on Energy and Water which reviewed it. One
D.C. insider148 suggested that Bush was prepared to veto the bill if these
provisions were not included.
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In the meantime, various state and local interests, TCID aside, managed to
obtain at least part of what it wanted from the terms of the settlement.149
Sierra Pacific wanted drought protection; it got at least 40 years of it,
provided it develops storage capacity to meet future urban demands.
California and Nevada wanted assurance that their water supplies would be
protected in the future; they both received such assurances and ended the
100-year-old water war between the two states. The Pyramid Lake Tribe
wanted money and water enough to maintain and enhance Pyramid Lake
and its fisheries; it got the promise of some of both, and while those amounts
may turn out to be "not enough" in the long run, the agreement continues the
pattern of decisions favorable to the Tribe and the Lake. The Fallon Tribe
wanted justice. If one defines justice in terms of forthcoming water rights
and monetary compensation for past damages, then justice, in this instance,
was served. The environment benefitted as well, with provisions built in for
wetlands and wildlife.
The federal government was also able to begin to move in a new direction
regarding reclamation policy in the United States. Although irrigated
agricultural projects in the West probably will never be totally abandoned, it
seems that only the most efficient agricultural projects will continue to be
partially subsidized, at least if the policy directions reflected in this piece of
legislation, continue to be pursued.

3.5 The Settlement Provisions: P.L. 101-618
The Truckee-Carson Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act (84)
contains two titles, which are only very briefly reviewed here. The first
settles the 70-year-old dispute between the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe
and the federal government. It creates a settlement fund for the tribe in the
amount of $43 million, to be allocated over a five-year period beginning in
1992. The fund is to be used for tribal economic development. In exchange,
the tribe agreed to release all claims that it has had against the federal
government resulting from its failure to meet its water obligations to them.
The tribe also agreed to accept and abide by the limitations imposed on their
water rights served by the Newlands Project. These are not to exceed
10,587.5 acre/feet of water per year for the reservation. They agreed to
withdraw their previous objections to the OCAP set by the Bureau of
Reclamation for the Newlands Project in 1988. And, finally, they agreed to
cooperate in the development and implementation of a plan to improve the
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efficiency of irrigation systems on the reservation that will utilize Project
water.150
Title II is much more complicated. The first set of conflicts that it resolves
concerns "the equitable apportionment of the waters of the Truckee and
Carson Rivers and Lake Tahoe between the states of Nevada and California"
[Sec. 204(a)(b)(c)]. Sec. 204(a) deals with the Carson River, in which the
provisions of the Alpine Decree (1980) are reaffirmed. In brief, the state of
Nevada was allocated approximately 80% of the waters of the Carson River
and approximately 90% of the waters of the Truckee River.
Sec. 204(c) deals with the Truckee River. This section grants the state of
California the right to "divert or extract, or to utilize any combination
thereof, within the Truckee River basin in California the gross amount of
32,000 acre-feet of water per year from all natural sources, including both
surface and groundwater, in the Truckee River basin. . ." [Sec. 204(c)(1)]. The
state of Nevada is entitled to all of the rest. While this section does explicitly
reaffirm the provisions of the Orr Ditch Decree, it does note that ". .
.[n]othing in this section shall be construed as modifying or terminating any
court decree, or the jurisdiction of any court" [Sec. 204(c)((3)(h)]. Thus, the
provisions of the Orr Ditch Decree relating to the allocation of water rights
on the Truckee River remain intact.
Sec. 204(b) deals with Lake Tahoe. Essentially, California gets the use of
23,000 acre-feet per year; Nevada gets 11,000 acre-feet per year. Both
allocations must be used within Tahoe Basin.
Title II also authorizes the Lahontan valley and Pyramid Lake Fish and
Wildlife Fund (Section 206(f)). It is to be used both for wetlands protection in
the Lahontan valley and threatened and endangered fish in Pyramid Lake.
It authorizes the purchase of water rights from "willing sellers" in the
Newlands Project service area. The target goal is to sustain approximately
25,000 acres of primary wetland habitat within the Lahontan Valley
Wetlands. The fund is managed by Interior. As discussed above, provisions
were also made for the protection and expansion of the Stillwater National
Wildlife Refuge.
The Pyramid Lake Tribe, in exchange for dropping the claims it presently has
against the federal government, is to receive $25 million for enhance-ment of
its fisheries, as well as an additional $40 million for tribal economic
development. Aggressive plans for the recovery and enhancement of the
fisheries are also specified.
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The Act expanded the legal purposes for which Newlands Project water may
be used; these purposes now include—in addition to agriculture—fish and
wildlife, municipal and industrial water supplies, water quality, recreation,
and other purposes recognized as beneficial under state law. The expanded
purposes are to be met, moreover, in a manner that will not increase
diversions of the Truckee River over those presently allowed.
The Act requires the Secretary of the Interior to “recoup” water diverted by
TCID during the 1973-1987 period in excess of the amounts allowed under
OCAP, during the period the OCAP was under dispute between TCID and
Interior. As noted above, recoupment was inserted as an amendment to the
Act and there were apparently strong feelings in the federal government
about it. The Department of Interior felt that these diversions were defiant
and flagrant, and asserts that TCID was at times simultaneously diverting
water from the Truckee River to Lahontan Reservoir and spilling water from
the reservoir. Interior states that two major efforts were made to resolve the
issue by negotiation prior to the United States filing suit, one during 1992-93
and a second in the facilitated negotiations of 1994-95. The present estimate
is that approximately one million acre-feet are owed by TCID.
The Act also specifies that the OCAP presently in effect shall remain in effect
until December 31, 1997, unless the Secretary decides, in his sole discretion,
that changes are necessary to comply with his obligations, including those
under the Endangered Species Act. It further specifies that, prior to
December 31, 1997, no court or administrative tribunal shall have the
jurisdiction to set aside any such OCAP or to order or direct that they be
changed in any way. Indeed, "all actions taken heretofore by the Secretary
under any operating criteria and procedures are hereby declared to be valid
and shall not be subject to revision in any judicial or administrative
proceeding."151 Under these provisions, the TCID appears to be constrained
from litigating the conditions of the settlement.152
Section 210(a)(2)(A) of the Act provides that the interstate allocation
(Section 204), provisions affected Fallon Naval Air Station water use (Section
206(c)), acquisition of water rights and use of Stampede and Prosser
reservoirs (Sections 207 (c) and (d)), disbursement of the Pyramid Lake
Paiute Economic Development Fund (Section 208(a)(3)(D)) shall not take
effect until the agreements and regulations required under Section 205
(including TROA) have entered into effect and the outstanding claims
described elsewhere in Section 210 have been dismissed with prejudice or
otherwise resolved.
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3.6 Implementation of P.L. 101-618
The Act, in essence, has seven major elements. These include:
!

Settling issues related to the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe;

!

Settling water allocation between the states of Nevada and California;

!

Encouraging the development of solutions for demands on Truckee River
waters;

!

Improving the management and efficiency of the Newlands Project;

!

Settling issues related to the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe;

!

Promoting enhancement and recovery of Pyramid Lake's endangered and
threatened fish species; and

!

Protecting Lahontan Valley wetlands from further degradation.153

Each of these items is discussed further below.

The Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe
Title I of P.L. 101-618 created a settlement fund for the Tribe in the amount
of $43 million, to be allocated over a five-year period beginning in 1992 and to
be used for tribal economic development. The Tribe agreed to release all
claims that it has had against the federal government resulting from its
failure to meet its water obligations to them. The tribe also agreed to accept
and abide by the limitations imposed on their water rights served by the
Newlands Project. They agreed to withdraw their previous objections to the
OCAP set by the Bureau of Reclamation for the Newlands Project in 1988.
And, finally, they agreed to cooperate in the development and implementation of a plan to improve the efficiency of irrigation systems on the
reservation that will utilize Project water.154
The Act also mandated that "the Secretary [of Interior], in consultation with
the Tribe and in accordance with applicable law, shall develop and implement
a plan for the closure, including if appropriate, modification of components, of
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the TJ drain system [see discussion above], including the main TJ drain, the
TJ-1 drain and the A drain and its sublaterals, in order to address any
significant environmental problems with that system and its closure" [Sec.
106(A)]. Under the settlement, the Tribe agreed to cap their use of water
rights at 10,587.5 acre-feet/year.
As of 1996, the final installment on the settlement was appropriated; these
funds have been placed into a Treasury account created on behalf of the
Tribe and the Tribe is able to access a portion of the interest of these funds at
this time. Claims against the federal government resulting from its failure to
meet its water obligations to the Tribe have been dropped. Presently,
negotiations are ongoing between the federal government and the Tribe
regarding the Tribe's ultimate ability to operate their facility independent of
TCID, should they so choose. The federal government and the Tribe are in
the process of closing TJ drain.
Federal Water Master
Under the provisions of the Orr Ditch Decree (for the Truckee River and
Lake Tahoe) and the Alpine Decree (for the Carson River), a federal Water
Master has been and is currently responsible for seeing that the water rights
decreed by these courts are satisfied in all three basins.

Specifically, the Orr Ditch Decree states:
A Water Master shall be appointed by this Court to carry out and
enforce the provisions of this decree and the instructions and orders of
the Court, and if any proper orders, rules or directions of such Waster
Master. . .are disobeyed or disregarded he is hereby empowered and
authorized to cut off the water from the ditch or canal owners or water
users so disobeying or disregarding such proper orders, rules or
directions. . .. The owner or owners of each ditch or canal herein
authorized to divert water from the Truckee River or any of its
tributaries, or from any ditch or canal or other waterway receiving
water therefrom, shall, within sixty (60) days after the entry of
this decree. . .install and thereafter at all time properly maintain
in such ditch, canal or other waterway, a reliable, sufficient and easilyoperated regulating headgate and locking and measuring services. .
.whereby the water diverted into such ditch, canal or other waterway at
any and all times may be properly regulated and correctly measured. .
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.. The stored water of any reservoir, including Lake Tahoe, may be
turned into and carried in the channel of any natural stream and
mingled with the waters thereof and diverted therefrom for the proper
uses of the persons or parties entitled thereto. The Water Master, upon
timely notice, shall so regulate the headgates along the streams and do
and direct to be done such other things as may be needful to transport
such stored water and deliver the same to the person or persons entitled
thereto. All persons are hereby prohibited from in any way interfering
with any such stored water while the same is being legally carried to
the persons or parties entitled thereto. 155
The Alpine Decree essentially uses the same language to create and
empower a court-appointed Water Master to manage distribution of water
from the Carson River system to those entities holding legal rights thereto.156
Once the various negotiations that are underway (discussed below) are
concluded, it is not certain that the current Water Master will assume the
additional responsibilities emanating from the negotiated settlement.
Indeed, the negotiated settlement specifically states that the new TROA may
include provisions for the "administration of the Operating Agreement,
including but not limited to establishing or designating an agency or court to
oversee operation of the Truckee River and Truckee River Reservoirs"
[Sec. 205(a)(3)(a)].
Water Allocation Between Nevada and California
Congress allocated Lake Tahoe primarily for in situ uses and the two rivers
for use in Nevada. Both the Truckee and the Carson are interstate rivers
shared by Nevada and California, but there was no formal comprehensive
allocation between the two states by Supreme Court decree, compacts, or acts
of Congress until 1990. As part of the Truckee-Carson water rights
settlement, Congress ratified the long history of judicial decrees, federal
agreements, and the 45 year history of efforts to negotiate a compact to
provide a de facto allocation.
Section 204 of the Settlement Act allocates the water rights of the Carson
and Truckee Rivers and Lake Tahoe. As to the Carson River, allocations are
administered in accordance with the Alpine decree. However, the Act does
not limit assertion of water rights that existed prior to January 1, 1989.
Primarily, allocations are not to exceed 1,300 acre-feet per year in California
and 2,131 acre-feet per year in Nevada. Nevertheless, California received an
additional storage amount in proportion to the reduction of imported effluent
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from the Lake Basin into the Carson River watershed when the available
water supply in the Truckee River basin is thereby increased. However,
these storage rights cannot interfere with mandates of the Alpine decree;
adversely affect fish and wildlife; nor exceed 2,000 acre-feet per year, or a
proportionate increase in the Truckee River basin, whichever is less.
Additionally, these storage rights must be available for irrigation purposes,
not to exceed 2,000 acre-feet per year. Further, California and Nevada are
permitted to study future beneficial interests, which includes the use of
water for wetlands or wildlife. Finally, interbasin transfers must comply
with California and Nevada state laws, and must comply with the Alpine
decree.
As to the Truckee River, California can divert or extract a gross amount of
32,000 acre-feet of surface or groundwater per year, and California water
purveyors may divert up to 10,000 acre-feet of its allocation directly from
unregulated surface flow for any beneficial use in the California part of the
Truckee River Basin. These diversions are subject to the rights of the
Pyramid Lake Tribe and Sierra Pacific Power Company. California cannot
use Truckee River basin water for uses outside the Truckee River basin.
Any change in timing and return flows made by the Tahoe-Truckee
Sanitation Agency, or other similar agency, must be offset against
California's gross diversion amount. Moreover, all uses of water for
commercial and irrigated agriculture within the California Truckee River
basin are subordinate to beneficial interests in Nevada, which includes the
maintenance of the Pyramid Lake fishery. Any boundary changes in the
Tahoe-Truckee Sanitation Agency are subject to California's rights under the
Act. The first 225 acre-feet of water used in California for snow-making
purposes is not charged against California's gross diversion rate.
Unmetered diversions used for residential purposes in California is
presumed to be four-tenths of one acre-foot per residence per year.
As to Lake Tahoe, California was allocated 23,000 acre-feet per year and
Nevada 11,000 acre-feet per year. For snow-making purposes, the first
600 acre-feet for California and first 350 acre-feet for Nevada are not
charged against either states' gross diversion. Additionally, the Act specifies
that any unmetered diversion or extraction of water for residential purposes
presumptively equals four-tenths of one acre-foot per residence per year.
Interstate transfers are subject to California and Nevada law. Additionally,
these transfers are chargeable against either state's allocation, and may be
charged where the water is used. However, each state may deny a transfer
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based upon a finding of adverse impacts on the environment or overall
economy of the area.
TROA and the PSA
As described above, the Secretary of Interior was ordered to negotiate a new
Truckee River Operating agreement with the State of Nevada and the State
of California. Details regarding TROA are given in Chapter 2.3 above. The
provisions of the Preliminary Settlement Agreement (PSA) signed by Sierra
Pacific Power Company and the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe (also described
above) are acknowledged in the negotiated settlement and will become part
of that settlement once agreement has been reached on the TROA. Public
Law 101-618, Sec. 205(a)(2)(c) requires that the provisions of the PSA be
included in the TROA.
The PSA will not become operative until the following criteria have been met,
however:
!

Federal authorizing legislation is passed;

!

The United States and Sierra Pacific reach an agreement on storage fees,
and develop and sign an operating agreement for carrying out the PSA's
water storage provisions;

!

The PSA has been submitted to and approved by the Orr Ditch and
Truckee River General Electric Courts;

!

Specific outstanding litigation and proceedings must be dismissed with
prejudice or otherwise finally resolved;

!

A water conservation plan is developed for implementation during
drought years; and

!

The state of Nevada passes legislation authorizing water meters, and
develops a plan to finance their installation.157

Regarding the first four points above, the negotiated settlement authorizes
and includes the PSA in its provisions. An interim agreement has been
reached between the United States and Sierra Pacific regarding storage and
water storage provisions.
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Section 29(e) of the PSA mandates that a conservation plan for drought
conditions be developed by Sierra Pacific. The plan must produce an annual
savings of 10% or more during the ensuing year whenever it appears that a
drought situation will occur (based on the April 1 seasonal Truckee River
runoff forecast).Sierra Pacific, the Pyramid Tribe, Reno, Sparks and Washoe
County entered into such an agreement on July 18, 1996. In this agreement,
Reno, Sparks and Washoe County agreed to adopt and implement ordinances
limiting lawn watering to a staggered system of no more than two days per
week during each and every year. Each entity also agreed to adopt and
implement ordinances prohibiting lawn watering during the summer season
between the hours of 1:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m.
Sierra Pacific further agreed to distribute free water saving devices, such as
toilet-fill-restrictors, toilet-reservoir-water-displacement devices, faucet
restrictors, leak detection tablets, low-flow showerheads, or other watersaving devices, provide adequate field personnel during the summer lawn
water season in order to encourage conservation and provide support for
monitoring implementation of the ordinances that limit lawn watering.
Sierra Pacific also agreed to reimburse Reno, Sparks and/or Washoe County
for expenses incurred (staff time) in issuing water ordinance citations within
Sierra Pacific's service area; and to provide, beginning in 1997, a program to
encourage, facilitate or participate in projects to retrofit water efficient landscaping. Sierra Pacific also agreed to provide annual reports on its water
conservation efforts (Water Conservation Agreement, July 18, 1996:6-7).
In signing this agreement, all parties acknowledged that the agreement met
the conservation plan requirements set forth in Sec. 29(e) of the PSA.
Further, the Conservation plan will become null and void if the TROA has
not been agreed upon and entered into effect by December 31, 1997.
With regard to water meters, the Nevada legislature passed (and the
Governor signed) Water Meter Legislation on June 30, 1989 (CH. 617, 1980
Nev. Stat. 1393). This legislation lifted Sierra Pacific’s ban on the use and
installation of residential water meters in the Truckee Meadows, provided
that: the Truckee River Negotiated Settlement goes into effect; residents do
not pay for hookups (they don't and won't); and residents are not forced to be
billed on a metered rate until 90 percent of Sierra Pacific’s retrofit meter
installations are completed. This means that before older residents living in
homes built prior to 1988 can be required to pay a metered rate, 90 percent of
the retrofits must be completed. New homes are required to be metered. On
February 20, 1996, the Public Service Commission approved Sierra Pacific’s
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Water Meter Financing Plan, which includes provisions for paying for the
installation of meters.
Newlands-Related Issues
Operating Criteria and Procedures (OCAP).—The OCAP were originally
separate rules and regulations set down by the Secretary of Interior specifically for the Newlands Project, as explained above. In 1990, P.L. 101-618
required that an efficiency study be conducted to investigate the feasibility of
increasing Project efficiency to 75% [Sec. 209(c)]. There is no requirement to
actually achieve this level of efficiency, although in 1994 hearings before
Congress, Reclamation reported that it is “achievable.” Nor is there a
requirement that the Newlands Project have efficiency targets; project
efficiency targets were first incorporated into OCAP in 1988.
P.L. 101-618 specifies that the OCAP that has been in place since 1988 shall
remain in effect—and cannot be set aside—until December 31, 1997, unless
the Secretary of Interior decides that changes are necessary in order to meet
his obligations, including those set forth in the Endangered Species Act. The
Secretary has apparently decided that such changes are necessary and
Interior has developed and published a proposed adjusted OCAP.
The long-term issue remains, as noted elsewhere in this report, the question
of certainty and whether there will be an ultimate limit to the amount of
water to be shifted from the Newlands Project under OCAP.

Recoupment.—P.L. 101-618 gives the Secretary of Interior the authority to
cancel all TCID repayment obligations owed to the Bureau of Reclamation,
provided: (a) the TCID agrees to collect all such repayment obligations
anyway, and to use those funds to develop and implement water conservation
measures; and (b) TCID enters into an agreement with the Secretary to
repay the more than one million acre-feet of water that it diverted above and
beyond that permitted by relevant OCAP.
TCID may have already met its repayment obligations to Reclamation in full,
however TCID still owes about $1 million from federal financing of various
supplemental construction activities, with the final payment due in the
year 2016. Other inducements offered to settle the recoupment issue under
P.L. 101-618 included $4 million in federal water conservation spending
(Section 209(h)(3)) and an equal amount from the State of Nevada
(Section 209(h)(2)), the opportunity to have a water bank (Section 209(d))
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and the financing of a recreation study (Section 209(e) and an effluent reuse
study (Section 209(f)).
However, if TCID and the Newlands irrigators perceive that these inducements are small in relation to what they are being asked to give up (recoupment water) and what they are being asked to pay for (conservation, which
they perceive benefits others, not them), then the incentives offered in the
Settlement Act may not be sufficient to obtain recoupment and followthrough on the requirement to purchase Bureau of Reclamation repayment
obligations and devote funds to improving water use efficiency is highly
questionable.
Notwithstanding, the Secretary has the "exclusive authority and responsibility to pursue such recoupment, except that, if an agreement or an order
leading to such recoupment is not in effect as of December 31, 1997, any
party with standing to pursue such recoupment prior to enactment of (Title II
of P.L. 101-618] may pursue such recoupment thereafter" [Sec. 209(j)(3)]. In
November 1995, the federal government pushed the issue of recoupment
further. In The United States of America v. Board of Directors, et al., the
government requested an order requiring TCID and the Newlands Project
water users to comply with recoupment plans, when those plans are
developed, and to comply with present and future OCAP (CV-N-95-00757HDM, November 22, 1995). The plan is not complete but will be presented in
litigation.
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe-Related Issues
Sec. 207(a) requires the Secretary of the Interior to revise, update and
implement plans for the conservation and recovery of the cui-ui and
Lahontan cutthroat trout. These plans, moreover, "shall include all relevant
measures necessary to conserve and recover the species." As discussed above,
these plans were released in 1992 and 1995. In addition, the status of Anaho
Island, which was a part of the original reservation and later designated as a
National Wildlife Refuge, was clarified (it remains a part of the reservation).
Sec. 8 authorized $25 million to be appropriated for the newly-created
Pyramid Lake Paiute Fisheries Fund, to be held in a Treasury Account for
the Tribe; interest on these funds are to be used for the maintenance and
operation of the fisheries. (Sec. 8 also authorized the appropriation of an
additional $40 million, to be used for tribal economic development.)
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The law also authorized the Secretary of Interior to acquire water rights,
from willing sellers, to be held and used to benefit the Pyramid Lake fishery.
Water rights acquisition under the cui-ui recovery plan has not proceeded
because NEPA requirements must first be met.
As noted, the Tribe is still pursuing avenues to obtain the right to all
unappropriated Truckee River water as well. Section 210(a)(2)(b) of the
Settlement Act provides that the PSA and the new TROA will not become
effective until the Tribe's claim to the unappropriated waters of the Truckee
River is resolved. On July 13, 1994, the State of Nevada and the Tribe
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding that provided, among other
things, that: (a) Pyramid Tribe's unappropriated water claim will proceed
through the State Engineer according to the two applications the Tribe had
filed in 1984; (b) if the Pyramid Lake Tribe is granted a water right to the
unappropriated waters of the Truckee River, Nevada and the Tribe will
jointly seek confirmation of that right, along with a determination that the
waters of the Truckee River are fully appropriated; and © the Tribe's
unappropriated right, if granted, will be enforced by the Orr Ditch Water
Master.
Stillwater National Wildlife Refuge
Title II, Sec. 206 "authorizes and directs" the Secretary of Interior, in
conjunction with the State of Nevada and other parties, "to acquire by
purchase or other means water and water rights . . .and to transfer, hold and
exercise such water and water rights and related interests to sustain, on
long-term average, approximately 25,000 acres of primary wetland habitat
within the Lahontan Valley wetlands," provided such "acquisition shall be
only from willing sellers. . .."[Sec. 206(a)(1)]. The Act also created the new
Stillwater National Wildlife Refuge as described above, to be managed by the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service for the purpose of maintaining and restoring
natural biological diversity within the refuge; providing for the conservation
and management of fish and wildlife and their habitats within the refuge;
fulfilling international treaty obligations of the United States with respect to
fish and wildlife; and providing opportunities for scientific research,
environmental education, and fish and wildlife oriented recreation
[Sec. 206(b)].
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has assumed management responsibility
for the Refuge, as required by the law and has developed a proposal to
acquire 75,000 acre-feet of water, over the next several years, to support the
25,000 acres of wetland habitat in Lahontan Valley that it is required to
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protect under P.L. 101-618. This amounts to about 40% of the water rights
that are currently in private ownership in the Carson Division of the
Newlands Project. An EIS has been completed on the impacts that such
acquisitions would have in and around the Newlands Project area. The pricetag for these rights is estimated to be as high as $69.4 million. The long-term
impacts are difficult to determine at this point in time because of all the
other issues that are as yet unresolved. For example, if the newest OCAP
further reduces the amount of water diverted to the Project and/or
recoupment becomes a reality, the wetlands will certainly be negatively
affected. Either move would reduce the amount of flows to the wetlands,
thereby making the U.S. Fish and Wildlife's mandate to protect the wetlands
more difficult to achieve. Nonetheless, at least two other impacts cannot be
avoided, no matter how these other issues are resolved.
A 1993 FWS report to Congress on the Water Rights Acquisition Program,
anticipates that the rural lifestyle, highly valued in Churchill County, will be
affected. "The Lahontan Valley wetlands water rights acquisition program
may take 53 to 78 percent of the currently irrigated agricultural lands with
water rights out of production."158 Yet "[f]or many members of the
community, ‘farm preservation values' reflect a prevalent attitude that the
farming lifestyle should be protected. As acres of farmland are taken out of
production, those members of the community who hold these values would be
adversely affected."159 So prized is the rural lifestyle in Churchill County, of
which family farming is an integral part, that the Service may be hard
pressed to find willing sellers in the numbers necessary to achieve their
goals.
Second, the area around Fallon, Nevada (the Carson Division) derives its
drinking water from wells in the shallow aquifer, 10 to 50 feet below the
surface, and this aquifer has increased in volume and extent since the
inception of the Newlands Project. This is because it has been constantly
recharged through seepage of irrigation water from Project delivery canals,
and the application of irrigation water to fields. No one seems to be certain
what the water-rights acquisition program, if successful, would have on the
water table—nor what the long-term consequences might be. For example,
while the U.S. Fish and Wildlife report mentioned above suggests that
"transferring water rights from agricultural areas to the wetlands is
predicted to have. . .minimal adverse impact on aquifer recharge in the
Lahontan Valley" (p. 7), the U.S. Geological Survey states that in "areas
where irrigation is removed, the amount of decline could be about 10 feet at a
distance of one to two miles from lined canals."160
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3.7

Subsequent Negotiations and Agreements

In the course of implementing the various provisions of the Act, including the
resolution of these issues, a series of post-settlement negotiations between
various parties emerged. The most important of these concerns the Truckee
River Operating Agreement, which remains in progress and is nearly ready
for signature (see above and Section 4.4). Not all of the objectives have been
achieved to date, however, and some of the subsequent negotiations have
failed. However, other initiatives to negotiate solutions have flourished in
the atmosphere of accommodation and compromise created in the aftermath
of the Settlement Agreement.

The “Second Generation” or “Facilitated” Negotiations
The Settlement, while groundbreaking, merely established a framework for
addressing issues related to the allocation and use of the Truckee-Carson
river waters. The Settlement required, at a minimum, a second generation of
negotiations among the parties and interests involved. One key player
identified the following important remaining questions in testimony to
Congress:161
!

How much water is irrigated agriculture entitled to from the Newlands
Project?

!

Who is to benefit from any savings in the delivery of water to farms?

!

What should the final operating criteria and procedures for the Project
be?

!

How much water is needed for the Lahontan Valley wetlands?

!

How can cui-ui recovery be integrated with the restoration of the Pyramid
Lake and Lower Truckee River ecosystems?

!

Can the water needed for the wetlands, Pyramid Lake and the Truckee
Meadows be acquired consistently with the evolving water needs and
shifting agricultural base of the Fallon and Fernley communities?

Other issues touched on (as noted by Interior) included Truckee River water
quality, possible further settlements with the Fallon Tribes, storage of state
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water acquired upstream of Lahontan Reservoir in the Carson River Basin,
and other upper Carson issues.
Beginning in late 1993, nine negotiating teams, representing a variety of
users and interests affected by the Settlement, began a series of discussions
that some hoped would lead to the development of answers to these and
other questions regarding implementation of the Settlement. To facilitate
the process further, Senator Reid agreed to let a professional mediator from
Resolve (Center for Environmental Dispute Resolution) of Washington, D.C.,
conduct more formal negotiations to mediate and arbitrate outstanding
water issues among the parties pertaining to Pyramid Lake and the Truckee
and Carson rivers.
Negotiator Gail Bingham from Resolve convened the first meeting of the
Truckee-Carson Settlement Negotiations in Reno, Nevada. Participants
included:
!

U.S. Department of the Interior (Office of the Secretary) and members of
a federal team that included FWS, Reclamation, BIA, TCCO, the
Solicitors Office, EPA and Justice;

!

State of Nevada (Department of Conservation and Natural Resources),
including Wildlife, Parks and State Lands Divisions);

!

Pyramid Lake Paiute Indian Tribe;

!

Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Indian Tribe;

!

Truckee Meadows Regional Planning Governing Board (Washoe County);

!

Sierra Pacific Power Company (WestPac Utilities);

!

Carson River Subconservancy District;

!

Lahontan Valley farmers and TCID (represented through the Lahontan
Valley Environmental Alliance or LVEA);

!

Newlands Water Protective Association;

!

Local governments (Fernley, Fallon and Churchill County); and
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!

Conservation Caucus (The Nature Conservancy, Environmental Defense
Fund, Lahontan Wetlands Coalition).

Various working groups consisted of the Modeling Working Group, Water
Quality, Land Use Planning, Hydro Power, and M&I (municipal and
industrial). The initial deadline for the completion of negotiations was
established to be January 31, 1995.162
Five months later, the Lahontan Valley Environmental Alliance,
representing local community and agricultural interests in Churchill County,
reportedly withdrew from the process, unable to reach an agreement with the
other parties where their interests were concerned. Indeed, one report had it
that “about the only thing the farmers, the [Pyramid Lake] tribe and
environmentalists got [from each other] out of the talks was a commitment to
continue communicating and try to work out differences” in the future.163
However, as with the question of Newlands irrigators so-called “walk-out,”
other sources again characterize the conclusion of negotiations more
neutrally, as a situation in which the LVEA had tried to take a tentative deal
back to the community, was unable to sell it, and, the negotiations already
having gone beyond their self-imposed deadline, most parties felt that
further negotiations would not be fruitful at that time.
These negotiations did provide the framework from which the Water Quality
Agreement (below) sprung, however. Also, the State of Nevada and the
federal government agreed to keep a minimum pool of 4,000 acre-feet of
water in Lahontan Reservoir at all times (for fish preservation), and to allow
the state to store water it buys for wetlands restoration there.
Negotiations Sponsored by Nevada Department of Conservation and Natural
Resources
The Director of Nevada Department of Conservation and Natural Resources
initiated negotiations between Fallon farmers and the Pyramid Lake Tribe.
In July 1996, after twelve negotiation sessions, negotiations were terminated
without agreement when both parties failed to agree on which issues could
be discussed. Some progress was made with respect to the Fallon farmers
being open to the idea of storing some of their Truckee River water in Sierra
Nevada Mountain reservoirs and bringing it down to Lahontan Reservoir
later in the spring.164 This would have allowed a more accurate determination of Carson River shortfalls which would then be made up by TCID's
Truckee River allocation.
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According to one observer165, the negotiations were constructed to involve
representatives who had not already committed to positions but were
crippled by their lack of understanding of the issues and the Truckee-Carson
system. Tentative agreements were made that were taken back to respective
managers and boards and which could not be accepted by these decisionmakers. This observer felt that the net effect was to damage the larger
process by creating an impression of failure to follow through on agreements,
and also a fear that other party would expect these unacceptable agreements
to become the opening positions in future discussions.

Water Quality Agreement
The cities of Reno and Sparks, Washoe County, the Department of the
Interior, the Department of Justice, the Environmental Protection Agency,
the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection, and the Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe signed the Truckee River Water Quality Settlement Agreement
on October 10, 1996. This agreement was negotiated among these parties in
order to settle pending litigation brought in December 1988 by the Tribe
against Reno, Sparks, EPA and NDEP.
The suit was brought when the Truckee Meadows Water Reclamation
Facility increased its treatment and effluent capacity from 30 to 40 million
gallons per day. In exchange for the Pyramid Lake Paiute Indian Tribe
dropping its lawsuit and allowing the cities of Reno and Sparks to use the full
40 million gallons per day capacity of the Truckee Meadows Water
Reclamation Facility, the cities and the U.S. Department of the Interior
agreed to spend $24 million to purchase Truckee River water rights.
These rights will be purchased over the next five years for the purpose of
improving water quality in the Truckee River. This will be accomplished by
diluting treated wastewater in the Truckee Meadows, thereby improving the
quality of water in the Lower Truckee River—which will, in turn, improve the
quality of water that makes it into Pyramid Lake.
The water rights acquisition cost will be shared equally between the cities
and Interior. The purchased water, estimated to total approximately
24,000 acre-feet, will be stored in upstream reservoirs and released during
low-flow periods.166 This acquisition represented the first such water
purchased specifically for the Truckee River itself and will be used to dilute
treated effluent discharges from the treatment plant and to provide more
water for Pyramid Lake.167 A computer model predicted that over a 95-year
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period, the additional water will allow Pyramid Lake to rise by 11 feet over
its level without the acquisition. It will also keep at least 300 cfs in the river
at Sparks during July and August 95% of the time (a condition occurring only
15% of the time previously) and will lower river temperatures. These actions
are projected to increase the number of days the river meets temperature
standard to 262 and the number of days it meets the dissolved oxygen
standard to 322.
The cost to local residents of the Truckee Meadows was estimated at
$0.41 per month, and sewer hookup fees were predicted to rise by $200 per
home.168
The Water Quality Agreement also deals in creative ways with application of
treated effluent to supply certain uses that require water even in time of
drought (such as parks, golf courses and the University of Nevada
experimental farm). Effluent is supplied in return for substituting clean
water flows based on less firm water rights.
Suit Seeking Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
Uncertainty concerning the total environmental impacts that will be caused
by implementation of the entire Act (all provisions of P.L. 101-618) prompted
local interests (Churchill County and the City of Fallon) to file suit against
the Secretary of the Interior. In Churchill County v. Babbit, filed
November 22, 1995, the county contends that the Act:
. . .seeks to reallocate water resources away from the farms and
communities in the Lahontan Valley located 60 miles east of
Reno\Sparks, Nevada, for the benefit of federal interests, including an
Indian Tribe, wetlands, and two species of fish. . .. Rather than
assessing the environmental impacts of this reallocation in a
programmatic manner, the United States has chosen to piecemeal the
environmental analysis by preparing simultaneously numerous
separate environmental documents under the National Environmental
Policy Act. . .all of which are related in time, geography and
environmental impacts. Plaintiff alleges that this piecemeal approach
to environmental analysis violates NEPA and has the potential to
cause significant environmental harm to the health, safety and welfare
of the people and communities in Churchill County (p. 2).
A similar suit was filed by the City of Fallon shortly thereafter and the two
suits were consolidated. The City and County are seeking an injunction
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against implementation of the Act until a Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement is completed. A third suit (consolidated with the first two)
was filed in relation to an inadequate NEPA compliance for water rights
acquisition under Section 206 of P.L. 101-618. In early 1997, the Court found
that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the action and the case is now on
appeal.
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4. Critical Issues: Case Study Discussion
During Phase II, the Truckee-Carson River Basin Study team focused on five
critical water-related issues in the basins:
•
•
•
•
•

Water transfers
Surface-Groundwater Relationships
Newlands Irrigators
TROA/OCAP
Watershed Management/Carrying Capacity

Our approach to the Truckee-Carson was as a case study, to inform
Western water policy. The five issues were investigated in depth not to
develop new recommendations or research for the river basins themselves,
but to illuminate water policy in terms of lessons learned and transferrable
experience.
The focus for this phase of work was evaluation: what worked, what did
not, and why. Emphasis was placed on federal agencies and programs, and
their role and actions, but interactions with the local, state, tribal and private
levels were considered as well. In evaluating the five selected issues during
Phase II the team considered the following:
•

What activities and programs most significantly address the problem?
Why they have been effective? Which are not working, and why? Which
Federal water resource management programs have been generally
successful and widely supported?

•

Might a basin-wide commission be effective in addressing these
problems? What are the pros and cons, including effects on state water
management?

•

What innovations in governance structures have promoted collaborative
efforts across stakeholder groups, jurisdictions or levels of government?
What innovative voluntary water marketing, banking, or transfer
systems should be noted? What innovative water conservation efforts
have helped reduce diversions? What innovative approaches to scientific
research or data collection have fostered wide participation and
agreement among stakeholders on either matters of fact or management
strategies?

•

What has been the Federal role in problem-solving? How effective have
Federal programs been in facilitating resolution? What changes in
Federal programs, authorities, missions, budgets, organization etc. would
more effectively address the problems under discussion?
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•

What mechanisms could integrate local, state and Federal levels for
planning, priority-setting, and problem-solving?

•

What must be done at the Federal level to address the water problem
under discussion over the next 20 years?

4.1 Water Transfers
Description of Emerging Markets
Motivations for Market Activity and Potential Buyers.—The primary
motivations for water transactions in the study area include to secure water
for threatened and endangered fish of Pyramid lake, support urban growth in
Reno and Sparks, acquire water under the multi-party Truckee River Water
Quality Agreement and secure water for wetlands restoration in the
Lahontan Valley.
Growth rates in the Reno Sparks area were around 32% over the 1980 to
1990 period, with high growth in rural communities as well—Carson City at
26% and Fallon at 51% (see Section 1). Sierra Pacific expects to have
adequate firm supplies to serve projected demands through the year 2015
based on its continuing water acquisition and conservation programs and
through the agreements it has negotiated to augment supplies through
improved reservoir management. Sierra Pacific will continue to focus its
water acquisitions in the Truckee Meadows and thus its purchases will not
compete directly with acquisitions associated with the water quality
agreement described below.
The multi-party Truckee River Water Quality Agreement signed in October,
1996 obligates (among many other provisions) the cities and the
U.S. Department of Interior to spend $24 million to purchase Truckee River
and Truckee Division water rights over the next five years to improve the
quality of water in the lower Truckee River, diluting wastewater from the
treatment plant and improving the quality of inflows into Pyramid Lake. The
acquisitions are expected to total about 24,000 acre feet, with costs to be split
equally between Interior and the cities—who will cover the costs through
small increases in water rates and increases of about $200 per home in sewer
hookup fees (see Section 1 above). Interior and the cities are considering
retaining a joint broker to handle their acquisitions and are seeking
Newlands Project rights to retire, so that diversions through the Truckee
Canal will decrease and the quantity and quality of flows into Pyramid Lake
will increase. The water acquired will be released from upstream reservoirs
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to improve water quality during the summer months so that the Lower
Truckee River is in compliance with Clean Water Act standards.
The 1990 Preliminary Settlement Act requires that an annual average of
25,000 acres of primary wetland habitat be maintained in Lahontan Valley.
USFWS has calculated that this requires 125,000 acre feet of water
(including return flows, usable spills and acquisitions, see Section 1 above).
USFWS and the state already had acquired about 20,000 acre feet as of mid1996 and are committed to continuing acquisitions until wetland restoration
goals are satisfied.
Potential Sellers.—Potential sellers are primarily irrigators because
irrigation is still the largest consumptive use of water in the basin. Irrigated
acreage is located in the Truckee Meadows, in the lower Carson Basin and in
the upper Carson Basin.
In the early 1990s, about 10,000 acres of land were still being irrigated in the
Truckee Meadows. No data is available on exactly how much irrigated
acreage remains in the Truckee Meadows as of the mid-1990s that is suitable
for water transfers to support urban growth. Irrigated acreage in the
Truckee Meadows will continue to be acquired and the water transferred to
support urban growth, continuing Sierra Pacific’s long standing water rights
acquisition program.
TCID irrigators comprise the largest group of potential sellers for the water
quality and wetlands acquisitions programs , as they control the largest block
of water rights in the study area. A recent survey of irrigators in the
Newlands Project indicates that sellers are influenced to sell by personal
reasons, such as farmers ready to retire with no heirs interested in taking
over or needing to sell due to divorce or other changed family circumstances.
Moreover, sellers have a higher portion of income from off-farm sources, a
higher debt-to-equity ratio, lower quality soils and are less likely to live on
the farm property than non-sellers.169
The Upper Carson Basin is experiencing population growth and former
pastures are being converted to subdivisions, concurrent with conversion of
some water formerly used in irrigation to urban use. Carson City is
gradually acquiring water from irrigators to support urban growth. About 58,
000 acres are irrigated above Lahontan Reservoir, with an approximately
140,000 acre foot annual depletion of Carson River flows. While some of this
acreage potentially could be fallowed in order to provide water for wetland
restoration or other downstream needs, numerous legal and political issues
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would need to be resolved in order to transfer Upper Carson water for use in
the lower basin.
Markets, Price Determinants and Fair Market Value.—While the Truckee
River Basin has been home to one of the most active and longstanding
markets for water rights in the western United States for over a decade (see
above for detailed history of market), the nature of the water market is
becoming more complex as transactions in the region now serve not only
urban growth but environmental needs as well. This section examines the
factors that characterize water markets and affect water prices and fair
market value in the western United States. Specific implications for the
Truckee Carson Basin are discussed at the end of the section.
What Is A Water Market?—The term “water markets” refers to
transactions which satisfy three conditions:
•

Water’s value is recognized as distinct from the value of land and
improvements. Water is bought and sold for its own sake, not merely as
an incidental part of a land transfer.

•

Buyers and sellers agree to reallocation voluntarily.

•

Prices are negotiable by the buyer and seller, not constrained to be “not
for profit” or “at cost.”

Transfers may include sale or lease of fee titles, water use permits,
conservancy district shares and project contract rights; conditional water
leases for drought year use; exchanges of water rights with varying priority
dates and arrangements to use conserved water. Water resources which
have been involved in market transactions in the American West include
groundwater, native and imported surface water, artificially recharged and
recovered water, effluent and conserved water.
The motivating force behind market transfers is the perception that economic
gains may be captured by transferring water to a location or purpose of use in
which it generates higher net returns than under existing use patterns.
Three conditions must be satisfied for a buyer and seller to consummate a
water transfer:
•
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The seller must receive a price offer that equals or exceeds the economic
benefits sacrificed in transferring water. A farmer, for instance, must
consider the net returns to water in irrigation, any decreases in the value
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of land, improvements and equipment due to reduced water availability
and expected appreciation in the value of the water right over time.
•

The buyer must expect the economic returns from the water right
purchase to exceed the costs associated with the purchase.

•

The buyer must view market acquisition of water rights as an
economically attractive method of obtaining water, relative to other
possibilities—such as litigation to change water allocation, new supply
development or contracting with an existing water service organization.170

What Affects the Prices Farmers Are Willing to Accept?—Irrigated
agriculture is still the major consumptive use of water in the study area, and
so most acquisitions for urban and environmental needs will involve
transfers from irrigation to the new use. The price paid for water will vary
from case to case, depending on the nature of the transfer arrangement. The
upper bound of what will be paid depends on the budget and willingness to
pay of the party acquiring the water. The lower bound on the negotiated
price will depend on the opportunity cost to the seller, lessor—that is, the net
income form irrigated crop production that they forego. In negotiated
transactions, the price will lie somewhere between these bounds, and will
depend on the bargaining power and skills of the two parties.
Cost-based pricing is sometimes used to set a price for acquisition of water by
public agencies. However, cost based pricing focuses on the opportunity costs
to the seller, and does not consider the economic benefits to the buyer.
Consequently, cost based pricing does not confer any of the net economic
benefits of the transfer on the seller.
How much an irrigator can reasonably accept for water rights depends on
several factors:
•

The value of water in irrigation, which in turn depends on both crop
revenues and production costs. Crop revenues are a function of crop
prices, and are also heavily influenced by federal commodity programs.
Where federal crop price support programs exist, they can make farm
revenues much higher than they would be otherwise. These additional
receipts make water more valuable to the farmer and thus make it more
expensive to bid water out of agriculture. However, alfalfa, the primary
crop grown in the Truckee-Carson basin, has never had price supports
according to comments submitted by the Natural Resources Conservation
Service.
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Production costs have many components. Those most relevant for this
discussion are the costs of irrigation water and of energy. Increases in
the cost of irrigation water from federal projects will increase farmers’
production costs and reduce the net value of water in agriculture. The
cost of energy is an important component of the costs of irrigating—both
for farmers who pump groundwater and farmers who use surface water
that must be pumped and conveyed from the river to their fields.
Renegotiation of energy contracts and declining groundwater tables are
two factors that can significantly affect irrigation costs and thus influence
farmers’ incentives to sell or lease their water.
•

Returns to farmland and assets without water. The economic
benefits are farmers really giving up when they sell water rights are the
differences between economic returns with and without water rights. If
farmland is not transferred when water is sold, the land may have value
for dryland crop production or grazing. Revenues, production costs and
risks will each be quite different in these alternative uses, if they are
practicable at all, than they were for irrigated crop production.

•

Expectations regarding future water values. A key question in any
irrigator’s mind involves the timing of a water transfer. “Should I accept
an offer for my water rights this year or hold onto them hoping for higher
prices?” The value of water in farming is based on the expected present
value of the periodic receipts to which the water right entitles its owner.
Because the value of a water right is based on a stream of returns over
time, it is sensitive to the time rate of discount and the expected change
in relative price of water rights in the future. Because the expectations
that affect prices for water rights are uncertain, willingness to sell is also
influenced by the risk-aversion of the farmer, and his willingness to hold
on to his water, taking the chance that the value of his right may fall
rather than rise.

•

Value of rural, agricultural lifestyle. Sociological and economic
studies indicate rural households are not in farming primarily for its
income potential. In fact, many farmers are living on less income than
they could earn in other jobs requiring comparable skills because they
value the independent, rural lifestyle that goes with farming. Where the
family has been established in farming for several generations and has
close cultural and historic ties to the land, these lifestyle values may be
quite important.
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All of the factors described play a role in determining the price at which
farmers are willing to sell or lease water. Where water rights are obviously
quite valuable in non-agricultural uses, farmers may hold out for prices that
far exceed the value of water in irrigation. For instance, Gardner and Miller
indicate that prices in Colorado’s Front Range peaked at values equal to the
capitalized marginal demand for water by municipal users in the late
1970s.171 As urban growth accelerated, agricultural right holders believed
that they each had a high probability of being able to transfer their water
rights to municipal or industrial water users and were no longer willing to
sell at prices that reflected only water’s value in irrigation. For a brief period
of time, the value of the water in urban uses was fully capitalized into
market prices.
Factors That Affect Water Right Prices—Examples From Western US Water
Markets.—A single unit price is unlikely to dominate in a regional market for
water. Price dispersion within a water market persists for two basic reasons.
First, as with other commodities characterized by multiple attributes, water
users are willing to pay different amounts for water rights based on the
specific attributes of the right. Second, characteristics of regional markets
contribute to price dispersion. The number and size distribution of potential
buyers and sellers, high search and information costs in thin markets, and
the heterogeneity of water commodities traded explain the persistence of
price dispersion in many water markets.
First, the number and size of potential buyers and sellers affects the degree
of price dispersion. Specifically, when there are few potential traders, or
traders are highly disparate in size, the linkages and information flows
within a market may be inadequately developed and a common unit price will
not emerge. This is often the case in regional water markets where there
may be only one or two large buyers (a mining corporation, municipality or
power plant, for instance) who purchase water from a number of small
landowners. Second, the more complex and multidimensional the commodity
traded, the higher the costs of search and the larger the dispersion in market
prices. Search and information costs, and numbers and sizes of potential
traders account for price dispersion not explained by specific water right
attributes.
Gila-San Francisco Basin: Water market activity in the Gila-San Francisco
Basin began when the basin was closed to additional appropriation in the
1960s. Market transactions in the Gila Subbasin are more numerous than in
the less populated San Francisco Subbasin, where right acquisitions did not
become common until the 1970s. Until the 1960s, most water rights were
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held by farmers and ranchers but mining interests acquired the majority of
water rights in the basin in the 1960s and the water market has operated on
a continuing basis since these large mining purchases. Water rights buyers
include irrigators, individual homeowners, small water service organizations,
Silver City, mining corporations, and other commercial enterprises. Many
transactions involve small quantities of rights, often less than an acre foot of
water.172
The area was adjudicated under Arizona v. California in the 1960s, when the
total amount of water that can be used (both surface water and groundwater)
was fixed.173 Consequently, the only means for those who need additional
supplies to get them is acquisition of existing water rights. The copper
industry was volatile during the 1970s and experienced a dramatic downturn
in the early 1980s when several mines in the area closed operations.
Because this industry was the dominant water buyer, its peaks and slumps
are directly reflected in water rights values in this basin. However, there has
been a steady increase in the population of Silver City, New Mexico, which
acquires groundwater rights in this basin and pipes the water to its service
area on the other side of the Continental Divide. Silver City’s demand, along
with that of second home and retirement developments, keeps water values
from being entirely subject to the cycles of copper prices. In the 1990s, prices
continue to rise in response to steady municipal and rural development
demand and to an increase in mining operations.
Statistical analysis of water rights transactions in this basin indicates that
water rights seniority is the single most important factor in predicting the
price at which water rights will sell, followed by the location of the water
rights, the buyer’s intended use for the rights, and the quantity of water sold.
Overall, this region experienced a very small (less than 1%) price increase per
year over the period 1966 to 1990. Over the shorter period 1966 to 1981, the
average annual increase measured 4%.
Statistical analysis is based on data from 95 water market transactions
which occurred during the period from 1971 to 1987 in the Gila-San Francisco Basin. Each factor which is statistically related to water price is
discussed below, along with evidence from other regional markets.
Priority/Reliability of the Water Right: In the Gila-San Francisco Basin,
higher prices are accorded to water rights with older (pre-world War II)
priority dates. Buyers pay about $370/ac-ft more for rights with pre-1940
priority dates. This is consistent with other observations in other regional
markets. Ross (1984) notes that prices paid by Colorado municipalities for
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senior water rights that can be exercised throughout the summer peak
demand period are three times higher than prices paid for junior water rights
limited to diverting water during periods of high stream flows.174 Municipal
and industrial water providers pay a premium for senior water rights that
may be used throughout the year, and that are less likely to be curtailed
during drought. Water users are willing to pay reliability premiums for
supplies available during dry years and droughts, as evidenced by the fact
that senior water rights sell for more than their junior counterparts. In
basins with an active market in water rights with different reliability
characteristics, the reliability premium can be inferred by examining market
price differentials. The value of more reliable water can also be inferred from
investments in storage and other strategies to firm up the reliability of
existing supplies. In general, the reliability premium will approach the
incremental cost of additional storage. If the premium were less than the
costs of storage then water users would acquire more senior rights instead of
investing in storage.175
Flexibility in Purpose and Place of Use: Compared to the San Francisco
Subbasin, growth pressures have been stronger in the Gila Subbasin, where
Silver City and mining companies have actively acquired water rights. Water
rights in the Gila Subbasin sell for about $1155/ac-ft more than water rights
in the San Francisco Subbasin. This illustrates the significant impact that
legal restrictions on market transfers can have on water prices. These
findings are consistent with evidence from other market areas. In Utah’s
Lower Sevier River Basin, for example, rights to pump groundwater generally
can transferred out of (but not into) areas that have been designated by the
state as “high impact” groundwater zones. This provision is designed to
prevent new groundwater pumping in areas where groundwater overdraft is
a serious concern. This barrier to transfer creates a differential in water
rights values. Groundwater rights located within the high impact zones sell
for 50–100% more than comparable groundwater rights located outside and
adjacent to the zones.176
If the point of diversion and place of use for a water right can be changed at a
relatively low cost, one would not expect to see large price differentials
associated with the original location of a water right. However, many
western states regulate proposed transfers of water rights across basin
boundaries more fully than they regulate transfers within a basin, due to
concerns with impacts on other water users in the basin of origin.
Consequently, market prices differ for water rights with similar
characteristics that are located in different, though neighboring, basins.
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Buyer Characteristics: Growing cities, mining operations, and utility
companies have been dominant buyers of irrigation rights in many regional
markets. In the Gila-San Francisco Basin, these high-visibility buyers pay
about $1125/ac-ft more than low profile buyers. This price differential
suggests that area farmers sell water rights to one another at more favorable
prices than those they command in transactions involving high-profile
buyers. This may reflect irrigators’ willingness to accept a lower price when
the water rights will remain in agricultural uses and in local ownership. The
price differential also suggests that high-profile buyers may pay a somewhat
higher price to mitigate the controversy that often accompanies transfers of
water out of agriculture. The price differential is consistent with
observations in other market regions in which transactions among farmers
and between local water users are characterized by lower unit prices than
transactions in which the purchaser is not a farmer, is non-local, or is a highprofile actor in the local economy.
Volume of Water Transferred: In the Gila-San Francisco Basin, larger
“packages” of water rights sell for a significantly lower unit prices. In most
states, the procedures for obtaining state approval to change the place and
purpose of use of a water right do not vary with the quantity of water being
transferred, and so the transactions costs per unit are likely to be lower for
larger volumes. However, such economies of scale may not extend to very
large transactions as these can generate attention and opposition that result
in high costs of obtaining state approval for the transfer.
The Sevier Basin Water Market: This market illustrates how hydrological
cycles and the entrance of large new buyers can affect market prices. The
Sevier River Flows north from the high plateaus of southwestern Utah,
terminating in the Sevier Desert one hundred and forty miles southwest of
Salt Lake City. Four mutual stock irrigation companies—Delta, Melville,
Abraham and Deseret (the DMAD companies), control virtually all surface
flow rights on the lower stretch of the river. Until recently, water delivered
by DMAD was used exclusively for irrigation. Management of the DMAD
companies has been highly integrated since at least the early 1960s.
Although the historical average yield per share of stock differs from one
company to another, the value of the water rights represented by the stocks
(on a per acre-foot basis) are virtually identical. In 1985, the price for water
represented by stock in any one of the four companies was approximately
$350 per acre-foot.
Water rights prices between 1974 and 1985 exhibit no trend either up or
down except for a brief period between 1979 and 1982, when a large
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acquisition by the Intermountain Power Project (IPP) caused a speculative
boom in land and water rights. The IPP acquisition is discussed further in a
later section of this report with respect to the way the acquisitions were
structured to preserve an agricultural base in the area. IPP paid over $2,400
per acre-foot for one large package of groundwater rights and water company
stock. Prices exceeded $1,000 per acre-foot for other sales of water stock
occurring at about the same time. By about 1982, the speculative bubble
subsided and water stock prices began to return to their former levels.
The vast majority of water transfers in this basin are seasonal water rights
rentals among irrigators. Studies conducted between 1948 and 1964 indicate
that there has been no long-term upward or downward trend in the real price
of surface water.177 Short-term price fluctuations, documented since the
1940s, have followed the hydrologic cycle of the river—rental prices are
higher in dry years and lower in wet years. Over the last several decades
rental prices have varied between seven and seventy-five dollars per acre
foot. Prices rose sharply in the period preceding and immediately after IPP’s
purchases in 1980, but leveled off to between $300 and $500 per acre foot in
1985 and 1986.
Colorado Front Range Water Market: Another longstanding active regional
water market is located along the Front Range region of the Colorado
Rockies. Prices are for shares in the Colorado Big-Thompson Project that
provides water to farms, cities, and businesses located north of Denver along
the east slope of the Rockies. These water rights provide highly reliable
supplies, as they are supported not only by native flows on the east slope but
also by substantial pipelines and reservoirs that store and convey water from
the rural western side of the Rockies to the rapidly growing east slope. This
market illustrates how perceptions of water scarcity may increase water
rights prices rapidly even though long-term supplies remain relatively
inexpensive and abundant and also illustrates price declines as new supplies
become available. A development boom in the mid-1970s drove real prices for
water rights to unprecedented levels by the early 1980s. Widespread concern
that increasing urban water demand was quickly outstripping supply led to
sharp increases in prices. Prices peaked at values equal to the capitalized
marginal demand for water by municipal users. As urban growth
accelerated, farmers were increasingly able to transfer their water rights to
municipal or industrial water users and were no longer willing to sell at
prices that reflected only the water’s value in irrigation plus a modest profit
margin.
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Water rights prices in this market fell in the 1980s at least partially in
response to the completion of the Windy Gap project (which imported
significant new supplies to this area), declining interest rates, and a faltering
farm economy that made farmers willing to sell at lower prices than
previously. In addition, some observers believe that city officials began to
recognize that they had acquired adequate water rights to meet foreseeable
needs and that continued acquisition of nearby agricultural water rights
might have undesirable effects on the regional economy and on the
maintenance of attractive agricultural green belts around urban
communities. This market experienced a long-term average annual increase
of 18% over the years 1961 to 1980 (the market peak) and a much more
modest increase of 8% over the longer 1961 to 1990 period.
The Role of Bargaining Power.—While the price that two parties
negotiate for a water transaction will be influenced by many factors, one
must not underestimate the importance of bargaining power in influencing
price. Threats of litigation cause potential sellers to reevaluate the security
and value of their water rights and can alter the price they would be willing
to accept. This has not gone unnoticed in the Truckee-Carson Basin where
some irrigation interests perceive that the OCAP and water transfer and
water rights litigation could be used to micro-manage irrigators and drive
them into an untenable financial situation so that they become “willing”
sellers.

Nature of the Transfer Agreement.—Several characteristics may vary
across water transactions: length of contractual agreement, annual versus
contingent transfer of water, reliability of supplies being transferred,
penalties and conditions for breaking the agreement, firmness of the
arrangement in the face of uncertain legal and hydrologic conditions, credit
extended to purchaser/lessee and structure of financial payments.
Acquisitions may be structured to occur only under specific conditions, such
as a water short year in the basin or to occur every year regardless of water
supply conditions. Payments may be structured in several different ways. A
one time up front payment can be made to permanently acquire water, or the
payment can be spread out over time. For a lease, there can be an up-front
payment to initiate the lease, followed by annual lease payments. Dry-year
option leases can be structured to provide payment to the lessor every year,
or only in years in which the option is exercised, and also may involve an up
front payment at the time the option agreement is negotiated. Innovative
transfer arrangements and market structures are discussed in detail in a
later section of this report.
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In principle, water can be made available from agriculture in several
ways—fallowing of irrigated land, switching to lower water use crops, deficit
irrigation and improved irrigation technology and water management. In the
case of water acquisitions based on fallowing land, the minimum price offered
to farmers will need to compensate the seller or lessor for foregone net
returns in crop production over the period the water is removed from
agricultural use. These foregone net returns can be estimated by examining
the typical cropping patterns in the area where water is being acquired and
calculating the present value of the net returns from, those crops over a
period of years. Information on typical net returns is available from the
Cooperative Extension service at the University of Nevada College of
Agriculture. For example, for Churchill County irrigated acreage served by
TCID, the Bureau of Reclamation estimated a net farm income of $106 per
acre for a 500 acre field crop farm growing alfalfa, barley and irrigated
pasture (selected as representative of farming in the Newlands Project).178
Net farm income varies widely because soil productivity and crop yields vary
considerably within TCID. Net profits for alfalfa production vary from $19 to
$115 per acre depending on bottom land soil type.179
For land with a primary potential use as agricultural land, decreases in
property value due to permanent removal of water rights already will be
reflected in the calculation of foregone net returns in farming. A separate
calculation to estimate loss of property value for the purposes of
compensating the seller is not necessary and would be duplicative.
For cases in which agricultural water is made available through agricultural
conservation practices, the price paid for the water will need to reflect
irrigators’ costs of implementing conservation practices, including direct costs
of equipment usage and labor and compensation for increased management
efforts necessary to implement and oversee conservation practices. Some
conservation practices save water every year regardless of whether it is a dry
year or not. Consequently, even if water is only needed in dry years, farmers
will need to be compensated for the annual costs of their conservation
projects.
Implications For Truckee-Carson Basin.—The factors that affect water
prices elsewhere in the West will also be influential in the Truckee-Carson
Basin. Water rights that are more reliable, either due to their priority date
or access to storage that increases their firm yield, will sell for more than less
reliable rights—especially given concerns in this basin over the impacts of
drought on wetlands and on urban supplies. Those rights that can be
transferred to wetlands, water quality and urban growth needs with a
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minimum of transaction costs and legal proceedings will sell for more than
those that pose difficulties in transferring across jurisdictional boundaries.
In other basins, high profile, non-agricultural buyers pay higher prices for
water than farmers pay when acquiring water from one another. Although
likely, it is not possible to predict that this will occur in the Truckee-Carson
Basin. Development pressures drive up water prices and the rapid growth in
the Reno-Sparks area, combined with new development in the Lower Carson
Basin and around Carson City will contribute to increasing prices on this
region. Litigation, new OCAP and other factors that affect the bargaining
power and legal and economic position of the parties in the Truckee-Carson
Basin will affect the prices that are negotiated in market transactions,
although the direction and magnitude of price impacts cannot be predicted in
advance of the new OCAP being promulgated or of resolution of litigation in
process. Changes in federal commodity programs and in market prices for
agricultural inputs and for crops occur over time. These affect the net
returns to water in irrigation and thus are another factor that will affect the
price at which farmers are willing to sell.

Water Markets and the Definition of Fair Market Value.—One definition of
fair market value used in the appraisal profession is: “the most probable
price, as of a specified date, in cash, or in terms equivalent to cash, or in other
precisely revealed terms, for which the specified property rights should sell
after reasonable exposure in a competitive market under all conditions
requisite to fair sale, with the buyer and seller each acting prudently,
knowledgeably, and for self interest, and assuming that neither is under
undue duress.”180 There are several concepts that are included in this
definition which require a careful interpretation when applied to water
rights, and which must be adapted from their typical application to real
estate.
First, in many areas of the West, the time period of “reasonable exposure” for
a water right is several years. Potential buyers need time to satisfy
themselves as to the legal and hydrologic characteristics of the water right,
including: the priority date of the right relative to neighboring water claims,
its susceptibility to forfeiture or abandonment findings under state law,
ambiguities regarding title, the firm yield of the right during dry years, the
typical yield of the right during years of normal streamflow and the probable
quantity of water that could be transferred to new locations and uses. These
inquiries typically take months and can take years for complex water
acquisitions. Moreover, some potential buyers seek state approval for a
transfer of the right to the buyers intended place and purpose of use before
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closing on the acquisition. The state approval process can take months to
years depending on the complexity of the transfer and the degree of
controversy it generates.
In addition to the lengthiness of reasonable exposure, water markets often
deviate from markets for other real property in their “competitiveness,” and
this needs to be taken into account when evaluating fair market value.
Water markets are typically “thin,” meaning there are only one or two major
water buyers in a region or there may be only a few potential sellers. It is not
unusual for a water market to involve the one large city in an area as a buyer
and a few farmers or a single irrigation district as potential sellers. In some
areas, a water right acquisition may only occur every few years, while in
active areas there are several transactions a month.
The “undue duress” clause in the definition of fair market value also needs to
be carefully interpreted with regard to water right transactions. Water
acquisitions nearly always are motivated by some form of duress. Water
utilities seek to acquire rights in order to prevent water shortages within
growing service areas, to improve water quality so as to comply with state
and federal regulations, or to replace water supplies that were lost or
restricted through endangered species or other environmental litigation.
Municipal, state, and federal agencies, as well as environmental
organizations, acquire water rights to preserve fish and wildlife habitat and
wetlands. Drought motivates water users to purchase senior water rights
that are less vulnerable to dry year shortages. Water right acquisitions in
the West also may be stimulated by litigation over Native American water
claims; claims which sometimes are satisfied by federal acquisitions of water
rights. In short, water acquisitions are typically linked to some regulatory or
judicial requirement and therefore are seldom entirely free of duress.
The self-interest motivation included in the definition of fair market value
also requires careful interpretation. Financial profit frequently is not the
primary factor motivating a water acquisition. Many buyers are public
utilities who do not earn profits, or are environmental groups or government
agencies with fish, wildlife, water quality or hydropower responsibilities that
must be satisfied. Where water acquisitions are made by businesses for
investment purposes, profits tend to be based on a long term return, rather
than being realized in one or two years.
Appraising the fair market value of water rights differs in a number of
respects from appraisal of other real estate. Water rights have a longer
period of “reasonable exposure” on the market than other real estate and
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water markets typically are less active and less competitive than land
markets. Moreover, transactions seldom are free of duress. Water rights
acquisitions are heavily influenced by regulation and litigation and a profit
motive may be absent. Public agencies acquiring land and water depend
heavily on appraised value to determine the price they are authorized to pay.
Consequently, appraisals of water assets need to carefully consider the
factors noted above and for large or controversial transactions, several
independent appraisals may be useful in establishing fair market value.
In the Truckee-Carson Basin, all of the factors described above as affecting
fair market value are active. The market involves relatively few buyers,
some irrigators may be selling due to financial duress and public agencies,
the primary buyers, are not motivated by a profit motive, but rather by an
agency mandate to accomplish wetlands restoration and water quality
improvements. The parties will be under varying levels of duress over time
to the degree that drought, lawsuits and changing regulations, such as new
OCAP, affect their water use.
Long Term Outlook for Water Availability and Price.—Various TruckeeCarson water acquisition programs intend to transfer a large quantity of
water used for irrigation to wetlands restoration. Over time, the prices
currently being offered for water rights likely will no longer be sufficient to
attract sellers because the marginal value of water in a specific use
(irrigation, in this case) rises as there is less water available for that use.
Consequently, offer prices will need to increase and acquisitions will become
more expensive. If acquisitions raise the costs of supplying irrigation water
and reduce conveyance efficiencies for remaining farmers, there will be
negative impacts on these remaining irrigators that may need to be
addressed. For instance, if remaining farmers are scattered widely among
various delivery canals, the cost per acre foot of delivering water to scattered
lands will be higher than when more farmland was being irrigated.
Compensation for these types of costs or to avoid the continuing inefficiencies
of serving these outliers, if paid, will further drive up the cost of the
acquisition program.
It is not possible to predict long-term trends in water prices in the study area
because there are many uncertainties, including litigation and negotiations
in process that remain unresolved. In general, experience in other western
water markets indicates that water prices rise notably as new buyers enter
the market for large amounts of water, as is the case in the study area, with
the acquisitions programs for improved Truckee River water quality and for
wetlands restoration. It is possible that the cost of bidding water away from
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farmers could drop when a critical mass of irrigated land already has been
retired and not enough irrigated acreage remains for agricultural services
and infrastructure to be viable. In this event, the remaining farmers might
sell land and water at lower prices. However, developers will be competing
for land in locations attractive for development and so price decrease may not
occur, even if commercial agriculture declines precipitously. Certainly there
will be pressure to look further afield for water as urban growth continues,
possibly to water exchanges and transfers involving the Upper Carson Basin.
Market Evaluation
Cost Effectiveness and Affordability.—The cost effectiveness of market
acquisitions must be evaluated in the context of the other alternatives
available to provide water for the urban growth, for improved water quality
in the Truckee River and for the Lahontan Valley wetlands. Other
alternatives include improved involuntary water acquisitions using eminent
domain powers, urban conservation, accelerated metering of urban water
users, improved agricultural conservation and reduced agricultural
consumptive use, further refinements in reservoir coordination in the
Truckee and Carson basins, canal lining, growth control and improved
effluent reuse.
Data is not available to systematically compare the costs and benefits of all
these options, in order them to the voluntary transfer approach. However, a
number of indicators suggest that voluntary acquisitions are likely to be
more cost effective and affordable than other approaches. Recent studies of
acquisitions for Lahontan Valley wetlands restoration indicate that it is the
less productive lands that are being fallowed, so the voluntary approach thus
far is preserving the most productive and profitable lands in farming.181 In
addition, an economic optimization model developed for the USEPA indicates
that raising water costs (either directly through increased per unit water
charges for agricultural and urban water users or indirectly through allowing
market forces to signal the opportunity cost of water) is the most effective
way to achieve water quality goals for the Lower Truckee River.182 The
model indicates that over 90% of the water should come from reduced
agricultural use and 10% should come from urban conservation. Since
directly raising the cost of water to TCID farmers and to large urban water
users is likely to be politically unpalatable, allowing an open market to
communicate the true value for water is more implementable.
Accelerated implementation of urban water conservation efforts already
underway is a part of a cost effective solution. The 1990 Settlement Act
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required Sierra Pacific to implement specific conservation measures. With
funds collected from developers seeking water service, the utility has begun a
meter installation program. The program’s goal is installation of
44,000 meters over the next decade. However, only 2,000 meters had been
installed by mid-1996. Households must volunteer to switch from a flat
water bill of $43/month for a typical household to metered water rates which
may result in lower monthly water bills. The metered water rates are based
on a two-tiered increasing block structure, with the lowest price block set at
6,000 gallons per month for a single family residence to accommodate typical
indoor residential use. Once 90% of customers that formerly paid flat water
rates are metered, then metered water rates become mandatory. In addition
to metering, the utility has implemented limits on outdoor watering, leak
detection and repair, public education, and other conservation measures.183
Effects on Water Delivery Efficiency.—As a significant portion of
irrigated land is retired, it may be possible to redesign the Newlands Project
to focus on irrigating the most productive soils served by the most efficient
canals. Possibly this could be accomplished through a land trust and land
exchange. When highly productive lands are acquired for wetlands
restoration or other purposes, the land could be banked and later sold to
farmers who have sold their less productive land but who wish to continue
farming.184 Through such exchanges, the remaining agricultural land could
be concentrated in areas best suited for farming and for maintaining
conveyance efficiencies. The FWS has frequently expressed interest in
exchanging retired agricultural lands to improve the economic viability and
water efficiency of the Newlands Project. Most of the Newlands Project
irrigated acreage retired to date for wetlands restoration has been land
located on the periphery of the project where poorer soils generally are
located. The acquisitions program thus far has not had a notable negative
effect on conveyance efficiencies.185
Third Party Economic Effects.—Third party economic impacts fall into
several categories and it is important to keep in mind that water transfers
out of agriculture have both positive and negative impacts. Negative impacts
on TCID and agriculturally-based communities get the most attention, but
there are numerous positive third party effects on the local economy as well.
Negative economic impacts from transfers include lost farm profits from
reduced farmed acreage. However, this is not a "third party" impact, since
the seller must receive enough revenue from a voluntary transaction in order
to willingly give up these farm profits. Negative third party economic impacts
from reduced farm acreage include:
158

Critical Issues: Case Study Discussion

•

Reduced profits for "backward-linked" businesses, those that sell inputs
and services to farmers,

•

Reduced profits for "forward-linked" businesses, those that purchase
crops produced and now must turn to more distant and expensive
suppliers for alfalfa, feed grain, etc.,

•

Reduced profits for general businesses in the area that sell goods and
services to households (assuming that some sellers exit the area reducing
the overall number of households located in a community),

•

Reduced jobs in all of the types of businesses referred to above,

•

Reduced property values associated with lower profits in the types of
businesses described above,

!

Reduced tax revenues collected by state and local governments on
business sales and property values for the types of businesses described
above.

The negative impacts described above assume that revenues earned from
water sales are not reinvested in farm operations in the study region. If farm
households which sell water remain in the area and spend most of their
revenues from water sales in the area (on farm operations or on other types
of purchases), then overall business profits and jobs in the region could
increase instead of decreasing.
Acquisitions of irrigated land for wetlands in the Truckee-Carson commenced
in 1990 and resulted in a transfer of 2,724 acres out of agriculture from 1990
to 1995. However, wetlands acquisitions accounted for less than half of the
total farmland transferred to nonagricultural uses. Development pressures
accounted for the majority of acreage leaving agriculture. Further, it is the
less productive farmlands that is being abandoned so there is a strong
potential to maintain a viable agricultural core in Churchill County.186
An additional concern stems from the fact that Fallon area rural drinking
water supplies depend on groundwater pumping from a shallow aquifer
which is recharged by seepage of irrigation water from fields and canals. As
irrigation seepage declines due to land fallowing, canal lining or farm
conservation, the groundwater supplies for the Fallon area may be adversely
affected.

159

Truckee-Carson River Basin Study

Positive third party impacts from transferring water to wetlands include:
!

Increased business profits due to increased recreation expenditures in
businesses that supply goods and services to hunters, fisherman, bird
watchers and other visitors drawn to the area by improved wetlands,

!

Increased property values associated with increased profitability of
recreation-linked businesses,

!

Increased tax revenues collected by state and local governments on
property values and sales associated with recreation-linked businesses,

!

Increased recreation benefits to local residents associated with improved
wetlands,

!

"non-use" values associated with wetland improvements and associated
improvements in bird and wildlife populations.

Non-use values for wetlands have been documented to be in the range of
$175 per household per year, in studies on wetlands in California. Non-use
values are likely to be an important third party economic benefit associated
with wetland improvement in the Lahontan Valley.

Mechanisms to Mitigate Problems
Market transactions can be structured in a variety of innovative ways that
can help to minimize third party effects and maintain agricultural activity in
rural areas where water is being transferred out of agriculture. This section
discusses different possibilities for structuring water acquisitions. Specific
implications for the Truckee-Carson Basin are discussed at the end of the
section.
Innovative Market Structures.—Water markets and specific negotiated
transactions around the western United States encompass a variety of
characteristics in order to meet the needs of particular water users and river
basin challenges. This section summarizes examples of innovative market
structures that can help address the needs of the Truckee-Carson basin and
other basins seeking to resolve conflicts over limited water supplies and
multiple and expanding water demands. It is worth noting that, without
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TROA and its flexibility for river operations, it would difficult or impossible
to implement these kinds of initiatives. The rigid operation regime which has
characterized the river would not accommodate the banking, storage,
retiming, leasing, exchange and other water management options entailed.

Creating A “Free” Market.—Some observers have suggested that a
genuine open market be created. There are a number of positive steps that
could be taken to harness market forces to serve the multiple water needs in
this region. However, it is important to recognize that nowhere in the
American West is there a “free market” for water. Water transfers are
highly regulated in order to protect the substantial public interest in water
use and water quality.
Creating a more open and competitive market with regular transactions
could help to assure farmers selling that they are getting a true market price
for their water. However, the number of buyers is relatively limited in this
region. The primary buyers in the two basins include Sierra Pacific, the cities
of Reno and Sparks, Washoe County, the US Department of Interior and the
State of Nevada. Each buyer has their own set of objectives and they
coordinate with one another to minimize the cases in which they would be
bidding against one another for the same properties. Consequently,
development of a highly competitive market is unlikely.
Contingent Transfers For Drought Protection.—Dry year transfer
arrangements are more flexible in the Truckee River basin because the
biology of the cui-ui does not require them to spawn every year. So, during
drought the cities can use the water so long as there is adequate water for
fish flows in most years. New storage agreements for the Truckee River
recognize this and allow Sierra Pacific to store their base water under the big
fish flow volume held in Stampede and to build up a margin of saved water
over time. The agreements also allow for exchanges and credits among the
various reservoirs so they can be operated as one coordinated system.187
Dry year options and conditional lease-backs, negotiated in anticipation of
drought, are two ways to ensure that water quickly can become flexible when
it is needed elsewhere. The difference between these two approaches is the
degree of security and long-term control over water provided by each. Under
a dry year option, ownership of the water right remains with the original
water user. The new water user, a municipal water provider or a state
agency, enters into an agreement with an irrigator allowing them to use
water under specific conditions. For water users who need highly reliable
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supplies, this type of arrangement provides a back-up source of water for dry
years. In one instance, a central Utah city paid a nearby farmer $25,000 up
front for a 25-year dry year option and agreed to provide, in any year the
option was exercised, $1,000 and 300 tons of hay to maintain the farmer’s
livestock. The option was exercised three out of the first 25 years the option
was in place.188
Though promising, dry year options can be unattractive to farmers who
desire more certainty when planning their farming operations. The following
example illustrates this point. In 1987 the Metropolitan Water District
(MWD) of Southern California attempted to negotiate a dry year option with
the Palo Verde Irrigation District (PVID). Under the proposed arrangement,
MWD offered Palo Verde farmers a payment up front at the time they
register acreage in the dry year option from irrigation and additional
payments during years the option would be exercised. MWD expected to call
that acreage into retirement once about every seven years in order to firm up
municipal supplies. Farmers rejected the proposal for a number of reasons,
including its effect on their ability to make long-range farming plans. Under
such arrangements, farmers face substantial uncertainty in planning their
crop rotations, their marketing strategies, equipment leases, and purchases
of inputs.
An agreement eventually was reached between MWD-Palo Verde to transfer
irrigation water to urban use in 1991, after years of complex negotiations.
MWD and the irrigation district negotiated a price and this price then served
as a standing offer to individual irrigators to induce then to fallow land.
Farmers were offered a price of $135 per acre foot of water made available
from land fallowing. As of 1992, 93,000 acre feet had ben made available
under this arrangement.189 The agreement involved the acquisition by MWD
of an option to use water made available by land fallowing and storage in
Lake Mead (where it was subject to evaporative losses and the risk of loss
due to a flood year spill of stored water.)190
A number of other issues need to be addressed when dry-year options are
considered. One of these involves defining the conditions under which the
option will be exercised. Reservoir and stream flow levels can be specified as
a basis for activating the option. Additionally, it is necessary to ensure that
farmers be compensated for lost crop revenues when the option is exercised,
for disruption of farm planning and land use patterns and for any production
and marketing expenses incurred prior to being notified that land would be
dried up for that season. The terms and timing for notification are important
issues to irrigators.
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Under conditional lease-backs, land and water are purchased by the entity
desiring long-term control of the water, most often a municipality or an
industry, and are leased back to the farmer so that farming can continue
except when the water is needed to replace drought short falls. The new
water right holder could be a state agency, and the lease-back conditioned on
the need for water to support instream flows for recreation, fish and wildlife
during dry seasons and years. Conditional lease-backs are attractive to
growing cities because they assure a supply of water that can be reserved
either during droughts or for water demand generated by new growth.
There have been several lease-back arrangements implemented in Arizona.
In 1985, the city of Mesa purchased 11,606 acres of farmland in Pinal
County, planning eventually to use the water in the city’s expanding service
area. Meanwhile the city is leasing the land back to farmers and the land
continues to be irrigated. The city of Phoenix purchased 14,000 acres of
farmland in western Arizona’s McMullen Valley in 1986. The city plans to
retire the land and transfer the associated groundwater to urban uses.
Phoenix is keeping the farmland in production, employing local farmers and
postponing some of the economic impacts of the eventual retirement of that
acreage.
Exchanges among water sources are one way to promote water use flexibility
and to encourage use of surface water in years it is available, conserving
groundwater supplies for times when streamflow is low.
In 1989, Metropolitan Water District and Arvin Edison Water Storage
District, an agricultural water provider in the southern San Joaquin Valley,
agreed on an innovative water exchange to firm up MWD’s dry year supplies.
In wet years MWD will store unneeded State Water Project entitlements in
the aquifer underlying Arvin-Edison. In dry years, the irrigators will pump
the stored water to irrigate crops and allow MWD the use of about
100,000 acre-feet of federal project water that would have otherwise been
used for irrigation. The farmers benefit because the stored water raises the
groundwater level and reduces their pumping costs. MWD receives reliable
supplies that cushion it against drought. Before being implemented, the
exchange must be approved by the California Department of Water
Resources and the Bureau of Reclamation.
Such exchanges can involve lower quality water supplies, such as treated
wastewater. In a number of areas, policy makers are encouraging farmers to
use treated effluent to irrigate so that higher quality water supplies normally
used for irrigation can be available for uses requiring higher quality water.
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For instance, farmers in the Tucson area receive treated effluent from
municipal treatment plants and this enables them to cut back on
groundwater pumping.191
Exchanging priority can help certain water users, especially cities and
industries, to secure highly reliable supplies in drought years. Such
exchanges of priority have substantial potential with Indian reserved rights,
since the priority date of most tribal rights goes back to the date the
reservation was established. There have been some agreements to defer
tribal seniority in drought years so that junior right holders have more
reliable water supplies. One arrangement involves the Navajo Nation, which
has a senior claim on the San Juan River. In exchange for congressional
approval of the Navajo Indian Irrigation Project, the Nation agreed to defer
its seniority during dry years and to share water shortages proportionately
with non-Indians. This gives downstream users in the Rio Grande Basin,
including the City of Albuquerque, more reliable supplies during drought.192
Transfer Arrangements to Maintain Rural Economy.—Making transfers
contingent on drought conditions is one approach to preserving an
agricultural base, as farming will occur as usual in normal years and farmers
can be adequately compensated in dry years to allow them to remain in
farming. Other approaches include setting a target amount of water to be
made available for non-agricultural purposes and rotating acreage fallowed
within those limits to maintain baseline agricultural economy. Another
approach involves partial buyouts of the water that is appurtenant to land,
leaving adequate water rights with the land to support gardens, horse
pasture and a rural lifestyle. It has been suggested that TCID farmers be
assigned a fixed amount of water and be allowed to benefit from any savings
from that pool of water. Rights of first refusal on saved water could be
granted to local agriculture and other local water uses before water is
transferred for uses outside the locale where it has been used in irrigation.
Innovative transfer arrangements promote efficient and flexible water use,
as do traditional purchases, but often have a less severe impact on rural communities and riparian environments. Consequently, they may incite fewer
objections and be more easily negotiated. The following paragraphs describe
a number of different types of voluntary transfers which can move water to
new uses and provide drought supplies for urban and environmental needs.
Innovative Transfer In Utah’s Lower Sevier Basin: This transfer provides
one example of how a very large purchase of water for non-agricultural
purposes was accomplished in a basin where water has been devoted
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primarily to agriculture. In 1980, the Intermountain Power Project (IPP)
bought twenty percent of DMAD company stocks, thousands of acre feet of
privately held groundwater rights, and eighty percent of the water stock in
another ditch company upstream of DMAD. The total package of water
rights, with a yield of 45,000 acre feet per year, cost approximately $2,400 per
acre foot. The water was acquired for cooling a new coal-fired power plant.
The projected size of the power plant operation was reduced after IPP had
already purchased the water rights. Consequently, about half the water
rights are not needed for power plant operations and IPP rents unused water
to irrigators193
Many different sellers were involved in the transfer, and most of the water
rights were sold in relatively small lots. There were 565 individual contracts
signed to purchase water company stock, averaging about 60 acre-feet per
contract. Another 31 contracts were signed for the sale of groundwater
rights with an average of 174 acre-feet per contract.
Water rights were transferred to IPP via a seller’s collective called the Joint
Venture. The Joint Venture was formed after a core group of organizers
announced IPP’s interest in purchasing water rights and advertised for a
collective bargaining coalition in the local newspapers in 1978. Anyone
owning stock in the DMAD or central Utah companies or groundwater rights
in the Delta or Lynndyl areas was invited to participate in the sale to IPP.
Participants were allowed to offer prorated quantities of water rights for
sale, established as fixed proportions (20%) of the water rights owned by
each prospective seller. Individuals were free to offer more than their
assigned quantity of water rights for sale, but they had to find other
participants who were willing to reduce their allotment by a compensating
amount. This led to the development of an active market in sales options.
Option prices for the sale of water rights to IPP through the Joint Venture
are reported to have sold for as much as $650 per acre-foot.194 If a particular
farmer didn't want to sell any water, but another farmer wanted to sell more
than 20%, the two farmers could strike a deal. The one wanting to sell more
than 20% purchased the other's "option" to sell 20%. In other words, all
farmers got something of value—either they actually sold water, or they sold
no water but were able to sell their "option to sell" to another farmer. No one
was left out of the potential proceeds from the transaction, as all irrigators
had an equal opportunity to sell water, thus avoiding the divisiveness that
has emerged between sellers and non-sellers in many areas.
Transfers of Conserved Water.—Another policy approach that could
allow irrigation water to move to new uses while minimizing impacts on the
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area of origin, involves incentives for water conservation, salvage and reduced
consumptive use. Most western states historically have taken a hard line
against new uses and transfer of conserved water, arguing that the portions
of a water right “salvaged” through conservation measures become available
to new or junior appropriators, rather than to those taking the conserving
action. In effect, the Interior position on OCAP is an instance of this “hard
line approach.” California and Oregon are exceptions, having passed statutes
encouraging transfer of conserved water. The Natural Resources
Conservation Service responded to the draft report by noting that “Nevada
law does not allow transfers of a portion of a water right (e.g., one acre-foot of
a 3.5 acre-foot right). On-farm irrigation water management is based on
consumptive use (which cannot be changed), and efficient application of the
water. Improvements in on-farm delivery do not conserve water, but rather
increase the likelihood that it may be utilized by the crop, thus increasing
production.”
There are a number of steps a state can take to facilitate the transfer of
conserved water. A first step is to provide the statutory incentive and water
authority by explicitly allowing transfer of conserved water and by protecting
rights not being exercised due to conservation from loss through forfeiture
and abandonment proceedings.
Even after enabling statutes are in place, a number of difficult technical and
hydrologic issues remain in determining the quantity of salvaged water that
actually can be transferred. In 1987, Oregon passed legislation stating that
the only salvaged water that may be transferred is that which in the absence
of the conservation measure otherwise would have been irretrievably lost to
the system and thus unavailable to other water users.195 Capture of
substantial irretrievable losses probably will not come from improvements in
irrigation efficiency, however, since most salvaged water previously reentered the system as return flows. Transferable water could potentially
come from switching from a higher to a lower consumptive use crop. Other
measures which decrease the amount of water irretrievably lost through
evaporation and deep percolation include lining earthen canals, better field
drainage, and improved on-field water management. In contrast the to
OCAP approach used in the Truckee-Carson basin, allowing farmers who
reduce consumptive use, perhaps through new crop rotations, to use the
additional water on other land, or to sell or lease the water can provide
strong conservation incentives. Laws in the western states on use and
transfer of salvaged or conserved water vary considerably, with protection of
other right holders being the primary constraint on new uses and transfers.
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There are few examples to date of successful transfers of conserved irrigation
water. The city of Casper, Wyoming is paying for canal lining on over
200 miles of the nearby Casper-Alcova Irrigation District’s conveyance
system. This arrangement is expected to provide the city with about
7,000 acre-feet of water per year. In California, MWD and Imperial
Irrigation District have reached a preliminary agreement after years of
negotiation. MWD will pay for conservation measures within the district
that are intended to salvage about 100,000 acre-feet per year, that can then
be transferred to MWD’s service area. Interestingly, both examples involve
water provided under Bureau of Reclamation projects rather than water
rights held under state law by individual appropriators.196
The San Diego County Water Authority and Imperial Irrigation District have,
after years of discussions, negotiated draft terms for a transfer of conserved
water that addresses the needs of the two parties. The agreement covers
issues of changing water values and pricing over time, drought year
arrangements and security in the ownership of water rights. IID required
that ownership of the water rights remain with IID, that pricing be based on
fair market value and the transferrable water be made available through
voluntary water conservation by irrigators. While the exact amount of water
made available depends on landowner participation, 250,000 to 500,000 acre
feet per year is likely to become available for urban use at prices that
escalate gradually to account for inflation and changes in regional water
values (as evidenced by market-based transactions), with a cap of 25% on
price increases over any ten year period. This pricing arrangement allows
the seller to capture some of the gains from increased water values of the
period of the agreement, while still giving the buyer assurance against
sudden and unpredictable increases in their costs. During drought year
shortages on the Colorado River system that force cutbacks in deliveries of
IID, the authority and the District will share the same percentage reduction
in water availability. The agreement extends 75 years from the year of first
deliveries to the Authority (anticipated in 1999) and is renewable.197
Water Banks.—Water Banks have been proposed for the Truckee
Carson Basin in order to simplify the process of acquiring water for wetlands,
water quality improvements and urban growth. For example, Yardas
proposed that water be banked by TCID irrigators in Lahontan Reservoir to
be used for any legitimate project purpose, including wetland restoration and
maintaining a buffer of supplies stored for dry years.198
Water banks can serve many important water management and allocation
objectives. A water bank is an institutional arrangement for storing water to
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be used at future periods in time and to facilitate trade and negotiations
among those contributing water to the bank and those seeking to use banked
water. When water banks can standardize the units of water to be traded
and the trading procedures, they reduce transactions costs because all the
multiple participants do not need to independently locate trading partners
and develop contracts, pricing and other terms of trade.
The opportunity to trade arises when some right holders have very reliable
senior rights and other water users seek more reliability for their own water
supplies. Some parties may wish to make a one-time transaction to sell
water, others a long- or short-term lease and still others a dry-year
contingency arrangement, and similarly for buyers/lessees. A water bank can
help match buyers and sellers based on their preferences. The bank’s supply
of water is an aggregation of the various types of water made available by
sellers/lessors. This water is then packaged in ways that meet the timing
and reliability objectives of buyers.
Water banks can involve storage in aquifers or in reservoirs. For instance,
MWD has negotiated underground water banking arrangements with
agricultural districts in which some of MWD’s surface water supplies are
delivered to and used by agricultural areas during years of plentiful supply.
The groundwater not pumped by the irrigators during those years is then
considered MWD’s stored water, available to them during years of low
surface water supply. One such agreement with Semitropic Water Storage
District will allow MWD to store about 350,000 acre feet and to withdraw
170,000 acre per year. MWD pays $90/acre-foot to the District to store the
water and $40/acre-foot plus energy costs to withdraw the water. MWD also
will pay $1.35 million up front for the district to construct facilities for
storage and withdrawal of MWD’s water.199
Mechanisms for Establishing Price and Negotiating Transfers.—
Auctions.—Auctions are used in many settings to bring buyers and
sellers together and to establish a price for assets to be exchanged. Auctions
have been used to allocate water supplies among potential buyers, with
recent examples in Victoria, Australia and in Texas.200 Auctions have a
number of advantages. They are public and transparent, mitigating the
appearance of favoritism or secret negotiations. They rely on the forces of
supply and demand and prices emerging at auctions will reflect current
market conditions and can respond to changing conditions. Auctions do not
require an administrator to set a price for water as the price emerges in the
auction process and reflects the participants knowledge of the basin and of
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the value they and others place on water in alternative uses. Variations in
water right attributes, such as seniority and location, are considered by
bidders in the auction setting and are reflected in price. Disadvantages of
auctions can include lack of familiarity with auctions by potential water
buyers and sellers and the need to carefully design and describe the auction
process so the rules and procedures are clear and so that collusion among
participants to influence prices is thwarted. Features which need to be
specified in designing an auction process include the minimum and
maximum amounts of water that can be offered for exchange, minimum and
maximum acceptable prices per unit of water, the notification process used to
alert interested parties of upcoming auctions, bidding procedures, necessary
documentation to be provided by sellers on the rights offered, qualifications
of bidders such as financial ability and location of intended water uses and
procedures for determining the winning bid and resolving disputes arising in
the auction process. There are many types of auction mechanisms that can
be used to solicit offers to sell and to buy water. Two of the most basic are
the English auction (the most familiar type) in which verbal bids are solicited
from an assembled group of potential buyers, and the sealed bid auction in
which written bids are submitted and then reviewed and the award made to
the highest bidder.201
An auction approach is being used in Texas to acquire water for environmental needs from irrigators. The Edwards Aquifer Authority (EAA),
created by the state legislature in 1993 in response to years of litigation and
controversy in the San Antonio area, is charged with addressing the rapid
growth in groundwater use that imperils endangered species that depend on
springs fed by groundwater and the regional economy based on irrigation and
urban growth. EAA is using a bidding approach to solicit irrigators to agree
to reduce their groundwater withdrawals during dry periods when the water
is needed to sustain spring flows for endangered species. In late 1996, the
EAA solicited offers to suspend irrigation from owners of irrigated acreage
within the Authority’s boundaries. The irrigators submitted a bid for the
price per acre they require to suspend irrigation on their farm unit, along
with descriptive information on the wells at which pumping would be
reduced, on their irrigation systems and the type of crops that would be cut
back. EAA evaluated the offers based on several criteria: proximity to the
springs at which groundwater levels must be maintained, types of crops to be
cut back (preference to water intensive crops), types of irrigation systems
used (preference to less efficient systems), commitment to dry land farming
(preferred over complete fallowing) and the offer price per acre. EAA will
accept offers adequate to obtain 20,000 acre feet of reduced groundwater use.
Half of that water will remain unused in support of endangered species needs
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and the other half will be auctioned off to municipal users who are
experiencing supply constraints in order to raise revenue to fund the
acquisitions.202
An auction process used in Victoria, Australia to allocate new water supplies
illustrates some of the factors to be considered in designing and
implementing an auction. In the late 1980s, about 38,750 acre-feet of water
became available through completion of a dam constructed at government
expense. Government studies recommended that new supplies be allocated
so as to maximize the economic return to the state and recover an
appropriate level of capital costs, in contrast to the customary practice of
providing water at low cost to encourage settlement and agricultural
development. Initially the government decided on a sealed bid process to
solicit bids for the fifteen year diversion licenses (the customary arrangement
for rights to public project water in this area). However, farmers resisted the
notion of any process that would cause them to pay more for water than they
were accustomed to and favored an open auction process, if there had to be a
competitive process at all. Participants were limited to those who already
had legal access to water in the river basin and to landowners and lessees
located in the basin, with urban areas and irrigators located within irrigation
districts specifically excluded. Bidders had to pre-register and indicate the
maximum quantity they wished to acquire and their intended uses. Local
farmers were concerned that large corporate farms would dominate the
auctions and so maximum volumes to be purchased by a single bidder in a
given auction were set at 625 acre-feet and no one land holding could
purchase more than ten percent of the total volume being offered. However,
landowners with multiple holdings could and did purchase more that ten
percent. The regional water commission approved a reserve price which
remained undisclosed, set at roughly the marginal value of water in the
lowest value crops grown in the region. Since the auctioneer did not accept
bids below this reserve price, this price became widely known after the first
few auctions. In the first two of six regional auctions, the median price bid
was well above the reserve price and there was substantial variation in the
prices paid. In later auctions, median bids approached and then equaled the
reserve price. Most of those acquiring water were existing irrigators, though
one fourth of the buyers were new irrigators. At the end of the auction
process, about 10,000 acre-feet remained unsold—likely because competition
from urban areas and irrigation districts was disallowed in order to make the
auctions politically acceptable to local farmers. Public knowledge of the
reserve price in later auctions, combined with weak demand, resulted in the
reserve price eventually functioning as a posted price, with bidders being able
to acquire the water they wanted at this price.203
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Standing Offers.—Standing offers are a widely used mechanism for
soliciting water supplies by public entities. For example, the City of
Albuquerque maintained a standing offer of about $1,000 per acre foot for
senior irrigation rights and gradually acquired supplies for urban growth in
this manner over much of the 1980s. A standing offer involves publicizing a
fixed offer price for water rights with specific characteristics that meet the
buyers needs. Standing offers have the advantage of simplicity and minimum
transaction costs as there is no negotiating over price and potential sellers
merely need to decide whether the posted price is adequate to induce them to
sell. The key disadvantage of standing offers lies in correctly setting the offer
price and specifying which types of water rights will be accepted for
acquisition. If the offer price is set too low, this will become apparent as few
takers will arise and then the price will need to be adjusted upward and
readvertised. If the price is set too high, more offers to sell will be received
than are needed and the purchaser will have to determine which water rights
to acquire and which to reject and will be paying more than was necessary to
acquire the quantity they needed. Moreover, water rights can vary widely in
their seniority, convenience of location and firm yield. Consequently, a
purchaser may prefer to vary the price paid based on the specific
characteristics of the right acquired, rather than to only acquire specific types
of rights at fixed prices. The fixed price will only approach the true economic
value of water in a region through a trial and error process of adjusting the
price, or through setting the price based on information on the economic
value of water provided by an active water market. However, in regions
where there already is an established market for water, there is little reason
for a purchaser to use a standing offer approach as they can simply
participate in the market through the usual channels.
The complexities of a standing offer approach are illustrated by the
California Drought Emergency Water Bank in 1991-92. In 1991, the Bank
offered $125 per acre foot to willing agricultural lessors and quickly acquired
820,000 acre feet. However, end users only wanted 655,00 acre feet at the
price they had to pay and so the bank and its buyer of last resort (the State
Water Project) was left with a substantial amount of unwanted and
relatively expensive water. On the positive side, the bank rapidly acquired
water for drought needs from a pool of previously unidentified sellers and
coordinated delivery of water to end users, though it did not accomplish this
at least cost due to the high price offered. The following year the bank
offered farmers just $50 per acre foot and acquired 154,000 acre feet, all of
which was passed on to end users. A standing offer approach is inflexible
over the short run if hydrologic conditions change and less or more water is
needed than was anticipated, as it is not practical to vary the offer price
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frequently. However, the price can be varied from year to year, reflecting
new knowledge of water supply and demand.204
Case By Case Negotiations.—Transactions negotiated on a case-by case
basis are the typical way in which prices are established and water transfers
arranged in a market setting. The prices emerging from bargaining between
potential buyers/lessors and sellers/lessees will better reflect the value of
water to the parties involved and the overall demand and supply conditions
in the basin than prices set administratively, as with standing offers. When
multiple transactions involving similar types of water rights occur, a going
price for water is established and this signals the value of water to water
users, encouraging economically rational decisions regarding water
conservation and transferring water to higher valued uses. With case-bycase negotiations, the parties can tailor the transfer to meet their specific
needs as to timing of payments, schedule for new water uses to phase in, and
so on. Some potential disadvantages of negotiated transactions include the
power of big players to strike better deals for themselves than smaller
players, the transactions costs incurred in negotiating the terms of exchanges
and the tendency for negotiated prices to cluster around a norm established
in past transactions, even when water values have changed.205
Implications For Truckee-Carson Basin.—All of the market structures
discussed have potential applicability in the Truckee-Carson Basin. Dry-year
options may be preferable to conditional lease-backs as the ownership of the
water does not shift out of agriculture and this may suit the politics of the
basin better. Water source exchanges and water banking have excellent
potential for balancing water demands and supplies for alternatives needs
between the Truckee and the Carson Basins in dry years.206 Transfers of
conserved water would require careful attention to hydrological connections
between surface flows, groundwater and flows into wetlands but are another
possibility for the study region. Auctions could be a useful mechanism for
acquisition programs that seek to acquire a large amount of water within a
specific period of time, such as the wetlands and water quality acquisition
programs. This would be a change from past practices of acquiring water for
wetlands only from sellers who already had put water (and land) up for sale,
as auctions actively solicit participants. The standing offer approach could
facilitate an orderly movement of water out of agriculture but if the offer
price is not carefully selected, the problems described earlier will be
encountered. Case-by-case negotiations have been the norm in this basin
and have worked well in the past when water for urban growth was the main
motivation for acquisitions. Now that water quality and wetlands also drive
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acquisitions, it may be time to try new market structures such as water
banks and auctions to facilitate transfers.
Targeted Acquisitions and Incentive Buyouts.—The U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS) is authorized to pay fair market value for land and water, as
determined by an appraisal, and approaches only property owners who have
put their land up for sale. Although Section 207(c)(2)(B) of the Settlement
Act states that “the Secretary may target purchases in areas deemed by the
Secretary to be most beneficial to such a purchase program,” the FWS does
not target specific locations and solicit owners in those locations to sell land
and water. There are special agency provisions and procedures that can be
used to obtain authorization to pay 5% more than the appraised value. FWS
has not yet found it necessary to exceed appraised value in the acquisitions
program for the Lahontan Valley wetlands. Another avenue for obtaining
authorization to pay more than appraised value is to obtain such authority
from the relevant congressional subcommittees in both houses of Congress.
Special congressional authorization has been obtained for FWS acquisitions
elsewhere, in cases involving unique properties that contain habitat essential
to a species in imminent danger of extinction.
For its Lahontan Valley wetlands acquisitions program, FWS uses its own
local staff appraisers, solicits reviews by agency appraisers at the regional
level, retains outside appraisers and also considers appraisals conducted for
the property owner. Once the appraisals are completed, negotiations focus
on whether the appraisal are accurate and correctly reflect the property
being considered, rather than being negotiations involving price per se. The
State of Nevada conducts its acquisitions in a parallel manner, coordinated
by the State Lands Department. The State and FWS informally divide up
irrigated areas between them so they are not competing for the same
properties.207
In order to choose which properties to acquire given limited budgets for
acquiring land and water, the FWS and the State of Nevada could solicit bids
to fallow land from irrigators and rate then on a modified SCS Land
Evaluation and Siting Assessment (LESA), including measures of land
productivity, project efficiency, local planning objectives and suitability for
the acquisition program.208
Mitigation of Third Party Impacts.—Some of the most important
opportunities to mitigate impacts of water transfers are the creation of
innovative market structures and transfer mechanisms and have already
been discussed. This section discusses need for mitigation and possible
173

Truckee-Carson River Basin Study

approaches to mitigating effects of transfers on rural economies. First, it is
important to understand the relative importance of agriculturally-linked
economic activity in the region.
The Truckee Carson River Basin encompasses a diversified regional economy
ranging from highly developed urban areas, to sparsely populated ranch
lands and irrigated farms, to remote, unpopulated wetlands and wildlife
habitat. The urban areas are characterized by high population growth,
resulting in pressures to acquire more water for urban uses. Outside of the
Reno-Sparks urban area, the primary sources of employment are the services
sector (which includes gaming and tourism), government, manufacturing, and
retail trade. Agriculture (including farming and agricultural service
businesses) accounts for a small portion of overall jobs and earnings in the
basin (less than four percent), but is important to some communities. In
Churchill County, farming and agricultural services account for 10–12 percent of jobs and personal income, with agriculture ranking below services,
mining, government, and wholesale and retail trade as a component of the
county’s economies.209 Churchill County has been the focus of concerns over
economic effects of water acquisition programs and is the geographic scope
for the recently completed FWS Final EIS for such acquisitions. The Fallon
Naval Air Station (which accounts for 27 percent of jobs in Churchill County),
nature-based recreation and farming have been the traditional mainstays of
the Churchill County economy. Given the rapid growth in the Reno-Sparks
corridor, much of the conversion of agricultural land to non-agricultural uses
has been driven by the fact that Churchill County serves as a bedroom area
for commuters into the cities.210
Outdoor recreation associated with wetlands such as hunting, fishing, hiking,
and bird watching) also is an important component of the economy of some
communities in the basin and will become more significant as wetland
acreage improves in quality and size.211 In good water years, the SWMA
supports hundreds of thousands of birds including ducks, geese, whistling
swans, egrets, and herons. In addition to its natural diversity, the area
provides high quality fishing and hunting opportunities. A recent study
indicates that 20% of economic activity in the rural area in which SWMA is
located is linked to tourism and recreation dependent upon water and
wildlife resources.212 However, less than a third of the original wetland areas
at the end of the Carson River remain, creating overcrowding and increased
competition for food which have adversely affected waterfowl populations
and recreation opportunities.
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Most farms in TCID are small, with about half (on average) of household
income coming from non-farm sources.213 These households are irrigating
land as a part of their rural lifestyle, not for economic returns from crops
produced (comments received from the Natural Resource Conservation
Service disagree with this assertion). They may be more disinclined to sell
water than commercial farmers, yet they own a notable portion of the water
rights in the areas targeted for acquisition. The conventional market-based
approach would be to raise the offer price until the required amount of water
is obtained. With the small "lifestyle" farms, this strategy may not succeed,
unless thee is some incentive that related to protecting or enhancing the
quality of life in the area. It is worth exploring whether there is some other
amenity or concession that could be offered—such as special hunting or
recreation access to restored wetlands, for local water sellers only. An area
of wetlands could be set aside for the sole use of local residents, or specific
hours or days of the week could be reserved for local use only. This area
could be managed by a local unit of government, such as Churchill County, in
order to assure responsiveness to local preferences.
Most farm households in the area rely heavily on non-farm income and so the
economic stimulus of improved wetland quality will benefit these households,
even as local economic activity associated with irrigated acreage declines. An
agricultural land trust could be created to preserve a permanent core of
irrigated lands, of a size sufficient to sustain a viable agricultural sector in
the local economy. Further, if fallowing of irrigated acreage is spread
between the Lahontan Valley and the Upper Carson Basin, then the
economic effects of reduced irrigated acreage will be less concentrated around
the community of Fallon. In addition, a small portion of the price pais for
water rights could be dedicated to local governments for economic
development assistance in the areas where large numbers of irrigated
acreage are fallowed.
To summarize, agriculturally-linked activities are only a small portion of the
overall economy of the region and many farm households already rely on nonfarm income for a significant portion of total household income. Lost
economic vitality in agriculture can be mitigated by some off the market
structures described earlier that minimize the amount and frequency of
irrigated land being fallowed. The Lower Carson Basin already is in an
economic transition in which farming is giving way to residential and
commercial development. Reduced economic activity in agriculture will be
balanced by increased economic vitality due to improved wetlands and
recreation opportunities and to the general trend of development in the area.
Consequently, mitigation of third party impacts from agricultural land
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fallowing is not as urgent as it would be in an area with a primary economic
dependence on agriculture.

Evaluation of Other Issues
!

Federal activities and programs: Micro management of water
management, as some observers characterize the OCAP, is not the most
effective way to encourage water use efficiency. Rather, as noted below,
the real value of water needs to be communicated through an active
market or through increased water prices. (See Section 4.3 for further
discussion.)

•

Basin wide commission: The Truckee-Carson basins already have a
negotiating forum, so an official basin wide commission is probably not
needed and would only provoke disputes over representation and other
confusion.

!

Innovative governance structures for the Carson Basin: Improvements in Truckee River operations over the past few year have been
accomplished through multi-party negotiations, but nothing similar has
occurred to examine the fragmented manner in which the Carson Basin
is operated. Through the Alpine Decree, the river is fragmented into
multiple segments, without a unified means to examine the basin as a
whole.

!

Federal role in problem solving: In other regions, such as California’s
Central Valley, the federal government can exercise its control over
federal water so as to ensure that the real value of water is signaled to
project water users. However in the case of the Newlands Project, the
federal government does not supply water by contract, so the government
does not have that option. The irrigators have water rights and pay the
irrigation district (TCID, as Reclamation’s agent), to operate and
maintain the water distribution system.

Encouraging development of a water market in the region may be an
effective means to communicate the scarcity value of water. In order for the
market to perform this function effectively, project water must be
transferrable for multiple purposes within and outside of project service area
boundaries. However, one commentator to the draft report noted that
discussions of the free-market concept with wetlands interests received
adamant opposition owing to concern that wetlands could not compete for
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water effectively in an open market. Signaling the scarcity value of water
will also provide incentives for water conservation, without the need to
prescribe exactly what conservation measure water users should implement.
As water becomes recognized as costly and valuable, water users will have
reason to investigate and implement the most economically rational water
conservation strategies.
Federal agencies could take the lead in establishing a dispute resolutions
process, a forum where problems and concerns regarding water acquisitions
could be discussed and resolved. Federal agencies could take a lead in
reinvigorating multi-party bargaining.

4.2 Surface-Groundwater Relationships
The relationships of surface and groundwater in the Truckee-Carson River
basins are functions of natural conditions and the alterations imposed by
development of agriculture and urbanization. In many circumstances the
natural trends are exacerbated or enhanced by the impacts of agriculture and
urbanization. This thesis is consistent between water quality and water
quantity considerations.
In general the quality of surface water and it’s ionic signature deteriorates
and changes respectively down valley. As represented by Total Dissolved
Solids (TDS), the headwaters of the Truckee-Carson Rivers exhibit dissolved
solids of 50 mg/l. The terminal discharge points exceed 10,000 mg/l at Carson
Sink (Carson Basin) and greater than 5,000 mg/l at Pyramid Lake (Truckee
Basin). The ionic character of the head waters is predominately calcium
bicarbonate. As the waters drain down valley they become sodium chloride
type with increasing amounts of sulfates.214
As described elsewhere herein, the basin water budgets that maintained the
elevation of the terminus lake water levels and the size of the wetlands has
been significantly impacted in this century. The natural change from water
source to sink in the water budget which occurs down basin from the wet
mountains to the arid desert has been skewed by water resources
development. The specifics of these trends along the drainage and the degree
to which the trends are exacerbated or enhanced are complex, including the
retention and spreading of waters from the rivers, changes in surfacegroundwater interactions and the changes in groundwater recharge and
discharge. For example groundwater conditions are significantly impacted by
the transport and spreading of irrigation systems in the basins. Downward
percolation of diverted surface waters in unlined canals and fields have
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raised the shallow water tables over large areas. The Carson River naturally
creates a groundwater recharge mound in the valley, the spreading of the
irrigation systems has expanded this mound. The Truckee Canal provides
enhanced recharge to the aquifer from which the Fernley public supply well
draw.
Water Use
The primary diversion of waters in the basins is for irrigation and
agriculture (83%) with public supply using 14%. The remaining users are
commercial and domestic, industry and mining and power generation.215
Trends reported in current water use are increasing domestic and municipal
water well installations and pumping, less irrigation well pumping associated
with the conversion of agricultural lands to residential use or the sale of their
water rights for environmental and municipal purposes, and efficiency
conversions on irrigation systems. The consequences of water use in the
basin are expected—as water is consumed in part or totally by municipal and
domestic uses or spread for irrigation the water resource available to the
terminus is reduced. Water quality is also impacted; loading of both the
surface and groundwater by waste streams affects the quality of the return
waters to the streams and the termini with both chemicals and concentrated
native minerals. The concentration of minerals is a natural process in the
down valley transport of waters but is enhanced through the land application
of waters. These induced changes in the interactions between surface and
groundwater affect both aquatic organisms and potentially the terrestrial
consumers. Diversion and withdrawals of the water from groundwater can
induce changes in the recharge and discharge of aquifers, affecting the
availability of moisture to native plants, agricultural crops and the depths of
water supply wells.
Interactions of Basin Waters
The interconnection between surface-groundwater in the Truckee-Carson
Basins is conceptualized in various Interior reports and investigations
depicting the interactions of the various aquifers as well as the surfacegroundwater through conceptual models.216 Important limitations to the
conceptual models include a lack of sufficient measurement and accuracy to
predict the long-term and localized consequences of changes in water uses.
The Natural Resource Conservation Service notes that PL 101-618 mandates
studies, but did not fund them or indicate how, when, where, and who would
complete them. This would appear to be an issue to which the Commission
should give serious attention, insofar as a settlement may give the
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appearance of completion, when the research work needed to provide its
underpinnings may not have been funded and completed. The USGS also
comments that a major void exists in modeling the interaction of
groundwater and surface water on a compatible time step. The need (driven
by contested water rights) is most acute at low river flows. This is where
surface water model errors become significant, because of unquantified
surface and subsurface irrigation returns and near-channel irrigation
pumpage. Since surface water model time scales are shorter than
groundwater models, some way is needed to simulate interactions on
streamflow over relatively short time scales.
Changes in the Truckee-Carson basins’ largest water use, diversions and
applications of water by irrigation, are likely to impact the basins.217 Possible
changes in response to programs initiated under Public Law 101-618,
particularly the water rights acquisition program, could include: reduction of
flow to the Carson Desert wetlands, reduction in recharge to the shallow
aquifers, and consequent loss of some recharge to the intermediate and deep
aquifers below. Beneath some of the irrigated lands, reductions in sulfates,
chlorides and dissolved solids in the groundwater have been attributed to the
diluting effects of surface waters imported from the rivers. These waters are
generally lower in TDS. The counter effect of causing the dissolution of
minerals as infiltrating waters leach native salts and metals is also
theorized.
The impact of the reduction in the application of irrigation waters is
probably complex and further measurement is needed. In fact, substantial
additional study is suggested by the United States Geologic Survey (USGS),
including further physical characterization of the aquifers, measurements for
the more accurate estimates of the components of the water budgets for the
basin, water quality studies, tritium and other stable isotope studies to
evaluate preferential movement of groundwater and the interactions of the
aquifers.
An investigation conducted under the USGS National Water-Quality
Assessment Program summarizes the natural and land use impacts on water
quantity and quality.218 The flow in the Truckee River is influenced by the
regulation of reservoirs in the headwaters, and irrigation diversions, return
flows and wastewater effluent in the lower reaches. The Carson River flows
are influenced by runoff from snowmelt in the headwaters and base flows
associated with imported irrigation waters in the lower reaches.
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Loading of nitrogen and phosphorus in the Carson River Basin was found to
increase below agricultural activities where both are added as fertilizers.219
Historical silver and gold mining activities are known to have contributed
mercury to the waters and alluvial sediments of the Carson River drainage.
Since the mining predates the twentieth century surface water diversions,
sediments containing mercury have been deposited beyond the Lahontan
reservoir and have reached the Carson Sink. This mercury occurrence is
currently being investigated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
The primary water quality impacts to the Truckee River are considered to be
the municipal wastewater effluent and the agricultural land return flows
through drains.
Groundwater quality, like the surface water quality, degrades down valley. A
noted example is that the TDS in the headwaters aquifers is 200 mg/l or less
and increases to over 10,000 mg/l at the Carson Sink, paralleling surface
water loads. The aquifer waters naturally increase in certain constituents as
the water drain down valley, as there is contribution from the geothermal
waters. Calcium sulfate and sodium sulfate probably associated with
gypsum and anhydrite deposits are some of the specific constituents that
increase. Chlorides from sources that may include basalt aquifers are
suggested by the USGS. In the basins the leakage of underground petroleum
fuel storage tanks, municipal landfill leachate, industrial spills, acid mine
drainage, applications of fertilizers, herbicides, pesticides and the spreading
of treated municipal wastewater effluent are all potential contributors to the
degradation of groundwater from land use changes (notwithstanding
regulations prohibiting these effects).
Water quality changes that include toxic chemicals and metals impact
aquatic organisms which can not digest these non-nutrients in the Stillwater
Wildlife Management Area.220 Water quality changes which add nutrients
are not considered as significant.
FWS indicates the optimum change with most immediate impact would be
the importation of high quality surface waters directly to the Stillwater
Wildlife Management Area. Examples of the risks of the current water
quality problems in the Carson valley are the mercury which persists and
passes upward in the food chain, and the acutely toxic waters laden with
native metals such as arsenic in the TJ and Hunter Drains. In the Truckee
Basin the nutrient loading of the wastewater effluents and loss of dissolved
oxygen threaten the Lahontan cutthroat trout and the endangered cui-ui
sucker in Pyramid Lake.221 (However, comments received to the draft report
dispute this, stating that “although such discharges may cause a problem on
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the Truckee River itself by stimulating algae growth and thus depleting
oxygen, it does not negatively impact Pyramid Lake itself, and may benefit it
by providing needed nutrients.”)
Municipal and domestic wells in the influence zone of the irrigation canal and
distribution systems benefit from these projects. The water levels in the
shallow aquifers are artificially raised, which helps offset the pumping costs.
The “freshening” effect of the relatively low TDS water that infiltrates can in
some circumstances offset the less fresh native groundwater which
experiences loading of natural salts and metal concentrated by evaporation.
Communities such as Fernley and much of the wells in the Carson and
Lahontan valleys are benefactors of these conditions.
Effects of Land Use Changes, Particularly Changes in Irrigation
During the past 150 years land use changes have impacted the water balance
in the Truckee-Carson Basins, increasing the loading of both nutrients and
toxins to the surface and groundwater and impacting the quality of the
waters at the terminus of both basins. In some cases transport from mining
delivered metal to the wetlands. In others, the increased recharge of the
shallow water table by irrigation may actually have changed the size and the
areas of discharge in the sinks. This may also have changed the concentration zones of salts from evaporation. At least in some areas, it has
concentrated the mobile metals in the drains, resulting in acute conditions of
toxicity as discussed above.
Can the responses to a public law now change the conditions in the basins
again? Certainly, the balance can change again with each shift, however the
uncertainties are still large regarding the extent of potential impacts to the
basin resources and environment. The interactions of the ground and surface
water will play an important part in the changes, as much of the water use
(irrigation) in the basins has interacted with the shallow groundwater.222
Changes in the efficiency of the irrigation water application will reduce
infiltration and consequently reduce recharge to the shallow groundwater.
Since the shallow groundwater is also the first groundwater to receive
infiltrating waste waters, landfill leachate, septic tank wastewater, fuel and
industrial spills it is also most at risk. Moreover, since the shallow
groundwater also contributes to the wetlands lakes and sinks, changes in
groundwater quality potentially impact these water bodies and their
ecosystems. Potential changes in groundwater levels associated with the
Settlement Agreement can have some impact on the following issues:
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!

The preferential movement of contaminants such as immiscible
petroleum fuels and dissolved toxins,

!

The lift of water wells screened in the shallow water occurrence,

!

The quality of water at drains,

!

The basin water budgets, and

!

The availability to crops and native plants.

It has been theorized that improvements in irrigation efficiency may improve
water quality at the terminus, such as the wetlands, if it reduces the
contribution of the drains. Alternatively, the zone of evaporative discharge of
the groundwater at the sinks and wetlands will retreat from the current
artificially extended location due to irrigation recharge of the shallow aquifer
and possibly expand the salt accumulation zone back up valley. Thus, a mix
of countervailing water quality and quantity-related impacts may occur.
Communities like Fernley may experience both declining water levels and
water quality if the Truckee Canal is lined.
Impacts from Non-Irrigation Land Uses
The shallow aquifers of the Basins are the most vulnerable to degradation
due to the relatively high permeability of the shallow soils and the permeable
channels in the shallow subsurface that connect the deeper water
occurrences. Land use changes that have nothing to do with the irrigation
efficiencies are now spreading outward from the municipal centers. Septic
drainage, commercial/industrial activities and the urbanization of the valleys
bring loading of nutrients, metals, organic chemicals, and toxins that are both
point and non-point sources of contamination. The development of Best
Management Practices for the businesses and residents can aid in reducing
the impacts of these new sources of risk.
Rural and urban wastewater treatment systems are an important control on
such nutrient and toxin loading, however where the effluent loads the rivers
it is also suitable to consider reducing or eliminating the discharge. The
recently concluded Water Quality Agreement accomplishes this objective
while maintaining flow levels through a water rights purchase program that
will substitute effluent discharges with high quality waters in the Truckee
river. Conjunctive uses of treated effluent may have measurable benefits
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and reduce or eliminate the costs associated with degradation of the water
resource where new water is limited. Gray waters consumed for cooling or
recycled may reduce contaminant loading of the water resources.
It should be noted that the movement of the groundwater is relatively slow
compared to the surface waters and that in the natural down-basin
transport, control of the groundwater quality has long-term risks and
benefits. The groundwater can be slowly degraded but will also take a long
time to remedy. Spills and loading in the surface waters are realized to be at
risk much faster and generally corrected faster. Nitrate loading of
groundwater is a common long term impact that poses a health risk for those
drinking the well water and contributes to the degradation of the surface
waters that receive contaminated base flow as well.
Many of the USGS suggestions for additional study can aid in the
appreciation of the shallow groundwater risk. The benefit of extending the
investigations deeper into the basin aquifers lies in the understanding of the
development potential and risks of water supply for sustaining municipal
growth. These studies could also improve understanding of the movement of
groundwater and the possible impacts of existing and potential future spills
to the deeper aquifers. The costs and duration of such studies are dear and
long, respectively.
Typically, Federal studies of this nature are county or basin-wide and not
accurate to individual parcels of land and their related waters. The
complexity of local groundwater flow in the Lahontan Valley is such that
reversals in direction from regional flow are possible, as well as water quality
changes over short distances. As a remedy to this the USGS has suggested
increasing water level measurements in the Lahontan Valley to improve
prediction of groundwater flow, especially in areas of the buried Carson River
channels. Also in areas of water rights sales where irrigation is going to be
halted, the collection of groundwater samples could be used to determine the
actual changes in groundwater quality as a new equilibrium is established.
The single most important study one USGS researcher recommended was the
relationship of the basalt aquifer contacts to the alluvial aquifer in the
Lahontan valley. Chlorides are showing statistically significant increases
with no apparent changes in the land use practices in some water wells. If
this is a result of up-coning of poorer quality groundwater from the basalt
aquifer it may have long-term impacts to public water supplies and
management of the water resource.
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The federal studies to date have provided good conceptual models for
appreciation of the interactions between surface and groundwater. The
impacts to the municipal and domestic water wells may best be evaluated as
wellhead studies, both to learn more about the future impacts of changes in
water usage to the aquifers as well as to determine the risks of other land
use changes to the water quality. Wellhead protection studies are localized
and will add important new data to the existing studies. These wellhead
studies should cover both water quality and quantity. With few exceptions
the proliferation of water wells with urban advance into the valleys comes
with risks both to the control of the water resource as well as the generation
of septic wastes that result from water use. Where groundwater is shallow
and the septic systems are less efficient the risk of contamination is greater.
Establishment of resources districts, rural water systems and best
management practices are candidate corrective measures.
Consolidation of water users from multiple to single systems allows better
metering and control. Many of the chemicals that load aquifers in urban land
use are toxic and persistent, including detergents, petroleum, pesticides,
herbicides and solvents. Moreover, they are less regulated due to the small
quantities and the absence of education and regulation of non-commercial
chemicals.
Mitigation to New Equilibria in the Ground/Surface Water Interactions
Some mitigative measures are visible, however since the conditions of the
interactions of water resources are not well defined at the local levels many
are not. Importation of waters to the wetlands is the preferred action under
the Settlement Act to mitigate loss of acreage. This action is desired because
the new waters are likely of better quality than drain waters received
currently from irrigation. Since the regional data suggests that the shallow
aquifer recharges the deeper aquifers and that down valley toward the
wetlands the leakage is upward223 there may be an incremental loss of down
valley contribution to the wetlands as Project efficiencies improve. This
would occur as a new equilibrium is established, although insufficient data
exists to accurately predict where to expect such occurrences.
A loss in head of 4 to 17 feet is reported as possible by the USGS in the
shallow aquifer due to Project efficiency improvements. Although
troublesome to shallow well owners who would be required to deepen some
wells or experience reduced yield, this is a one-time capital expenditure. As
in many arid basins the aggradization of rural water wells to a rural water
system with a single well or well field allows management of production,
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consumptive use, monitoring of quality and aids in sustaining development.
Rural water systems can be locally financed. This is already being considered
in Washoe County by the County, Tribe and Sierra Pacific Power Company.
The consequences of Project efficiencies to a public supply well such as at
Fernley may be much greater than to individual water supply wells, since the
Truckee Canal is the primary recharge source for the aquifer from which they
pump their water.
The USGS indicated that in such cases the induction of river losses could
occur as the wells cone of depression expands to that source of recharge. The
consequence of changing the Project system efficiency to water quality in the
middle aquifer is not known. The local drillers in the Lahontan valley report
good quantities and quality of water in the middle aquifer unit. The USGS
reports downward flow in the west part of the valley from the shallow aquifer
into the middle aquifer and upward flow from the middle aquifer into the
shallow aquifer and the wetlands in the east. Changes to the recharge of the
shallow aquifer from Project efficiency enhancement may result in less
available water to both recharge and freshen the middle aquifer water
resource. Given the chloride changes mentioned above, the loss in recharge
may potentially impact the future public supply value of the middle aquifer.
If the unit were developed and the wells over-pumped it might result in the
up-coning of these lesser quality waters.
The USGS and the EPA have performed some additional as yet unpublished
work in the Lahontan Valley. The work consists of probing and hydraulic
testing to determine the locations of some of the buried Carson River
channels. This level of investigation is site specific and can aid in
understanding the localized impacts of water use changes. It is also
expensive. Probably the most cost effective data collection at this point is
water level measurements through time. Such measurements coupled with
collection and analysis of groundwater samples will aid in refining the
theories concerning the changes in groundwater quality. The Truckee and
Carson basins have been equilibrating to human-induced changes in water
use and the current trends and potential changes are likely to result in new
equilibration. Given the highly interactive nature of the ground and surface
water such measurements will be important in the understanding of post and
future water resources conditions. The increase in studies by the EPA and
local agencies related to point source of pollution will also extend the data
base applicable to understanding the interactions of water resources.
Key Lessons Learned
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!

Surface and groundwater conditions have equilibrated to changes
brought about by human use and changes in that use drives a
reequilibration.

!

There is no way to measure the original conditions and the effects of the
original changes. Therefore, the uncertainty involved in those events
may be larger than the changes that have occurred since. The effects to
wetlands and other water-related phenomena in the basins due to the
changes such as irrigation cannot be differentiated from the potential
effects due to climatic change in this century.

!

Project efficiency improvements and changes in irrigation patterns (e.g.,
due to water rights acquisition), may or may not have detrimental effects.
This is clear neither with regard to water quality or quantity.
Contemporary urbanization effects may have greater effects on the
shallow water aquifer than the effects of irrigation over the past century.
The Truckee-Carson basins are exceptionally sensitive to change.

!

Land use changes are more significant in terms of water quality in basins
where surface-groundwater continuity is strong than in western basins
where groundwater is confined and hydrologic conductivity is low.

!

Water quality may be more limiting and may have more significant longterm impacts on the ability of the water resource to sustain use in these
situations than water quantity, although the latter has received far more
attention in the Truckee-Carson basins.

4.3 Newlands Irrigators
Throughout the west, water reallocation is replacing the development of new
supply as the primary source to satisfy demands. The end of the era of
relatively easily developable new supplies of water corresponds with a time
in which instream values and tribal trust requirements are receiving
increased attention, and municipal supplies face the twin stresses of growth
and drought. Irrigated agriculture, using a relatively large supply of water at
a relatively low price is the natural and first alternative to which many of
these water-needy interests turn, seeking to reallocate supply through
economic, legal and regulatory processes. The conjunction of these shifts in
the conditions and characteristics of supply and demand are not mere
coincidence, and the stresses they engender are evident to varying degrees in
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most western river basins. The Truckee-Carson provides a particularly apt
example of these dynamics at work.
In choosing to focus on issues associated with Newlands irrigators as one of
the critical unresolved water-related problems in the Truckee-Carson Basins,
the purpose is to provide the Western Water Policy Review and Advisory
Commission an in-depth look at this dynamic in terms of the community
which is being asked to sell or conserve the water that will allow these other
users to meet their needs. The Truckee-Carson may be a somewhat extreme
example in the conflicts that have arisen in terms of the contrast between the
degree of consensus reached by non-agricultural parties in the basins on the
one hand and the degree of alienation from that consensus felt by the
agricultural community on the other, but it is not particularly atypical in
terms of the power newly exercised on behalf of instream (or, in this case, inlake and in-wetland) values and tribal trust, and the resentment of that
power experienced by the agricultural community. In this respect, an
attempt to understand the experience of the agricultural community may be
revealing and may clarify how and why such issues reach impasse. The hope
is that this investigation can assist water policy-makers to avoid similar
degrees of impasse elsewhere in the west.
Notwithstanding the many comments received on the draft report, to conduct
such an investigation is not to advocate on behalf of the Newlands irrigators,
but it is to listen carefully to their views and experience and to attempt to
relate them as precisely and sensitively as possible. Therefore, the following
is written with the express intent of stating as accurately as possible the
irrigators’ point of view and positions, as they experience it and as they see it.
Without such an understanding, policy-making must choose between blame
or ignorance, neither of which is a satisfactory basis for dealing with people
and resources as vast and valuable as those that comprise western
agriculture and western water.
In the interests of balance, we also quote at length from the comments
received with respect to many of the specific issues raised below (in italics),
so that the reader will also have access to the views of the other parties
involved in the settlement negotiations. It is important to realize in doing so,
however, that it is not the purpose of this document to adjudicate among
parties, sort out disputes, propose basin-specific solutions, or decide who is
right and who is wrong. The purpose of exploring this particular issue
remains to encourage and inform western water policy in reaching resolution
by understanding the experience of the irrigated agriculture community as it
confronts the changing west.
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Effects of Fundamental Change in Federal Goals on Irrigators and Rural
Communities
The Truckee-Carson Irrigation District exemplifies a rural western
community in transition, which is trying to define itself in the emerging postreclamation era West. TCID faces pressures typical of many such western
communities, but also some atypical ones. The District presents a typical
example of the economic pressures confronted by irrigated areas that rely
primarily on low-value crops. External market pressures create incentives to
leave land fallow or to sell the land and appurtenant water rights. However,
few areas are faced with such an unfortunate location as the irrigators of the
Newlands Project under post-Settlement conditions. The irrigators are
squeezed by two water claims that have been able to mount strong legal and
political claims. To the northwest, the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe’s longterm goal is to eliminate all transbasin diversions from the Truckee to the
Carson. The Stillwater National Wildlife Refuge to the east seeks increased
high quality flows to support the refuge.
The irrigators share a long, proud history of settling one of the last areas of
the inner-mountain West to be irrigated. Farmers settled the Fallon area in
the latter part of the nineteenth century as a result of efforts by the state’s
politicians to find an engine of economic growth to supplement mining and
timbering, and arrest Nevada’s population decline. The area was not a prime
candidate for irrigation. But with the Reclamation Act of 1902, incentives for
irrigation succeeded where prior efforts undertaken to develop a private
irrigation economy had failed.
The federal government’s long support for the Newlands irrigators has
created expectations of continued support. Assured delivery of water to meet
water rights of Newlands irrigators remains a contractual commitment of the
federal government and a requirement of P.L. 101-618 and the courts.
However, as new resource conditions and values have emerged in the past
two or three decades and as American cultural values have shifted to
increasingly respect and incorporate those values, the federal government
has, over a period of two or three decades, given increasing priority to the
satisfaction of tribal and environmental claims in the basin. These, together
with the pursuit of OCAP have challenged the Newlands irrigators to
recognize that water conservation and the efficient operation of projects to
allow an expanded range of purposes to be served by the available water now
form baseline expectations for their industry.
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The irrigators have followed two strategies to protect their economy and way
of life from federal and tribal efforts to reallocate water to tribal and
environmental purposes. They have asserted their prior water rights as a
barrier per se to reallocation, and they have at various times proposed to
substitute a physical solution for strict reliance on entitlements. However,
the efforts of the irrigators to participate in a more general settlement of
Truckee River entitlements has been hampered for several reasons. One is
conceptual: the federal government, Tribe and Sierra Pacific Power Company
are moving toward a more risk-based management scheme. These parties
are trading firm rights for a physical solution that provides an adequate
margin of safety in water-short years. This concept clashes with the belief by
the irrigators that they should be entitled to enjoy their water rights without
risk. Indeed, tribal comments to this section of the draft report note “. . .the
most basic problem seems to be that the irrigators believe that they are entitled
to divert all the Truckee River water it takes to fill Lahontan Reservoir each
year, no matter how much of that supplemental water is beneficially used or
how much is wasted due to conveyance losses, evaporation or spills.”
Another reason is political: the power shift away from the irrigators and
towards the tribe, environment, and upstream users has eroded the
irrigators bargaining power. There is less incentive for the federal
government to bargain, as opposed to subjecting the irrigators to strict
interpretations of OCAP, the Endangered Species Act, and Nevada water
law. Finally, the irrigators and their communities appear to be still defining
a vision for themselves in the new post-reclamation era. The status quo may
no longer afford a sustainable vision, as water transfers and other forces
work to decrease the irrigated acreage in the Newlands Project.
Alienation of the Irrigators
In some ways, the Truckee-Carson negotiations provide a case study in
alienation. We consider the issue of alienation at some length because we
believe it presents an instructive object lesson to western water policy and
decision-making. It comes as no surprise that the party alienated would be
the one whose water was targeted to meet the needs of other participants.
Indeed, where else was water to be obtained in the quantities needed to meet
the large agenda of restoring Pyramid Lake, recovering the cui-ui, preserving
the Lahontan Valley wetlands and improving water quality if not from
agriculture? It should have been expected that the Newlands irrigators would
perceive themselves as “losers” to the extent that the overall process
succeeded in its objectives.
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It is strongly recommended that western water policy confront this reality in
river basins throughout the western states and begin to explore innovative,
proactive solutions that can both serve new needs and that are workable for
irrigators. The OCAP provide a classic case in point. It is not the OCAP goal
to conserve water and eliminate waste that is at issue (and hence great detail
on the achievements in that regard are beside the point), but rather the
intrusive form and adversarial manner in which OCAP have been imposed
that have made this innovative solution unworkable from the point of view of
fostering a final resolution in the basin.
In the Truckee-Carson, many comments in response to the draft report note
that negotiations were lengthy, numerous and sincere, and that every effort
was made, from the point of view of the non-agricultural parties involved, to
meet the demands of irrigated agriculture in ways that would still allow
other objectives to move forward. The purpose of the following discussion is
not to question the sincerity and effort of those involved, but to illustrate how
the irrigators felt alienated, as an object lesson that may be useful elsewhere
in western water policy.
We take note as well that, at least in the opinion of the following commentators to the draft report, insofar as the Truckee-Carson itself goes, the
situation may be improving: From an Interior viewpoint, recent years have
seen a marked improvement in people working together to solve mutual
problems and take cognizance of both mutual and divergent interests in the
Truckee-Carson basins. This has led increasingly to approaches based on
agreements. The recent successes with the new O&M contract with TCID and
the Truckee River Water Quality Settlement are examples; substantial
headway is being made with regard to TROA and a second set of negotiations
with the Fallon Tribes. There are numerous instances of individual parties
and groups going out of their way to draw TCID into negotiations, keep them
at the table, provide technical assistance, hold special sessions to address their
issues, and provide opportunities for meaningful input from TCID and the
irrigators.
The “Walk-Out” and Scapegoating.—Some accounts of the history of events
in the Truckee-Carson negotiations state that the irrigators withdrew from
negotiations and “left the table.” However, in personal interviews a number
of participants in the process, including both state and federal officials as
well as irrigators, offered a more neutral characterization of events. By this
view, an impasse had been reached at a particular juncture of the
negotiations sponsored by Senator Harry Reid, and a mutual decision was
made that it was not productive to go forward. The irrigators refusal to agree
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to demands placed upon them at that point was then characterized in some
quarters as a “walk-out.” It appears more accurate to say that, both in the
Reid negotiations and in the subsequent “facilitated negotiations,” the
parties at the table were unable to agree, but the irrigators did not express
an unwillingness to continue negotiating.
At a minimum, it must be recognized that such claims and counterclaims are
based in perception and that success in a negotiation process (and successful
facilitation in particular) is defined by the ability to bring the parties involved
to rise above such perceived barriers. The Truckee-Carson settlement has
not succeeded in that respect insofar as the involvement of the irrigators is
concerned. To date the process has been unable to produce a proactive
agreement that includes the irrigators. From their perspective, they have
been excluded from genuine influence on the outcomes of the settlement
process; at the same time, they experience a great deal of blame directed at
them. The consultants preparing this report heard blaming statements
frequently in investigating the issues associated with irrigators. Such an
outcome represents a fundamental failure to reach closure in negotiation,
and falls short of the kind of inclusive achievement that western water
problem-solving requires.
Exclusion and blame suggest a situation in which scapegoating may have
been perpetuated. Scapegoating as a social process occurs when consensus is
achieved by identifying an individual or group with a problem experienced by
the community to the extent that the two become nearly indistinguishable.
Under such circumstances, a sort of transfer of condemnation occurs, from
the problem to the individual or group, who become so associated with the
problem that they receive the blame for it. The group finds the necessary
cohesion to overcome its internal differences and tensions in the solidarity
felt with respect to the rejection and/or expulsion of the scapegoat.
This theory does not perfectly fit the Truckee-Carson situation; certainly the
irrigators have varying relationships with other parties, ranging from
adversarial to sympathetic. However, as we have pointed out elsewhere, a
shift in social priorities and cultural values has occurred in the West, away
from “settling the frontier” and toward protecting and restoring the
environment and meeting long-neglected commitments to Native American
tribes. With this “paradigmatic shift,” irrigators feel that, although they are
carrying out a social mission that had enjoyed cultural consensus in times
past, they and their work has come to be associated with the creation of
these environmental problems and accumulated failures of national policy
with respect to Native Americans to the extent that they feel blamed for
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these ills. They feel unfairly made the scapegoat for these problems when
they are only doing what, in effect, society asked them to do and praised
them for doing in earlier times.
This process is described in social anthropology; as with many sociocultural
processes, it need be neither conscious nor deliberate (in the sense of
conscious intention) in its operation. Many comments to the draft report
state that the commentator has neither participated in nor observed an
attitude toward the irrigators that would be appropriately characterized as
scapegoating. Therefore we have sought to clarify both the use of this term
and its intent. It is in no way intended to perpetuate a cycle of blame and
condemnation, nor to suggest that the other parties in the Truckee-Carson
settlement have deliberately pursued sinister policies. Nevertheless,
scapegoating as a social process is unhealthy and, where overall workable
solutions are desired, is bound to interfere with the larger objective. The
controversial nature of water resource management in the west is bound to
raise such temptations; these should be vigorously resisted.
At times, actions were taken that seemed designed more to hit out at the
irrigators and cause them harm than to advance toward a larger solution.
Enough such instances occurred to raise in the minds of several of those
interviewed (not only irrigators) some question as to the agendas of other
parties. This is an area where the federal government can and should work
to maintain balance, particularly where native peoples are involved and the
federal government itself shares some of the blame for a history of old
wounds or broken promises that may be festering among them.
In comments to the draft report, the Tribe submitted the following view on the
history of events in the 1990 Settlement Act vis-a-vis the irrigators:
After the PSA was signed in the spring of 1989, the major parties
involved in the settlement negotiations, guided by Nevada Senator
Harry Reid, focused intensively on trying to resolve the issues between
the Tribe and TCID. Despite good faith efforts by all parties, no
agreement was reached. The issue which led to the impasse was the
amount of Truckee River water TCID would be allowed to divert and
store in Lahontan Reservoir. The previous year the Interior
Department had issued the 1988 OCAP which established a Lahontan
Reservoir target storage level of 215,000 acre feet at the end of the
spring runoff period in June. That meant that Truckee River water
could be diverted to Lahontan Reservoir only to the extent necessary to
reach that level. TCID insisted that the end-of-June target storage
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level be increased to a full reservoir, 295,000 acre feet. The Tribe and
the federal government were equally insistent on at least maintaining
the end-of-June target contained in the 1988 OCAP. Indeed, the Tribe
had challenged the 215,000 acre foot target storage level as too high.
[At a] meeting in the summer of 1989 at Sierra’s office in
Reno. . .TCID’s representatives informed the other parties and Senator
Reid’s representative that TCID could not accept anything less than the
full reservoir target. They clearly stated that that issue would have to
be resolved through litigation unless the Tribe and the federal
government were willing to accept the 295,000 acre foot target. The
Tribe and the federal government stated that they felt just as strongly
as TCID on this issue. Both sides understood and respected the other’s
position.
TCID’s representatives also stated that they did not want Senator
Reid’s settlement effort to stop because of this fundamental
disagreement on the issues involving the Newlands Project. They said
that there were other important issues we should try to resolve,
including the interstate allocation with California and Nevada.
Senator Reid and the other parties said that they appreciated TCID’s
position that the negotiations on the other issues should continue.
Shortly thereafter agreement was reached on the interstate issues as
well as other matters including a water rights acquisition program for
the Lahontan Valley wetlands. Senator Reid introduced a bill
incorporating these agreements as well as the PSA in the fall of 1989.
Senator Reid’s bill was silent on the Newlands Project issues because
no agreement had been reached.
A hearing was held before the Senate Subcommittee on Water and
Power in February 1990. Notwithstanding its previous position, TCID
opposed enactment of the settlement legislation because it did not
address the Newlands Project issues of concern to TCID. The federal
government joined with TCID in opposing Senator Reid’s bill for the
same reason, among others.
Senator Bradley, the subcommittee chairman, stated at the close of the
hearing that the subcommittee would not take any action on Senator
Reid’s bill for a period of 90 days. He asked the parties to try again to
resolve the Newlands Project issues during that period. He also stated
that while the subcommittee preferred that the affected parties reach an
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agreement, the subcommittee would proceed with Senator Reid’s bill if
there was no agreement within that 90 day period. The Tribe, TCID
and the federal government met again pursuant to Senator Bradley’s
suggestion but to no avail.
TCID then launched an organized campaign, including public
demonstrations, against Senator Reid’s bill. The subcommittee
proceeded to mark-up and to consider amendments to Senator Reid’s
bill based on the testimony presented at the hearing as well as new
positions advanced by the Interior Department. It was at that time,
after TCID had urged the parties to continue to negotiate notwithstanding the impasse reached on the Newlands Project issues, after
TCID had opposed Senator Reid’s bill that was silent and neutral as to
Newlands Project issues, after the Senate subcommittee had provided
another 90 days to find a mutually acceptable solution to the
Newlands Project issues and after TCID had launched a public
campaign against the proposed settlement, that the provisions included
in section 209 of the Settlement Act made their first appearance. Those
are the provisions of the Settlement Act to which TCID most strongly
objects.224
It is clear from this history that TCID was provided ample opportunity
to participate in the settlement and was not left out of the process or
made a scapegoat by the other parties.225 Rather, TCID made a
deliberate decision to oppose enactment of the settlement legislation
even before the settlement bill included the Newlands Project
provisions. The Tribe would have preferred for the Newlands Project
issues to have been resolved as part of the Settlement Act or, failing
that, for TCID to have adhered to its original position and supported
enactment of a settlement bill that was neutral as to the Newlands
Project issues.
In short, TCID made a decision and it backfired. As the [report]
correctly states. . . TCID is now attempting to defend a water budget it
had previously rejected as insufficient. It has no one to blame for the
outcome but itself. The. . .attempt to shift responsibility to the federal
government (and inferentially the Tribe) for TCID’s own deliberate
choices. . .[is] unwarranted. [Note: for criticism of the irrigators’
strategy, see below.]
Notwithstanding TCID’s attempt to derail the settlement, the
Settlement Act includes significant safeguards for the Newlands
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Project irrigators as well as other water right owners. Section
205(a)(2)(B) states that the Operating Agreement that carries out the
PSA must:
[E]nsure that water is stored in and released from Truckee River
reservoirs to satisfy the exercise of water rights in conformance
with the Orr Ditch decree and Truckee River General Electric
decree, except for those rights that are voluntarily relinquished by
the parties to the Preliminary Settlement Agreement as modified
by the Ratification Agreement, or by any other persons or entities,
or which are transferred pursuant to State law.
Similarly, section 210(b)(13) states:
Nothing in this title is intended to affect the power of the Orr
Ditch court or the Alpine court to ensure that the owners of vested
and perfected Truckee River water rights receive the amount of
water to which they are entitled under the Orr Ditch decree or the
Alpine decree. Nothing in this title is intended to alter or conflict
with any vested and perfected right of any person or entity to use
the water of the Truckee River or its tributaries, including, but
not limited to, the rights of landowners within the Newlands
Project for delivery of the water of the Truckee River to Derby
Dam and for the diversion of such waters at Derby Dam pursuant
to the Orr Ditch decree or any applicable law.
These provisions of the Settlement Act, which carry out and expand
upon the protection provided in section 28 of the PSA, belie any
suggestion that Senator Reid, the Congress, the Interior Department,
the Justice Department, the Tribe or any other party, either singly or in
combination, targeted, went after or sought to diminish the water
rights of Newlands Project irrigators or any other water right owners.
[Note: for discussion of the irrigators’ views on “takings,” particularly
with regard to OCAP, see below.] To the contrary, the Settlement Act
expressly guarantees that the modified and improved operation of
Truckee River reservoirs pursuant to the PSA and the Settlement Act
will not interfere with the established water rights of any person or
entity. The same or similar safeguards will be included in TROA.
Further comments submitted to the draft report by the Tribe go on to the
background and history of the TROA and the “facilitated negotiations” with
respect to their attempts to involve irrigators:
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The TROA negotiating parties have continued to include TCID in their
discussions and to try to make peace with TCID in the years following
enactment of the Settlement Act in 1990. TCID representa-tives have
participated actively in TROA subgroups, the drafting committee,
negotiating sessions and plenary sessions. At one time a special TROA
subgroup was created to negotiate TROA issues with TCID. The
subgroup was selected with a view toward avoiding antagonism and
confrontation and promoting constructive dialogue. The TROA issues
also were encompassed in the intense settlement negotiations held in
1994-95 (known as the second generation or facilitated negotiations)
under the sponsorship of Senators Reid and Bradley. These
negotiations were conducted by a professional and respected mediator
approved by representatives of the Lahontan Valley, the Tribe and the
other participating parties. The federal negotiating team was led by
Assistant Secretary Betsy Rieke. . .. The Lahontan Valley interests
rejected a proposal accepted by all of the other parties which was
supported by their friends and allies including Nevada Director of
Conservation and Natural Resources Mr. Pete Morros, and Nevada
Congresswoman Ms. Barbara Vucanovich. Most recently, in the
summer of 1996, face-to-face negotiations between representatives of
the Tribe and the Lahontan Valley were held without the participation
of attorneys, experts or federal officials under the auspices of Mr.
Morros. One major goal of the Morros negotiations was to try to find
acceptable terms and conditions for TCID and other Lahontan Valley
entities to become signatories to TROA.
None of these efforts succeeded, but that was not due to lack of effort.
No stone has been left unturned in seeking solutions. Every
conceivable mechanism has been tried including the consultant’s
proposal for direct meetings between tribal and Newlands
representatives without federal participation; to the best of [the Tribe’s]
knowledge, no suggested procedures have been rejected.
Clear Bounds on Water Requirements of Federal Responsibilities.—The
process followed in determining the amount of water required from
agriculture in order to meet federal trust responsibilities was never bounded
in such a way to make clear to the irrigators that some limit existed as to the
amount of water sought. They felt exposed to an open-ended process in
which one of the principal messages they felt they heard questioned their
fundamental right to water, thus keeping before them the specter that they
might ultimately wind up losing all their Truckee Division water. Such a
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situation continues in the stated objective of the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe
to eliminate the Derby Dam diversion.
Interior comments: It is true that representatives of the Pyramid Lake Tribe
have from time to time stated a goal of eliminating the Truckee Division and of
eliminating diversions from the Truckee River. Federal representatives
repeatedly and publically have stated that this is not a federal goal and that
protecting irrigators’ rights is a federal goal. Proposals in negotiating
sessions, including proposals supported by the Tribe and the environmental
community, have been made to the irrigators that fall short of that goal.
Perceived Process Objectivity.—The irrigators felt that the objectivity of the
process was not protected. For example, they felt offended by a state-ment
made by a facilitator during the second round of negotiations, to the effect
that perhaps it would not be possible for the Newlands irrigators water
rights to be permanent. If such a comment were made, it would be a notable
departure from facilitation practice in that it would suggest a negative
opinion on a fundamental issue that is perhaps the central concern of the
irrigators. Whether or not the facilitator made the comment in precisely
those terms or was or was not is in fact objective, was not determined. The
significant point is that facilitator’s objectivity fell into question on the part
of a key participant, and where this happens, facilitated negotiation is very
likely to fail.
Process objectivity was also brought into question, in the minds of the
Newlands irrigators, by the appearance of conflicts of interest on the part of
other parties, particularly with regard to a contract held by an environmental organization with federal agencies for real estate purchases at a time
when irrigators were working with that environmental group in the belief
that they were an independent agent seeking to form local partnerships. It is
beside the point whether or not real conflicts existed or that many parties to
the process held federal contracts. The significant issue remains that, in this
situation, the irrigators worked directly with this environmental group in the
belief that they were a genuine third party, and were disturbed to find that
this same group had a contractual relationship with the federal government
that, in the irrigators minds, raised a question of potential conflict in terms of
the role and information with which the irrigators had entrusted them.
Water Transfer and Water Right Validity Protests.—The Pyramid Lake Paiute
Tribe moved to invalidate a series of proposed water transfers among
Newlands irrigators and water-righted lands, which both the irrigators and
the State of Nevada felt satisfied the requirements of state law. This action
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turned on the question of whether the transfers needed to be examined on a
parcel-by-parcel basis or a Project-wide basis. Nevada officials felt that a
parcel-by-parcel requirement violated both state law and federal decree,
however the Tribe successfully argued that the federal contracts authorized
water use on specific areas, so that a parcel-by-parcel examination would be
required to transfer water. This was upheld twice on appeal to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals.
This departure from common practice among irrigation districts throughout
the west, where transfers are often allowed among individual Project
participants and even between irrigation districts without further review
upon the concurrence of their boards, appears to be based on the language of
the conveyance contracts, which are specific to particular areas of land to be
irrigated, and also on the relatively unique situation with regard to water
rights ownership in the Newlands Project (again, under the Alpine Decree,
water rights on the Newlands Project are associated with specific parcels of
land). These conditions have been used to greatly complicate the irrigators
abilities to apply water to water-righted land as best meets the needs of their
industry.
The challenge was motivated by the Tribe’s belief that the irrigators
attempts to transfer old and unused water rights that may have become
subject to forfeiture. The Tribe, in comments on the draft report, state that
“(i) literally hundreds of transfer applications involving 20,000 to 30,000 acre
feet of water were filed by Newlands Project irrigators and almost all of those
applications systematically seek to transfer water rights which had not been
exercised for long periods of time; (ii) in many instances, the land to which
those rights are appurtenant has been used for long periods of time for
purposes inconsistent with irrigated agriculture; (iii) if granted, the transfer
applications would result in 20,000 to 30,000 acre feet of increased annual
Truckee River diversions to the Newlands Project and away from Pyramid
Lake; . . . and (vi) the Tribe has not objected to . . . wetland transfers or to other
transfers of Newlands Project water rights which do not seek to revive long
dormant and unexercised rights.
However, according to the State Engineer and recent court decisions, long
dormant and unexercised water rights may not be necessarily lost under
Nevada water law. In Nevada as in other western states, state water law
guarantees that water rights holders who make full beneficial use of their
water rights may go on using that water in perpetuity. It provides that “the
right to divert ceases when necessity for use does not exist” and also that
water rights holders who fail to use all or part of their water right for a
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period of five years forfeit the right in whole or in part, accordingly.
However, according to the State Engineer, in Nevada non-use is not
absolutely determinative of forfeiture, but is only “one element” to be used in
deciding whether a water right has been forfeited. Also, pre-statutory water
rights (which the Nevada Supreme Court ruled are pre-1913 rights), may be
lost only by abandonment, which requires a showing of the intent to
abandon. Recent case law (1989 Eureka Decision) establishes that forfeiture
may be cured by “substantial reuse” of the water and that “clear and
convincing” evidence of non-use is required to determine forfeiture.
In the case of the Newlands Project, although the original Project water right
is pre-statutory (1902) and water is not distributed among irrigators on a
water rights priority basis, the courts have ruled that forfeiture may apply
based on the date of contractual conveyance of water to individual land
owners (recall that, under the Alpine Decree, water rights are vested in the
individual property owners of the Newlands Project and appurtenant to
specific parcels of land). These contracts occurred at various times, making
some Newlands water rights more vulnerable to forfeiture than others. The
Tribe’s attorney states that the transfer application often consisted of a mix
of pre- and post-1913 rights, but had to be challenged as a whole.
Invalidation of their proposed transfers is particularly difficult for irrigators
to accept in light of the fact that both the wetlands acquisition program and
the water quality agreement depend upon large scale water transfers from
agriculture. To the irrigators, this raises a question of fairness. The
irrigators felt that transfers involving water of similarly questionable status
were approved for other parties, giving them the feeling that the authorities
were willing to wink at such issues when the parties involved were not
Newlands irrigators, but applied the rule strictly when they were. For
example, the irrigators note that Sierra Pacific has purchased lands in the
area with appurtenant water rights, and has been allowed to store these
water rights in Stampede with the anticipation of using them as needed in
the future. (Sierra’s attorney notes that more latitude is granted municipal
purveyors under Nevada water law than other water rights holders. Also,
Sierra purchased perfected, pre-statutory Nevada water rights, which, as
noted, may not be lost due to non-use but only by abandonment.
Other commentators to the draft report also contend that there are significant
differences as to the history of the establishment and use of water rights at
issue, as well as to their environmental impacts. The FWS responds that
“Sierra Pacific has not been allowed to store newly purchased water in
Stampede Reservoir. [Under] the Interim Storage Agreement for Stampede
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and Boca Reservoir (i.e., Contract for the Storage of Non-Project Water Among
Sierra Pacific, Washoe County Water Conservation District, Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe and the United States). . .Sierra Pacific is allowed to store up to
14,000 acre-feet of privately owned water in the excess storage capacity of the
reservoirs for 25 years. Sierra Pacific, through exchange procedures, may store
its water from Donner and Independence Lakes in these reservoirs when it does
not interfere with project functions of the reservoirs. [Note: Sierra Pacific did
not make this point in its very detailed comments.]
The Tribe states, in their comments to the draft report, that “Section
206(a)(1)(B) of the Settlement Act imposes an important constraint on the
transfer of water rights acquired for the Lahontan Valley wetlands; the
transfers of water rights to the wetlands have been limited to water rights
which were recently exercised at the places of use to which they were
appurtenant. However, as noted above, state water law does not necessarily
require forfeiture of unexercised surface water rights; also, the owner may
cure forfeiture by “substantial reuse.”
The “fairness” perception is exacerbated by some of the further ramifications
of this dispute. State of Nevada officials note that the effect of the invalidation has been to take land out of production for a number of years. As the
federal government has moved to adjust OCAP, reducing water allocations to
the Newlands Project based on land in irrigation, no account has been taken
of the fact that some land was idled because it was tied up in disputed water
transfers. The result has been to reduce the water-righted acreage counted
under the proposed Adjusted OCAP. One Reclamation official, although
affirming no intent to use the invalidation as a means to in effect take water
from the irrigators, acknowledged that “perhaps a windfall was taken
advantage of.”
The Newlands irrigators also felt that the water right validity challenge was
brought in such a way as to increase animosity and make it more difficult for
the opposing sides to establish a working relationship. According to the
irrigators, 2,200 notices for forfeiture and abandonment were sent out with
threats of additional fees and charges if those in receipt did not sign off on
the notices, when they believed the proper legal steps (service and filing) had
not been taken. The irrigators experienced this as a gambit to see if they
could be browbeaten into abandoning their rights without due process.
Further Tribe comments: No entity or group with Truckee River water rights
other than the Newlands irrigators has attempted to revive long dormant
water rights in a systematic way that is so adverse to the Tribe’s interests.
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There are significant and material differences between the water rights of
Newlands Project irrigators and the rights of other users of Truckee River
water which make the Newlands’ rights much more vulnerable to a successful
challenge based on the peculiarities of Nevada law.
The notices of the Tribe’s claims of forfeiture and abandonment. . .were mailed
in accordance with a court order. Prior to the issuance of that order, notice
and an opportunity to be heard were provided to numerous attorneys
representing TCID as well as individual irrigators. The order signed by the
judge was developed in consultation with those attorneys and in accordance
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures.
The issue of the vulnerability of Newlands irrigators’ water rights mentioned
by the Tribe has to do with the circumstances explained above. Some were
conveyed in contract from the United States to the land owners after 1913
and therefore are subject to challenge for forfeiture (whereas most other
Truckee River water rights are pre-statutory rights and can only be lost by
abandonment). The Tribe’s commentary goes on to ask why wouldn’t the
Tribe seek to challenge the exercise of rights that would take water from the
Truckee and which are vulnerable. Certainly, such a position is understandable on the part of this party, given its position and interests. However,
this report focuses on the federal role and opportunities, and the lessons that
should be learned for western water policy, not the strategy and tactics best
suited to advance tribal interests.
In that light, the combined protests of water transfers and water rights
validity at the same time that OCAP were being imposed and tightened and a
settlement was underway which the irrigators clearly did not feel they could
accept could only make them feel under siege. It is not the kind of timing or
combination of actions that suggests a desire to reach a proactive
accommodation, but rather the sort that fairly advertises a full scale attack.
Attempts to deny this only stretch credibility by denying the obvious and the
engagement in such denial (as is evidenced in some comments received on
the draft report) only serve to illustrate to the Commission the kind of
dynamic which has been set in motion in the Truckee-Carson and which
should be avoided on other river basins. We suggest that the federal
government is uniquely positioned to “raise the siege mentality” by playing a
more balancing role in such situations (see below).
Transfer of Donner Lake Water.—The Warren Act is a law which requires a
contract to use federal reclamation facilities to store or convey non-project
water. Warren Act contract requirements were used to deny irrigators the
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use of federal facilities for transfer of Donner Lake water for other than
strictly Project purposes at a time when flexibility was being emphasized in
empowering and encouraging the Tribe and Sierra Pacific to develop
solutions involving the creative use of Truckee River facilities, including
federal facilities, to store and exchange water. The basis for denial was the
interpretation that Donner water, while not strictly Project water, should be
subject to Project restrictions on Truckee River diversions (OCAP), and that
allowing transfer of Donner water would exceed OCAP.
Again, issues of fairness and equity surface. This constraint was felt to be
discriminatory by the irrigators, and by other parties as well. Several
Nevada officials, for example, characterized the situation as “patently unfair”
and “a clear discrimination in the federal treatment of TCID as opposed to
Sierra Pacific or the Tribe.”
Both Interior and the Tribe commented similarly; the following is the Tribe’s
response: Section 209(b) of the Settlement Act prohibits the Secretary from
allowing diversions of Truckee River water to the Newlands Project over those
allowed under OCAP. This law must be followed. Allowing Donner Lake
water to be diverted through federal facilities also would violate the
Secretary’s trust responsibility to the Tribe as construed and applied in the
decision in Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton. . .the agreements between
the Tribe and Sierra include significant benefits to the Pyramid Lake fishery.
The proposals to divert Donner Lake water through federal facilities for
non-project purposes (including diversions to the Fernley Wildlife
Management Area) only involved detriments to the Pyramid Lake fishery.
There were no benefits. . .there are a number of legal issues involving TCID’s
share of Donner Lake water which further complicate proposals to divert and
utilize that water. Those issues include the question of whether those Donner
Lake rights are appurtenant to the water right (sic) lands within the Truckee
Division of the Newlands Project and, if so, whether they can be used elsewhere
without the consent of those water right owners.
These comments adopt an inflexible legal position where the latitude for
greater flexibility in interpreting requirements appears to exist. For
example, one federal official interviewed suggested that an interpretation
that OCAP applies only to Project water, and that private water could be
handled differently. It is also worth noting that TROA itself gives cities
flexibility to store water, a situation that would potentially increase Truckee
River diversions, yet this effect is stated as the basis of denial for the
irrigators proposals.

202

Critical Issues: Case Study Discussion

The comments are disturbing in that they also appear to make benefits to
Pyramid Lake the sine qua non for all actions taken in the Truckee River
Basin. The commentators do not cite significant impacts to Pyramid Lake,
but only lack of benefits (perhaps because the amount of Donner water is
relatively small). If benefits are to be the sine qua non, proposals which have
other benefits, but no significant impacts to Pyramid Lake, would be
nonetheless ruled out. Where such informal criteria may exist in western
water management—and this report does not conclude that they do in fact
exist on the Truckee Carson, but uses this case study to illustrate the
point—the federal government has an opportunity to exercise the balancing
role we recommend elsewhere in this study, to restore flexibility to all parties
while protecting its trust responsibilities.

Irrigators Attempts to Participate in Basin Water Management.—The irrigators state that they made a number of proposals to use water in ways that
they felt would ultimately benefit fish in Pyramid Lake and wildlife in the
Truckee River Basin. They felt that these were ignored or rejected, but they
could find little objective rational for the acceptance of other parties’ creative
proposals while their own were rejected. Here, as elsewhere, we cannot
judge whether the irrigators proposals were in fact better or worse than
those made by others. This party to the negotiations continues to feel
strongly that the process has been conducted in such a way that their
attempts to participate and to exert an equitable influence over basin
management have not been met with the kind of open mind accorded other
players.
!

One area of conflict concerns the use of Donner Lake water, described
above. The irrigators claim that Donner water is not subject to OCAP,
but can be sold to municipal purveyors, used to serve environmental
values, or used for recharge, subject to Nevada state law. Federal
agencies take the view that the water is subject to OCAP as well,
inasmuch as the Orr Ditch Decree allows water to be used only to the
extent needed to satisfy beneficial use, which the federal government
argues is bounded by OCAP. Thus, Donner Lake water could be used to
serve other uses in the Truckee Basin, but not diverted to serve such uses
out of the basin. (Interior comments note that TCID sold some Donner
water to a Reno-area golf course during the 1994 drought.)The OCAP and
Donner Lake transfer issues are addressed elsewhere; here, we raise the
issue to illustrate one of the situations in which the irrigators feel that, in
a settlement process that has been characterized by creativity in
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revisiting traditional water management practices, they have not been
accorded a similar degree of flexibility.
Self-contradictory comments received from Interior on this point assert
(1) that Donner Lake water could not be brought over in excess of
amounts allowed under OCAP and (2) that “the question has never been
whether Donner water is subject to OCAP.” The point remains that the
importation of Donner Lake water were subordinated to OCAP and it is
precisely this decision which the irrigators do question. Clearly, the
commentator does not realize it, but these assertions could both be made
at once only if the irrigators’ positions were so minimized as to dismiss
the legitimacy of the questions they raise—a symptom of the finding of
“exclusion” made in this study.
!

An example of the kind of proposal made to use Donner water concerns
the Fernley wildlife management area (FWMA). The FWMA was created
by Newlands irrigators from a combination of surface flow and irrigation
drain water. Loss of irrigation in the Truckee Division threatens this
resource. The irrigators offered a proposal to help maintain this resource
using Donner Lake water (see above), but were rejected. The reason
given was that it would create an out-of-basin diversion over the OCAP
limit, in violation of P.L. 101-618. Others saw this as a good faith gesture
to offer water to environmental values by the irrigators, who had little
else to gain from it. A State of Nevada participant observed “it was
almost as if they did not want to let TCID do good things.”
Fish & Wildlife Service Response: the Service has been constant in its
position that allowing diversions from the Truckee River in excess of that
allowed under OCAP would be adverse to threatened and endangered
species of Pyramid Lake, and to the riparian corridor of the lower Truckee
River and its associated wildlife. The Service’s position is not new, but has
been discussed on innumerable occasions and during meetings where
debate and understanding has been encouraged. The loss of wetlands is
being addressed through the Service’s water acquisition program to protect
and maintain at least 25,000 acres of wetlands in Lahontan Valley. [Note:
the Lahontan Valley wetlands water acquisition program does not address
the Fernley Wildlife Management Area; it is not clear that FWS comment
in that regard is meaningful.]

!
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November and December 1995, and allow it to flow to Pyramid Lake. In
exchange an equal amount of credit water would be stored in Stampede
Reservoir. If Lahontan Reservoir spilled, the credit water would be
forfeited; if Lahontan did not spill, the credit water would be diverted to
Lahontan later in the year. The proposal entailed a tradeoff of what
appeared to be reasonable risks considering the relatively high
probability of spilling at Lahontan. A small risk of having to use some
water dedicated for cui-ui would be exchanged for an increased flow to
Pyramid Lake. The federal (FWS) decision to disallow such a proposal is
hard to reconcile, in that it would have benefitted the Tribe and Pyramid
Lake levels, and would have kept more water in the Truckee River. TCID
was willing to forgo water it would have been legally entitled to under
OCAP. The irony is that, as pointed out above, the settlement is based on
mutual risk-sharing, but in this case risk-sharing was refused the
irrigators. The FWS response (summarized below) does not indicate that
a decision to accept zero risk to cui-ui was based on comparative model
runs or technical analysis on the impact such a decision would have on
the survival of cui-ui. It does not candidly acknowledge that FWS does
accept risk to cui-ui when using water stored in Stampede Reservoir for
cottonwood regeneration in the Lower Truckee River and in the
agreement allowing Sierra Pacific credit storage. Both are based on
accepting essentially the same risk tradeoff that the FWS found
unacceptable with respect to the Reclamation/TCID proposal. Again, it
appears that the irrigators’ attempt to participate in a solution that
would better manage the Truckee River was met with inflexible policy
(zero risk to cui-ui) rather than a risk-based decision clearly grounded in
solid technical analysis. It appears that the federal government is more
concerned with assuring that OCAP targets are not exceeded than it is
with possible overdiversions from the Truckee River, which seems to be
putting the cart before the horse. (The situation may be tested again, as
the proposed Adjusted OCAP does provide for credit storage, but FWS
policy remains a hurdle to exercising this provision.)
Interior/Fish & Wildlife Service Response:226 The decision by Fish &
Wildlife Service not to accept the exchange proposal was explained during
a meeting in the Federal Water Master’s office with TCID, Reclamation,
Sierra Pacific and the Tribe, and in a letter to the editor of the Lahontan
Valley News in reply to allegations raised in the column “Waterline.”
In November 1995, the Bureau of Reclamation proposed that December
diversions to Lahontan Reservoir from the Truckee River as allowed under
OCAP be foregone in exchange for an equal amount of water in Stampede
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Reservoir (water reserved by court order for the conservation of threatened
and endangered fishes of Pyramid Lake) to be reserved as “project credit
water.” The purpose of the proposal was to reduce the chance that
Lahontan Reservoir would spill during the following spring. If Lahontan
Reservoir did not spill before the end of the next June, project credit water
in Stampede would be released to Lahontan Reservoir, possibly in excess of
the Lahontan storage limit prescribed by OCAP.
After carefully evaluating the proposal, the Service concluded that
implementation of the proposal would not be in the best interest of the
endangered cui-ui of Pyramid Lake. Although the proposal had the
potential to reduce spills from Lahontan at no risk to the Project, it also
could potentially cause less water to be available in the spring to
supplement cui-ui spawning flows—the most critical time for the survival
of ui-ui. Since Stampede storage is the only assured water supply for cuiui, the Service must use it conservatively. Such an exchange would not
have been in the best interest of cui-ui because it would have been trading
spawning flows for lake elevation maintenance. The Service could not
accept the risk the proposal imposed on water decreed by the courts for the
survival of cui-ui.
!

Similarly, the irrigators state that they made a proposal with respect to
the Water Quality Agreement, suggesting conjunctive use of the
irrigators water to serve both water quality and irrigation needs and
avoiding a $24 million expenditure otherwise required to purchase water
rights. The proposed management scheme combined upstream storage
with the ability to bring water through to the irrigators at critical times,
subject to a 48-hour call. Again, this was rejected and it is not the purpose of this report to second-guess such decisions. The following comments explain the view of Interior and the Tribe as to why the irrigators’
proposal was less preferable than the settlement that was achieved:
Interior comments: While Interior had a significant interest in improving
water quality through the Water Quality Settlement, its greatest interest
was in increasing the quantity of water flowing into Pyramid Lake to help
recover and protect the cui-ui. The metro area governments’ greatest
interest was in water quality so as to avoid expensive modifications to
their waste treatment plant. The settlement involved conjunctively using
the water being purchased to accomplish both goals. Without the gain in
water to Pyramid Lake, Interior would not have been willing to fund its
part of the settlement.
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TCID’s conjunctive use proposal, in contrast, did nothing to increase flows
to Pyramid Lake and would not have resolved the water quality problem
in the Truckee River below Derby Dam. All of the additional water being
held back in Truckee River reservoirs until the summer low-flow period
under TCID’s proposal would have been diverted at Derby Dam and would
have left the lower Truckee River largely dewatered during the summer as
it often is today. Because of this, it would not have solved the Pyramid
Lake Tribe’s water quality concern and the Tribe would not have been
willing to qualify their authority to set water quality standards on the
lower Truckee River to assure that the settlement agreement benefits to the
metro area were not compromised. It also would not have solved the metro
area problem except in the river stretch from Reno to Derby Dam. . .. On the
other hand, the TCID proposal could improve water quality and instream
flows in the river segment from Reno to Derby Dam and have a residual
improvement effect on water quality on the remaining depleted river below
Derby Dam. Coupled with the Settlement, it provides a useful gain beyond
the great instream flow and water quality gains in the settlement. For that
reason, Interior continues to be interested in pursuing such an
arrangement in addition to the settlement. [Other commentators to the
draft report also state that the irrigators’ proposal does not provide the
water quality flows needed below Derby Dam, but, as a supplemental to
the Agreement, the proposal is beneficial and has been well received.]
It is not the purpose of the Truckee-Carson River Basin Study to go into a
detailed comparative analysis of the benefits of the two competing
proposals, but assuming the accuracy of the Interior comments (which are
echoed by other commentators, such as the Tribe and Sierra Pacific), why
has this remained an issue that “sticks in the irrigators craw?” Various
accounts of the steps taken to reach the Water Quality Agreement given
by different parties, provide a possibly illuminating explanation:
Interior comments: The principles of the water quality settlement were
worked out and discussed during the facilitated negotiations in 1994-95.
A one-page presentation of those principles was provided to all parties to
those negotiations (including TCID) in the last session in early March
1995. The final substantive negotiation for the settlement took place about
a year later. A day or two later (and a year after having the set of
principles in hand), a TCID representative at a TROA meeting suggested
substituting their conjunctive use proposal for the settlement. It was
indicated that Interior would not abrogate the agreement on the basis that
agreement had just been reached, subject to clearance by principal. . ..
Subsequently, a few minor wording changes were made and the settlement
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was signed. . .the reason why the settlement approach was better than
TCID’s proposal was explained to the TCID representative by several
participants at the table in the TROA session.
Fish & Wildlife Service: the Service did not support TCID’s proposal to
use Newlands Project water in place of the Water Quality Agreement
because it would not benefit listed fishes of Pyramid Lake and would not
improve riparian and water quality conditions in the lower Truckee River,
as would the Water Quality Agreement. The Service, however, is
supportive of TCID’s proposal as a compliment to the Water Quality
Agreement because it would improve instream flow, aquatic habitat, and
water quality throughout much of the Truckee River upstream of Derby
Dam. It would also increase recreational opportunities in upstream
reservoirs and in the river. The Service’s positions have been clearly
explained in detail to TCID and others on numerous occasions.
Sierra Pacific comments also state that the original concept for the water
quality settlement was developed during the second generation facilitated
negotiations, which included the irrigators and that it did not deviate
significantly from that concept in its final form. It is asserted that the
detailed negotiations were in settlement of litigation, “which is customarily
a private matter among litigants.”
By contrast, the irrigators view is that the water quality settlement was
worked out behind closed doors, in a meeting to which they were not
invited. They protested in writing, and offered their own proposal. At
that point Interior officials are quoted to have said that Interior would
not abrogate the Water Quality Agreement; and this moment was
understood by the irrigators to be then some months before the
completion of the agreement, let alone signing.
It does not matter which account of events is “right;” indeed it is easy to
see how all of them could be substantially “right” at once. The Interior
commentary outlines a logical sequence of events, but clearly handles the
irrigators not as a party who needed to be consulted, but as one who
needed an explanation after a fundamental agreement had been reached.
It may be quite correct as a matter of protocol to have excluded the
irrigators from a litigation settlement negotiation to which they were not
party. However, this sequence of events illustrates another instance in
which the irrigators felt excluded from the give-and-take of the process.
Feeling consistently rejected in their attempts to contribute positively to
those solutions, it becomes difficult to maintain a “solutions orientation.”
Positions harden and litigation may be viewed as the only recourse. The
208

Critical Issues: Case Study Discussion

lesson to western water policy is once again to promote an inclusive
approach, even if it means breaking minor precedent by bringing in a
party with known interest but without formal standing in a final
settlement of a litigated matter such as this.
!

The irrigators also made proposals for facility improvements that they
felt would save water, and again were frustrated in having them rejected.
Their frustration was particularly acute in that, having paid off the cost
of the Project and unable to qualify to have the federal government turn
the Project over to them, they found the government unwilling to make
improvements that were felt would save water to the general advantage.
For example, the irrigators proposed to line the V-Line, saving water and
using the investment value of that water to pay for the cost of conserving
it. Interior and Tribe comments assert that the irrigators proposals were
not economically practical. The responses do not provide sufficient detail
to evaluate the comparative economics (although we note that the
Interior response confuses the value of water with the value of water
rights), nor was such detail sought from the irrigators. Again, the issue
lies not in the details of the cost-benefit analysis, but in the handling of
the proposal. Interior comments tie the willingness to appropriate funds
to the irrigators’ willingness to accept recoupment, a well-known nonstarter, thus in effect scotching the discussion by linking it to terms that
the proposing party must be expected to reject. The Tribe’s response
offers a variety of “complexities” which precluded serious consideration of
the proposal [such as] the problem of determining how much of any saved
water from the Carson Division of the Project would accrue to the Truckee
River and how much would accrue to the Carson River. Further clouding
the picture was that these amounts could and probably would vary
significantly from year to year. However, these “problems” all arise with
OCAP and have been disposed of in that regulation’s implementation. To
propose the same problems as barriers in this regard is merely to signal
an unwillingness to negotiate. Here again the underlying dynamic is
illustrated, providing an object lesson to western water policy.

Recoupment.—Recoupment of water diverted by TCID in violation of
OCAP is sought in the amount of approximately one million acre-feet. In a
situation where, if efficiency targets and water duties are both met, there is
no surplus water with which to “pay off” recoupment requirements, it is
difficult to see how the continued pursuit of recoupment pursuit serves the
long-term interest of a larger solution. If this contradiction is acknowledged,
then the recoupment action seems more punishing than problem-solving. In
some respects, as discussed further below, despite its service of the laudable
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goal of conservation, the continued pursuit of the “forced march to efficiency”
represented by OCAP may have been one of the most negative tactics in
which the federal government has engaged. The lesson of OCAP and
recoupment appears to be that processes so “heavy on the stick and light on
the carrot” are likely only to increase levels of conflict and exacerbate the
difficulty of reaching overall acceptable solutions in western water policy.
Summary.—Thus, notwithstanding the “cooperation and consensus” trend
that is said to have characterized the settlement negotiations, it appears that
the negotiated settlement has included a subtext of sustained attack on the
Newlands irrigators which may have undermined what otherwise might have
been possible agreements that could have included them. The irrigators
themselves felt that they were close to achieving agreement in the so-called
facilitated negotiations, but ultimately did not feel enough security to
conclude the agreement. What made them feel that they could not agree may
have been rhetoric as much as substance. There is something of Israel and
Palestine in this; the lack of security felt by irrigators in their property rights
under a negotiated settlement stemmed from very pointed rhetoric which
implied (or sometimes stated in so many words) that they had no right to
exist at all. Such characterizations were made as that they were “stealing
water.” They felt blamed for all of the environmental ills in the basins and
the failures of the federal government to make good on promises to the tribes
over a century or more, but did not see enough evidence that federal agencies
or the tribes themselves were taking responsibility for their share in creating
the problems at hand.
One might say that this interest group should have been able to rise above
such rhetoric, but the point is that they did not, it was very apparent that
they would not, and yet words were chosen that could not but be expected to
drive them further away from agreement rather than bring them into the
circle of consensus. On the one hand, such word choice may reflect only the
heat of battle. On the other, it has served to raise questions in the minds of
the irrigators as to the sincerity of negotiations. From their point of view,
they were forced from the game and then accused of refusing to play.
Certainly, they perceived a lack of sincere intent to negotiate with them on
the part of the other parties in the process, they did observe that they had a
genuine influence on its outcomes, and they doubted that there was a
genuine commitment to conclude an agreement with them.
Whether or not the irrigators’ positions were the right ones or their proposals
were reasonable, the point is that the structure and conduct of the
negotiations did not serve to include them and bring them to workable
210

Critical Issues: Case Study Discussion

solutions with the other parties. It is too easy to simply blame the excluded
party for this; a more balanced assessment suggests that other parties to the
negotiated settlement and the federal government in particular from time to
time lost sight of larger objectives and gave in to the temptation of reaching
partial solutions through excluding and scapegoating a key player.
The irrigators have become the one significant exception to the “cooperate
and negotiate trend” that led to settlement in the Truckee-Carson basins,
and provide an example of what can happen to an important stakeholder
when other parties cooperate and negotiate a solution in which they are not
willing participants. Notwithstanding, irrigated agriculture remains the
player at the table with the most (water) to contribute. Whether they
voluntarily left or were forced from the Settlement Act negotiations, irrigated
agriculture has been effectively by-passed in terms of influence and control.
The irrigators’ position is now fraught with irony—they find themselves
rejected today in their attempt to defend a water budget which they
themselves had rejected as insufficient in earlier negotiations.
Rural Communities.—As an addendum to this section, it is important not to
oversimplify in characterizing the situation as irrigation interests versus
tribes, environment and municipal use. In fact, in addition to the irrigators,
rural communities and others in the area are affected by the changes
contained in the Settlement Agreement. The Lahontan Valley
Environmental Alliance tried unsuccessfully to bring them to speak with one
voice, but the diversity may have been too great. It is worth noting that,
while farmers may ultimately decide to sell and leave, the existing rural
communities have no such option.
Indeed, the City of Fallon wrote in response to the draft report, that in their
view, “the Act [P.L. 101-618], as it is being implemented, destabilizes the
communities on the Carson River side, not only those in the Newlands
Project but the entire watershed to its headwaters. . . destabilization and
further litigation will likely result.” The Fallon letter shares many of the
concerns expressed by Newlands irrigators with regard to effects of settlement implementation on existing water rights and subsequent consequences
to affected rural communities. In addition to central concerns regarding the
potential effects of the settlement implementation on the City’s drinking
water supply, the City indicates that the implementation of P.L. 101-618 goes
beyond the understanding that they, at least, had at the time of agreement
both in terms of the scope of actions being undertaken under its name and in
terms of its effects on water rights and water use. They also hold that
minimally required consultation with local interests was not carried out,
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particularly with regard to NEPA requirements (see discussion of the lawsuit
seeking a Programmatic EIS above).
The City of Fallon’s comment letter noted the frustration experienced over a
decade in trying to educate the federal government and the general public as
to the differences in the duties and activities of the City versus TCID. They
state that “casting TCID in [the] capacity [of representing the community]
has worked extremely well for the interests. . .who would like to take water
from the residents and citizens of the counties of Churchill and Lyon, the
City of Fallon and the Town of Fernley, and redistribute it upstream for
growth and mitigation for that growth.”
Newlands Spokesperson
Newlands water rights are owned by 4,000 individual farmers. Getting
agreement from so large a group has proved elusive. According to others
involved in the process, parties negotiating on the irrigators’ behalf have
more than once been unable to deliver when it appeared that an agreement
was within reach. Other parties involved have expressed frustration with
this and note that, until one party is given legitimate authority to negotiate
for this group, it may not be possible to bring them into a final settlement.
One commentator to the draft report suggested that some parties hold the
view that TCID used their grassroots process as a stalling technique.
Historical context helps clarify the situation. Up until the mid-1980s, TCID
largely handled matters on behalf of the irrigators. At about that time, more
individual irrigators began to involve themselves in the water controversies
and settlement issues, and matters proceeded toward a potential lawsuit
between the individual irrigators and the District over the protection of
property rights. This led to the creation of the Newlands Water Protective
Association.
The decision-making process employed by TCID and the Newlands irrigators
has been to hold a referendum vote among Newlands water rights holders
when an agreement has needed to be concluded or a position defined. This
procedure was used in accepting the original Truckee River Agreement, and
the irrigators feel it must be respected in making future decisions affecting
river operations and water rights.
This has been a time-consuming and uncertain procedure which some have
felt has not worked well within a pressured, deadline-driven negotiating
process. As the larger process unfolded, it was felt that there was not enough
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time allowed for the irrigators to work through the kind of grassroots process
that they needed to achieve consensus regarding the issues on the table.
Given that the settlement process has, to date, taken roughly a century to
unfold, it seems that allowance could be made to accommodate this need by
an important party to the process. One commentator (City of Fallon) on the
draft report states “even if the TCID could represent the owners of water
rights, it would have no authority to bargain, negotiate or barter those
individuals’ water rights without the consent of every holder of such rights.
This is simply a legal prerequisite to dealing with individuals ownership of
real property.”
The Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, another key player in the negotiations, also
requires a referendum vote of tribal members to affirm its decisions. A key
difference between the course taken by the tribe and that of the irrigators
may be that in the tribe’s case, a Tribal Referendum was taken early on
(1992) in the negotiated settlement process that, together with Tribal
Council approval, established a negotiating position and empowered
spokesperson(s) for the tribe, so that each element of the negotiating process
did not have to be returned to the full vote of the tribe. Such a strategy might
ultimately better serve the irrigators as well.
Negotiating Strategy
Part of the problem in reaching a positive accord may have been that the
irrigators have not had a workable negotiating strategy. As was noted in the
Phase I report, this was a criticism levied by some other participants in the
process. However, upon further investigation it was determined that the
irrigators were advised by a very knowledgeable senior water consultant
whose reputation and track record make it unlikely that there was a lack of
good advice on negotiating tactics and strategic planning. Nevertheless, no
matter the quality of the advice the irrigators may have been getting, still
more participants interviewed during the second phase of work echoed the
view that there appeared to be some difficulty in grasping the complexity of
the Truckee-Carson system and in accepting the need for developing a
compromise position.
Again, the success of the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe in navigating the
settlement process provides instructive counterpoint. According to a
presentation by Joe Ely, past tribal chairman, the Tribe suffered from a
public perception of being unstable and indecisive. Two key steps were taken
to overcome this problem and other obstacles, that opened the way toward
the realignment in the balance of power regarding water allocations
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described earlier in this report. First, as noted above, the Tribe established a
negotiating position and convinced other parties and the public of its
willingness to settle water issues by negotiating at any time with anyone.
Second, the Tribe took a decisive step by negotiating directly and independently with Sierra Pacific, leading to the breakthrough Preliminary Settlement Agreement.227 In both convincing other parties of its willingness to
settle water issues and in negotiating directly with major contenders in the
Truckee-Carson basins, the irrigators strategy has lagged behind the Tribe’s.
Both remain significant challenges not yet surmounted by the irrigators.
There is also the question of the degree to which the irrigators have been
painted as unsophisticated to serve the ends of those who would benefit by
simply dismissing them and their ideas out of hand. It was often commented,
however, that an increased sophistication and awareness on the part of the
irrigators has been noted over the years. Comments received from the
irrigation community in response to the draft report state “We do understand
the environmental, tribal and municipal issues but we do not feel that it
serves justice to force one small community to pay for all of these perceived
social injustices. . .”
The irrigators’ basic negotiating objective as articulated by TCID was to keep
their water rights whole. To their opposition, “good negotiating” consisted of
their agreeing to give up water. The strategy faced by the irrigators was, in
their view, twofold: (1) opposition to any solution in which farmers retained
control of water rights, and (2) an attempt to put all water under OCAP, with
an absolute upper limit on use. This insight into their opposition’s strategy
does not suggest a lack of sophistication.
On the other hand, the irrigators perception that the strategy of their
opponents was to attack from many sides at once may be more a reflection of
how a multi-dimensional resource conflict would appear to the party whose
water is at stake when the others seem to have banded together in favor of a
solution to which they cannot agree.
An important lesson here is that although a lack of success in negotiating
effectively on the part of any key player (such as the irrigators) may afford
rich opportunities for other players to take advantage, it cannot be in the
overall best interests of a solution. Again, the federal government may be
uniquely positioned to provide balance.
The “Takings” Issue
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A part of the debate centers on the larger issue of federal “taking” of
individual property rights, an issue which is being debated throughout the
West today in many places and with respect to many different kinds of
resources. The Newlands irrigators feel that the taking of property rights is
as central an issue as endangered fish or tribal trust responsibilities, and
that federal actions undertaken to meet the latter responsibilities have
amounted to a taking of private property without due compensation.
To deal with this issue in depth is beyond the Truckee-Carson River Basin
case study, but suffice it to say that a range of sophistication may have been
displayed both among individuals and over time. It appears that today, most
irrigators understand that ownership right is defined by water demonstrably
put to beneficial use and not the face value of paper rights, although in the
past there may have been confusion by some members of the irrigator
community on this point.
The issue has a long history, as is the case with most Truckee-Carson water
problems. For some time, the federal government took the position that
water rights belonged to the federal government, while property owners held
that water rights were appurtenant to the land and, as such, constituted
private property. This was pursued to the United States Supreme Court in
1983, when that court upheld, in Nevada versus the United States, that the
beneficial interest in these water rights belong to the individual property
owner: “the beneficial interest in the rights confirmed to the Government
resided in the owners of the land within the Project to which these water
rights became appurtenant upon the application of Project water to the land.”
In this context, irrigators believe that the pursuit of OCAP, recoupment, and
other actions which result in reducing diversions at Derby Dam constitute a
taking of decreed water that the Supreme Court has ruled belongs to the
Project’s private property owners.
Failure to achieve OCAP standards results in penalties which the irrigators
view as forced decreased diversions that constitute “takings.” In another
example, the negotiation between the Tribe and Sierra Pacific which reduced
Floriston Rates is considered to have overlooked the irrigators significant
and valuable interests in maintaining those releases to meet agricultural
needs. The irrigators have argued that lowering the Floriston Rates will
result in reduction of the amount of divertable water at Derby Dam, a
reduction in carryover storage in Lahontan Reservoir, and the promotion of
drought conditions. A federal duty to have protected those rights is cited, and
negotiations for “remanagement” of water or storage without their
involvement is considered inappropriate.
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However, commentators to the draft report point out that Floriston Rates can
only be reduced under the PSA, Settlement Act, or TROA when other water
rights are not being called upon, which they hold provides a built-in protection
for TCID. This is reinforced by Section 28 of the PSA, which provides
mitigation if there should be inadvertent impairment of another party’s water
rights. Other commentators argue that reduced Floriston Rates would not
reduce the amount of water available at Derby Dam for diversion through the
Truckee Canal under OCAP at all. They state that Floriston Rates would only
be reduced by the amount of water that would have flowed past Derby Dam
into Pyramid Lake, and by the consumptive use portion of water rights (served
by Floriston Rates) acquired by Sierra Pacific. Thus, among the nonirrigation parties there is some difference of understanding on this point.
Among the federal actions most prominently considered by the irrigators to
have been used in “takings” are the Endangered Species Act and OCAP. In
addition, irrigators felt that threats were used in attempts to force their
relinquishment of rights. For example, they felt that they were asked to
hand over their rights to Donner Lake water under threat of litigation and
recoupment.
The irrigators say that they asked Reclamation why they did not just condemn the project, and were given to understand that the federal government
could afford neither the price nor the publicity. Thus, the perception has
grown that the federal government is killing off the project slowly through
the use of tribal and environmental laws. Claims on behalf of these public
resource values are seen as, in essence, a cover for condemnation.
Interestingly, an interview with the Tribe’s attorney raised the issue of
condemnation as a potentially “hard choice” which the federal government
may have to confront in such situation. An example was given of the “ThirtyOne Corporation” property, served by the Newlands Project, which is said to
have 200 acre-foot water right but which is said to require the release of
5,800 acre-feet of water to deliver the water right (due to conveyance losses,
etc.). The point made by the Tribe’s attorney is that, although this is a valid
water right, if the irrigators gave in on such egregious examples of water
waste, a more positive negotiation atmosphere would be created. Other
irrigators and the TCID would probably respond that they have no right to
bargain away the Thirty-One Corporation’s water right (or anyone else’s),
unless that party agreed to terms to retire it. Claiming to have identified
some 85,000 acre-feet of water believed to be capable of being saved by
retiring about 9,500 acre-feet of rights (these numbers could not be
independently verified), the Tribe’s attorney suggested that the hard choice
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that must be faced is to consider the exercise of condemnation in such
situations, given that years of negotiation have not produced a solution and
assuming that a reasonable buyout is offered and refused.
From another perspective, the irrigators have already successfully protected
their decreed rights against a readjudication, but the “use it or lose it”
philosophy of western water law and the legal and financial incentives
provided by the federal government makes the property rights strategy
difficult to use. A water right depends on the constant application of water to
a beneficial use, and thus the precise extent of many individual water rights
is unknown (and may be less than claimed or perceived to be). This issue is
not unique to the Truckee-Carson, but is true throughout the west.
Not only do appropriative water rights not always correspond to the users’
expectations based on irrigation practices or paper entitlements, but
appropriative rights are not conducive to the maintenance of a community of
users when external economic pressures create counter incentives. The
property rights strategy assumes that all water rights holders have common
and unchanging objectives. However, the economic and social incentives for
continued farming in the area vary among the water users, and users may be
expected to take increasing advantage of opportunities to participate in the
new water transfer markets.
It also should be noted that agriculture has done comparatively well in the
Truckee-Carson basins as compared to other areas where water was
involuntarily surrendered to satisfy environmental restoration priorities
(e.g., in Mono Lake, the California Central Valley Project, or the Kesterson
remediation). Further, it should be kept in mind that while TCID’s position
(and that of farmers who wish to continue to farm) may be relatively weak,
those individual farmers who sell water or water rights may come out quite
well. In fact, it has been argued that the best approach for TCID would be to
stop fighting water purchases. In this, they sometimes oppose their own
members. From this perspective, it may be better for the District to work
toward creating a genuine open water market, where that the selling price is
the “fair market value.”
Perhaps the most telling comment with respect to the takings issue is the observation that negotiations need to focus on interests, rather than rights. So
long as parties remain narrowly focused on rights, little movement is possible. When they see how their interests may be served by compromise, then
solutions can be achieved. This perspective needs to be broadened in one

217

Truckee-Carson River Basin Study

respect, however. Until a party’s legitimate rights are acknowledged, it is
rare that they will be able to move forward to consider their wider interests.
Facilitating a Positive, Proactive Role
Level Playing Field.—One of the most widely expressed opinions we
heard was that the single most important step that could be made to reinvolve the irrigators in a positive, proactive way would be to simply level the
playing field. The federal government has enormous resources and, particularly where legal disputes are carried on over long periods at great expense,
federal involvement on one side of an issue or another can skew the balance.
Here is a sampling of the various ways in which this view was phrased:
!

“Simply by taking one side or another, federal involvement may actually
make it less likely that the best settlement will be achieved.”

!

“Where the weight of the federal government swings, there the winner
sits.”

!

“Commitment of such vast resources to the fray means that it will not be
a fair fight.”

Without a doubt, for decades, the weight of the government has heavily
favored Reclamation and irrigators. Recently, it has swung to favor the side
of the tribes and the environment. More than one federal official (and many
others) noted both positions are equally wrong.
Many federal officials who work or have worked in the Truckee-Carson River
Basins are acutely aware of this effect. One stated “the federal government
is coming down on one side, but the role of the federal government should be
to equalize.” As noted above, State of Nevada officials also feel that the
federal government is maintaining a playing field that leans toward the
Tribes and environment, and against the irrigators. On the other hand, when
the Tribe’s attorney was asked whether it was appropriate for the federal
government to set a price in the form of benefits to Pyramid Lake on the
irrigators’ opportunity to participate in TROA upstream storage, he replied,
“yes, because federal policy for so long favored and subsidized reclamation
interests for so long.”
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The Effect of the Bureau of Reclamation’s New Mission.—This imbalance is
due in part to the changing mission of the Bureau of Reclamation, which has
compelled employees of that agency to achieve an appreciation of the balance
of interests at work in the larger picture of the Truckee-Carson River Basins.
Federal leadership should be applauded for the shift it has effected toward
recognizing and protecting neglected environmental values and tribal
interests. But, because Reclamation has come further in balancing priorities
to a degree that does not always characterize the actions of other key
agencies—who vigorously pursue their interests more narrowly—the net
effect is to dilute federal vigor in representing one side of the picture
(reclamation) while leaving it undiluted and puissant for others (tribes,
environment). The achievement in restoring federal support for tribes and
environment does not excuse a slip in looking after equally legitimate
reclamation responsibilities.
One person with whom we spoke felt that “Reclamation has been put under
somebody’s thumb and silenced. It is now politically incorrect for
Reclamation to represent the irrigators—indeed, it has been made clear that
Reclamation will not represent their former constituency.”
The irrigators certainly perceive these dynamics at work. They feel that
Interior has shifted from promoting reclamation goals and the success of the
Newlands project, to advocacy of tribal trust and environmental values. The
consistency with which the tribal position is favored by the federal
government suggests, in the eyes of both state and local government as well
as the irrigators, a bias. (It is important to note that in identifying that the
pendulum may have swung too far, we are not arguing against the shift in
social values characteristic of the west today, nor the shift in the federal role
to accommodate this change, nor are we implying that a return to previous
imbalance in favor of reclamation should be effected.)
As the new Reclamation mission has been implemented, irrigators have felt
abandoned by their traditional ally and mentor, and have felt that they have
become second-class citizens among water users. Reclamation in turn has
found itself in an awkward position, with the mandate that it undergo a “sea
change” in attitude and take on a new mission. Reclamation officials
interviewed sympathized with the irrigators and felt a sense of responsibility
for the Newlands Project, coupled with a recognition of constraints on their
ability to support the Project in ways that were previously routine.
Reclamation managers interviewed clearly understand the mandate that
Interior speak with one voice (discussed further below). As one put it, “there
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is an agenda and that agenda is to favor the tribes.” In such circumstances, it
is not possible for Reclamation to act unilaterally to level the playing field.
Rather Reclamation of necessity has become the agent required to carry out
many of the measures decided by Interior and Justice to reallocate water
from reclamation purposes to the now-favored tribal trust and environmental
goals. Some of these actions have been experienced as punitive by the
irrigators and, coming from an old ally, the wedge of alienation was perhaps
driven deeper than it might have been had the initiatives been spearheaded
by another entity who shared less common history with the irrigators.
In some instances, in reference to the various proposals which the irrigators
have put forth themselves as discussed above, Reclamation appears to have
been prevented from responding more positively to the irrigators’ initiatives.
One senior Reclamation official stated that the agency could have, for
example, provided the resources for efficiency improvements, but was
directed not to because “that would perpetuate the Project.” This would
suggest that, notwithstanding the stated goal of maintaining a viable
agricultural community, other agendas may be operating which have not
been made explicit outside federal circles.
It should be noted, however, that a number of key issues such as OCAP,
which date to 1973, and the fight over water transfer invalidation, which has
been dragging on for 13 years, precede the “new Bureau of Reclamation” by
many years, suggesting instead a scenario more along the lines of a
frustrated and angry parent taking ever more forceful action to try to force a
recalcitrant child to toe the line. Thus for example, senior Interior
negotiators express the frustration that Interior has had an extremely
difficult time over the entire period of dealing with the irrigators on
Newlands water conservation (OCAP) issues.
This analogy may be apt in that, just as a frustrated parent may sometimes
strike out, so frustration here seems to have spilled over at times into actions
designed more to punish than to solve problems. One water engineer
(neither a federal employee nor involved on the side of one of the major
contenders) characterized the situation as one in which “Interior regards
TCID with disdain because of their view that the irrigators overdiverted and
applied water to non-righted land.” Where events have gone that far, the
advantage of the years of experience which senior federal negotiators and
agency officials may bring to the table may be less important than the need
for a fresh perspective, untainted by the frustrations of years past. One
senior federal official who has moved on in his career from the TruckeeCarson, looking back, felt that some people have been involved too long and
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have set opinions and attitudes. Not surprisingly, those senior officials with
the longest involvement feel the opposite.
The Decision to Speak with “One Voice”.—The history of the TruckeeCarson settlement helps make clear how events have proceeded to create
such perceptions on the part of some senior, local federal officials in the
Truckee-Carson River Basins. As related by senior Interior officials who
have long been involved in the settlement, throughout the 1980s Interior had
trouble coming to grips with Truckee-Carson issues, including the conflict
between tribes, irrigators, and the environment. In February 1990, Senator
Bradley held a hearing on proposed settlement legislation at which three
Interior Assistant Secretaries (covering tribes, reclamation and fish and
wildlife) were not coordinated, expressed differences of opinion, and sought
to go in different directions. (It is worth noting that sources who were
involved in the Truckee-Carson debate at the time note that these
differences involved opposition to settlement based on the feeling that
Newlands’ interests were not being adequately protected—just as
Washington had opposed the California-Nevada interstate compact because
it did not protect tribal interests.) The political fallout was reported to be
intense and immediate. One highly-placed Washington source termed the
hearing a “first-order disaster” in having given the appearance of a failure of
the Assistant Secretaries to work as a team. Marching orders were issued
that, henceforth, Interior would speak with one voice in the Truckee-Carson
River Basins.
Senior Interior personnel assigned to the matter felt that the main problem
was in clarifying goals. The twin pillars for resolution were to be (1) the
Preliminary Settlement Agreement (PSA, see discussion in Chapter 2)
worked out between Sierra Pacific and the Tribe, and (2) the CaliforniaNevada interstate compact. A third major goal was to tie in environmental
interests through Section 206 of the Settlement Act, to restore Lahontan
Valley wetlands (this, and not Pyramid Lake, which the Tribe was looking
after, was felt to be the primary concern of the environmental community).
Along the way, a federal strategy was laid out to make some money on
Stampede Reservoir by charging to store water for drought protection (under
the then existing PSA). Notably, nowhere in these primary objectives does
representation of the interests of the Newlands Project irrigators appear.
Even more fundamentally, nowhere in the stated purposes of P.L. 101-618
are the interests of the irrigation communities elevated to be coequal with
the other major interests in the basins, which are given notice there (other
than passing reference among the list of purposes for operation of federal
reclamation facilities in the basin).
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Interior responds: it should be pointed out that the Newlands Irrigation
Project already had its authorizing legislation in place and didn’t need further
legislation. it should also be pointed out that Sections 205(a)(2)(D), 209(b)(2),
and 210(b)(13) are in the legislation specifically to protect Newlands Project
irrigators and other water rights holders on the two river systems, and
Sections 206(a)(2)(A), 206(a)(3)(B) and (C), and 207(c)(2) and (4) are
specifically in the act to protect irrigation interests with regard to the
authorized water right acquisition programs.
It must be appreciated that the numerous federal voices speaking prior to
this direction were a source of frustration to the local community and that
the “one-voice” achievement (including the Truckee-Carson Coordination
Office) has been largely praised and welcomed. However, some of the federal
officials interviewed see the direction to speak with one voice as having gone
too far. These individuals argue instead that there has not been enough
opportunity for the various agencies to vigorously articulate the interests
they represent before the ultimate decision-makers, who would then perform
the balancing function from the vantage of being fully and effectively
informed. Such a solution to the conflicts which are inherent in western
water management may be more appropriate than a mandate to speak with
one voice. It may be too easy for such a mandate to become, in effect, a
muzzle on one side of the issue, leading to a playing field seriously out of
level.
One official stationed in the Truckee-Carson River basins gave an example
(from another river basin) in which a veteran public relations consultant
counseled after a rocky hearing that the various federal agencies involved
were trying to be too uniform. Under such circumstances, their
constituencies no longer believed them and, more important, no longer
believed that their own voices were being heard or their interests
represented. Thus, they believed that their only choice was litigation.
Similarly, the irrigators feel that their fallback position is to litigate (or,
ultimately, to sell).
In fairness, it must be noted that the federal government is in something of a
double-bind here, on the one hand being chastised for expressing the internal
contradictions inherent to the situation and on the other for forcing a
reconciliation of them. However, the “one-voice” solution did not remove
politics from the decision-making, but left some parties feeling that the
federal position had become too politicized to make negotiation meaningful.
It is telling that the attorney for one party (not one of the major contenders)
is quoted to the effect that the only opportunity for a fair, unbiased, apolitical
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hearing may be in the courts. Where such feelings become widely held,
western river basins can look forward to becoming tied up in decades of
litigation.
Upstream Storage.—One area in which the playing field may be out of level
is in respect to the right to participate in upstream storage and exchange
agreements on the Truckee River. Senior officials with both Reclamation and
the State of Nevada question the value (as well as the validity) of denying the
irrigators’ request for use of Donner water in this respect. They felt that the
amount of water involved does not justify “drawing a line in the sand.” More
fundamentally, they believe that upstream storage for irrigators would
significantly advance a solution. They see the intransigence of other parties
on this issue as particularly ironic, because such an arrangement could
actually benefit both the Reno/Sparks area and Pyramid Lake.
For example, water sent to Lahontan Reservoir (as required) was spilled in
the January 1997 flood. Allowing TCID to hold water upstream on the
Truckee side to the last possible moment while waiting to see how the water
year develops is a win-win opportunity, because it would allow any water
that would have been spilled at Lahontan to go to Pyramid Lake. This
opportunity is actually taken advantage of under the proposed Adjusted
OCAP, but without any consideration given to the irrigators for the benefit it
provides. Such tradeoffs as allowing the irrigators to use the proposed credit
storage to offset deficits incurred through Project operations less efficient
than targeted would seem to be more in line with the win-win flexibility
afforded other system users under the TROA to bargain their needs for
upstream storage in ways that generally benefit all parties. If such credits
were allowed, perhaps irrigators could meet their OCAP target. The point for
policy is not only that, in a system generally open for tradeoffs, opportunities
should be open to all, but more fundamentally that taking a benefit without
offering a tradeoff benefit (other than to assure that the status quo with
respect to Project water use) is only likely to generate resentment and
entrench opposition.
Again, the purpose here is not to advance a recommendation for the TruckeeCarson, but to suggest how, as a case study, the Truckee-Carson example
indicates an important lesson for western water policy. The concepts of
storage and exchange of credit water are often cited as one of the most
important lessons learned in the Truckee-Carson basin. Considered in the
context of the irrigators needs, the further lesson suggested here is that
where a river basin is opened to such new and innovative practice, all major
players should be actively encouraged and given opportunities to participate
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in the advantages conferred to the full extent allowed by applicable law and
regulation.
Interior responds: these issues are still under discussion in the TROA context.
For instance, Truckee Division, Carson Division, Donner and water quality
conjunctive use are all potentially viable options so long as the storage does
not include carryover storage and the OCAP are adhered to. . .TCID’s proposal
for Carson Division storage, however, currently insists that the storage be
above OCAP levels, that it include carryover storage, and that its storage be
senior to everyone else’s credit water. There is no mandatory signatory party
at the table willing to accept that arrangement. . .
The Tribe responds: from the Tribe’s standpoint, there are three obstacles to
providing TCID with credit storage under TROA. First, as previously noted,
credit storage in federal reservoirs has carried a price in the form of benefits to
the Pyramid Lake fishery. That was true of the original credit storage
arrangement with Sierra under the PSA and it has been carried forward to the
other credit storage provisions included in TROA.228 The Tribe sees no reason
for treating TCID differently in this regard. Indeed, if TCID were treated
differently, Sierra, California, Reno, Sparks, Washoe County and other parties
might very well seek to renegotiate the terms and conditions of their credit
storage arrangements.
Second, the Tribe, the federal government and Sierra have insisted that all
entities who receive storage benefits under TROA must sign TROA, relinquish
any claims they have that are adverse to TROA and agree not to challenge
TROA or to support someone else’s challenge to TROA. In the case of TCID,
among other things, that would mean that TCID would have to withdraw its
application for Truckee River “unappropriated” water since the Settlement Act
provides (in Section 210(a)(2)(B)) that TROA cannot take effect until the
Tribe’s claim to that waster is resolved in a manner satisfactory to the Tribe
and Nevada. TCID has not shown any willingness to agree to this condition.
Third, the Tribe is unwilling to give up the enormously important OCAP gains
for which it fought so long and so hard. TCID, on the other hand, seems to
link its approval of TROA to a significant weakening (or perhaps even the
elimination) of OCAP.
Positive Steps.—The following suggestions identify some ways in which the
federal government could act in similar situations to opening the way for a
positive, proactive involvement of the agricultural community by leveling the
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playing field (some of these revisit some of the driving forces which have
alienated the irrigators, as discussed above):
!

The parameters of discussion must be drawn so that true negotiations
can occur. As one veteran of the process put it, true negotiations cannot
occur unless each party has something to gain and something to give. In
the Truckee-Carson example, several of those interviewed (not irrigators)
felt that the irrigators have been placed in the position of “everything to
give and nothing to gain.”

!

A line needs to be drawn to indicate where and when the federal
government will have met (or has met) its tribal trust and endangered
species recovery responsibilities. Where such measures as OCAP are
implemented in a continually increasing incremental fashion to meet
such responsibilities, the federal government needs to anticipate and
answer up front such questions as “Where does the trust responsibility
end?” (For example, in this situation, does the federal government share
the Tribe’s goal of eliminating Derby Dam?) “Are such measures being
implemented to get more water for these goals without having to
purchase it?”

We suggest that the federal government should strongly consider drawing
such lines so as to keep federal agencies and tribes out of micro-managing
the day-to-day operations of its reclamation Projects. In the Truckee-Carson
case, for example, that might entail delimiting jurisdiction to end at Derby
Dam.
Fish & Wildlife Service Response: the Service has “drawn” the “line” for
delisting cui-ui and Lahontan cutthroat trout in the form of recovery objectives
as stated in each species recovery plan. These plans are not “set in concrete”
but are periodically updated or revised as necessary to respond to new
information about the species and changing environmental conditions. [Note:
in terms of the irrigators concerns, this response does not address the critical
question of providing certainty as to how much water this means.]
!

Once fundamental responsibilities, such as tribal trust and endangered
species recovery have been defined, it may be that the United States
needs to step out of the fray and let the participants who have
fundamentally differing interests negotiate any further changes among
themselves. In the Truckee-Carson, experienced veterans of the
Settlement negotiations observed more than once that the real issues lie
between the Tribe and the irrigators, and that a true and final settlement
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will never be reached unless and until these two parties sit down and
negotiate it together. This model was followed by the Tribe with the
Sierra Pacific Power Company and has become a foundation for the entire
Settlement agreement.
Some federal officials and others question whether a lack of trust for the
federal government may exist such that it may be difficult at the table when
solutions are negotiated. Such a suggestion is sure to be equally difficult for
well-intentioned civil servants who have labored long and hard in the service
of larger objectives.
The federal government is here again in a double bind, as it must see to its
various resource and facility management responsibilities. Nevertheless, the
precedent has been set in which key participants negotiating without federal
presence were able to achieve the breakthrough Preliminary Settlement
Agreement between the Tribe and Sierra Pacific. If several such agreements
are being negotiated separately, some neutral third party needs to monitor
potential conflicts among the various agreements.
It should be noted as well that some federal representatives have achieved
the trust of all sides. Perhaps it is the rarity of such individuals that limits
the speed with which solutions can be achieved. Where such an achievement
is made, the federal government should hesitate before moving such
individuals on to new assignments while the outcome remains in the balance.
!

If the federal government is constrained from stepping back from the
fray, then the playing field might be levelized by committing a more equal
amount of support to all sides in the negotiation. This is compatible with
the suggestion made elsewhere that the various agencies of the federal
government, rather than seeking “one voice,” each vigorously represent
their interests before larger decision-makers, so that the debate is
transparent, open to public view, and all sides are assured that they are
heard and well-represented. In the Truckee-Carson case, both legal and
technical assistance appears to have been provided in far greater
quantity recently to the tribal and environmental interests at the table
than to the reclamation side.

Recognition of Larger Forces at Work.—A final prerequisite to proceed
toward a proactive settlement that includes the irrigators in a positive way is
for the irrigators themselves to see the larger forces at work. As discussed
above, these include the shift away from historical federal support for
reclamation (and the larger objective of settling the West), and the
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corresponding contemporary shift in cultural values toward remedying past
inequities toward Native American tribes and toward environmental
protection or restoration. Interviews with the irrigators indicate that their
leaders, at least, certainly do recognize these processes.
Indeed, this is so much the case that they suggest that some redress of past
inequities would be fair and justifiable. However, they add that such
remediation cannot go so far as to simply return the situation to its pristine
condition. As one state official put it, “Irrigators have slowly, bitterly, but
finally recognized the change in the world around them and accepted it. They
have succeeded in a very difficult change of attitude and perspective.”

4.4 Water Management: TROA, OCAP and the Negotiated Settlement
This issues falling under this broad heading have been cast in such a way as
to allow a family of related issues to be treated together. The negotiated
settlement has profoundly affected the Truckee-Carson river basins both
through its mandates with regard to a key existing regulation affecting
diversion between the two basins (OCAP) and in its establishing the basis to
work out a new framework for operating the “source basin” (TROA). A
number of aspects of the negotiated settlement with respect to these two
central water management initiatives are addressed here.
TROA
Evaluation of the TROA has been hindered by the inability to obtain a copy
of the draft TROA for review. Many of the provisions of P.L. 101-618 depend
upon the agreement of the parties to the settlement on TROA and its
entering into effect. Additionally, much of the innovative consensus-building
that has resulted in overall workable solutions from the perspective of most
of the parties to the settlement, including water storage credits and
exchanges and more flexible river operations to the benefit of tribal and
fishery values, all depend upon the TROA.
The TROA is the centerpiece of Settlement Act implementation. Under
negotiation for an extended period, it is nearing completion but is not yet
signed. If the TROA is not signed by the required parties, the entire
settlement is made much more uncertain. As described above, in order for
TROA to enter into effect, it must be signed by the States of Nevada and
California, the Secretary of Interior, Sierra Pacific Power Company, and the
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe (the latter two signatories are required as a
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function of the Preliminary Settlement Agreement). The TROA also has to
be approved by both the Orr Ditch and Truckee River General Agreement
courts.
At this time, the TROA is nearly complete, with most of the required and
optional signatories appearing to be inclined to sign the agreement. Among
the latter, TCID stands out as the most uncertain signatory. TCID will be
given the opportunity to sign the TROA and the required signatories would
like to have TCID on board. TCID representatives continue to attend TROA
negotiating sessions. However, TCID may choose not to sign the TROA if
they find their interests are not well served by doing so. For example, once
the TROA is in effect, none of the signatory parties may challenge any of its
provisions in court. TCID may want to keep its option open to do so.
Moreover, TCID may ultimately challenge the constitutional validity of
portions of the Settlement Act. TCID also believes that, as a signatory to the
Truckee River Agreement, it ought to be a required signatory to TROA.
Also, the State of California recently notified the TROA committee that,
“despite considerable efforts made over the recent months, California cannot
approve a draft Truckee River Operating Agreement. . .until several
significant remaining issues affecting California are resolved.” These include
the “definition of diversion” issue, on which California submitted proposed
language, which was rejected. California states that “we believe that
representatives of the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe and Sierra Pacific Power
Company are attempting to limit the use of California’s allocation beyond
what is specified in P.L. 101-618, and this is unacceptable.” Apparently, other
parties to TROA characterize the issue as one of “accounting.”
California went on to note that “every unsettled issue is, to at least one
major interest on one side of the border or the other, a critical issue. . .[and
a]ccordingly, California will not approve a TROA to accompany the Draft
EIS/EIR until these unsettled issues (in addition to the “definition of
diversion”), the “water well,” “mid-course correction,” and possibly other
TROA issues are worked out to the mutual satisfaction of the parties. This
means that representatives of the State of California must and will take the
necessary time to consult with local interests in the California portion of the
Truckee River Basin so they may support the draft TROA without significant
reservations.” California representatives interviewed for this report
indicated dissatisfaction with the TROA having “dragged on way too long”
and being “stalled.” The concern expressed by California representatives is
stated to be based in part on a perception that Interior and the Tribe are
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attempting to extend control on river operations to benefit the Tribe and
Pyramid Lake fish beyond what has been agreed under P.L. 101-618.
The Use of Models
Many involved in the TROA negotiations pointed to the development and use
of good, flexible models for water quality and water quantity as a key to
negotiating a new TROA. The following comment to the draft report was
received from USGS:
The feasibility of proposed operations and sometimes original concepts
were the direct result of model simulations. The exact amounts and
timing of credits and exchanges, their consequences and so forth were
the product of modeling efforts. Of course, long hours in meetings and
compromise were also necessary to come to agreement, but if not for
modeling simulations which provided some assurance to agreement
signatories that, ‘Yes, this will work,” or ‘No, this will not work,’
negotiations would not have advanced nearly to the point where they
now stand.
Unfortunately, the only available model was not physically-based, had
a monthly time-step, and was not documented. The first two
deficiencies make accurate analysis of dynamic water issues such as
water quality, instream flows, ramping and short-term flood waves (to
name but a few) impossible to examine. The third deficiency (lack of
model documentation) has made all parties dependent upon a single
person (a consultant to Sierra Pacific) to make the changes to the
rather unwieldy model that he (the consultant) has created. Although
most parties say they are ‘comfortable’ with his results, no one really
knows the details in his code nor how he has cast the gray areas of law
and agreements, some of which are only now being discussed. How
were such aspects simulated two years ago, when the details are only
now being discussed?
Several federal efforts have been launched to document this model,
none of which have been successful due to the extremely convoluted
nature of the coding and the lack or inadequacy of internal comments
within the model code. This situation in which all parties are
dependent upon a single person and a single model has prevented each
individual party from making their own computer runs and
developing their own positions. Instead of simultaneous runs, each
party had to wait for the consultant to work their idea into his model
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and then had to trust that their idea was being adequately
characterized in simulations. In our estimation, this delayed the
development of a TROA and was a constant source of nagging distrust.
One benefit of the model being developed by the USGS for use in the
public domain is that it will be well-documented and supported, thus
allowing federal expertise and a legal defense that will not require the
only federal expert witness to be the consultant for the opposition, such
as is the case now. . .One of the problems USGS is experiencing while
developing a daily operations model of our own is that a
comprehensive listing of decrees and agreements dictating current (preTROA) operations is not available. . .The lack of formal definition for
system operations slowed the development of our own model and any
verification one would want to undertake with the monthly model.
Further, because the negotiating parties do not fully understand the
whole system, there were not always sufficient checks and balances in
interpretation of the monthly modeling results or within the
negotiations.
A series of memos written by a group of software engineers and modeling
specialists employed by Interior to review and attempt to document the
Negotiation Model for TROA raise serious questions about whether the
Truckee-Carson settlement is in fact proceeding with the assistance of the
type of “good model” noted by participants to be essential. The following are
excerpted from the comments made by these experts:
I think the model is in such a state that it is essentially impossible to
go through with understanding. Furthermore, I could not and would
not defend it in court. Because it is so difficult to understand I have
reached the point that I think proceeding would be unreasonable. . .
The Negotiation Model has. . .grown in an out-of-control fashion, often
in pressure-cooker situations that required major revisions and results
in a day or two. The code is now extremely convoluted. One cannot tell
what parts of the overall program perform a certain function, or even
which parts of a single subroutine might. In going through the code we
often heard, when we questioned a seemingly invalid operation, that
the problem was probably fixed up somewhere else. There was no
clear, understandable path through the code and ever arriving at
understanding of the model’s operation would, I think , be next to
impossible.
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It is extremely difficult to separate whether operations are simply
personal estimates (usually with little justification) on processes and
constants, or whether the choices are actually based on rational
analysis or dictated by court cases. The model has almost no internal
documentation describing [its] operation, the reasoning behind choices,
the flow of logic. . .
Yet another aspect of the coding style, which makes the code almost
impossible to understand, is that the program uses local variable
names of “dog, cat, rat, cow, hog, fox. . .[so that] it is nearly impossible
to read through a subroutine and make sense of it. The meanings of
these variables can change many times (even as many as 20 times)
within a single subroutine. . .
Because of the lack of a clear understanding of the model’s operation, I
do not think that one can assure the model results are valid. . .
In many places the code is extremely convoluted, making it difficult to
tell where or how or under what conditions a particular calculation is
made; many calculated quantities are constrained by a number of
upper and/or lower limits, some of which appear either superfluous or
irrelevant; some switches, which prescribe the path the computer
follows through the code, are undefined or incompletely defined, so
that the conditions under which a particular path is followed are
unclear; some portions of the code are apparently never used, but
nevertheless remain in place; many temporary variables are assigned
names which have no connection with what they represent; in many
cases, the same temporary variable name is used over and over within
a subroutine to represent different quantities; and in a number of
subroutines, hydrologic quantities are calculated using coefficients or
factors which, apparently, are not explained or justified anywhere. . .
The TROA model is such a patchwork of assumptions, physical and
political simplifications, and convoluted code that it is difficult to say
what the output results might represent or whether they approach a
realistic representation of the water system. . .
No mere human could in good conscience profess to understand [the
TROA model] in detail and prove that the results are “right.” . . . On
the other hand, it is probably difficult to prove that it is “wrong” in
any overall sense, even though it is not hard to point out specific
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instances of inordinate sensitivity, small errors, arbitrary
assumptions. . ..
Rarely have I seen a case where the need to start over is more clear-cut.
The TROA model cries out for a new start when viewed from
any number of perspectives. . .The model is hopelessly complex for
anyone to understand. . .There is not adequate internal documentation. . .Documenting the overall strategy is probably impossible given
the lack of an overall design. . .Our work showed various sensitivity
problems where tiny differences caused substantial differences in paths
through the code. . .
As the TROA world regards the present model much as a religion, no
matter how good a new model is, it will be measured against the old
TROA “King James” version with the burden of proof resting on the
new, not the old.
. . .the present model is not understandable, and probably not
defensible at any deep level. . .
. . .the Negotiation Model represents, I think, a political document, not
a scientific one. It is telling the principals. . .what they want to hear.
Any time this was not true, the model was examined to see if the
“problem” could be “fixed.” No more clear example of this phenomenon
occurred than. . .when the model said. . .that the cui-ui were better off
without the TROA than with it. . .[they] went into the model and found
the “problem” and—surprise—now the cui-ui do better under TROA. I
suspect this happened a lot. Any time the results were not favorable,
they would look hard for a problem, or change a process or parameter
to give the politically acceptable “more reasonable” result. By contrast,
I suspect that if the model were telling them what they wanted to hear,
errors would go undetected.
Among the recommendations made by these experts, with possible
application elsewhere, are these:
!
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!

Thorough investigation and documentation of existing system operation,
including a process flowchart, are strongly recommended.

!

A suggestion was made to simplify TROA by setting aside the question of
who owned water at particular locations in the system, and simply
operate the system in the most efficient way possible, not worrying about
where who’s water was in the system and all of the associated exchanges,
credits and “types of water.” Storage amounts and priorities would be
maintained, water rights protected and decrees satisfied, but with much
greater simplicity and flexibility, according to proponents of this idea.
Federal Leadership

Federal leadership was exercised in an unusual way, through congressional
apportionment, to create the Settlement Agreement, and continues to be
exercised in forging the Truckee River Operating Agreement (TROA).
According to E. Leif Reid, this means of interstate water allocation had been
used only once before, in settling a dispute between Arizona and California
regarding lower Colorado River water.229
Checchio and Colby state that the Truckee-Carson water settlement
highlights the crucial role of effective leadership in resolving water disputes,
with specific reference to the role played by Senator Harry Reid.230 E. Leif
Reid argues that the use of congressional apportionment in allocating
disputed interstate waters is more efficient, less expensive, more flexible,
and more likely to fairly accommodate all legitimate interests, leading to a
substantively better outcome. However, given the situation with the
Newlands irrigators described above, it is difficult to wholeheartedly affirm
his conclusion that “congressional apportionment differs significantly in that
it can achieve a positive outcome irrespective of whether all the disputants
reach agreement. Thus congressional apportionment has a greater potential
for success than compacting.”
Congress can impose its will, as it has on the irrigators in the Settlement
Agreement, but can this be construed as success when an unwilling party
surrenders its resources under duress and continues to challenge the
outcome and the process? Is it success even if a relatively powerless
contestant is forced to accede? An argument in favor of greater exercise of
federal power in settling interstate water disputes, particularly in today’s
West, would seem hard to sustain. E. Leif Reid adumbrates the concerns
that arise when he states, “settlement negotiations are as yet fraught with
distrust and animosity [but] parties negotiating under. . .the shadow of
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congressional intervention would be more inclined to deal with each other in
good faith.” It is doubtful that the Newlands irrigators would agree that they
have experienced an increase in good faith. Equally questionable is whether
casting a longer congressional shadow, with its attendant implied coercion, is
a good idea in western water problem-solving at this particular moment in
American history. Certainly, state officials interviewed do not feel that this
is a model that ought to be repeated throughout the West.
At the same time, it must be acknowledged that but for the exercise of
federal power, the California-Nevada interstate compact would have
neglected the legitimate interests of the Native American tribes. On the
other hand, the Settlement Act is felt by the irrigators to similarly neglect
their interests.
Thus, in comparing congressional apportionment and interstate compacting,
it appears that neither is inherently superior in assuring that all interests
are protected. This appears to be more a matter of social consensus at the
time the instrument is used than an advantage of one form of interstate
water dispute resolution over another. Either is quite capable of overlooking
important interests, and, unless pushed to extinction, such interests never go
away. One cannot fully agree, with E. Leif Reid, that “The Truckee dispute
saw a seemingly intractable situation resolve itself in relatively few years” so
long as the rural communities and Newlands irrigators have not joined that
agreement.
Significant leadership was also exercised below the level of Congress, in the
Department of Interior and its administrative agencies. The evaluation of
this leadership, not surprisingly, depends upon the positions of the various
interests involved and the degree to which the actions of Interior leaders
furthered the agenda of the one doing the evaluation. The leadership of some
individuals, such as Betsy Rieke, was noted by many players for achieving
the trust of all sides and thus significantly advancing the process towards
solutions.
However, the prevailing feeling is that success in the settlement negotiations
required “joint leadership.” Both Sierra Pacific and the Tribe took on a
substantial initiative to lead. Late in the process, California is said to have
brought about a change in its representation that resulted in better top-level
communications and support in California, and brought better cohesiveness
and leadership to the process.
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The Preliminary Settlement Agreement, negotiated without federal
involvement by two of the key players in the Truckee-Carson conflict
provided a breakthrough foundation on which the subsequent Settlement
Agreement could be erected and raises interesting questions as to the role of
federal leadership. Should similar negotiations, without federal involvement, be encouraged in other western water situations? The answer appears
to be a qualified “yes.”
Federal leaders themselves applauded the initiative taken by the Tribe and
Sierra Pacific, and said they would consider allowing non-federal parties to
work out solutions involving the use of federal facilities in the future so long
as federal approval were then obtained and costs were within reasonable
bounds. This was a relatively low-cost solution that gave the federal government an opportunity to develop funds (storage charges which go to fund to
restore Pyramid Lake and Lahontan Valley wetlands), assisting in meeting
an obligation that the federal government was going to have to take on
anyway. Further, TROA negotiations were built on this base.
Some federal officials see the history of federal presence in the TruckeeCarson River basins as a legacy of broken promises: “many promises have
been made, but not kept, both to the tribes and the irrigators.” Overall, the
assessment of federal role and presence by federal officials themselves is a
mixed report card. Some point to the Newlands Project as a success, and to
management plans for the upstream reservoirs on the Truckee River to serve
recovery of the cui-ui, recreation, flood control, water quality as well as
providing some security for M&I water users. Others find Newlands a
failure.
When the issues leading to the Water Quality Agreement arose, federal
leadership actively promoted regional solutions and settlements. Secretary
Babbitt expressed an interest in “broadening the range of settlement” and
Interior made the proposals that brought this solution to table, along with
the Pyramid Lake Tribe.
Insofar as the federal government needed to speak with “one voice” (see
above for a discussion of this initiative), leadership was exercised quickly and
effectively to coordinate the various agencies of Interior and to look beyond
the PSA to identify other problems that could be solved in the process of
TROA negotiations. Principal benefits of the Truckee Carson Coordination
Office (TCCO) included establishment of good rapport with all players and
provision of local staff to deal with issues on ground, facilitate resolution, and
achieve open communications. This model should be considered elsewhere in
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west where multiple bureaus are involved in water conflicts. Without such
coordination, as one Washington leader put it, delegation of responsibility to
multiple field bureaus results in their doing a good job of vetoing one another
without resolving the issues. This yields “least common denominator”
solutions. Washington also recommended that a local coordination office be
paired with a D.C. official not beholden to any of the bureaus or Assistant
Secretaries. Still others felt that the principal benefit of TCCO was that it
“allowed [them] to get to ‘no’ quicker.”
Role of Justice Department
The role of Justice is to handle litigation, represent federal agencies,
establish the government’s position on legal issues and advise client federal
agencies when a decision is made to pursue litigation. The role includes
conducting settlement negotiations either to settle existing litigation or to
avoid future litigation. Justice has a commitment to and devotes extensive
efforts to Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) processes and seeks to
facilitate settlements of issues by agreement rather than through litigation.
Justice is also charged by law with the enforcement of federal laws, including
the Endangered Species Act and antitrust laws.
Along with the Executive Branch, Justice has the power to resolve agency
conflicts to establish a coherent government position where litigation is at
issue. The exercise of this considerable power has left many local players
feeling that Justice overstepped the boundaries of its role in protecting the
legal interests of the United States, to the extent that it sometimes made
technical decisions beyond its competence and often inappropriately drove
management policy.
From the point of view of Justice, the Department has tried to be very careful
to take positions on legal, not technical issues. The Truckee-Carson and
Lake Tahoe are all managed pursuant to federal court orders on cases in
which, in all three instances, the United States brought action as plaintiffs
(the Alpine, Orr Ditch, and Truckee River General Electric decrees). This
situation is unusual, according to Justice, as compared to other western
rivers not having this level of federal control, and Justice must assure that
actions and decisions taken in the basins are consistent with those decrees.
Justice also points to the long history of litigation over operation of Newlands
project. Hardly an issue exists that has not been litigated or may be.
Virtually any conflict raises the potential of going back into court regarding
interpretation of existing decrees; Justice estimates that the United States
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has been in court 10-15 times. Some of these suits have been resolved and
others remain active. In this context, Justice asserts that proactive care and
preparation is warranted. Also, under P.L. 101-618, TROA is mandated but
contingent upon settlement of all outstanding litigation relating to those
solely dependent for water on the Truckee River (this does not include TCID
because it also gets water from the Carson). Such litigation cannot be
resolved without the active participation of the Justice Department.
Notwithstanding, the view was widely-expressed among participants on
many sides of the issues, including all levels of government involved in the
negotiated settlement and a significant proportion of the federal
representatives interviewed, that the involvement of the Department of
Justice in the process was at times counterproductive. Only at the highest
(Washington, D.C.) levels did we find the role exercised by the Department of
Justice unequivocally supported. This view of Justice was so widely held that
it suggests that there should be very careful assessment of the role of the
Justice department where it is involved in western water controversies, to
avoid its overtaking the legitimate roles of the federal management agencies
and decision-makers.
Particularly in its influence on Interior, Justice is seen as driving what issues
would be developed and pursued, and how they would be developed and
pursued. State and local officials (and locally-based federal officials) are not
shy in expressing the view that the situation would be much improved and
more amenable to final solution if Justice could be limited to a less intrusive
role. Examples include decisions and positions taken on the level of NEPA
compliance allowed, the investigation of groundwater issues, and river
management and operations.
Often, irrigators feel they are held to the strict letter of laws and decrees
when the ability to be more flexible is basis of settlement and the TROA.
The federal government has an opportunity to carefully consider the
tradeoffs against strict, legalistic interpretations and strategies in western
water policy-making, to facilitate movement on the issues and avoid
unproductive disputes that may stifle creative solutions. While narrow
interpretations are doubtless defensible, where more flexible interpretations
may be allowable they might better open doors to final resolution.
OCAP and Recoupment
Effects of OCAP.—Interviews and comments received indicate that the
1988 OCAP are being largely adhered to, and are substantially reducing
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diversions of water from the Truckee River and improving flows into Pyramid
Lake. Federal officials and tribal representatives assert that this is
occurring with little or no adverse impact on the irrigation of validly waterrighted land.
OCAP, in combination with several court cases, is said to have served to
significantly reduce Newlands Project diversions from the Truckee,231 in
order to provide as much water as possible to Pyramid Lake. According to
information submitted by the Tribe, from 1915 through 1967 (prior to OCAP),
an average of approximately 240,000 acre feet of Truckee River water per year
was diverted at Derby Dam to the Newlands Project. Under existing
conditions and the 1988 OCAP, the average annual Truckee River diversions
are approximately 110,000 acre feet.
The Tribe goes on to state that, if the proposed Adjusted OCAP are adopted,
average annual Truckee River diversions to the Newlands Project would be
further reduced to an annual average of approximately 90,000 acre feet. This
would be a reduction of more than 60%, with virtually the entire reduction
(approximately 150,0000 acre feet per year) going to the lower Truckee River
(below Derby Dam) and Pyramid Lake.
The Tribe further asserts that, with the increasing urbanization of the Town of
Fernley, the continued conversion of Truckee Division agricultural water
rights to M&I purposes, and the anticipated Truckee Division water right
acquisitions pursuant to the 1996 Water Quality Agreement, there is expected
to be a further reduction of as much as an additional 30,000 acre feet per year.
If so, that would bring the average Truckee River diversions down to an
average of approximately 60,000 acre feet per year, a 75% reduction amounting
to about 180,000 acre-feet, on an annual average, from the pre-OCAP period.
Therefore, the Tribe believes that reductions required under the OCAP are
directly responsible for ameliorating the drop of Pyramid Lake level even
during severe drought. Before implementation of OCAP, Pyramid Lake
reached a low point of 3783.9 feet in elevation. As noted above, the current
elevation is about 3808 feet, a gain of 24 feet in spite of severe drought during
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Under the 1988 OCAP, model runs predict the
lake will eventually reach an elevation of 3838.8 feet, which is 54.9 feet higher
than the historic low.
The enforcement of the OCAP also has reduced the outflow of water from the
Carson Division of the Newlands Project to the adjacent wetlands. In the
Settlement Act, Congress determined that the best way to obtain and secure a
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reliable supply of good quality water for the Lahontan Valley wetlands was
through the acquisition of water rights, rather than by depending on Project
outflows and inefficiencies. Approximately 20,000 acre feet of water rights
have been purchased by the federal and state governments from willing sellers
within the Project and transferred to the wetlands since 1988. The current
program calls for the purchase of at least 55,000 acre feet of additional water
rights from willing sellers both within the Carson Division of the Project and
from the Carson Valley above Lahontan Reservoir.
Reclamation reported to Congress at a 1994 hearing on P.L. 101-681 oversight that the OCAP efficiencies in place since 1988 were tested in only two
full-supply years (1989 and 1993). In both years, TCID failed to meet the
OCAP target efficiency. The efficiencies achieved in both years were similar
(58.4% in 1989 and 58.8% in 1993), while the phased-in target efficiency
continued to increase (from 62.1% in 1989 to 66.4% in 1993). In no year but
1989 did net diversions exceed expected diversions, and then by just
3,000 acre-feet. Thus, the anticipated shortage was not realized. Reclamation indicated that “it is expected that diversions to the Project will
remain less than expected in the OCAP as a result of fewer acres irrigated in
the Project than predicted by the OCAP.”
Further testimony at the 1994 Congressional oversight hearing indicated
that the end-of-June storage target in the 1988 OCAP for Lahontan Reservoir (215,000 acre-feet) was nearly met in 1989 and was exceeded by
34,000 acre-feet in 1993 (due to Carson River runoff well in excess of forecast in both March and April of that year). Thus, the testimony states, in
April 1993 diversions from the Truckee River to Lahontan Reservoir were
restricted for the first time under this OCAP. The OCAP prevented diversions from the Truckee River through August 1993 and again in October of
that year.
The fact that diversions were not actually restricted under OCAP until 1993,
plus the relatively low correlation between the actual efficiency reported in
the 1994 Congressional testimony and the net diversions reported in the
same testimony and the relatively small efficiency gains (about 4% since
1988), all leave the question unclear as to how much of the change in Truckee
diversions and Pyramid Lake levels is due to OCAP and how much to other
drivers such as drought (reducing the amount available for diversion from the
Truckee), high flows (increasing the relative amount available from the
Carson), water rights acquisitions (reducing irrigated acreage), other
reductions in irrigated acreage, or other factors. Statements drawing a direct
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correlation between OCAP and reductions in diversions and increases in lake
levels have not provided this analysis.
According to Interior, the proposed Adjusted OCAP should have minimal
impact on irrigation operations and then only as a somewhat greater
shortage in severe drought years because of reduced carryover storage.
Interior comments to the draft report states that the lion’s share of reduced
diversions comes from reduced spills, evaporation and seepage. The proposed
Adjusted OCAP would lower the efficiency target to 66%, approximately one
percent lower than the 1988 OCAP (at present, the Newlands Project
achieves about 62% efficiency). Other OCAP effects include those on
Lahontan Reservoir (a recreation facility), wetlands (less water) and
socioeconomic impacts.
The proposed Adjusted OCAP notes that proposed storage targets are based
on the TROA model, which assumed reduced Project water demand, lower
efficiency targets, current Truckee River operations, and Project shortages
consistent with the 1988 OCAP. Among other things, the model runs held
the frequency and magnitude of Project shortages consistent with the 1988
OCAP. (However, as noted, the projected shortage under the 1988 OCAP
never materialized.) The rule states that shortages to the Project are reduced
under the proposed storage targets by approximately 2,500 acre-feet
compared to the 1988 OCAP regime applied to 1995 water use. Comments
received on the draft rule included a question asking why the end of June
storage target in Lahontan Reservoir was reduced by 19% when the project
acreage is only 9% less than anticipated in the 1988 OCAP. The reply is not
entirely intelligible, but asserts that a lesser demand in the Carson Division
justifies the reduction.
Irrigators feel that, because of drought followed by high waters, the 1988
OCAP has not been adequately tested and the proposed Adjusted OCAP will
be much more severe in terms of diversions and reservoir target levels. In
their view, it attempts to capture a shortage that had been expected from the
1988 OCAP but was not realized, and the effort to make this revision a
federal regulation is intended to place hurdles between it and the judicial
system, and to do so before December 31, 1997. (The 1988 OCAP were
approved by U.S. District Court subject to a hearing on objections raised by
various parties and the 1990 Settlement Act directed that the 1988 OCAP
remain in place through 1997, hence it was never published in the Federal
Register.) Comments on the Adjusted OCAP strongly oppose the regulation.
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Nevada officials and Newlands irrigators commenting on the proposed
Adjusted OCAP objected to the short time allowed for comment, particularly
since it included the holiday season and coincided with the January 1997
floods. TCID’s attorney wrote “The methods employed by BOR and Interior
in this process are foreign to any concept of a democratic government and
reflect a dictatorial attitude designed to disenfranchise the water rights
owners most affected by the OCAP.” The comment period was extended by
an additional 60 days.
Issues Associated with OCAP.—The controversy over OCAP appears to turn
on the issues of water rights, conservation and the definition of “waste”
under conditions of water scarcity and competing federal responsibilities,
including tribal trust, endangered species, and serving the water rights held
by the individual farmers comprising the Newlands Project. Because the
federal government (Reclamation) contracts TCID to operate and maintain
the Newlands Project, federal water priorities and responsibilities come into
play in determining issues of water use, and conflicts with state law and
regulation have resulted.
Under Nevada water law, beneficial use is the limit and extent of a water
right, a principle often cited by all sides to water disputes. State water law
does not provide for government to intervene in determining that a water
user may not “need” all of the water used under a perfected right, but this is
just what OCAP, in effect, does. Nevada water law does provide, as do other
western states, a criterion of “reasonableness” with respect to water use, but
it does not specifically prohibit “waste” as do some other states. State law
states that “rights to the use of water shall be limited and restricted to so
much thereof as may be necessary, when reasonably and economically used
for irrigation and other beneficial purposes. . ..,” however this does not clearly
support a determination, such as that upon which OCAP is based, that an
inefficient water system is wasteful and that those who use that system
should have their water rights reduced accordingly.
Therefore, the irrigators view OCAP as a “taking” (as discussed above). In
that regard, it is interesting that the proposed Adjusted OCAP includes the
following statement: “The proposed rule does not represent a government
action that would interfere with constitutionally protected property rights
and does not require a Takings Implication Assessment under E.O. 12630.”
The OCAP have been resisted and challenged by TCID and the water users
on the Newlands Project. The courts have upheld both the regulatory
authority of the Secretary of the Interior over the diversion, use and
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management of water within the Newlands Project and the validity of the
OCAP. They have also held that the Secretary is obligated by virtue of his
trust responsibility to the Tribe to utilize his regulatory authority to limit
diversions of Truckee River water to the Newlands Project and away from
Pyramid Lake to the maximum extent possible consistent with the applicable
decrees and contracts. Congress ratified the 1988 OCAP, reaffirmed the
Secretary’s trust obligation and applied it to the implementation of the
settlement in Section 209(j) of the Settlement Act.
TCID’s unsuccessful challenge to the OCAP and refusal to comply with the
OCAP (until 1988) also gave rise to the recoupment action (discussed above)
in which the United States and the Tribe are seeking recovery of more than
one million acre-feet of Truckee River water. The Tribe and the United
States claim that that amount of Truckee River water was deliberately and
illegally diverted away from Pyramid Lake by TCID in violation of the
applicable OCAP from 1973 through 1987.

OCAP as a Problem-Solving Tool.—Perhaps the most illuminating question
that could be asked in evaluating the OCAP strategy is the degree to which
OCAP and recoupment actions have worked to increase consensus and
problem-solving in the basins. The Tribe and Interior assert that it is helping
solve key resource management problems by limiting diversions from the
Truckee River and increasing flows to Pyramid Lake (see above regarding the
question as to the degree to which OCAP is itself responsible for the
observed reductions in diversions and lake level increases since 1988). On
the other hand, it is apparent that OCAP have worked to increase conflict
between the irrigators and the other parties in the basin.
Overall, is OCAP the best way to achieve the goals of water conservation and
reduced Truckee River diversions? Several of those interviewed felt that
OCAP-style accounting measures and targets have diverted attention from
larger questions and that the manner of implementation or negotiation of
these measures probably has made both the overall settlement and the
achievement of gains in efficiency more difficult than they needed to be.
Market incentives and enlightened self-interest are cited as more effective
motivators for desired behavior than onerous, mandatory rules.
Not everyone who supports the efficiency concept agrees that the OCAP are
the best method to achieve that goal. The OCAP are seen by some as having
been used as a handle to micro-manage the irrigators. The perception is that
the screw was tightened and tightened to drive irrigators into becoming
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“willing sellers.” Some feel that this is poor public policy: driven by
accounting measures and targets (e.g., acreage base, water duties,
efficiencies, etc.), these targets became the object of contention, losing sight
of the more fundamental larger issues. One person said “everyone got so
caught up in the numbers game that it becomes obsessive. It also raised the
level of bitterness and frustration with the federal government.”
One suggestion was to create a fixed water budget and let farmers keep any
savings they can achieve beyond meeting that budget—cut the link between
water and land and allow water to move flexibly in a genuine market.
Allowing water to move around will let the best farmers farm under this
theory.
The continued federal pursuit of stringent OCAP is positive from many
points of view but counter-productive to a Truckee-Carson River Basin
solution that includes irrigators. Negotiating under the cloud of OCAP was
bound to heighten the feeling of unfairness on the part of the irrigators and
hence shorten the field of compromise available to the participants in the
process. There was nothing in the nature of a negotiation in the federal
demand that water be wrung from existing practice—no matter how
reasonable it was to curtail waste—and thus the sincerity of the stated
objective to negotiate a solution was brought into question. So long as OCAP
was pursued in tandem with a negotiated settlement, the one appeared to
put the lie to the other.
According to senior federal officials who were involved in the 1988 OCAP it
was based on Section 7 consultation under the Endangered Species Act and
received a “no jeopardy” opinion, meaning that it represented an agreement
on water use that would protect fish. The proposed Adjusted OCAP raises a
question as to what federal trust responsibility requires it, if the existing
OCAP already avoids jeopardy to the listed threatened or endangered
species.
The Fish and Wildlife Service, in comments to the draft report, cites
Section 2(c)(1) of the Endangered Species Act to the effect that federal
agencies are required to conserve listed species and use their authorities to
further the purposes of the Act, which include conserving ecosystems of listed
species and providing programs for conserving listed species. Conserve, under
the Act, means to use all methods and procedures necessary to bring a listed
species to the point where the protection of the Act is no longer required. To
this end, one of the purposes of refining OCAP is to help satisfy the federal
government’s responsibilities under the Act to recover listed species.
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This response appears to again raise the question of the open-ended nature
of the federal government’s responsibilities (as defined here) with respect to
the demand for water and the irrigators need for some certainty in that
regard. It also does not show how the lesser standard of “conserve” as
opposed to “no jeopardy” provides sufficient basis for reducing water
delivered under perfected rights.
Also, as noted earlier, the Adjusted OCAP does not take account of land idled
in contested water transfers in the computation of water-right acreage.
Further, the federal government has not allowed irrigators to receive credit
for water used for environmental purposes, such as Fernley Wildlife
Management Area. OCAP are regarded by the irrigators as forced decreased
diversions from Derby Dam, thus promoting a counterproductive focus on the
issue of rights and “takings” when solutions lie in the direction of a focus on
interests.
Beyond these issues, the goals set by Congress for the Newlands Project
Efficiency Study raise more questions. P.L. 101-618 requires investigation of
the feasibility of achieving 75% efficiency. The Nevada State Engineer
commented, “I don’t believe that there is an irrigation district in the West
using flood irrigation that can achieve 75% efficiency. It is an unrealistic
goal.” The conclusion that these efficiencies are achievable stands in
contrast, and may open the door for further reductions in water rights
deliveries, however the cost of such achievement may be prohibitive.
When parties interviewed were asked for examples where such efficiencies
had been achieved, the only known examples of irrigation districts that could
be cited used center pivot irrigation. Elimination of a few outliers could
increase efficiency toward the 1988 OCAP standard of 68%, but it was felt to
achieve 68% would require extensive heavy lining of canals (which would
raise issues regarding recharge).
Reclamation is charged to supply decreed water in each irrigation district,
but new modeling by the State Engineer indicates that greater shortages
would occur during times of drought (see Comment Response 21 as well).
This elicited the comment “I never heard of a regulation that would short
farmers in time of drought.”
The federal government is felt to have been inflexible and unrealistic on
OCAP. There appears to be a feeling on both the local and state levels that
these requirements are rammed through by the federal government with
little consultation or consideration of their impacts. The federal view is that
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OCAP responds to court orders tied to specific Indian trust issues (Pyramid
Lake tribe).
In summary, the federal government appears to be locked into pursuing a
course that has long been open to question as to whether it truly serves the
needs of the larger process. The lesson to be learned for western water policy
would appear to be the value in stepping back from the consuming drive to
enforce compliance and revisit larger objectives. In this case, the need for the
Adjusted OCAP appears not to be well documented in terms of a clear
definition of ultimate water requirements needed to meet endangered species
and tribal trust responsibilities. It raises unproductive questions of
underlying motives with regard to forced water rights sales and an
unproductive renewed focus on rights in general. Given that a number of
those interviewed felt that TCID could probably accept the 1988 OCAP, the
usefulness of asking for more water must be tested against the effect it will
have on the ability to achieve an overall workable solution in the TruckeeCarson River Basins.
Interior responds: TCID was offered the opportunity to provide OCAP alternatives for examination in the effort to develop a new, long-term OCAP, but
has declined to submit any proposals. . .. Interior has held extensive discussions with Newlands water right holders on various alternative approaches to
conserving water on the Newlands Project. . .[including] four half-day meetings set up by Interior to specifically discuss, address, and take comments on
federal proposals related to the four technical issues that are proposed for
change in the “new OCAP.”
Water Budget Alternatives.—A more tenable solution may be to negotiate a
fixed water budget with the irrigators, allowing them to keep any savings in
excess of the target. This approach, which has been suggested by others
involved in the settlement process over a number of years, might promote
better relationships and result in a more effective program as well.
Consideration of such an approach should include the tradeoffs in focusing
efficiency policies on operations versus water delivery efficiency improvements and the degree to which a mix of these measures be implemented. A
means of monitoring and evaluation would need to be defined, including
decision as to who should be involved in these activities and the responses
that should be taken to adjust requirements or incentives if efficiencies do
not improve as desired.
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Such a solution might be facilitated if future legislative and/or negotiated
solutions allow irrigators to more flexibly transfer water rights among
themselves as best meets their requirements, overall efficiency goals, and the
upstream storage flexibility requirements discussed above. Substituting a
self-governing, incentive-based system for the current OCAP, which grinds
against a final resolution, together with the removal of the federal government and Tribe from micro-managing the irrigators, could well provide both
an improved performance and the basis for a proactive solution.
Interior comments to the draft report state that “a fixed diversion limit was on
the table in the facilitated negotiations. While there are attractive features to
such an approach, great care needs to be exercised to assure that water rights
are protected or waived when providing flexibility between delivery system
conservation and on-farm conservation. A small group of irrigators can block
use of a system based on on-farm efficiencies.

4.5 Watershed Management and Carrying Capacity
Issues of fairness and rights dominate the efforts to implement PL 101-618.
With the settlement as the foundation for TROA, other negotiations are
taking place to address issues not directly resolved by the settlement or by
TROA. There have been suggestions that more comprehensive planning may
be an alterative to the on-going process which continues to generate
litigation—a sure sign of a lack of perceived unfairness and unresolved
issues. Three alternatives for basin-wide resource management are
discussed in this section: watershed resource ecosystem-based planning,
land management and the federal program known as LESA.
Watershed Management
Water resource managers are increasingly relying on watershed
management to protect and restore water quality and to manage water
supply. Watershed management is an integrated, holistic strategy for more
effectively ensuring water quality, water supply and flood management.
Water quality means meeting the objectives for the chemical, physical and
biological integrity of water requiring a dynamic and inclusive system of
planning and management. Watersheds are defined by hydrologically
defined drainage basins, rather than political boundaries. Creating a
watershed planning area encompasses not only the water resource, such as a
stream, river, lake, estuary or aquifer, but all the land from which water
drains.
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Because watersheds include vast land areas, resource management
addresses land uses ranging from timber harvest to urban development.
These disparate land user groups must work together if planning solutions
for watershed management are to be made possible. The stakeholder or
interest-driven process has been used successfully in local and regional
resource management efforts, and relies on collaborative and cooperative
planning. The approach emphasizes the involvement of all affected stakeholders and fosters the cooperation of federal, state and local organizations.
This comprehensive method provides an integrated management plan upon
which different resource managers and land use planners develop specific
management strategies.
The strength of the watershed management approach is based on several
benefits:
!

Governmental and non-governmental agencies can accomplish more
through cooperation with all stakeholders than by acting independently;

!

Limited resources are shared and spent more efficiently because of the
coordination;

!

Those most likely to affect and to be affected by watershed management
participate as stakeholders and bring local knowledge and noninstitutional solutions;

!

The burden of resource protection is more evenly distributed among all
parties.

In an era of seeking environmentally sensitive and sustainable economic
growth and development, watershed management furthers these goals.
Evaluation of the Settlement Agreement and its implementation process
suggests that it has been limited by its focus. This focus has not served to
incorporate all the stakeholders within the Truckee-Carson basin who could
contribute to solutions, including providing multiple benefits for new
programs necessary to supply water to the wetlands and tribal interests.
Currently, the burden for implementation (in terms of water) is centered on
the Newlands Project/Churchill County area. Opportunities for new
partnerships in sharing the challenge of meeting environmental and tribal
needs could be met by a Truckee-Carson basin watershed management or
integrated resource management program.
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Commentators to the draft report assert, however, that the facilitated
negotiations did focus on the entire watershed of the two basins in Nevada
and that, between the Lahontan Valley Water Rights Acquisition EIS and
the TROA EIS, the environment of both river basins has been described and
analyzed (and that a third EIS is being prepared that deals holistically with
the lower basins of the two rivers).

Steps for Watershed Management.—The planning area or boundary of a
comprehensive watershed management process should be based on the
issues compelling the need for watershed management. Strictly speaking the
watershed is the entire drainage zone contributing to the surface and
groundwater. However, several watershed planning process are applied to
smaller areas sometimes called hydrologic units, but more commonly called
“watersheds”. Such watershed segmentation limits solutions to problems of
the study area even if the source or cause of water degradation in quality or
supply may be within another segment.
The settlement and negotiations have focused on water supply to the
wetlands and tribal interests. Expanding the “problem area” to include the
basin might increase opportunities to:
!

Describe the hydrological system and its historic function;

!

Describe the fluvial geomorphology and its relationship to proposed
solutions;

!

Identify flood management needs and opportunities which could be used
conjunctively for off stream storage for water efficiency and integrated
operations;

!

Describe the natural history, its historic role in the landscape ecology and
potential resource management alternatives; and

!

Describe the carrying capacity of the basin for a water budget to meet the
water supply needs for urban, environmental, tribal and agricultural
users.

The Truckee-Carson basins, like most watersheds functions and systems,
have been altered by human activities, most notably transbasin water
diversion. To begin to prepare for comprehensive basin-wide watershed
management several steps are necessary:
248

Critical Issues: Case Study Discussion

!

Public education about the need for watershed management is essential
to attract people where they live and work and connect their quality of
life and economic well-being to the watershed. The public education
effort for the Truckee-Carson is partially met de facto by newspaper
articles, and local “group” initiatives. There is no basin newsletter, or
clearinghouse for news relating to watershed management.

!

Involve a variety of people or stakeholders in the planning process
including those who are directly affected, and those who are indirectly
affected. The participation during the negotiations and settlement has
been broadly inclusive, but there may be additional stakeholders may
wish to be part of a watershed management effort as well as some who
have felt unsatisfied with the process that has gone on to date.

!

Demonstrate an understanding of the socioeconomic issues associated
with watershed management. The settlement does not address the
socioeconomic issues in a comprehensive manner. The LESA program
discussed below provides criteria for considering these issues, but its
application is limited to the Newlands Project/Churchill County region.
Key people interviewed for this report noted a lack of an economic plan to
address the effects of the water rights acquisition on long-term
agricultural production. While LESA uses criteria for suitability for land
conversion, this does not address the overall socioeconomic structure
within the whole basin.

!

Ensure objective fact-finding process to confirm facts so that participants
trust the information and do not betray agreements about such facts.
This should not be interpreted as an exercise in developing consensus
about science, but instead an effort to bring the facts and knowledge of
science to the public to foster decision making based on science as well as
socioeconomic values.

There appeared to be no systematic joint fact-finding during the settlement
negotiations, although federal documentation was readily available to
participants. Since the settlement, individual groups and governmental
agencies have shared information. The basin-wide watershed approach could
be a framework for confirming information, gaps in information and
methodology for gathering new information necessary to make system-wide
decisions for resource management. The EIS process does provide
information and public review, but this a reactive process and does not
contribute the value of joint fact-finding.
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!

The planning process must succeed in developing trust between the
participants. A facilitator is often necessary to gain comfort in the
fairness of the process. The facilitator helps participants have a voice in
the process, fosters respects for participants’ values and interests, and
maintains focus on the mission of the watershed management process.
The facilitator may need to balance the power at the table by inviting
appropriate parties, make arrangements for technical assistance and
strategies for the organization and planning process. (In Section 4.3
above, there is further discussion of problems with the facilitated
negotiations that have been held to date.)

!

The watershed management process should develop a vision supported by
goals and policies and an action plan. The level of detail should match
the ability of the participants to agree in general and to reach common
ground on goals and policies. With the policy plan accepted and adopted
in some fashion, depending on the governing framework, strategic plans
can be developed to refine the policies and implement programs for
reaching the goals of the watershed management plan.

The Truckee-Carson settlement set forth goals for water supply to the
wetlands and tribal interests. However, the process did not produce a vision
for the entire basin. Individual group efforts vary in having a mission or
goals which serve as vision statements, and may be limited geographically in
their application.
!

A management entity might be created to monitor action programs, audit
performance and assess the level of success, and reconvene the policy
body if necessary to provide modifications and corrections for the plan.
The entity may act as a power broker and present a single representative
for a large region when funding requests are for state and federal funds.
The Truckee-Carson Coordination Office is restricted to a geographical
region and has limited responsibilities. TROA’s task is directed by the
settlement agreement and is likewise limited. There is no basin-wide
entity for a resource management process.

Watershed Management in the Settlement Agreement.—Watershed
management has not been implemented de facto on the Truckee-Carson
basins as a result of the Settlement although some have suggested that the
Settlement Agreement, TROA and even the Environmental Impact
Statements (EISs) address watershed management issues. This is true, but
only for instream flows in designated river segments and not the entire
watershed basin. TROA efforts address storage and timing, recreational
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pools and instream flows, and water quality. Water rights acquisition
programs have entailed review of water use rather comprehensively
throughout the Nevada portion of the basins. Other fragmented efforts
include the mitigation funds for stream enhancement directed to the upper
Truckee River, with competing and sometime conflicting management goals
for game and native fish.
A comprehensive, ecosystem-based watershed management planning process
might have been useful in the Settlement Agreement, but to what extent
would have been determined by the time constraints at that time. If time
constraints were not restrictive, the watershed management process as
described above and based on the guiding principle of consensus decisionmaking, may have been useful to address each river segment and its
individual interests. A conflict resolution process using focused issue
sessions or other consensus building solutions may have been able to better
address some of the divisions of interests and feelings of exclusion that arose
on the part of some parties to the settlement process (see, e.g., Section 4.3
above).
The issues and concerns that contributed to them might have benefitted from
the respect given them in the planning process as well as the need to find
solutions so the whole process could move forward. This takes time and
requires incremental decision making rather than a forced majority vote.
The negotiated settlement efforts raised issues associated with watershed
management, but not within an entirely successful collaborative and
consensual framework. This had the unfortunate result that the process is
suspect in some eyes, and weighted with a sense of betrayal, lack of trust,
feelings of being left out due to the exercise of political power, and perception
that values and opinions are so entrenched as to be barriers to an effective
planning process. Whether a comprehensive watershed management could
have overcome the barriers to trust and cooperation that the settlement
negotiations experienced is open to question.
Key players in the Settlement Agreement and its implementation disagree
about the value of implementing a watershed management program. Some
suggest that it may make sense to bound federal implementation actions
based on evidence that the native fish would suffer no adverse effects. A
watershed management process undertaken now might give stakeholders a
chance to develop local partnerships, participate in joint fact finding and
explore all avenues thoroughly. With the Settlement Agreement and TROA
in place as a management scheme, there might be sufficient motivation to
solve the remaining issues guided by the watershed principles iterated above.
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Others suggest that any effort at watershed management planning is a waste
of time and, in fact, a tactic to derail the Settlement Agreement’s
implementation. These sentiments in part reflect the difficulties which the
settlement process itself has encountered to date. This effort has left
participants with opinions about the watershed approach. However, each
constituent to the settlement and TROA process offer solutions that indeed
represent the principles of watershed or integrated resource planning. As
noted above, one of the individuals involved in implementing the Settlement
Agreement, observed the need for a more inclusive and comprehensive
implementation program to improve and coordinate management actions for
the agreement.
Those involved in watershed management elsewhere would recognize the
themes expressed above regarding the strength and weaknesses of
watershed planning. It is not that watershed planning or indeed land use
planning were inadequate in the Truckee-Carson, but rather a question of
using these tools to their full extent. Following are a few guiding principles
for conducting such a process to solve water resource problems:
!

Local Partnerships and Federal and State Incentives: Planners
need to balance local actions and management with partnerships and
incentives provided by federal and state programs. Control and command
and “we know best” approaches by well-meaning governmental and nongovernmental organizations leaves out the interested parties at the local
level who need to feel that they can have some control and responsibility
in the solutions. This principle recognizes that sometimes the
implementation of law or regulations may be the motivation for local
interests to begin to address the problem. However, it is clear that
without agreement and acceptance of the problem, there will be little
cooperation in joint problem solving.

!

Consensus versus Power by Majority: Power politics may be tempting,
but for long term, durable resource management programs, all those who
have a stake in the success of resource management need to accept if not
support the program. Watershed planning and management creates
opportunities to build consensus among potential adversaries, including
tribes, farmers, environmental interests, resource managers, resource
users, and landowners. The consensus process emphasis is on
recognizing concerns of others and finding acceptable, creative and
sustainable solutions with the fair distribution of burden. Defining the
terms “acceptable, sustainable and fair distribution” is an avenue to
reaching an understanding of the fears and concerns and forming
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alliances for meeting those concerns. Again it should be stressed that the
motivation for problem-solving is usually because the status quo is worse
and there is expectation that solutions may be more palatable.
!

Flexibility and Trust: There must be local “ownership” in the concept
of watershed conservation; a program promulgated and imposed by the
federal or state governments will not be likely to be well-received.
Confronted with the need for new tools, government can learn to be more
flexible and custom-design solutions for each situation. Government
funding and incentives are fundamental to giving local people a sense of
responsibility for seeking change. Brokers who establish partnerships
for balanced watershed management need to be trusted. Credible and
trusted organizations are often non-governmental (NGOs) and should be
considered by the government for a significant role in resource
management.

!

Stakeholders: The term “stakeholder” conveys a sense of having a share
in the resource and its management. Determining who has a stake in the
long-term management of a given watershed is an inclusive process and
will involve people not usually associated with water resources.
Gathering all the parties to the table means all issues are likely to be
exposed, and solutions and burdens have a greater chance of fair
distribution. The most contentious player may begrudge those who are
less directly involved in resource management, but water resources are
more than an extractive resource—they are also a sustainable element
for the economic and environmental well being of the region.

!

More is Better: The more people involved in watershed management,
the better chance the programs will survive and succeed with changing
political and economic pressures. Reliance on education, volunteers and
participatory activities increases the overall constituency for long-term
watershed management.

!

Paying versus Incentives: There isn’t enough money in the federal and
state treasuries to buy watershed management strategies. More
innovative cost sharing including those costs associated with regulation
need to be considered. Incentive programs that foster responsibility and
participation may encourage desirable behavior at all levels and increase
partnerships.

!

The Role of Science: Watershed management should be based on
sound science. Science by its definition never has all the answers and
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shouldn’t be expected to supply all the answers before planning and
actions are implemented. Scientific principles should prevail in decision
making. To avoid using science as a weapon, the watershed management
process should initiate a joint fact-finding process to assure all
stakeholders are making decisions with information they trust. This
principle challenges the scientific community to communicate effectively
and clearly with the parties to the watershed management process. Such
a process acts as insurance against future charges of “poor” science.
!

Leadership: Leadership is the key ingredient for the time consuming
and lengthy consensus process to develop a watershed management plan.
Leaders are people who are adept at looking at a process, identifying
potential bumps in the road and providing strategies to stay on the path
to the destination. Leadership should not be confused with control but
should be recognized for keeping the consensus process going and for all
parties to feel included including having their ideas represented in the
management plan.

The question has also been raised as to what extent a basin-wide commission
would be useful in furthering solutions for critical water problems. Because
each federal agency in the Truckee-Carson Water Basin has a constituency,
some of those affected by the settlement might wish to establish a new entity
which would help address perceptions that the federal government has been
biased and has not provided a fair forum for consensus decision making.
Consideration might be given to having the Council of Environmental Quality
(CEQ) organize, fund and lead a comprehensive resource management
program. Another agency with experience in region-wide resource
management and not party to the settlement negotiations is the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). This agency has considerable
experience in organizing and development comprehensive conservation
management plans involving all sectors. However, both these candidates
are federal agencies themselves, and would seem only to exacerbate questions of the federal role and voice (see Section 4.3 for further discussion).
A basinwide commission, if implemented, should adopt resource management as its mission, and not focus narrowly on settling claims. The process
should not be less than five years, at the end of which would be a consensus
document for resource management. All sectors would have interest problems identified and addressed based on status and trends reports developed
by technical advisory committees with each sector having representation.
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Local Watershed Initiatives
Local watershed groups play an important role in the issues of the TruckeeCarson basins. Although the groups have disparate interests and goals, they
have taken the initiative to gather information and to focus on issues
affecting their segment of or interests in the basin. These initiatives sharpen
the issues and are a catalyst for others who may be affected by management
actions for the settlement, but want to part of the group so that their
interests are represented. The stakeholder groups include state and federal
resource managers, local land use authorities, landowners, Native American
Indians, agriculturalists, anglers, the academic community, environmental
and community interests, water and power purveyors, recreationists, timber
harvest interests, urban and municipal interests, and building industry and
development interests.
The local watershed groups involve many of the listed stakeholders but not
all. Some of the people involved in the settlement agreements or required to
implement the agreements believe that only people with direct of use or
vested right to the resource are legitimate stakeholders, and that
participation should be limited to that criteria. Others believe that the
success of the implementation of the agreements is dependent upon being
inclusive especially for those not directly affected and yet whose activities
indirectly influence the implementation of the agreements. These include the
Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management and other state and municipal
public lands as well as private lands adjacent to management areas.
There are both formal organizations and informal groups in the TruckeeCarson whose purposes and missions partially meet watershed management
programs requirements. The following is a brief general inventory:
Truckee River Watershed Protection Project.—EPA initiated the Truckee
River Strategy for watershed planning to end litigation. EPA coordinates
various program activities and agencies to focus restoration efforts on the
Truckee River Strategy. In particular, EPA provides grant assistance to
Native American tribes to assess problems, develop water quality models,
and implement both nonpoint and point source controls. The existing
stakeholders could be expanded to include the Newlands Project/Churchill
County interests, Fallon Tribe and Washoe County Water Conservancy to
address water supply issues, effluent from the Truckee Meadows and water
quality concerns. This group is not regarded as a leader of a watershed
initiative because not all stakeholders are at the table. The group is
perceived as another federal effort to implement its will on others and it
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would not be prudent to try to reconstitute the Strategy for a comprehensive
watershed management process.
Lower Truckee Restoration Project .—P.L. 101-618 directs the Secretary of
the Army, in consultation with the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe, State of
Nevada, Environmental Protection Agency, Secretary of the Interior and
other interested parties, to study the rehabilitation of the lower Truckee
River for the benefit of Pyramid Lake fisheries.
In addition, Washoe County is attempting to restore Steamboat Creek to
improve water quality in the creek and in Truckee River. A group exists to
focus on Steamboat Creek and to identify its role, propose solutions for
restoration and help define water needs.
Lahontan Valley Environmental Alliance.—This group has a Board of
Directors and is funded. The Alliance is considered a “stakeholder” group
with all entities engaged in discussions, planning and development. The
group has no statutory or legal authority but its recommendations are being
heeded by some entities. The formation of this group was in reaction to the
Settlement Agreement. While it would be a valuable participant in a
watershed management process, it could not take a leadership role because
of its perceived interests.
Truckee River Operating Agreement Committee.—TROA is seen as a
watershed initiative although its project area is limited and it addresses a
narrow range of issues. The TROA Committee has been suggested by some
key players to be a lead for a watershed management process. The TROA
Committee would have to expand its jurisdiction to include the basin
watershed and would have to expand its stakeholder members. TROA’s
leadership would have to be evaluated for its acceptability by others and in
the event such acceptability does not exist, it should be considered a
“stakeholder” participant because of its authority as well as to share its
knowledge and experience in implementing the agreement.
Upper Carson River Watershed Plan.—The Carson Valley Conservation
District is the lead in Douglas County to prepare a management plan.
Federal and state agencies, water agencies, affected parties in Fallon,
environmentalists, farmers, ranchers, landowners, recreationists, anglers
and hikers meet every other month to identify problems and to find solutions.
The first product of this group was a report titled, “Upper Carson River
Management Plan” (issued August 1996) which makes findings on the
watershed issues, identifies the need for implementation of Best
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Management Practices (BMPs), and provides a history of the natural
resources and the existing environment, a complete list of the permitting
process and general funding sources available for watershed projects.
Although the Conservation District is applying fundamental principles of
watershed management process, the District is regarded as too regional and
not representative of other interests. This group is experienced in the
information gathering and interest driven process and would contribute to a
basin-wide program.
Middle Carson River Coordinated Resource Management Group.—The
Coordinated Resource Management Group is tasked with identifying
problems and solutions for the Middle Carson River and seeks agency
technical help in its efforts. It is made up of landowners along the river, with
limited involvement from the governmental agencies, and concerned citizens.
This group is similar to the Alliance and would not be regarded as a leader of
a comprehensive watershed management program for the same reasons.
Evaluation of Local Watershed Initiatives.—Watershed groups consist of a
variety of types: from ad hoc associations of landowners and concerned
people who initiated an effort to advise decision-makers on actions which
directly affect them to more formal, regionally based groups consisting of
governmental and non-governmental organizations, with broad
representation of affected people within a watershed.
Watershed groups define problems and solutions from single issues to the
broad spectrum of comprehensive watershed elements. Whether focusing on
parochial or regional interest, they do so without land use planning
approaches because of the lack of confidence in land use planning or a strong
philosophical aversion to regional and regulatory land use authority.
In the Truckee-Carson basins, local watershed initiatives have not
historically been an important component of the negotiations leading toward
the Settlement Agreement and its implementation. The extent to which they
can or should be integrated with and contribute resolution of basin-wide
problems is open to question.
The local watershed groups and initiatives are approaching resource
management with a list of limited issues and fragmented segments of the
watershed. However, the groups have developed working relationship among
and between themselves and federal agencies. The level of information and
scope of planning areas varies, but is a basis for confirming such gathered
information in a comprehensive resource management planning effort. Local
257

Truckee-Carson River Basin Study

watershed groups or initiatives should be represented in and share
information and possible solutions for any basin-wide management plan.
Land Management Planning
Current land use planning and management in the Truckee-Carson basins,
as everywhere, affects property in which individuals have an interest. Their
ownership and other interests are held as sacred individual rights and
infringement upon these rights is considered threatening. This was not
always the case. The settlers of the American colonies brought European
traditions, values and laws to the new land as is , such the establishment of
communities with town squares providing common land for all. By the late
19th century, much of the sense of community good had evaporated with the
wealth and competition generated by successful land development and
industry. Cities jammed housing together lacking a common square or park
and adjacent to factories. Farmland conversion enabled cities to grow to
accommodate rapid population growth relying on the notion there was always
more farmland to the west.
Around the turn of century, the public conscience took a turn toward reform
and social justice. During this century, land use regulation developed from
health and safety concerns addressing how housing should be built and how
activities affecting neighborhoods and communities should be located.
Zoning regulations set standards for structures so that there is adequate
space for light and air and sufficient distance from noisy, smelly and noxious
activities. These early zoning regulations addressed the most egregious
incompatible and unhealthy development, while concepts of beautiful cities
were the province of public works, public land use or barons willing to fund
beneficial projects.
Patterns of land use after World War II emphasized suburban development
providing communities with individual amenities of house and yard, without
the common pool of land and land use associated with the colonies. The
perceived mistakes of the uncontrolled sprawl development of the 1940s and
50s became apparent to the social activists generation of the 60s, spawning
the advent of serious planning and environmental controls.
Driven by concerns for public health and safety and quality of life, Congress
and state legislatures passed laws for clean water, clean air, environmental
assessment, regional land use (mostly coastal protection) and endangered
species. In general, people believed that land is an exhaustive resource, not
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just a commodity, and is essential to the economy, environment and general
well-being of the community.
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive . . .. The values it
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is
within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well
as carefully patrolled. [Justice William O. Douglas, state in Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
The police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy
places; it is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the
blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.
Justice Douglas, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974)
As the consequences of implementing these expanded laws and regulations
began to affect people's activities, resistance grew and the good intentions of
rational land use for environmental goals were challenged. In many sections
of the country but especially in the West, land use planning is depicted as a
governmental scheme to deny the use of vested property rights.

Regional Land Management Planning in the Truckee-Carson Basin.—Although
there are regional and statewide land use Planning programs, such as the
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, neither California nor Nevada have a state
master plan nor adequate programs for land management.
Comprehensive land management planning for the implementation of the
negotiated agreements in the basins is recognized by almost all entities as a
necessity for coping with increasing demand on land and water and its effect
on development, agriculture and the environment. The conundrum for people
is how to reconcile commonly held values of clean water, environ-mental
values of open space and wildlife, the quality of life including housing, jobs
and modern amenities and the closely held belief in vested rights.
As described in greater detail below, the LESA process is facilitating
decisions for lands more suitable for selling water rights and thus undergoing
a land use conversion. The LESA process is agriculturally based although it
has been modified to accommodate wetland values. But other land uses are
used for criteria to assess agricultural land conversion and not for its
suitability for other uses. In concept, LESA demonstrates that resource
management is acceptable to most, signifying a comprehensive land
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management system may be used to facilitate and improve implementation of
environmental laws and in particular, negotiated agreements.
Key person interviews showed that overall resource management process is
regarded favorably in the Truckee-Carson basin but implementation through
land management is not regard highly. Several caveats render the process
ineffectual. The smaller the planning area, the more likely people would
participate in a resource management effort. The smaller area would limit
the stakeholders which has the advantage of not having to address all issues
directly and indirectly related to the management needs of the area. The
disadvantage is perpetuating the parochial geographical interests and
limiting the potential solutions that might otherwise be available within a
larger planning area. Other caveats include the standard of participation
which some have suggested excludes those without existing water rights.
This restriction limits the issues to be addressed and again the potential
array of solutions. And finally, while resource management is endorsed by
many, the necessary land restrictions through land management are
resented.
Defining the mission for a land management plan is essential. It may be
possible to involve all parties in a watershed resource management planning
process where the goals are ecosystem restoration, water use efficiency and
conservation, water supply and quality and reduction of flood threats. The
goals would have to refined with policies to help define restoration targets
and performance expectations, best management practices for water use and
water quality, assurance criteria or long-term reliable water supply, and
expected effective flood management. To implement the subsequent goals
and polices requires planing tools to ensure durable land use designations
based on the resource management needs.
Implementing Land Management.—Truckee-Carson basin land management
would involve the planning process and public participation, developing a
vision or the planning area, identifying issues, and in addition, must include
the following:
!

Map, for purposes of environmental constraints and not just jurisdiction,
and describe watershed lands, resources and natural habitats.

!

Describe the current condition of the land and resources. (e.g., an
inventory of wetland and riparian vegetation and a description of the
general health of such vegetation, any known species habitat, description

260

Critical Issues: Case Study Discussion

of habitat linkages for biodiversity, known or suspected historic sites and
other resources).
!

Describe and map the extent of the panning area (e.g., the affected
reaches of a river system and the area’s natural history, function, use,
value and extent of the effects of human activity).

!

Describe existing scenic resources.

!

Describe relevant acts, plans, policies, programs and regulations that
may affect the area and its resources.

!

Analyze carrying capacity to identify potential cumulative impacts to
watershed lands and resources and to establish the appropriate uses and
limitations on those uses within an affected area such as a ecological
landscape region, watershed or riverine system. (e.g. a discussion of the
watershed functions and values).

!

Prepare background reports on the physical, social and economic
characteristics of the planning area.

The Natural Resources Conservation Service comments, with respect to the
above, that “many of the inventories suggested are currently completed and
available. NRCS has completed soils surveys and conservation plans on
much of the privately owned land in the United States, and much of the land
in the Truckee-Carson Basin. In addition, a great deal of the public land has
completed soils surveys, including all the lands within the Truckee-Carson
Basins in Nevada. TCID and Reclamation have extensive information
concerning the Newlands Project, county and state governments have a great
deal of information concerning infrastructure, water use, water needs, land
use, and other resources. Numerous other land management agencies within
Interior have extensive databases of information, as well as local and state
agencies, and private sources. There is probably little need for more data
collection, but rather a greater need for compilation of available information.”
Action plans would be needed to implement the plan elements. The following
are planning tools useful for implementation:
!

Adoption of Planning Documents and Zoning Standards: These
planning documents are subject to change by the decision making body
and are often considered as long lasting as the next election.

261

Truckee-Carson River Basin Study

!

Transfer of Development Rights: Individual landowners can enter
into negotiations whereby the owner (sender) of open space, or habitat
land sells or transfers “development credits” to a landowner-developer
(receiver) wishing to increase the density on a developable parcel. This
approach requires comprehensive land plans to identify sender sites,
reserved sites and receiver sites. Separate land banking accounts may be
necessary.

!

Multiple-Owner Specific Plan (Open Space Land Dedication
Financed by Open Space Assessments or Impact Fees): Through a
specific plan or area plan process, protection costs are spread over all
landowners in the plan area, and are financed by land-secured debt or
benefit area fees, giving smaller landowners the benefit of a large-scale
specific plan.

!

Land Readjustment Through Joint Venture Partnerships: Under a
land readjustment program, multiple landowners transfer their
properties into a single entity in exchange for a proportionate interest in
the entity.

Because within the Truckee-Carson Water Basin there has been such fierce
fighting about water, and because the latest steps toward settlement
changed nearly a century of agricultural practice and arrangements, it would
seem necessary to have a legislative charter to establish a comprehensive
land management system. The charter would need to clearly define its
purpose, the process and guiding principles or rules of the game. An example
of such a charter is given in the Tahoe Compact.
An existing entity which could take a leadership role is the TROA
Committee, although it would have to be expanded for basinwide coverage,
its purpose expanded to be more than water distribution, and all
stakeholders representing interest throughout the basin and affected by
watershed management and land use planning.
If comprehensive land use were initiated, planning could be applied to
address concerns about water being bought for urban uses. The planning
process could help define a secure, planned commitment to agriculture in the
basins, within the constraints of the overall system, including tribal trust
responsibilities and environmental goals. It can build local partnerships,
identify all the issues, involve the public, develop comprehensive background
reports, and support constraints and opportunities mapping based on
physical criteria of soil, water, infrastructure and land form.
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Up-front land use planning is seen by many to make sense, but current
planning seems to be disconnected from the realities of the land. Most
participants in the process encourage the adoption of physical standards, but
some were concerned that stakeholders would not be part of the decision
making for establishing standards.
Land use planning and management is the preferred alterative to litigation,
but there is frustration about the local planning process which seems driven
by politics and growth pressures. The repeating process of master planning
an area and then amending the plan or worse ignoring the plan to
accommodate immediate market needs of development is a barrier to full
participation and acceptance of land use planning.
Land management can be a prudent and fair approach to address competing
demands for resources. The process of planning is preferred over litigation
by being an inclusive process with consensus decision making. But the
implementation of the plan is often viewed as flawed and unreliable. A key
problem is lack of planners involvement in resource management initiatives.
Land use planners are often not employed by resource agencies where this
type of project is initiated. They are aware of more creative ways to get
things accomplished, rather than relying on acquisition as do so many in the
land management field.
Land Evaluation and Site Assessment (LESA)
The LESA system is a tool developed by the Natural Resource Conservation
Service to implement the Farmland Protection Policy Act of 1981 (Public law
97-98). LESA provides systematic and objective ratings of the agricultural
suitability of land as compared to other uses. It uses soils soil and assessment of soils capability and productivity together with a social and economic
site assessment to create a comprehensive planning tool. It has been
suggested as a means to focus agricultural use in the Newlands Project areas
under the pressure of water rights acquisition and transfers, to preserve the
most productive areas and focus acquisition on more marginal lands.
The land evaluation (or LE) is a process to rate soils to a specific parcel for
agricultural use. A relative value is determined for each soil type. In practice
the LE relies on the land capacity classifications, important farmlands
classifications, soil productivity ratings, or soil potential ratings. The site
assessment (SA) component of LESA scores the site for attributes such as
parcel size, relationship with nearby land uses, land-use regulations, farmuse taxation status, impacts of proposed use, compatibility with local
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comprehensive or general plans, and proximity to urban areas. The scoring
of the parcel based on the LE and SA ratings indicate the parcel's relative
agricultural value.
LESA is considered a land use-planning tool for agriculture. Too often the
land use planning process sets goals and objectives, including standards, for
open space, residential development, highway alignments and public services,
and uses agriculture lands as reserve lands without regard for the
capabilities and productivity of the agriculture. LESA is intended to identify
the best land in the most valuable agricultural regions, allowing local
government to direct development to non productive or less productive lands
and areas avoiding adverse impacts to agriculture.
Land Evaluation.—In evaluating land for crop production, soils are rated by
one or all of three systems listed above.
Land Capability Classification: The U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) uses land capability classification system for classifying soils
according to potential for field crops or pasture. Eight classes and four
subclasses indicate the limitations of each type of soil. This system is the
most widely used land rating scheme in farmland protection. The soils are
classes according to their limitations when they are used for field crops, the
risk of damage when they are used, and the way they respond to treatment.
Important Farmland Identification: Important farmland identification is
a USDA rating system that places land in one of four groups: prime
farmland, unique farmland, land of statewide importance, and land of local
importance. Prime farmland is land that has the best combination of physical
and chemical characteristics for producing food, feed, forage, fiber, and
oilseed crops and is also available for these uses. It has the soil quality,
growing season, and moisture supply needed to economically produce
sustained high yields of crops when treated and managed, including water
management, according to acceptable farming methods.
Unique farmland other than prime farmland is used for the production of
high-value food and fiber crops. Examples of such crops are citrus, tree nuts,
olives, fruit, and vegetables.
Additional farmland of statewide importance is land, in addition to prime and
unique farmlands, that is of statewide importance for the production of food,
feed, fiber, forage, and oilseed crops. Criteria for defining and delineating
this land are to be determined in the appropriate state agency or agencies.
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Additional farmland of local importance, where appropriate, are identified by
the local agency or agencies concerned.
Soil Productivity: Soil productivity is the capability of a soil to produce a
specified plant or sequence of plants under a physically defined set of
management practices. This determination is more an economic than a soil
science concept.
Soil Potential: Soil potential ratings are classes that indicate the relative
quality of a soil, compared with other soils in the area, for a particular crop.
Site Assessment.—The site assessment portion of LESA is designed to rate
factors other than the soils and overall agricultural productivity of the land.
Site assessment involves the human influence on the land, such as the
proximity of the land to urban centers and the amount of on-farm
investments.
The site assessment is designed by the state or local land use permitting
government. The types of factors that may be included in site assessment
include the following:
!

Percentage of land in urban use within a few miles of the proposed site,
as well as the percent of land in urban use adjacent to the site, and the
distance of the site from an urban area.

!

The percentage of the site that has been farmed in the past few years.

!

The extent to which the site is protected by state and local farmland
protection policies and programs.

!

The size of the farm containing the site, as compared to the average farm
size in the county.

!

The extent to which the conversion of the proposed site causes the
conversion of other farmland to non-farm uses.

!

The extent to which agricultural support services exist in the area, and
whether the conversion of the proposed site would reduce the demand for
such services.

!

The extent to which on farm investments have been made and
maintained.
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!

The extent to which the proposed land use is compatible with agricultural
uses in the area.

The maximum scores for each factor are assigned according to the importance
of the factor.
LESA's use of technical information is combined with information associated
with land use planning to provide a mechanism by which as much
information as possible can be gathered about a site and its surroundings
before taking any actions to change the existing land use.
LESA Applied to Land Acquisition for Agreement Water.—The Natural
Resource Conservation Service (NRCS) modified the standard LA evaluation
criteria to evaluate lands subject to water purchase program pursuant to the
Settlement Agreement. The LESA team was led by NRCS and consisted of
representatives of the Bureau of Reclamation, Agricultural Extension
Service, the Navy, Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribe, Nevada State Lands, City
of Fallon, Churchill County, Truckee-Carson Irrigation District, Lahontan
and Still Water Conservation Districts, The Nature Conservancy, Lahontan
Valley Alliance, and Newlands Protective Association. Invited but not
participating were the Farm Bureau and the Fish and Wildlife Service (the
latter attended some meetings toward the end of the process).
The team developed the SA to provide an objective criteria for the water
rights purchase program. The custom-designed criteria takes into account
the value of wetlands, which in many instances are adjacent to prime
farmland. LESA ordinarily would evaluate the wetlands as open space
contiguous to prime farmlands resulting in a high score for the farmland thus
not suitable for "conversion" or sale of water. By modifying the criteria the
farmlands near wetlands received a lower score based on the water use
efficiencies.
This modified LESA has been adopted by Churchill County planning and can
be used by the FWS as a base map for identifying opportunities for
conversion. The FWS claims not to have an ability to target purchase (which
appears contrary to Section 207(c)(2)(B) of the Settlement Act) and so has
resisted using the LESA map to identify potential willing sellers. Currently
the only agency subjected to the restrictions of LESA scoring is the FWS,
which feels this is inequitable application of a planning tool that should be
required for others seeking to convert agricultural land.
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Future Uses For LESA.—LESA is similar to a land based opportunities and
constraints analysis used by planners (see McHarg, Design With Nature)
County planners are using the parcel scoring for land use determinations for
future growth. This experience is instructive for land management whose
objectives are efficient resource management. The base map depicts the
most suitable soils for agriculture thus directing urban development away
from these sites. With modification, LESA can incorporate wetland and
other habitat factors into the rating system to define land use designations
for urban development, open space, agricultural lands, wildlife habitat, flood
plains, forest lands, and mineral resources.
LESA could be used aggressively to focus irrigation on the most efficient
canals, best soils, and most productive farmers, shrinking it to a tight core
while using land swaps to trade outliers back into the center. Leadership for
this approach should be by the Natural Resource Conservation Service which
is a trusted agency experienced in the land evaluation process. The cost of
this endeavor could be funded through a water transfer fee at the time of
water right acquisition as well as real estate transfer tax. However, these
funding mechanism should be developed in the overall process.
Carrying Capacity
It is easy, in following the consuming story of the Truckee-Carson River
Basin water conflicts and settlements, to lose sight of the rather elemental
overarching goal of all this activity, which is simply to adjust human use
pressure to the capacity of the resource. Do the negotiated agreements and
water adjudications well prepare the basins to live within their long-term
carrying capacity for water?
As was noted in the Phase I report, carrying capacity considers the ability of
a resource to sustain a given level of use, in good condition, in perpetuity.
Obviously, under such a definition, the capacity of water to sustain use in the
Truckee-Carson basins while remaining in good quality (and maintaining
associated resources in good quality) has been a fundamental driving factor
which has motivated Interior, the Tribe, the irrigators and Sierra Pacific
(among others) to pursue their various agendas over the past decades. In
essence, water-related problems in the Truckee-Carson Basins arise from
exceeding carrying capacity with respect to this critical, limiting resource.
With Nevada growing at an unprecedented rate (4% to 5% annually) and
heavy urban growth in the Truckee Meadows, the long-term sufficiency of
basin resources to meet water demands is a key objective addressed by

267

Truckee-Carson River Basin Study

TROA and the other agreements and actions that are being undertaken to
implement the negotiated settlement.
Once carrying capacity is reached, the key question is no longer resource
development, but reallocation, a fact with which the Truckee-Carson Basin
has been grappling for some years now. This situation is characteristic of
water throughout the West today. However, “carrying capacity” with respect
to total demand on a resource is far from a final, static answer so long as
means exist to move the resource from one use to another. Viewed from the
perspective of economics, this leads to discussion of water markets and the
ability of the resource to move from lower value uses to higher value ones.
This also raises the question of whether so-called “lower-value” uses are in
fact of such low value or whether subsidies have kept the price artificially
low.
Many of those involved in the settlement negotiations over the past decade
made similar comments with regard to carrying capacity. They feel that the
period of growth covered by TROA is about as far as water can be pushed to
serve the competing demands in the Truckee-Carson basins. Limits and
constraints are perceived to be very real. TROA is planned to accommodate a
certain amount of water supply growth in Truckee Meadows and, after that
is reached, it is not clear where additional water would come from. Irrigated
agriculture continues to consume a large proportion of the Truckee-Carson
basins’ water supplies and can look forward to continued pressure in
competition for that water so long as the economics involved favor the use of
water in other ways.
In a way, TROA serves as a growth plan, and perhaps one lesson to be taken
here is that more attention might be given to careful documentation of the
growth projections upon which it is based. Not just the future that is likely
to be experienced should be considered, but also the future that is desired. In
general, the long-term questions of planning for growth and accommodating
the carrying capacity of the resource are not directly addressed by the process
that has gone on over the past decade. It would be well for future
generations and the long-term economic and environmental health of the
Truckee-Carson basins that they be more explicitly addressed, both here and
throughout western water policy.
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